Summary
Preparatory proceedings set time periods within which written briefs are exchanged and applications for evidence are made.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Only when the time at which submission was expected becomes known can responsibility for the delay be assigned fairly. Dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness follows statutory conditions such as intent or gross negligence and delay in the completion of the lawsuit. After setting out this standard, what remains is what the preparatory proceedings lead the parties to expect. This section examines the very framework of expectation set by those preparatory proceedings and asks at what point the entrance through which late materials enter the examination of the case is opened. In the synthetic scene, Defendant B presents new materials as oral argument draws to a close, and Plaintiff A disputes this as intentional delay; accordingly, before asking who bears responsibility for the delay, the question first arises whether the standard for expected submission was clear.
As to the manner in which preparatory proceedings are conducted, Article 280 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Preparatory proceedings are conducted by setting a time period, having the parties submit preparatory briefs or other documents, or exchange them between the parties, and apply for evidence to prove the asserted facts." In this language, the actor first determined is the court that sets the time period, and the conduct then required is the submission of preparatory briefs and other documents, their exchange between the parties, and the application for evidence supporting the asserted facts. The condition is the setting of a time period, and it is predicted that the exchange of documents and the application for evidence will take place around that period.
Connecting this language with the conclusion of this section reveals why the criterion opening the entrance to this remedy lies in the assessment of the time of submission and the effects of delay. The preparatory period is a period set for organizing assertions and evidence, and the setting of that period does not itself mean the attribution of responsibility for delay. Thus, the point that preparatory proceedings lead parties to expect submission and the question whether the statutory conditions of dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness are satisfied as to late submission are distinct stages of determination. If the former is the criterion opening the entrance to this remedy, the latter requires the separate requirements of intent or gross negligence and delay in the completion of the lawsuit.
Even so, the counterargument that parties may find it genuinely difficult to respond however ample the guidance is directed at the question whether responsibility for delayed submission can be laid on the parties merely because a preparatory order was served. That counterargument emphasizes that the greater the weight of the delayed materials on the outcome of the lawsuit, the less a formal notice of the time period can guarantee the response needed to prevent an erroneous judgment. Yet the existence of a preparatory order cannot be converted into proof of fault for every delay. While acknowledging that guidance provides the standard for expected submission, the disadvantage remains that the statutory conditions of intent or gross negligence and delay in completion must still be separately verified.
In the synthetic scene, Defendant B presents new materials as oral argument draws to a close, and Plaintiff A disputes this as intentional delay; on these facts alone, neither the cause of the lateness nor the delay effects that further examination would produce is revealed. Whether a preparatory order was issued, whether a record of submission and the reasons for the delay were left within that period, and what the anticipated examination burden and the grounds for dismissal were, are likewise not determined in this scene. If mere tardiness remains and intent, gross negligence, or delay in completion is negated, the conclusion of dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness is to be reconsidered.
Accordingly, the conclusion this section permits is as follows: the setting of a period by preparatory proceedings provides the standard for expected submission; and where, measured against that standard, the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness are not satisfied, or the method in question has been lawfully admitted, and where the relief demanded, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the statement of claim and the right of the chosen action can be defended, the entrance to this remedy is open. Conversely, the single fact that a preparatory order was issued cannot be taken as proof of fault for every delay.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
The preceding section held that this remedy operates where, on an examination of the timing of submission and the effects of delay, the case does not fall within the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness or the method in question has been lawfully admitted. Now the question remains: what are the conditions that block this remedy? In the synthetic scene, Defendant B presents new materials as oral argument draws to a close, and Plaintiff A disputes this as intentional delay; what must be determined in that dispute is not the bare fact of lateness, but where the grounds for assigning responsibility for the delay come from. To fix the standard of that responsibility, one must first examine what kind of predictability the court creates through preparatory proceedings.
The language that supplies those grounds is confirmed first. Paragraph (1) of Article 280 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Preparatory proceedings are conducted by setting a time period and having the parties submit preparatory briefs or other documents or exchange them between themselves, and apply for evidence to prove the asserted facts." In this language the actor is the court, and the conduct is setting a time period and requiring the submission of documents or directing their exchange between the parties; together with this, receiving applications for evidence to prove the asserted facts is the manner in which preparatory proceedings are conducted. What this paragraph addresses is the procedural form of the exchange of documents and applications for evidence; the requirements or effects of dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness are not drawn directly from the text of this paragraph.
That preparatory proceedings proceed by setting a time period for the exchange of documents and applications for evidence connects with the foregoing conclusion. Here the preparatory period means the period set for organizing assertions and evidence. The reason these two things—the design of a document procedure with a set period, and the expectation of submission signified by that period—must be examined separately is that, whenever responsibility for delay is assigned, the former lays the groundwork for the latter, yet they are not the same stage of determination. Where the statutory condition is established—that, through a delayed submission made with intent or gross negligence, the completion of the lawsuit is delayed—and the relevant attack or defense method is dismissed, this remedy is blocked. One must not forget that, while that statutory condition takes as its axis the expected time of submission predicted from the design of the preparatory period, separate requirements for reaching the dismissal must also be satisfied.
The strongest counterargument to this distinction arises from the point that parties may find it genuinely difficult to respond however ample the guidance. Even if the preparatory period was notified and the exchange of documents was announced, if the parties lacked sufficient time or ability to grasp its contents, holding them responsible for late submission may be unfair. It is also an axis of this counterargument that, to prevent an erroneous judgment, important materials must be accepted regardless of timing, and one must respond without erasing this disadvantageous aspect. Yet the foregoing answer does not change. A preparatory order is merely material revealing the expectation of submission, and it does not substitute for proof of the statutory conditions of intent or gross negligence and delay in the completion of the lawsuit.
Returning to the synthetic scene and comparing the conditions, it is established that Defendant B submitted new materials as oral argument drew to a close, and that Plaintiff A disputed this as intentional delay. However, whether a preparatory period was set and how it was notified, whether Defendant B could know of that period, and how far the submission of materials actually delayed the completion of the lawsuit are not determined in the scene. Therefore, on the scene alone one cannot determine whether the requirements for dismissal are satisfied, and the cause of the delay and its effects remain undetermined. But the mere fact of undetermination cannot establish that this remedy is blocked.
In sum, the cases in which this remedy is blocked are limited to those where, on the basis of the expectation of submission created through the preparatory period, a delayed submission with intent or gross negligence is recognized, the completion of the lawsuit is thereby delayed, and the relevant attack or defense method is ultimately dismissed. The remedy must not be said to be blocked by the single fact that a preparatory order exists, or by the single fact of lateness. Conversely, where each element of the statutory condition is recognized and leads to the dismissal, the result of blocking this remedy cannot be avoided. At that boundary, where the materials needed for adjudication are lacking, one must examine which deviation is justified and what circumstances remain.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Unless that standard is revealed, one cannot even say what is late. Preparatory proceedings are the procedure that creates that expectation. The problem is that, however sufficient the guidance of this procedure may be, the parties may have found it genuinely difficult to respond. In such a situation, what do the preparatory proceedings set by the court lead one to expect?
The relevant language leaves the formation of the expectation of submission to the procedure. The actor indicated by this language is the presiding judge conducting the preparatory proceedings, and the conduct is the setting of a period and the demand for submission of documents within that period. In the same terms, the preparatory period is the period set for organizing assertions and evidence. The submission of preparatory briefs and other documents, the exchange between the parties, and the application for evidence spoken of here all proceed by mediation of this period.
The point where that language meets the conclusion of this section is the distinction between prediction and determination. Preparatory proceedings lead one to predict the timing of the exchange of documents and applications for evidence, but that prediction alone does not determine the cause of the lateness. If the grounds of fault for the delay, or the effect that delay had on the examination, cannot be known, the materials for determination remain unspecified. At this point the author does not declare the matter unknowable, but leaves it undetermined, distinguishing it from unknowability. Being unable to determine and being impossible to judge in the first place belong to different stages, and if the latter is raised to the former, the distinction itself disappears.
The strongest counterargument is directed at the loss this distinction leaves. Starting from the point that parties may find it genuinely difficult to respond however ample the guidance, force is given to the contention that important materials must be accepted regardless of timing in order to prevent an erroneous judgment. While matters are left undetermined, the conclusion remains unsettled, and in the meantime the accuracy of the determination may be shaken. Even so, however, the existence of a preparatory order cannot be converted into proof of fault for every delay. A preparatory order is a fact concerning the formation of the expectation of submission, not an all-encompassing proof of responsibility for delay, and the disadvantage identified by the counterargument remains as it is as the boundary is maintained.
In this scene, taking only the situation in which Defendant B presents new materials as oral argument draws to a close and Plaintiff A disputes this as intentional delay, the boundary of this question becomes visible. If the record of submission, the preparatory order, the reasons for the delay, the anticipated examination burden, and the grounds for dismissal are confirmed, one can examine whether dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness applies. But if the cause of the lateness, or the delay effects of additional examination, cannot be known, the materials for determination remain unspecified. If it is confirmed that mere tardiness remains and that intent, gross negligence, or delay in completion is negated, the conclusion of dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness is to be reconsidered. Facts not present in the scene are left undetermined, and only a conditional distinction is preserved.
What this section permits is the separation of predictability from the assignment of responsibility. Responsibility for delay is not determined merely by the fact that the guidance and period-setting of preparatory proceedings created an expectation of submission, and if the cause of the lateness or the delay effects on the examination are not confirmed, the undetermined state of the materials for judgment remains. What is not permitted is to convert undetermination at once into unknowability, or to substitute the existence of a preparatory order for proof of fault in every delay.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
Before examining whether that condition is established, one must first look at what the preparatory proceedings set by the court lead the parties to expect. In the situation where Defendant B presents new materials as oral argument draws to a close and Plaintiff A disputes that submission as intentional delay, responsibility for the delay can be fairly determined only once it becomes clear at what point the expected submission occurred.
The language that serves as the basis for that expectation is found in Article 280 of the Civil Procedure Act. Paragraph (1) thereof provides: "Preparatory proceedings are conducted by setting a time period, having the parties submit preparatory briefs or other documents, or exchange them between the parties, and apply for evidence to prove the asserted facts" (Article 280 of the Civil Procedure Act). This language specifies three things as the manner of conducting preparatory proceedings: setting a time period; having the parties submit preparatory briefs and other documents or exchange them mutually; and receiving applications for evidence to prove the asserted facts. Here the actors are the court conducting the preparatory proceedings and the parties participating in that procedure; the conduct is the submission and exchange of documents and the application for evidence; and the condition is that such conduct be carried out within the period set.
The method prescribed by this language is directly tied to the materials for judging responsibility for delay. When the court sets a preparatory period and requires submission and exchange, the parties can predict what must be filed within that period. Here the preparatory period means the period set for organizing assertions and evidence. If there is a record that the period was set—that is, the preparatory order and its contents—the point at which submission was expected is specified, and one gains a standard of comparison for judging by what measure the thing called a late submission was late. By contrast, the record of submission shows what actually came in and when, and the anticipated examination burden shows what new examination will be added because that material came in late. The grounds for dismissal are the place where the court's judgment on whether the conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness were recognized with respect to these materials is contained. As concluded in this section, stage-by-stage adjudication is to be made solely on the basis of the materials recorded in these five items—the record of submission, the preparatory order, the reasons for the delay, the anticipated examination burden, and the grounds for dismissal—and records that do not exist are not to be filled in by presumption.
A distinct inconvenience remains with this record-centered adjudication. The strongest counterargument is directed at the point that parties may find it genuinely difficult to respond however ample the guidance. Even if a preparatory order existed, if the materials were hard to find or hard to understand, the party's fault can hardly be charged for the late submission. Added to this is the demand that, to prevent an erroneous judgment, important materials must be accepted regardless of timing. These losses and values are not erased. Yet this counterargument cannot convert the very existence of a preparatory order into proof of fault for every delay. A preparatory order shows only the time at which submission was expected; what the reason for the lateness was, whether there was intent or gross negligence, and whether the completion of the lawsuit was in fact delayed must be confirmed from separate records.
Reviewing the synthetic scene in light of the materials dealt with in this section, only the fact that Defendant B submitted new materials as oral argument drew to a close and the fact that Plaintiff A disputed this as intentional delay are established. Whether a preparatory order existed, how the commencement and expiration of the preparatory period were fixed, what B's reasons for the delay were, what examination burden would be added, and whether the court dismissed the matter are not confirmed by any record. What can be discerned from the scene is only that the records enumerated above are needed to judge the dispute over late submission. Since the gaps cannot be filled with facts absent from the synthetic scene, fault for the delay and satisfaction of the requirements for dismissal remain undetermined until the records are further confirmed.
The conclusion permitted in this section is limited to the following: the preparatory proceedings set by the court give rise to the expectation that they will proceed by way of the exchange of documents and applications for evidence within a set period, and the kinds of records needed to confirm that expectation are the record of submission, the preparatory order, the reasons for the delay, the anticipated examination burden, and the grounds for dismissal. By contrast, to hold that a single preparatory order proves fault for the late submission, or to supplement reasons not in the record by conjecture and thereby fix the requirements for dismissal, is a determination this section does not permit.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In the scene where Defendant B submits new materials just as the oral argument is drawing to a close and Plaintiff A contends that this is an intentional delay, the remaining question is precisely where the expected timing comes from. What do the preparatory proceedings set by the court lead one to predict? What kind of change overturns the existing stage determination? On the premise that the statutory conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing are already given, this stage examines the predictions created by the preparation period and the conditions under which those predictions collapse.
Article 280 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "the preparatory proceedings shall be conducted by setting a period, having the parties submit preparatory briefs and other documents, or having them exchange these between the parties." In this wording, the actor is the court, and the act is the setting of a period and the instruction to submit and exchange documents within that period. The preparation period is therefore read as a device by which the court first opens the arena in which documents and arguments are gathered and exchanged. Although the provision also covers applications for evidence, the scope confirmed in this section is limited to the setting of a period that instructs the exchange of documents.
This wording and the stage determination lead one to view the preparation period in two parts. One is the indication of the time at which the court expected submission; the other is the allocation of responsibility for observing that time. The definition of the preparation period as a period set for organizing arguments and evidence corresponds to the former. The statutory conditions, such as intent or gross negligence and delay in the conclusion of the lawsuit, remain a matter of the latter. The fact alone that a period was set does not determine responsibility for a late submission, and if only simple tardiness remains and intent, gross negligence, or delay in the conclusion is denied, the conclusion of dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing must be re-examined.
If narrowing this distinction is advantageous for handling materials submitted late, the loss is that even abundant guidance may leave the parties genuinely unable to respond. There is also the accompanying demand that, if the materials are important, they must be accepted regardless of timing so as to prevent an erroneous judgment. Even so, the existence of a preparation order cannot be converted into proof of culpability for every delay. A preparation order merely shows the time the court expected; responsibility for the delay must be separately confirmed by the statutory conditions of intent or gross negligence and delay in the conclusion of the lawsuit, not by the existence of that order.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that Defendant B submitted new materials just as the oral argument was drawing to a close and that Plaintiff A contested this as an intentional delay. Although this point of submission may be set against the indication of the preparation period, whether a preparation order was actually issued, whose responsibility the delay was, and how much the additional hearing would postpone the conclusion are not made clear by the records. The items that should be left in the judgment records are the submission records, the preparation order, the reason for the delay, the anticipated hearing burden, and the reason for dismissal. As these items remain unfilled, whether the statutory conditions for late submission are met remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the existence of a preparation period leads one to predict the time at which submission was expected; what it does not permit is the determination that delay beyond that time is itself proof of culpability. If the designated change is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectiveness determinations are discarded and the determination is made anew from the stage; conversely, if intent or gross negligence and delay in the conclusion of the lawsuit are confirmed, the stage determination is maintained.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
In the scene where Defendant B submits new materials just as the oral argument is drawing to a close and Plaintiff A contends that this is an intentional delay, the question before asking about responsibility for the delay is what one must first be able to predict. If the preceding conclusion is taken as a premise that dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing follows legal conditions such as intent or gross negligence and delay in the conclusion of the lawsuit, the question remaining at this point is how to deal with the circumstance that, however abundant the guidance, the party may in fact have been unable to respond.
Article 280 of the Civil Procedure Act sets out the method of conducting the preparatory proceedings, and its paragraph (1) provides: "(1) The preparatory proceedings shall be conducted by setting a period, having the parties submit preparatory briefs and other documents, or having them exchange these between the parties, and having them apply for evidence to prove the facts alleged." In this wording, the actor is the court conducting the preparatory proceedings; the acts are the submission of preparatory briefs and other documents, their exchange between the parties, and applications for evidence; and the condition is that a period is set for that conduct. As a result, the preparation period becomes the period set for organizing arguments and evidence.
The meaning of the period-setting prescribed by that wording and the fixed conclusion of this stage are placed at different stages. That the court set a preparation period and had submissions and exchanges carried out is a matter of procedure management that makes predictable which materials must be submitted by what point. By contrast, whether a delayed submission may be dismissed for untimely filing is a matter of determination that requires examination of the separate statutory conditions of intent or gross negligence and delay in the conclusion of the lawsuit. To make the existence of a preparation order a stepping stone between the two stages would be to convert the time of expectation set by the former into the very proof of culpability of the latter.
The loss on the side that this distinction closes off is equally clear. The counterargument that, if the materials are important, they must be accepted regardless of timing so as to prevent an erroneous judgment, is aimed at the value of giving priority to the accuracy of the judgment over the party who failed to meet the deadline. If the new materials have sufficient weight to change the conclusion, excluding them solely because they are late leaves behind an error that could have been corrected without a retrial or separate litigation. Yet this does not mean that the existence of a preparation order can be converted into proof of culpability for every delay; the risk of omitting materials identified by the counterargument is taken up on the side of strictly examining the statutory conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing.
The facts that can be confirmed in the synthetic scene are limited to what appears within that scene. It is established that Defendant B submitted materials just as the oral argument was drawing to a close and that Plaintiff A contested this as an intentional delay, but the reason B delayed the submission and the hearing burden those materials would additionally demand are not written in this scene. Only when the submission records, the preparation order, the reason for the delay, the anticipated hearing burden, and the reason for dismissal are confirmed can it be determined whether the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing are met. Where the cause of the delay or the delaying effect of the additional hearing cannot be known, that part must be left undetermined.
In sum, what can be established in this section goes no further than that the preparatory proceedings, by setting a period to conduct the exchange of documents and applications for evidence, make the expected time of submission predictable. Whether liability for failing to observe that prediction may be imposed is determined separately according to whether the statutory conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing—such as intent or gross negligence and delay in the conclusion of the lawsuit—are each met. The fact alone that a preparation order was issued does not prove culpability for a late submission. Whether late arguments and unexplained arguments present the same problem remains as the next question.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section reached the conclusion that the existence of a preparation order cannot be converted into proof of culpability for every delay. The question that now remains concerns an earlier stage: what the preparatory proceedings set by the court lead the parties to predict. Defendant B submits new materials just as the oral argument is drawing to a close, and Plaintiff A contends that this is an intentional delay; to evaluate this dispute, one must first clarify what the procedure required in advance.
Article 280 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "the preparatory proceedings shall be conducted by setting a period, having the parties submit preparatory briefs and other documents, or having them exchange these between the parties," and having them apply for evidence to prove the facts alleged. In this wording, the court is the actor that 'sets a period,' and the parties are charged with the acts of 'submitting or exchanging documents and applying for evidence.' What the preparatory proceedings lead one to predict is precisely the timing and manner of these three requirements.
Accordingly, the confirmed conclusion is that the preparatory proceedings proceed by setting a period to conduct the exchange of documents and applications for evidence. Here the preparation period means the period set for organizing arguments and evidence, and the requirement to submit and exchange documents and the requirement to apply for evidence are distinct stages composing the preparatory proceedings. To ask about responsibility for the delay, it must first be separately revealed which requirement existed at which time, so that it can be judged at which part of which requirement a particular material was inserted late.
However detailed the court's guidance may be, circumstances may remain in which the parties are genuinely unable to respond. Differences in capacity to litigate or in access to materials, and the difficulty of the content of the preparation order, constrain the parties' responses, and this inconvenience is not erased no matter how refined the design of the preparatory proceedings. From the facts alone that the court set a preparation period and required submissions of documents and applications for evidence, one cannot summarily conclude that the party's delay involved intent or gross negligence, and the statutory condition that the conclusion of the lawsuit was delayed must also be separately confirmed.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene of this section are only that Defendant B submitted new materials just as the oral argument was drawing to a close and that Plaintiff A contends this was an intentional delay. Whether those materials were already included in the exchange of documents during the preparation period, whether they correspond to a newly required application for evidence, and whether that submission actually delayed the conclusion of the lawsuit cannot be established from this scene alone and therefore remain undetermined. What remains is the work of cross-checking the submission records, the preparation order, the reason for the delay, the anticipated hearing burden, and the reason for dismissal.
The conclusion of this section holds only within the narrow range that the subject of prediction set by the preparatory proceedings is the exchange of documents and applications for evidence within the set period. To broaden it so as to generalize responsibility for delay to everyone, or to justify dismissal by the existence of a preparation order alone, is the direction this conclusion does not permit.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In the scene where Defendant B submits new materials just as the oral argument is drawing to a close and Plaintiff A contends that this is an intentional delay, what is asked here is what the preparatory proceedings set by the court lead one to predict. On the premise that dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing follows statutory conditions such as intent or gross negligence and delay in the conclusion of the lawsuit, what is asked here is what the preparatory proceedings set by the court lead one to predict. If the preparatory proceedings present the time at which submission was expected, upon what does the meaning of that time rest, and upon what does the allocation of responsibility for passing that time rest?
Article 280 of the Civil Procedure Act frames the wording for this question as follows. "(1) The preparatory proceedings shall be conducted by setting a period, having the parties submit preparatory briefs and other documents, or having them exchange these between the parties, and having them apply for evidence to prove the facts alleged." (Article 280 of the Civil Procedure Act) The actor indicated by this wording is the court, and the act is to cause the submission and exchange of documents and applications for evidence to proceed by setting a period. The condition is that the procedure proceeds in a form in which the preparatory briefs, other documents, and applications for evidence are organized within that period. Other issues under this paragraph are not addressed.
The link connecting the above wording with the conclusion of this section is the definition of the preparation period. This definition leads one to view the character of the period in two stages. One is the expectation of submission conveyed by the court to the parties; the other is the responsibility for submissions exceeding that expectation. The former is the circumstance the wording directly makes predictable, while the latter is the circumstance separately required by the statutory conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is that the requirements of the latter are not automatically met simply because the former is revealed.
The strongest counterargument points out that this distinction conceals practical losses: namely, that however abundant the guidance, the parties may in fact have been unable to respond. Even where difficult circumstances, circumstances learned only late, and the burden of drafting preparatory briefs remain, if the existence of a preparation order serves directly as the basis for determining responsibility for the delay, the last chance to prevent an erroneous conclusion is closed. The answer of this section is that the existence of a preparation order cannot be converted into proof of culpability for every delay. A preparation order merely reveals the time at which submission was expected; it does not substitute for the recognition of the statutory conditions of delay through intent or gross negligence and delay in the conclusion of the lawsuit.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the fact that materials were submitted after the preparation period set by the court had passed, the reason for the delay that caused the materials to be submitted late, and the burden of the additional hearing that can be anticipated are items that can be left in the records. Yet from this scene alone, the cause of the delay, the effect by which the delay would actually postpone the conclusion of the lawsuit, and the reason the court ordered dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing are not established. Where the cause of the delay or the delaying effect of the additional hearing cannot be known, the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the parties can predict that the period set by the preparatory proceedings is the time set for organizing arguments and evidence, and that, so long as that prediction remains alongside the submission records, it becomes the starting point for a fair discussion of responsibility for the delay. The conclusion it does not permit is that the statutory conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimely filing are met merely by the fact that the preparation period was exceeded. That is, the existence of a preparation order is not itself the proof of culpability.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는데, 이 다툼 앞에 놓인 물음은 따로 있다. 실기 각하는 고의 또는 중과실과 소송 완결의 지연 등 법정 조건을 따른다는 점을 전제로 한다. 이제 늦은 주장·증거가 심리에 들어가는지 여부를 판정하는 데 쓸 수 있는 근거의 범위를 정해야 한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 민사소송법 제280조 제1항으로, 그 문언은 다음과 같다. "변론준비절차는 기간을 정하여, 당사자로 하여금 준비서면, 그 밖의 서류를 제출하게 하거나 당사자 사이에 이를 교환하게 하고 주장사실을 증명할 증거를 신청하게 하는 방법으로 진행한다." 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 변론준비절차를 진행하는 법원이며, 행위는 기간을 정해 서류를 제출하게 하거나 당사자 사이에 교환하게 하는 것과 증거를 신청하게 하는 것이다. 그 조건은 기간을 정한다는 점이고, 이 문언은 다른 항의 쟁점까지 다루지 않는다.
위 문언과 앞서 확인한 결론을 이어 보면, 늦은 주장·증거의 심리 진입을 판정할 때 인용할 수 있는 근거는 이 문언에 한정된다. 여기서 두 판단을 구별해야 하는 까닭이 드러난다. 하나는 법원이 정한 준비기간 안에 제출이 이루어졌는지 여부이고, 다른 하나는 그 시기를 넘긴 제출을 실기 각하 요건에 따라 거절할지 여부이다. 앞의 문언은 전자에 관한 절차의 진행 방법을 말할 뿐이며, 후자의 요건까지 새로 만들거나 바꾸지 않는다. 따라서 판결이유나 다른 항으로 시야를 넓혀 늦은 자료의 처리를 정할 수 없다.
한편, 안내가 아무리 많아도 당사자가 실제로 대응하기 어려울 수 있다는 반론이 남는다. 자료가 중요하다면 시기에 관계없이 받아들여야 잘못된 판결을 막을 수 있고, 설명이 부족한 측에 그 책임을 돌리는 편이 실체적 진실에 가깝다는 뜻이다. 그래도 이 반론의 불리한 측면을 지운 채 결론을 바꿀 수는 없다. 준비명령이 존재했다는 사실 하나로 모든 지연의 귀책을 증명된 것으로 만들 수 없기 때문이다. 실기 각하가 문제되는 한, 그 요건은 고의 또는 중과실과 소송 완결의 지연 등 법정 조건이며, 이는 앞 문언의 문언 범위와도 구별된다.
합성 장면에서 드러난 사실만으로 이 물음에 닿는 대목을 꺼내 보면, 제출이 변론이 마무리될 무렵에 이루어졌다는 점과 원고가 의도적인 지연이라고 다툰다는 점이다. 앞의 조건은 준비기간이 주장·증거의 정리를 위해 정한 기간이라는 것이고, 그 기간을 정한 준비절차가 서면 교환과 증거 신청을 어떻게 진행하는지를 말한다는 점이다. 다만 준비명령의 실제 내용, 늦어진 원인, 추가 심리가 소송 완결을 얼마나 늦추는지에 관한 기록은 장면에 없다. 그러니 늦은 제출이 실기 각하 요건에 해당하는지, 아니면 적법하게 받아들여져야 하는지는 이 장면만으로 확정할 수 없으며 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 늦은 주장·증거의 심리 진입을 판정할 근거로 삼을 수 있는 문언이 민사소송법 제280조의 해당 범위에 한정된다는 것이고, 준비기간의 정의와 준비절차의 진행 방법은 그 안에서 설명된다는 것이다. 허용하지 않는 것은, 그 문언만으로 곧바로 실기 각하의 요건이 모두 충족되었다고 단정하는 결론이거나, 다른 항의 문언과 판결이유를 빌려와 늦은 자료 처리의 기준을 새로 정하는 결론이다.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는 장면에서, 이번에 분리할 물음은 늦은 주장·증거의 심리 진입 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분이 무엇인가이다. 이 물음은 지연된 자료를 받을지 말지의 이분 선택을 넘어서, 그 선택 안에서 어떤 조건을 따로 헤아려야 하는지를 가리는 데 있다.
해당 문언은 민사소송법 제280조 제1항이며, 그 문언은 준비절차가 "기간을 정하여, 당사자로 하여금 준비서면, 그 밖의 서류를 제출하게 하거나 당사자 사이에 이를 교환하게 하고 주장사실을 증명할 증거를 신청하게 하는 방법으로 진행한다"고 규정한다. 이 문언은 진행 수단이 기간의 정함과 서류 제출·교환·증거 신청임을 가리키고, 제2항은 준비절차의 진행을 재판장이 담당한다고 규정한다. 여기서 기간은 준비기간, 즉 주장·증거의 정리를 위해 정한 기간을 뜻하며, 문언은 그 기간 안에 무엇을 제출하고 교환하는지를 예측하게 한다.
법원이 정한 준비절차는 무엇을 예측하게 하는가 하는 물음에 이 문언이 응답하는 방식은, 제출을 기대한 시기와 그 시기를 어겼을 때의 책임을 분리해서 보라는 것이다. 시기의 예측 가능성은 준비기간의 정함과 안내에서 나오고, 지연의 책임은 실기 각하의 법정 조건, 다시 말해 고의 또는 중과실과 소송 완결의 지연 등에서 따로 판단된다. 그 둘을 한 덩어리로 묶으면 제출을 기대한 시기의 밝음만으로 지연의 귀책까지 입증된 것처럼 되는데, 이는 문언이 정한 예측 기능을 넘어서는 해석이 된다.
그렇다고 안내가 있어도 당사자가 실제로 대응하기 어려운 상황이 사라지는 것은 아니다. 늦은 자료에 담긴 내용이 중요하면 시기에 관계없이 받아들여야 잘못된 판결을 막을 수 있다는 점은, 각하로 인한 손실을 직접 겪는 당사자에게 설득력 있는 반론이다. 그러나 준비명령의 존재를 모든 지연의 귀책 증명으로 바꿀 수는 없으며, 이는 준비기간의 안내가 보장하는 것은 제출 기대의 예측이지 고의·중과실의 증명이 아님을 뜻한다. 반론이 겨냥한 불리함은 그대로 두되, 각하 요건의 충족 여부는 별도로 남는다.
이 절의 장면에서 이 물음에 속하는 사실은 제출 시점이 변론이 마무리될 무렵이었고, 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투었다는 점뿐이다. 여기에 제출 기록·준비명령·지연 이유·예상 심리 부담·각하 이유를 대조 대상 기록으로 놓고 보면, 준비명령의 존재 자체로는 지연의 귀책이 확정되지 않고, 지연 이유나 완결 지연 효과가 무엇이었는지도 이 장면만으로는 밝혀지지 않았다. 제출이 늦어진 원인 또는 추가 심리의 지연 효과를 알 수 없는 경우, 실기 각하의 해당 여부는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 늦은 주장·증거의 심리 진입 안에서 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우의 세 조건을 명시해 나누어 판정하는 것이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 준비명령의 존재를 귀책의 증명으로 승격하는 것이다. 제출 시기와 지연 효과를 따져 실기 각하 요건에 해당하지 않거나 해당 방법이 적법하게 받아들여진 경우 그 자료는 심리에 들어오고, 고의 또는 중과실의 지연 제출로 소송 완결이 늦어지는 법정 조건이 인정되어 각하된 경우 들어오지 않으며, 만약 단순한 지각만 남고 고의·중과실 또는 완결 지연이 부정되는 것으로 확인되면 실기 각하 결론을 다시 판단한다.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
앞서 법원이 정한 준비절차는 무엇을 예측하게 하는지 살피는 단계를 지나, 이제 늦게 제출된 주장과 증거가 심리에 실제로 진입하는지 여부를 구별해야 한다. 합성 장면에서 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는데, 이 다툼은 자료의 늦음 자체가 아니라 그 늦음에 대한 책임을 둘러싼다. 그 책임을 묻기에 앞서 법원이 정한 준비절차가 무엇을 예측하게 하는지 정리한다.
이 절의 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민사소송법 제280조 제1항이다. 그 문언은 준비절차를 다음과 같이 전개한다. "①변론준비절차는 기간을 정하여, 당사자로 하여금 준비서면, 그 밖의 서류를 제출하게 하거나 당사자 사이에 이를 교환하게 하고 주장사실을 증명할 증거를 신청하게 하는 방법으로 진행한다."(민사소송법 제280조) 여기서 '기간을 정하여'는 법원이 정하는 준비기간을 가리키고, 이는 주장·증거의 정리를 위해 정한 기간이다. 이 문언은 서면의 제출·교환과 증거 신청을 준비절차의 진행 방법으로 지정할 뿐, 늦은 제출의 법적 효과까지 직접 규율하지는 않는다.
따라서 준비절차의 문언과 늦은 제출의 판단을 별개의 단계로 구별해야 한다. 앞의 단계는 법원이 서면과 증거 신청을 어느 시기까지 정리하도록 기대하는지 보여주고, 뒤의 단계는 그 기대를 넘어서 제출된 자료가 심리에 진입하는지, 혹은 막히는지를 결정한다. 이 물음에 해당하는 구별 기준은 세 갈래다. 열리는 조건은 제출 시기와 지연 효과를 따져 실기 각하 요건에 해당하지 않거나 해당 방법이 적법하게 받아들여진 경우이고, 막히는 조건은 고의 또는 중과실의 지연 제출로 소송 완결이 늦어지는 법정 조건이 인정되어 해당 공격·방어방법이 각하된 경우이며, 미확정은 늦어진 원인 또는 추가 심리의 지연 효과를 알 수 없는 경우다. 막히는 쪽에 들어가려면 제출의 지연과 귀책, 그리고 완결의 지연이 함께 인정되어야 한다.
안내가 많아도 당사자가 실제로 대응하기 어려울 수 있다. 준비명령이 내려지고 준비기간이 통지되었더라도, 당사자가 그 안내를 실질적으로 받아들이고 제출을 마칠 여유가 없었다면 지연의 책임을 그에게 무겁게 물을 수 없는 손실과 불편이 생긴다. 특히 자료가 사건 결론에 중요한 것일수록 늦었다는 이유만으로 심리를 배제하면 잘못된 판단이 남을 위험이 커진다는 가치가 반론의 바탕에 놓인다. 준비명령은 기대된 제출 시기를 보여주는 자료일 뿐, 고의 또는 중과실이라는 귀책 사유와 소송 완결의 지연이라는 법정 조건이 각각 인정되는지 여부는 별도로 판단되어야 한다.
합성 장면에 드러난 사실에 한정하면, 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵에 새 자료를 내었고, 원고 A는 그 제출을 의도적인 지연이라고 다투었다. 이 사실은 제출 시기가 준비기간의 기대를 넘어섰음을 보여줄 뿐, 늦어진 원인이 고의 또는 중과실인지, 추가 심리가 실제로 소송 완결을 얼마나 늦추는지까지는 확정하지 못한다. 기록으로 남겨야 할 것은 제출 기록·준비명령·지연 이유·예상 심리 부담·각하 이유이다. 따라서 이 장면만으로는 미확정의 영역이 남아 있고, 만약 단순한 지각만 남고 고의·중과실 또는 완결 지연이 부정되는 것으로 확인되면 실기 각하 결론을 다시 판단해야 한다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 세 조건의 구별에 한정된다. 제출 시기와 지연 효과를 따져 실기 각하 요건에 해당하지 않거나 그 방법이 적법하게 받아들여진 경우 심리에 열리고, 고의 또는 중과실의 지연 제출로 소송 완결이 늦어지는 법정 조건이 인정되어 각하된 경우 막히며, 늦어진 원인이나 추가 심리의 지연 효과를 알 수 없으면 미확정으로 남는다. 이 구별은 늦었다는 사실만으로 자동으로 각하할 수 있는지, 중요한 자료의 지연을 어떤 이유로 결론지어야 하는지, 늦은 주장과 설명되지 않은 주장이 같은지를 판단하는 문제까지 확장되지는 않는다. 그 경계를 지키는 한 준비명령의 존재는 귀책의 증명이 아니라 지연의 기대를 보여주는 자료로만 다룬다.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
법원이 정한 준비절차는 무엇을 예측하게 하는가,라는 물음은 그 귀책 판단 앞에 놓이는 절차의 시간적 틀을 묻는다. 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는데, 이 장면에서 지연의 책임을 물으려면 무엇이 언제 제출될 것인지가 정해져 있었는지가 먼저 밝혀져야 한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민사소송법 제280조 제1항에 있다. 그 조문은 "①변론준비절차는 기간을 정하여, 당사자로 하여금 준비서면, 그 밖의 서류를 제출하게 하거나 당사자 사이에 이를 교환하게 하고"라고 적는다. 여기서 주체는 기간을 정하는 법원이고, 행위는 준비서면·그 밖의 서류의 제출이나 당사자 사이의 교환이다. 조건은 그 행위가 기간을 정하는 방식으로 진행된다는 것이며, 이 항이 다루는 것은 서면의 왕래와 그 정리이다.
같은 조문은 이어서 "주장사실을 증명할 증거를 신청하게 하는 방법으로 진행한다"고 이어진다. 이 구절은 주장·증거의 정리를 위해 정한 기간, 즉 준비기간 안에서 주장사실을 뒷받침할 증거의 신청까지 함께 예정된다는 점을 보여준다. 따라서 준비절차는 무엇을 예측하게 하는가에 대한 답은 서면과 증거의 제출·신청 시점이 기간으로 정해지고, 당사자가 그 기간에 맞추어 자료를 내놓을 것이 기대된다는 것이다. 이 기대의 구체적인 시점이 드러나야 비로소 늦은 제출이라 부를 만한 차이가 생긴다.
예를 들어 기간이 너무 짧거나 자료가 방대하면 준비명령이 내려졌더라도 그 안에 응하기 어려운 사정이 있을 수 있다. 그러나 이 반론이 지적하는 어려움은 준비명령의 존재 자체를 지연의 책임 근거로 바꾸는 것을 막을 뿐이다. 앞의 답대로, 준비명령의 존재를 모든 지연의 귀책 증명으로 바꿀 수는 없으며, 실기 각하의 법정 조건은 여전히 고의 또는 중과실과 소송 완결의 지연을 요구한다. 안내가 있었다는 사실은 그 조건을 추정하게 하는 자료가 될 뿐, 조건의 존재를 대신 확정하지 않는다.
피고 B가 변론이 마무리될 무렵 내놓은 새 자료를 이 장면의 관련 사실로 두고 앞의 조건과 대조하면, 제출 시기와 그로 인한 소송 완결의 지연 효과를 따져 실기 각하 요건에 해당하는지가 이 절의 물음이다. 제출 기록, 준비명령, 지연 이유, 예상 심리 부담, 각하 이유가 판단의 기록으로 남는다. 그러나 늦어진 원인이나 추가 심리의 지연 효과를 알 수 없으면 그 사항은 미확정으로 남는다. 준비기간의 정함이 드러났다는 사실만으로 늦은 제출의 책임이 곧바로 확정되는 것은 아니고, 원고 A의 의도적인 지연이라는 주장도 그 자체로 판정되지 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 준비절차가 기간을 정해 서면 교환과 증거 신청을 진행하여 제출을 기대한 시점의 기준을 제시한다는 것이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 준비명령의 존재만으로 모든 지연의 귀책이 증명된다는 것이다. 지연 책임의 귀속은 실기 각하의 법정 조건이 남는 별개의 판단이다. 늦은 주장과 설명되지 않은 주장은 같은가?