Summary
A statement that a party does not know a fact is governed by the statutory text presuming that the fact is disputed.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Defendant B answered that he did not know the fact, while plaintiff A invokes that statement as one admitting it. In this scene the meaning of the defense is reversed in an instant. The moment a failure to know is recast as an admission, the meaning of the defense is turned upside down. The deemed treatment of a fact not clearly contested and the exception under which it is deemed contested in light of the oral argument as a whole are to be read together. The question this scene aims at is narrow: whether pleading ignorance is the same operation as the finding of facts, and on what standard the channel of this remedy opens. In a lawsuit, the finding of facts is an operation of confirming facts through evidence and examination, whereas pleading ignorance is the attitude of statement at the stage preceding it. If the two are placed on the same footing, a single word at the time of the reply would come to determine the facts of the trial in their entirety. This question must therefore begin with fixing the meaning of the statement.
Article 150 paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act supplies the statutory text for this question directly. The Article provides that where a party has stated that the party does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party, that fact is presumed to have been contested (Civil Procedure Act Article 150). The subject governed by this wording is the party confronting the opposing party's assertion; the act is the statement that the party does not know; and the condition is that the statement is directed to a fact asserted by the opposing party. The effect produced by the wording is not to fix the truth of the fact, but to presume the existence of a contest. Thus this provision fixes the direction of proof without fixing the content of the fact as well. Here, pleading ignorance—that is, a statement that one does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party—takes its place as one form of defense, in contrast to confession. The confession and revocation of confession dealt with by the other paragraphs of the Article are not resolved at this point.
This basis and the standard of decision are interlocked. The presumption of contest creates the position in which the proof procedure begins, and the finding of facts is the result that follows once that position is filled. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is simple: if, at the earlier stage, pleading ignorance is read as a confession, the opportunity for proof at the later stage disappears altogether. The standard on which the channel of this remedy opens begins with reading the meaning of the statement properly. One distinguishes the requirements of confession, contest, and manifest fact, and where the statutory conditions for revocation of confession are met and this is reflected, the entrance to this remedy opens. The performance demanded means the content of the performance sought by the claim, and specification means setting out that content and the opposing party in the complaint so that they can be identified. Only reading these two levels apart, without adding conditions afresh, is the settled standard.
One can evade every fact through the word 'ignorance.' The loss targeted by this counterargument is concrete. If a party answers that he does not know a fact he in fact knows well, the opposing party must gather new evidence afresh, the trial schedule stretches out, and even facts that had seemed manifest return as matters of contention. The result is that a party's mistake or neglect ties up the trial, and this inconvenience directly touches the values of speed and economy in the lawsuit. Even so, pleading ignorance cannot be converted into a confession. This answer does not erase the disadvantage raised by the counterargument. The point that a late reply or an ambiguous attitude can in fact delay the trial is left as it stands. It is only that the course of reversing the meaning of the statement is not taken as a means of relieving that inconvenience. Unless the direction of the presumption prescribed by the statutory text is changed, there is no ground for replacing words of not knowing with words of knowing.
Only the facts relating to the synthetic scene are drawn out and compared with the conditions above. Defendant B answered that he did not know the fact, and plaintiff A invokes this statement as an admission. If the content of the statement is directed to the fact asserted by the opposing party and the context is clear, this statement is read not as a confession but as pleading ignorance. In that case, the statement of not knowing falls under the statutory provision that such a statement is presumed to have been contested, and the fact is accordingly placed within the scope of the contest (Civil Procedure Act Article 150). Conversely, where a confession validly remains and, the statutory requirements for revocation not being met, the channel for denying that fact again is blocked, the matter does not fall here. If the context of the statement or the very fact taken as the object of the confession is unclear, the determination remains undetermined. If it is confirmed that a statement of not knowing was recorded as an admission, the conclusion changes under the rule presuming that the fact was contested.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Pleading ignorance—that is, a statement that one does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party—ends with the presumption that the fact lies within the scope of the contest. On that statement alone the truth of the fact is not fixed, nor is the opposing party's assertion automatically adopted. The conclusion this section does not permit is broader. Reading words of not knowing as words of knowing—that is, as a confession—is not justified at this point. Pleading ignorance cannot be converted into a confession. The task of distinguishing facts determined without proof, and the side to which that binding effect belongs, becomes possible only after the meaning of the statement has first been read precisely. The standard operates only within the range in which the form of the reply is made an issue without distorting its meaning.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Within the current that reads together the deemed treatment of a fact not clearly contested and the exception under which it is deemed contested in light of the oral argument as a whole, what must be asked this time is what is reversed the moment those words are taken down. Here, is pleading ignorance the same as the finding of facts, and what are the conditions under which the remedy is barred? This question is aimed at how the mode of expressing a defense alters its legal effect.
The statutory text corresponding to this question is the following wording of Article 150 of the Civil Procedure Act: “②Where a party has stated that the party does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party, that fact is presumed to have been contested.” This wording fixes the subject as the party responding to the opposing party's assertion, the act as the statement that the party does not know that fact, and the condition as the fact that the statement was made. Once the statement was made, the effect of presuming that the fact was contested follows. The word 'ignorance' denotes the type of statement in this wording, and means a statement that one does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party.
Under this wording, the statement of not knowing follows the statutory rule that the fact is presumed to have been contested. Here, however, two stages must be distinguished. One is the effect of the presumption that follows from the mere fact that the statement was made; the other is whether that presumption has somehow been broken and a judicial confession validly remains. These two determinations cannot be mixed. The fact that the matter is read as a contest at the earlier stage does not make the confession disappear at the later stage; and where at the later stage the confession validly remains and, the statutory requirements for revocation not being met, the channel for denying that fact again is blocked, the channel of the remedy is closed.
Herein lies the reason that distinction must not be drawn too widely. The reproach that one can evade every fact through the word 'ignorance' carries with it the concern that it is unjust for a fact that differs from reality to tie up the trial through a party's mistake. If words offered in defense instead cause the statement to be read in reverse, that loss falls upon the party who spoke. The statement of not knowing remains a statement read as a contest and does not assume the guise of a statement of admission. Without erasing the inconvenience targeted by the counterargument, the boundary between these two is maintained as it stands.
What can be confirmed from the synthetic scene is how that boundary operates in the present question. So long as the statement answering that one does not know is not dragged over as a statement of admission, the framework of the presumption under the statutory text seen above holds. From this scene alone, however, one cannot determine cases in which the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of the confession is unclear.
What this section has confirmed is the narrow distinction that pleading ignorance is not the same as the finding of facts, and the direction of reading a fact as contested from the mere fact that the statement was made. This is not to say that every defense is secured by that one word, or conversely that any statement hardens into an admission. A determination is reached only within the boundary set out in the preceding paragraph; circumstances beyond it remain outside this point.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Taking only the conclusion that the preceding stage read together the deemed treatment of a fact not clearly contested and its exception, that argument is not unfolded again here. The question remaining now is whether the stage that takes statements placed within confession, contest, and deeming as the material for decision and the stage that cannot proceed to decision because the material itself has not even been identified belong to the same category. If the former, a determination must be made as to that fact; if the latter, the very object of the determination remains. If these two, whose names are similar, are mixed, even a defense whose meaning has been read by mistake is handled as though it had been accepted.
The provision that follows states: “②Where a party has stated that the party does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party, that fact is presumed to have been contested” (Civil Procedure Act Article 150). The subject of this wording is the party who made the statement as to the fact asserted by the opposing party; the act is the answering that the party does not know that fact; and the condition is that the answer was in fact given in the sense of not knowing. Here, pleading ignorance means a statement that one does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party, and this statement does not hold its place where the answer is given to a fact other than that fact, or where the records are one in which the context of the statement has been blurred. The Procedure as a whole, which the other paragraphs of the Article deal with, is not explained at this point.
Under the wording above, the statement of not knowing is presumed to have contested that fact; the fact therefore remains a matter requiring proof and does not drop out of the object of decision. This conclusion runs in the direction opposite to judicial confession, and this is why the two must be distinguished. Judicial confession requires no proof as to that fact and settles the decision, whereas pleading ignorance does not deny that fact but shows only the attitude of not knowing, leaving in place a position where proof is needed. And the undetermined matters this section separately addresses are different again. If the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of the confession is unclear, what the material for decision is cannot be identified, and the matter remains undistinguished—being left undetermined as distinct from inability. Inability here means the state of being unable to render a judgment as to whether that fact is true or false, whereas undetermined means the state of not even being able to discern what the material for decision is; the latter cannot stand in for the former on the ground that a determination on it has been deferred.
The counterargument that presses hardest asserts that one can evade every fact through the word 'ignorance.' In fact, if a party repeats answers of not knowing, the opposing party bears the burden of proof each time, the inconvenience and delay of a dragged-out lawsuit arise, and the reproach remains that the opposing party suffers loss owing to the speaking party's lack of memory. Moreover, it also feels unjust that a fact differing from reality ties up the trial through a party's mistake. The reason the statutory text above provides that a statement of not knowing is to be treated as a contest is not an intent to read that attitude as close to a confession so as to lighten the opposing party's burden of proof; on the contrary, it is to make clear that the attitude is not an admission. The delay and burden pointed out by the counterargument remain as consequences brought about by the structure of this provision, but that inconvenience cannot be urged to shake the distinction itself.
One fact in the synthetic scene bears on this question. If B's answer falls within pleading ignorance in that it is one of not knowing, then under the statutory text above that fact is presumed to have been contested, remains in the position where proof is needed, and A's handling of it, invoking the statement as a confession, runs contrary to this provision. Conversely, if B's answer is directed to a different fact, or if the context of the statement is blurred so that it cannot be identified as an answer to which fact, then from this scene alone the material for decision cannot be discerned and the matter remains undetermined. Even viewed this way, no route by which B's statement becomes a confession can be found within this scene. In what actual context B's statement was made cannot be determined from this scene.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Pleading ignorance in the form of not knowing is not a finding of fact, and the fact remains in the position where proof is needed without passing through confession. Matters as to which the material for decision is not identified, because the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of the confession is unclear, remain undetermined, being distinguished from the inability to render a judgment on that fact. Nor can one say that inability to obtain the remedy follows immediately for the mere reason that there is no material, nor are matters left undetermined handled as though the fact did not exist. To draw this distinction is not the work of splitting a short conclusion in two, but of preserving the order according to which it must first be settled which fact is to be taken as the object before one can speak of a judgment on that fact.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
In this scene, what the plaintiff seeks is not a fact established through proof, but the convenience that comes from treating the defendant's statement itself as an admission. Yet if the object and the context that this statement points to are unclear, at which stage that statement should be used as material is shaken as well. What is being asked now, therefore, is whether a statement pleading ignorance has the same character as a finding of fact. And to answer that, one must also determine which records must be opened and examined. This question is not one of assessing the reliability of the statement, but one of defining the scope of the records that may be used for the decision.
The provision of law corresponding to this question is Article 150, paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act (Civil Procedure Act, Article 150). The subject this provision addresses is the party who makes a statement concerning a fact asserted by the opposing party; the act is a statement that the party does not know; and the condition is that the statement is directed to the fact asserted by the opposing party. Its effect is fixed in the form of a presumption. Here, a presumption means that the party's statement creates a state in which proof of that fact is demanded anew. The text does not use any expression that elevates the statement to a determination of fact. Accordingly, looking at this paragraph alone, pleading ignorance is placed in a position different from a finding of fact.
The reason this difference must be distinguished is that the materials for the stage-by-stage decision change. Party statement protocols, answers, assertions of revocation of confession, and materials concerning error are all materials that remain in the records, and the decision is made solely on the basis of what is written in these records. The moment one fills in facts absent from the records by means of a presumption, the work of confirming what the statement of not knowing was directed to is omitted. The author's conclusion is plain. The stage-by-stage decision is made solely on the established records, and records that do not exist are not filled in by presumption. A confession is a statement that accepts the fact asserted by the opposing party as it stands, whereas pleading ignorance is a statement declaring that one does not know that fact. The two are exactly opposite in the direction of the statement, so moving one into the other amounts to changing the effect fixed by the text. Accordingly, the two are distinguished solely on the basis of the materials remaining in the records, and only then is the stage decided.
The loss aimed at by this counterargument is the inconvenience that arises where a defense is used as a pretext. For the plaintiff, if the opposing party continues to postpone the confirmation of facts by invoking memory or knowledge, even facts that are not in dispute are contested anew, and the attrition grows. It is also unjust for a wrong fact to tie up the trial owing to a mistake. What this answer safeguards is the requirement of a confession, and it prevents the danger of recording as accepted a fact that the declarant did not accept. The attrition pointed out by the counterargument is something to be reduced, not a ground for inverting the meaning of a statement. The loss that arises the moment the meaning of the defense is inverted is more direct than the attrition spoken of by the counterargument.
In this scene, only one fact is relevant to this question. When the party statement protocols, answers, assertions of revocation of confession, and materials concerning error, which are the materials in which this statement is recorded, are placed together, the range within which what the statement of not knowing was directed to can be confirmed from the records is determined. Whether, however, there are materials in the records that satisfy the statutory conditions for revocation of confession, and whether the context of that statement has been clarified, cannot be determined from this scene alone. They remain unverified, and yet the narrow conclusion already reached does not change. If the statement of not knowing has been recorded as an admission, the conclusion is revised in accordance with the rule deeming the fact contested. This merely indicates the conditions under which the records change; it does not move pleading ignorance into a confession.
The conclusion this section permits is that pleading ignorance and a finding of fact are distinguished, that the stage is decided solely on the established records, and that records that do not exist are not filled in by presumption. What it does not permit is the conclusion of adding context absent from the records and converting pleading ignorance into a confession. A state of insufficient materials is one of non-determination and is not immediately irremediable; it means that judgment can be set up anew to the extent the records are filled in. However, where a judicial confession validly remains and, the statutory requirements for revocation not being satisfied, the channel for denying that fact again is closed, the fact cannot be erased by a statement of not knowing alone.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Now, once it is confirmed that the direction of the records changes, attention turns to the situation in which the existing judgment must be discarded and the decision made anew from the beginning. At such a moment, when the direction of the records changes, it is necessary to ask again what the defense of pleading ignorance protects.
The provision of law sets that distinction from the outset. Article 150 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Where a party has stated, with respect to a fact asserted by the opposing party, that the party does not know, that fact shall be presumed to be contested." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 150) The subject spoken of here is the party confronted with the fact asserted by the opposing party; the act is a statement of not knowing that fact; and the condition is the case in which the fact asserted by the opposing party is specified and the statement is directed to that fact. Pleading ignorance is the name of a statement falling under this condition, and the issues governed by the other paragraphs of the provision are not the share of this sentence.
That text confers on pleading ignorance the legal effect of a presumption of contest, and the reason this effect is distinguished from a finding of fact is that the allocation of proof remains as it was. A fact presumed to be contested is not thereby a fact admitted as true, but returns to a fact requiring proof by the opposing party. Accordingly, the moment pleading ignorance is recorded as a confession, the burden of proof is reversed and the channel for disproving that fact is closed. Conversely, if it is recorded as a contest, the door to proof remains open. If it is confirmed that the direction of the records changes, the conclusion changes.
The reason narrowing this distinction is inconvenient is that a gap arises between substantive truth and the records. Where a party has lost memory or has misunderstood the object of the statement and answered by pleading ignorance, it is difficult to regard that statement as honestly reflecting the facts. Even so, because the weight of the trial shifts according to the direction of the records, room remains for the result to diverge from reality. The criticism that all facts can be evaded under the words of pleading ignorance is aimed at the indiscriminate abuse of pleading ignorance on the records, but the answer to it is not to heighten the effect of pleading ignorance but to read the direction of the statement correctly.
In the scene in which this question is posed, only the direction of Defendant B's statement is material for judgment. Then that fact returns beneath the contest and is placed in a state where proof is entrusted to the opposing party. Conversely, if the context of that statement, or the fact taken as the object of the confession, is unclear, the form of the finding of fact remains undetermined.
The range this question reaches is that the stage-by-stage decision can be corrected by reading the direction of the statement; it does not extend to establishing pleading ignorance itself as a true fact. Where a judicial confession validly remains and, the statutory requirements for revocation not being satisfied, the channel for denying that fact again is closed, the existing judgment on that part remains as it is. Is pleading ignorance the same as a finding of fact? The answer to that question is that it is not; the question of what change overturns the existing stage-by-stage decision corresponds to the case in which it is confirmed that the statement is recorded in the direction of a contest.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
If a fact asserted by the opposing party can be avoided by the words of pleading ignorance, what relation those words bear to a finding of fact is the question of this stage. Having read together the deeming that applies where there is no express denial and the exception for treating a matter as contested over the course of the oral argument as a whole, one must now ask about the limitations inherent in the words of pleading ignorance themselves. In the scene in which Defendant B answered that he does not know the fact and Plaintiff A invokes this as a statement admitting it, whether such invocation is permitted becomes the issue. Following the earlier question of whether pleading ignorance is the same as a finding of fact, it asks what follows if all facts can be evaded by the words of pleading ignorance.
To answer this question, the relevant text is first examined. Article 150, paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "(2) Where a party has stated, with respect to a fact asserted by the opposing party, that the party does not know, that fact shall be presumed to be contested." In this text, the subject is the party who makes a statement concerning a fact asserted by the opposing party; the act is a statement of not knowing; and the condition is the fact that such a statement was made. Here, pleading ignorance means a statement of not knowing a fact asserted by the opposing party. The text attaches to that statement only the legal effect of a presumption of "contest," and attaches no other effect. In this section, only this paragraph is addressed, and the requirements or effects prescribed by the other paragraphs of the provision are not explained here.
The effect attached by that text is a presumption of contest, and the conclusion of this section at this stage is that pleading ignorance cannot be converted into a confession. The two determinations lie at different stages. A confession is a statement admitting a fact asserted by the opposing party, while pleading ignorance is a statement of not knowing that fact. As in the foregoing question pleading ignorance was regarded as not the same as a finding of fact, so here too the two statements must be separated, because the text presumes only a contest in the case of pleading ignorance. Different rules apply to a statement recorded as an admission, whereas the presumption of contest applies to a record of a statement of not knowing. Converting this into an admission is an act of changing the effect attached by the text. Accordingly, after distinguishing the requirements for confession, contest, and manifest facts, the stage reflecting a case in which the statutory conditions for revocation of confession are satisfied, on the one hand, and the reading of pleading ignorance as a confession, on the other, must be judged separately.
That said, this distinction does not produce no inconvenience whatever. The strongest counterargument is that all facts can be evaded by the words of pleading ignorance. That counterargument aims at two kinds of loss. One is the inconvenience of a party who knows the fact feigning ignorance and delaying the proceedings; the other is the assessment that it is unjust for the trial to be tied up because the declarant has lost memory. A doubt does remain whether it is right to leave as they are the result of the lawsuit being delayed owing to a party's mistake when another fact is the truth. The answer to this, however, is that pleading ignorance cannot be converted into a confession. Even without denying the delay and injustice pointed out by the counterargument, to invert a statement of not knowing into a statement of admission on the ground of that inconvenience exceeds the range the text permits.
The conditions are compared solely on the facts placed in the synthetic scene. Defendant B answered that he does not know the fact, and Plaintiff A invokes this as a statement admitting it. That there was a statement of not knowing is confirmed in this scene, but neither the context of that statement nor what fact was taken as the object of the confession has been determined here. Accordingly, whether the plaintiff's invocation accords with the effect of the text cannot be determined. If it were confirmed that the statement of not knowing had been recorded as an admission, the conclusion might change under the rule deeming the fact contested; but this is merely altering one condition of the decision, and is not a fact that actually occurred. Where it is unclear which statement the party statement protocols, answers, assertions of revocation of confession, and materials concerning error remaining in the records refer to, it cannot even be judged whether this is a case in which the confession validly remains and, the statutory requirements for revocation not being satisfied, the channel for denying that fact again is closed. Where the context of the statement or the object of the confession is unclear, the conclusion must be left undetermined.
In summary, not every attempt to avoid a fact asserted by the opposing party is accepted merely because the words of pleading ignorance were used; yet neither can those words be read as an admission. What the text attaches to pleading ignorance is a presumption of contest, and the rules applicable to a confession are limited to the case where that statement has been admitted. This section does not determine what the facts, service, or performance results of an actual case may be, nor the year, amount, commencement date, or judgment results that do not appear in the synthetic scene. The conclusion this section permits is that pleading ignorance cannot be converted into a confession; the conclusion it does not permit is treating a statement of not knowing as it stands as a statement of admission.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
As set out in the preceding section, pleading ignorance cannot be converted into a confession. The question is what a statement of not knowing a fact urged by the opposing party should be treated as, in law. Is pleading ignorance the same as a finding of fact?
The text that answers this question lies in Article 150 of the Civil Procedure Act. It provides: "Where a party has stated, with respect to a fact asserted by the opposing party, that the party does not know, that fact shall be presumed to be contested." The subject this text addresses is the party confronted with the assertion of the opposing party; the act is a statement of not knowing that fact; and the condition is the case in which such a statement was made concerning a fact asserted by the opposing party. The effect this text attaches to that statement is to admit a contest by way of a presumption.
The direction indicated by this basis is plain. A statement of not knowing follows the provision presuming that the fact is contested. Accordingly, the words of pleading ignorance are settled not as a confession admitting a fact but as the posture of contesting that fact. A confession admits the fact and fixes it without separate proof, while a contest leaves that fact unfixed. The two create exactly opposite directions with respect to the same fact. The moment a pleading of ignorance, which carries the meaning of a defense, is changed into an admission, the meaning of the defense is inverted; maintaining this distinction is therefore the core.
Even so, if all facts can be evaded by the words of pleading ignorance, would not the defense be subject to abuse? This counterargument aims at loss. Where a fact different from reality is at issue and the trial is tied up because of a party's mistake, the opposing party must continue to bear the burden of proof and the inconvenience of delay. Even so, pleading ignorance cannot be converted into a confession. This text has fixed the effect of contest for a statement of not knowing, and if that fixed effect were inverted on the sole ground of a mistake, the distinction attached by the text would disappear. The inconvenience pointed out by the counterargument remains, but that inconvenience does not manufacture a confession.
As in the synthetic scene, Defendant B answered that he does not know the fact, and Plaintiff A invokes this as a statement admitting it. Contrasting this fact with the foregoing conditions, the content of the statement is that of not knowing, and the opposing party's invocation seeks to read it as an admission of fact. Since pleading ignorance means a statement of not knowing a fact asserted by the opposing party, the statement in this scene falls within pleading ignorance. Accordingly, it cannot be treated as a statement of admission and is placed in the direction of a presumption of contest. However, the parts where the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of the confession is unclear cannot be determined from this scene.
The line this section draws is this. A statement of not knowing is not an admission of fact but is presumed to contest that fact, and a judgment that converts pleading ignorance into a confession and turns it into a finding of fact is not permitted. Conversely, neither is it the conclusion of this section to treat as pleading ignorance a case in which nothing at all was said in response to the opposing party's assertion, or in which there was no express denial. To this extent is the range fixed for the manner in which a statement of pleading ignorance is distinguished from a finding of fact.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
This transition arises not from a change in the content of the statement but from reading the direction of the defense in reverse. Since the preceding stage has already addressed the distinction between ignorance and admission of fact, this stage asks how far that distinction opens and closes the door to relief. If the neighboring sections deal respectively with no response, evident facts, and revocation of confession, this question goes no further than fixing the place occupied by a single statement of not knowing.
The provision in question is short. Article 150 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Where a party states that the party does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party, that fact shall be presumed to have been contested." The subject to which this text refers is the party responding to the fact asserted by the opposing party, and the act is a statement that the party does not know that fact. The condition supported by this text is that these two elements appear together, that is, where the party answers that the party does not know the fact asserted by the opposing party. Ignorance here means, in the words of the text itself, a statement that one does not know the fact asserted by the opposing party.
This text does not treat that statement as an admission of fact. Ignorance is a statement that one does not know the fact asserted by the opposing party, and the same text presumes that fact to have been contested. The stages are therefore divided. The first is to classify the kind of response as confession, contest, or ignorance, and thereby determine what was declared unknown; the second is to determine what that statement is to be taken as. If this distinction is elided, the words "I do not know" are converted directly into words of admission, and the statement of not knowing loses the place where it follows the provision that presumes the fact to have been contested. The latter judgment is one I would keep separate from the materials needed when asserting revocation of confession on the ground of mistake.
The counterargument that every fact can be evaded under the name of ignorance targets a practical inconvenience. At the least, an opposing party who appears knowledgeable evades the facts, irrelevant records alone proliferate, and the inconvenience falls not on the party who spoke but on the party who heard. Whether it is also fair to leave even an accidentally misspoken answer available as a means of defense is raised alongside this. Ignorance cannot, however, be converted into a confession. Moving the place that the provision designates as contested over to admission is not justified by the inconvenience the counterargument points out. The fact remains, and cannot be erased, that no path is open in this section for resolving the convenience demanded by the counterargument in the manner this text allows.
There is one fixed fact in the synthetic scene. Here the invocation refers to how the opposing party records and utilizes that statement, and it does not overlap with the place where B again clarifies in what sense he spoke. The text in which the statement was recorded, the fact taken as the object of confession, and the presence or absence of mistake materials are left open as the record of determination. If, among these, the context of the record or the fact in question remains unclear, that fact is not made into the result of a fresh determination but is left undetermined. The portion extending beyond the expressly stated conditions cannot be fixed as the scene.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Ignorance is a statement that one does not know the fact asserted by the opposing party, and under the same text it is placed in the position where that fact is treated as contested. If it becomes the same as admission of fact, this question cannot be answered; conversely, a conclusion that allows every evasion as a tool is likewise not what this section addresses.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Ignorance is not the same as admission of fact. It must now be examined what the relevant provision prescribes for a statement of not knowing. The question of this analysis is in what form the stage of facts determined without proof and the binding effect attaching to them appears here.
The relevant provision is Article 150 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text provides: "Where a party states that the party does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party, that fact shall be presumed to have been contested." Here the subject is the party responding to the opposing party's assertion, the act is a statement that the party does not know that fact, and the condition is the time when a statement is made regarding the fact asserted by the opposing party. This paragraph does not address other paragraphs concerning the formation of a confession.
What the text prescribes is the direction of treating that fact as contested. If a confession, without proof, determines a fact and binds the trial, ignorance is conversely the stage of judgment that leaves that fact within the debate. Herein lies the reason for keeping the two distinctions apart. To go beyond recognizing a statement of not knowing as a contest and elevate it to a confession would create a new binding effect that the relevant provision does not prescribe.
Against this, a counterargument is raised that every fact can be evaded under the name of ignorance. That counterargument targets the inconvenience that, however much material the opposing party has prepared, one can shift the burden of proof by merely pleading ignorance to the opposing party's assertion, and the injustice that a party who answered wrongly by mistake is bound by the trial. Without erasing the inconvenience the counterargument points out, it is not answered by tying to ignorance the same binding effect the relevant provision attaches to confession.
In this scene, Defendant B answered that he did not know the fact, and Plaintiff A invokes this as a statement admitting it. If that answer of not knowing is a statement regarding the fact asserted by the opposing party, the relevant provision presumes it to have been contested. Depending on whether the entries in the record of the party's statement of examination and the written answer set down the answer of not knowing as it stands, and whether a claim of revocation of confession and mistake materials were submitted, the determination on the records may differ; but this scene determined nothing further than that.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. By the text of Article 150 (2) alone, a statement of not knowing is presumed to have contested that fact, and the binding effect of a confession does not follow. The same text neither grants any right of evasion with respect to all facts nor serves as a ground for unwinding a confession on the ground of mistake or negligence. The binding effect cannot be broadened by drawing in the reasons for judgment or other paragraphs.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
From the place left by the preceding section after confirming the difference between ignorance and admission of fact, this question asks what remains to be separately adjudicated within the reach of that binding effect. In this scene, the answer of not knowing is at once an expression of defense and a statement left in the record. Depending on which way that statement is read, the presence or absence of a contest is determined.
The provision corresponding to this question is as follows. Article 150 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "(2) Where a party states that the party does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party, that fact shall be presumed to have been contested." The subject to which this text refers is the party making a statement regarding the fact asserted by the opposing party, the act is stating that the party does not know, and the condition is when that statement concerns the fact asserted by the opposing party. This text does not jointly prescribe the issues handled by other paragraphs of the same Article.
If the above text and the conclusion of this section are joined, the portion to be adjudicated is limited to the expressly stated conditions. That is, the fine distinctions within the stage are limited to the conditions of the case in which they operate, the case in which they are blocked, and the case in which they are undetermined. The operating case is the one in which the respective requirements for confession, contest, and evident fact are distinguished, and where the statutory conditions for revocation of confession are satisfied, that is reflected; the blocked case is the one in which a judicial confession remains validly in place and, the statutory requirements for revocation not being satisfied, the route to denying that fact again is blocked; the undetermined case is the one in which the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of confession is unclear. That a statement of not knowing is presumed to be a contest, and that the presumption substitutes for a confession, are separate determinations. Only by viewing the two separately can the legal effect of ignorance be kept from being overstated.
If a party says only that he does not know a fact that differs from reality, the lawsuit is held up, and the inconvenience and loss are great in that the mistake ultimately redounds to the opposing party. The counterargument points out that the value of truth-finding in trials may be sacrificed to abuse of ignorance. The earlier answer, however, does not waver. Ignorance cannot be converted into a confession. Without changing the meaning of ignorance, distinguishing which way to record it according to the conditions of the operating case, the blocked case, and the undetermined case does not diminish the disadvantage the counterargument identifies; it merely fails to serve as a ground for turning that disadvantage into a confession.
Taking out only the facts relevant to this question from the synthetic scene, Defendant B answered that he did not know the fact, and Plaintiff A invokes this as a statement admitting it. Contrasted with the provision that a statement of not knowing is presumed to have contested the fact, the answer of Defendant B is settled by interpretation as one to be read as an indication of contest rather than recorded as a statement admitting the fact. From the scene alone it cannot be determined whether a statement of not knowing has been confirmed to have been recorded as an admission.
The conclusion this section permits goes no further than that ignorance is not the same as admission of fact, and that a statement of not knowing is adjudicated in conformity with the conditions of the operating case, the blocked case, and the undetermined case under the provision presuming the fact to have been contested. The conclusion this section does not permit is to convert ignorance into a confession, or to create a new stage outside the three expressly stated conditions and confer on it the effect of an admission of fact.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Is ignorance the same as admission of fact? The preceding section took ignorance to be a statement that one does not know the fact asserted by the opposing party, and held that it follows the provision presuming a statement of not knowing to have contested the fact. With respect to the same ignorance statement, Plaintiff A invokes it as a statement of admission, while Defendant B makes it a sign of defense. This opposition determines what place the literal meaning of a statement occupies at trial. What must be asked now is whether that statement produces a fact determined without proof, or leaves only a contest.
The provision provides: "(2) Where a party states that the party does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party, that fact shall be presumed to have been contested" (Civil Procedure Act Article 150). This text binds the subject to the party who has made a statement regarding the fact asserted by the opposing party, the act to a statement of not knowing, and the condition to the point in time at which that statement was made. The effect the text extends to takes the form of a presumption. It means that the fact is deemed contested; it does not mean that the opposite fact is at once determined to be true.
In joining this provision to the conclusion of this section, the respective requirements for confession, contest, and evident fact must first be separated. A judicial confession is formed from a statement admitting the fact asserted by the opposing party, and ignorance proceeds from a statement of not knowing; the two are therefore not the same act. Accordingly, the boundary between the side seeking to create a fact determined without proof and the side seeking to avoid that binding effect lies in the shape of the statement. Where the statutory conditions for revocation of confession are satisfied and this is reflected, the binding effect does not operate; where a judicial confession remains validly in place and, the statutory requirements for revocation not being satisfied, the route to denying that fact again is blocked, it is blocked.
It also targets the loss and inconvenience that it is unjust for a trial to be held up by a party's mistake even though the fact is otherwise. However, a statement that leaves only a contest cannot be changed into one of admission in order to prevent that loss. Since a statement of not knowing cannot be converted into a confession, ignorance cannot be converted into a confession. The burden of the mistake the counterargument points out must be dealt with at the place of the statutory conditions for revocation of confession and mistake materials, and it cannot be removed by reversing the effect of an ignorance statement.
On these facts alone it cannot be categorically asserted that a confession has been formed. In light of the provision that a statement of not knowing is presumed to have contested the fact, a contest stands in that place. However, whether the records—the parties' statements of examination, the written answer, the claim of revocation of confession, and the mistake materials—clearly show the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of confession cannot be determined from this scene alone. That part remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The respective requirements for confession, contest, and evident fact are separated, and where the statutory conditions for revocation of confession are satisfied and that is reflected, the binding effect does not operate. Conversely, where a judicial confession remains validly in place and the statutory requirements for revocation are not satisfied, so that the route to denying it again is closed, the matter is blocked. Where the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of confession is unclear, it remains undetermined. The distinctions set out up to this point are the criteria that divide the operation, blockage, and undetermined status of facts determined without proof and their binding effect.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
In the preceding step, the deemed acceptance when a fact is not expressly disputed and the exception to it were read together, and it must now be gauged how far that conclusion carries. It is precisely at this point that the question arises what place the word "not knowing" holds. Is not knowing the same as admitting the fact? And at the end of this question, what must be handed over to the next section? This question requires a judgment separate from the establishment of an admission, which the preceding section has already addressed. For how one records a statement of not knowing can reverse the content of a defense. Accordingly, the present analysis narrowly examines only what effects follow once the statements are classified and how that classification operates.
Article 150, paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows: "Where a party has stated that the party does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party, the fact shall be presumed to have been disputed." The subject designated by this language is the party responding to the opposing party's assertion, and the act is a statement that the party does not know that fact. The language sets two conditions. First, the object must be a fact asserted by the opposing party; second, the statement must have been made that the party does not know that fact. When these two conditions are met, the statutory text presumes that the fact has been disputed. This section does not address the other paragraphs of this Article or other requirements.
The link connecting this language with the conclusion of this section is the direction of the presumption. A statement of not knowing is read not as approval of that fact, but as an inability to take a position on the fact, pushed aside toward the side of dispute. Is not knowing the same as admitting the fact? The answer to this question is fixed as no. Admitting a fact produces the effect of accepting the opposing party's assertion as it stands, whereas a statement of not knowing produces only the effect of being presumed, as the statutory text provides, to have disputed it. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is that in the former case one proceeds in the direction in which no further proof is required, while in the latter case one remains in the direction in which issues remain at stake. There is no reason to attach new requirements or exceptions here.
Pressing this distinction to its extreme entails a loss. The mere word "not knowing" could avoid every fact. If a party repeats that the party does not remember, then no matter how specific the opposing party's assertion, the facts may never be sorted out and the trial may drag on. Moreover, a fact that is in truth different but that was let slip by chance through the words "I do not remember" may remain. These inconveniences and unfairness must not be disregarded. Even so, not knowing cannot be turned into an admission. The effect the statutory text gives to a statement of not knowing is a presumption of dispute, not an effect of approval; turning the meaning toward the side the opposing party invokes runs contrary to the direction the language sets. The unfavorable part remains as it is, and only the conclusion is held.
What must be examined at this scene is only the form of the statement. The gap between these two expressions is exactly the object of adjudication in this section. An answer of not knowing falls within not knowing, while the invocation of "a statement admitting" is an attempt to shift that not knowing into admitting the fact, and thus runs in the direction opposite to the presumption set by the statutory text. However, if the context of the statement or the fact taken as the object of the admission is unclear, nothing can be fixed. If it is confirmed that a statement of not knowing was recorded as one admitting it, the conclusion is corrected under the rule that presumes the fact to have been disputed. This only alters the conditions; it creates no facts from outside the scene.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. Not knowing is a statement that one does not know a fact asserted by the opposing party; when such a statement is made, that fact is presumed to have been disputed; accordingly, not knowing is not admitting the fact. What is not permitted is any judgment that goes further. Neither can it be asserted that, on account of not knowing, the opposing party's assertions as a whole become void, nor, conversely, that every statement is approved. Both lie outside the range set by this language. What remains is how attendance at the hearing date bears upon this presumption: if a party does not appear at the hearing date, are all statements deemed approved?