Summary
The importance of the material and the statutory conditions of delay must be set out separately, leaving a record of the reasons for admission or exclusion.
6.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
중요하다는 말도 늦었다는 말도 혼자서는 공정한 종결을 만들지 못한다. 중요한 자료의 지연은 어떤 이유로 결론내려야 하는가? 청구 변경도 현저한 지연의 제한을 함께 받는다. 자료의 중요성과 지연의 법정 조건을 따로 적어 수용 또는 배제 이유를 남겨야 한다. 심리종결의 이유란 더 심리할 필요와 절차의 한계를 설명하는 판단을 뜻한다. 이 두 설명을 함께 적는 것이 공정한 종결을 판단하는 기준이다.
이 절에서 다루는 법문은 민사소송법 제149조 제1항이다. 그 문언은 당사자가 제146조의 규정을 어기어 고의 또는 중대한 과실로 공격 또는 방어방법을 뒤늦게 제출함으로써 소송의 완결을 지연시키게 하는 것으로 인정할 때에는 법원은 직권으로 또는 상대방의 신청에 따라 결정으로 이를 각하할 수 있다고 정한다. 여기서 법원이 각하할 수 있는 대상은 뒤늦게 제출된 공격방법 또는 방어방법이며, 지연을 이유로 배제하려면 고의 또는 중대한 과실로 인한 제출과 소송 완결의 지연이 함께 인정되어야 한다. 이 문언 자체에는 자료의 내용이 중요하다는 사실만으로 앞의 요건을 면제한다는 취지가 들어 있지 않다.
우선 제출 시기와 그 지연이 심리에 미치는 효과를 따져 실기 각하 요건에 해당하지 않거나 해당 공격방법이 적법하게 받아들여진 경우를 나누어 본다. 다음에 비로소 이 구제의 입구가 열린다. 두 단계를 구별해야 하는 이유는 첫째 단계가 늦은 자료의 처리를 다루는 반면, 둘째 단계가 소의 내용이 적절히 정해져 있는지를 물기 때문이다. 자료의 중요성과 지연의 법정 조건을 따로 적어 수용 또는 배제 이유를 남겨야 한다는 요구가 바로 이 구별에서 나온다. 여기서 심리종결의 이유는 더 심리할 필요와 절차의 한계를 설명하는 판단을 뜻한다. 심리종결의 판단과 같은 결론을 내지 않으면서 그 설명을 남기는 방식이 요구된다. 판단을 법원이 내린다면 판단의 근거가 되는 중요성과 지연 조건을 각각 적어 두어야 한다. 이는 자료가 아무리 중요해도 지연에 관한 법정 조건을 건너뛸 수는 없다는 뜻이다. 따라서 늦은 자료의 처리는 중요하다는 평가와 지연 요건의 인정 여부를 한 문장으로 합칠 수 없고, 둘을 나란히 적어야 한다. 여기서 심리종결의 이유란 더 심리할 필요와 절차의 한계를 설명하는 판단이며, 그 판단이 바로 실기 각하의 근거를 구분하는 작업을 떠맡는다.
그러나 상세한 이유를 요구하면 신속성의 목적을 해칠 수 있다. 중요한 자료라면 시기에 관계없이 받아야 잘못된 판결을 막을 수 있다는 점도, 늦게 제출된 자료를 심리에 넣지 못하면 얻을 수 있었던 공정을 잃게 된다는 점에서 강한 불편으로 남는다. 그렇더라도 중요성만으로 모든 지연 요건을 없앨 수는 없다. 반론의 불리한 부분은 그대로 두고, 자료의 중요성을 따로 적어 수용 또는 배제 이유로 설명하는 방식이 요구된다. 즉 중요성이 큰 자료라는 평가는 지연에 관한 법정 조건이 인정되었는지를 대신해 주지 못한다. 그 대신 중요성을 별도 항목으로 적어 두고 지연 요건의 인정 여부와 함께 판단의 근거로 삼는 것이 결론을 유지하는 길이다. 자료의 중요성과 지연의 법정 조건을 따로 적어 수용 또는 배제 이유를 남겨야 한다는 요구가 신속성의 목적과 충돌하는 불편을 지우지 않고도 그 자리를 남긴다.
피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는 장면에서 이 물음에 관련된 사실은 이 둘이다. 여기서 자료가 늦게 제출된 것으로 인정되는 경우 자료의 중요성을 별도로 평가한 뒤 지연에 관한 법정 조건을 검사해야 한다. 피고 B는 자료의 중요성을 강조하고 원고 A는 지연의 의도를 강조하지만, 어느 쪽의 설명만으로도 실기 각하의 요건이 채워지는 것은 아니다. 만약 단순한 지각만 남고 고의 또는 중대한 과실이나 완결 지연이 부정되는 것으로 확인되면 실기 각하 결론을 다시 판단해야 한다. 이 판정 조건은 고의 또는 중대한 과실로 인한 제출과 소송 완결의 지연이 함께 인정되어야 한다는 법정 요건에 대응한다. 다만 합성 장면은 연도·금액·기산일을 정하지 않았으므로 늦어진 기간의 길이나 추가 심리의 비용은 확인하지 못한다. 남은 미확정 항목은 그대로 두되, 자료의 중요성과 지연 요건을 나란히 적는 기준은 그대로 적용한다. 늦어진 원인 또는 추가 심리의 지연 효과를 알 수 없는 경우에는 미확정으로 남고, 그 미확정이 곧바로 구제 불능이나 각하의 사유가 되지는 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 늦은 자료를 다룰 때 그 중요성을 별도로 적고 지연에 관한 법정 조건의 성립 여부를 함께 설명한 뒤, 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건이 청구취지에 특정되고 선택한 소의 권리를 방어할 수 있는지 확인하여 이 구제의 입구를 여는 데까지이다. 중요성만으로 모든 지연 요건을 없애는 결론은 허용되지 않는다. 또한 지연이 있었다는 사실만으로 각하하거나, 미확인 항목을 끝까지 확정하지 못한 채 그대로 진행해도 된다는 결론도 이 절의 몫이 아니다. 여기서 심리종결의 이유는 더 심리할 필요와 절차의 한계를 설명하는 판단을 뜻하며, 그 설명이 남는 선에서 판정을 마친다.
6.2The Conditions That Block Relief
앞 단계에서는 청구 변경도 현저한 지연의 제한을 함께 받는다고 보았으나, 지금의 물음은 그 제한이 자료 제출의 지연에 어떻게 작용하는지에 한정된다. 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는 장면에서, 중요한 자료의 지연은 어떤 이유로 결론내려야 하는가라는 물음과 함께 구제가 닫히는 조건이 무엇인가라는 물음이 놓인다. 그 물음은 자료의 중요성과 지연의 법정 조건을 따로 적어 수용 또는 배제 이유를 남겨야 한다는 전제 위에서만 다루어진다.
그 전제는 민사소송법 제149조 제1항의 문언으로 구체화된다. 그 조항은 "당사자가 제146조의 규정을 어기어 고의 또는 중대한 과실로 공격 또는 방어방법을 뒤늦게 제출함으로써 소송의 완결을 지연시키게 하는 것으로 인정할 때에는 법원은 직권으로 또는 상대방의 신청에 따라 결정으로 이를 각하할 수 있다"고 정하고 있다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 뒤늦게 공격 또는 방어방법을 제출한 당사자이고, 행위는 제146조의 규정을 어긴 뒤늦은 제출이며, 조건은 고의 또는 중대한 과실과 소송 완결의 지연이다. 자료의 중요성이 이 문언에 열거된 조건에 들어 있지 않은 점이 이 절의 출발점이다.
이 문언을 근거로 이 절의 결론은, 고의 또는 중대한 과실의 지연 제출로 소송 완결이 늦어지는 법정 조건이 인정되어 해당 공격 또는 방어방법이 각하된 경우 구제 통로는 닫힌다는 것이다. 여기서 법정 요건의 인정과 각하라는 두 판단 단계를 구별해야 하는 까닭은, 전자가 각하의 문을 여는 조건이고 후자가 그 문을 닫는 처분이기 때문이다. 제149조는 각하의 요건을 정할 뿐, 요건의 일부만 갖춘 상태에서의 처리를 별도로 정하지 않는다.
이 절의 가장 강한 반론은 상세한 이유를 요구하면 신속성의 목적을 해칠 수 있다는 점을 겨눈다. 중요한 자료라면 시기에 관계없이 받아야 잘못된 판결을 막을 수 있다는 점에서, 지연 요건을 엄격히 따지는 태도는 잘못된 종결을 고칠 기회를 잃게 만든다. 자료의 중요성이 오롯이 확인되지 않은 채 각하될 때 입을 수 있는 손실은 실질적이고, 반론이 지적하는 신속성의 이익과 충돌한다. 그렇더라도 앞의 답은 중요성만으로 모든 지연 요건을 없앨 수는 없다는 것이며, 이는 반론이 강조하는 중요한 자료의 유용함을 부정하지 않고도 지연 요건을 따로 검사해야 한다는 뜻이다.
이 장면에서 이 물음과 관련된 사실은, 피고 B가 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내었고 원고 A가 의도적인 지연이라고 다투었다는 것뿐이다. 이 사실을 앞의 조건과 대조하면, 제149조 제1항이 요구하는 고의 또는 중대한 과실과 소송 완결의 지연은 이 장면만으로는 확정되지 않는다. 원고 A가 의도적 지연이라고 다투었다는 사실은 그 주장을 표시한 것이지, 요건의 인정을 의미하지 않는다. 지연의 원인 또는 추가 심리의 지연 효과를 알 수 없는 이 상태에서 심리종결의 이유, 다시 말해 더 심리할 필요와 절차의 한계를 설명하는 판단은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 지연 요건의 각각이 따로 확인되어야 하며, 중요성만으로 그 요건을 대신할 수 없다는 데까지이고, 자료의 중요성에 비추어 지연 요건을 모두 없애야 한다는 결론은 허용하지 않는다. 각하된 공격·방어방법에 관한 판단을 표시할 때 민사소송법 제208조 제2항이 정한 "주문이 정당하다는 것을 인정할 수 있을 정도로 당사자의 주장, 그 밖의 공격·방어방법에 관한 판단을 표시한다"는 기준이 요구되지만, 이 절은 그 표시의 분량을 따로 다루지 않는다.
6.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
이 물음은 합성 장면을 전제로 한다. 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다툰다. 앞 절에서 고의 또는 중과실의 지연 제출로 소송 완결이 늦어지는 법정 조건이 인정되어 해당 공격·방어방법이 각하된 경우에는 이 구제가 막힌다고 정리했다. 그렇다면 늦어진 원인이나 그 자료가 늦게 들어온 뒤에 심리에 얼마나 더 부담을 주는지가 밝혀지지 않은 경우에는 어떻게 처리할지가 남는다.
이 문제의 출발점은 민사소송법 제149조 제1항이다. 그 문언은 "당사자가 제146조의 규정을 어기어 고의 또는 중대한 과실로 공격 또는 방어방법을 뒤늦게 제출함으로써 소송의 완결을 지연시키게 하는 것으로 인정할 때에는 법원은 직권으로 또는 상대방의 신청에 따라 결정으로 이를 각하할 수 있다"고 정한다(민사소송법 제149조). 여기서 법원이 각하할 수 있는 대상은 제146조를 어겨 늦게 제출된 공격 또는 방어방법이다. 다만 그 판단의 조건은 두 층으로 나뉘어 있다. 하나는 뒤늦은 제출에 고의 또는 중대한 과실이 있어야 한다는 것이고, 다른 하나는 그 탓으로 소송의 완결이 지연되어야 한다는 것이다. 이 둘은 따로 확인해야 하는 사정이다.
자료가 새 공격·방어방법의 근거로 얼마나 중요한지는 심리를 열어둘 만한지를 가늠하는 데에는 관계된다. 그러나 제149조 제1항의 각하 요건이 채워졌는지는 그와 별개로 판단되어야 한다. 중요한 자료라도 고의 또는 중대한 과실로 늦게 제출되어 소송 완결을 지연시킨 것으로 인정되면 문언이 정한 각하 사유가 된다. 반대로 중요성이 크더라도 제149조 제1항이 요구하는 지연 조건이 확인되지 않으면 각하를 받는다고 보기는 어렵다. 이 구별이 빠지면 중요하다는 사실 하나로 늦은 제출의 사유가 모두 무력화되거나, 늦었다는 사실 하나로 자료의 내용이 모두 가려지는 잘못이 생긴다.
이 구별을 두고 반론이 나온다. 상세한 이유를 요구하면 신속성의 목적을 해칠 수 있다는 것이다. 지금 늦어진 원인이 무엇인지, 그 자료를 받아들일 경우 추가 심리가 얼마나 걸릴지 일일이 따져 적으라고 요구하면 종결이 그만큼 늦어진다는 점에서, 이 반론은 절차가 지키려는 신속한 종결이라는 가치를 직접 겨냥한다. 그러나 그 우려가 인정된다고 해서 중요성만으로 모든 지연 요건을 없앨 수는 없다. 민사소송법 제149조 제1항의 문언은 고의 또는 중대한 과실과 완결 지연을 각하의 조건으로 함께 두고 있으며, 이 조건들을 나란히 보지 않으면 오히려 자료의 중요성만으로 종결의 한계가 무너진다. 그래서 반론이 지적한 신속성의 가치는 인정하되, 지연의 법정 조건이 사라지는 방식으로는 답하지 않는 것이다.
이 경계를 합성 장면에 적용하면 구별이 분명해진다. 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 제출했고, 원고 A는 그 제출이 의도적인 지연이라고 다투고 있다. 이 장면은 제출의 시기와 의도가 문제되고 있다는 사실까지만 정해 둔다. 그러나 늦어진 원인이 무엇인지, 그리고 그 자료가 늦게 들어옴으로써 심리에 실제로 얼마만큼의 지연 효과가 생기는지는 장면이 담고 있지 않다. 이 항목들이 기록으로 채워지지 않은 동안 제149조 제1항의 각하 조건이 채워졌는지는 판정할 수 없다. 이때의 판정은 확정되거나 막힌 것이 아니라 미확정으로 남는다. 앞에서 본 것처럼 지연 제출과 완결 지연이라는 법정 조건이 인정되어 각하된 경우에는 구제가 막히지만, 지금처럼 원인이나 지연 효과가 확인되지 않은 경우에는 그렇게 보지 않는다는 구별이 성립한다.
이렇게 미확정으로 남기는 처리는 구제가 막힌 경우와 구분되어야 하며, 동시에 자료 부족이 곧바로 구제 불능을 뜻하는 것도 아니다. 미확정은 현재의 자료만으로는 판단이 서지 않는 상태를 가리키고, 구제가 막힌 것은 제149조 제1항이 정한 각하 조건이 인정되어 해당 공격·방어방법이 배제된 상태를 가리킨다. 반대로 단순 지각만 남고 고의·중과실 또는 완결 지연이 부정되면 실기 각하 결론을 다시 판단한다. 여기서 심리종결의 이유는 더 심리할 필요와 절차의 한계를 설명하는 판단을 뜻하며, 판결서의 이유에는 주문이 정당하다는 것을 인정할 수 있을 정도로 당사자의 주장, 그 밖의 공격·방어방법에 관한 판단을 표시한다(민사소송법 제208조). 그 판단을 남기는 데 어떤 기록이 필요한가?
6.4The Records Needed for Determination
To decide in this scene whether the court will accept late-filed material, one must set down side by side how important the material is and how late its submission was. Checking whether records remain that can answer each of these two questions is the starting point of this determination.
The provision in question is Article 149(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, which provides that "where a party, in violation of Article 146, submits a means of attack or defense belatedly through intent or gross negligence, thereby delaying the conclusion of the lawsuit, and this is recognized, the court may, ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon the other party's application, dismiss it by ruling" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 149). The subject this provision designates is the party who delayed the submission; the act is the belated submission of a means of attack or defense; and the conditions are the violation of Article 146, intent or gross negligence, and the delay of the conclusion of the lawsuit. This section addresses only the records of the conditions this provision requires, and does not address the question of the duty to explain, which is prescribed in other paragraphs of the same Article.
What connects this provision to the conclusion of this section is the division of records. The importance of the material is a question of the extent to which the material justifies the need to continue the examination; and the statutory conditions of delay are a question of whether the submission was made through intent or gross negligence and whether it postpones the conclusion. The two determinations require different records. The submission records and the preparation order leave behind when and what was presented and what the court had scheduled; the reasons for the delay and the anticipated burden of examination leave behind why the delay arose and how much more examination is required; and the reasons for dismissal on procedural grounds leave behind what conditions the court recognized and what it excluded. Stages are determined using only the material recorded in these records, and missing records are not filled in by inference.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that, if the material is important, strictly inquiring into the conditions of delay may instead produce a wrong judgment. Its contention is that, if the material is important, it should be accepted regardless of timing in order to prevent a wrong judgment. This concern clearly points to the loss, resulting from the exclusion of late material, of departing from substantive truth, and it also leaves in place the inconvenience of having been unable to examine the contents of the material. Even so, importance alone cannot eliminate all the delay requirements. If the submission records and the reasons for the delay were never created and the cause of the lateness cannot be known, one cannot say that the determination of the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds was recorded; and if the anticipated burden of examination was not recorded, the basis for recognizing delay of the conclusion is also empty.
In the synthetic scene, the facts needed for the determination are only these two: the timing at which Defendant B submitted new material around the time oral argument was drawing to a close, and the contention of Plaintiff A that the submission was an intentional delay. Comparing these facts to the statutory conditions, the submission records and the preparation order must establish the timing of the belated submission and the examination plan up to that point, while the reasons for the delay and the anticipated burden of examination must provide the basis for determining intent or gross negligence and whether the conclusion was delayed. Because the scene does not state why the submission was late, how much more examination would be required, or on what grounds the court dismissed it, those items remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is one in which the importance of the material and the statutory conditions of delay are each recorded in the designated records and the conditions are determined on the basis of those records alone. Conversely, failing to examine the delay requirements because of importance, or filling in reasons for delay or burdens of examination that are not in the records by inference, exceeds the scope of determination of this section. One does not draw a conclusion from the mere fact that the material was late; one first checks what remains in the submission records, the preparation order, the reasons for the delay, the anticipated burden of examination, and the reasons for dismissal on procedural grounds.
6.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In the preceding stage there was a direction to separate the importance of the material from the delay, and now the question is what conditions would reverse that determination.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 149 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its paragraph (1) states that "where a party, in violation of Article 146, submits a means of attack or defense belatedly through intent or gross negligence, thereby delaying the conclusion of the lawsuit, and this is recognized," the court may dismiss it by ruling. In this provision the subject is the party, the act is the belated submission of a means of attack or defense, and the conditions are the intent or gross negligence arising from the violation of Article 146 and the delay of the conclusion of the lawsuit.
The court proceeds to dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness only when all three conditions are recognized together. The fact that important material was submitted is an evaluation indicating the need for examination, while the judgment that the conclusion was delayed through intent or gross negligence is a separate determination as to whether that material should be pushed out of the examination to the end. Here, the reasons for the conclusion of hearings mean the determination that explains the need for further examination and the limits of the procedure, and if these two determinations are combined into a single line, which of them was decisive disappears from the records. (Civil Procedure Act, Article 208)
If the inner circumstances of the delay and the anticipated burden of examination had to be recorded at length for each item of material, the conclusion of the lawsuit would be delayed, and the cost of deferring the examination would be transferred to the party that litigated to the end. If intent or gross negligence and the delay of the conclusion are removed from the conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds under Article 149(1), the rule becomes that late material is accepted unconditionally, and the predictive function of the preparation order and the time of submission collapses together. Therefore, while accepting the loss of expedition pointed out by the counterargument, one narrows the inquiry to checking the statutory conditions one by one, within the scope of leaving behind the submission records, the preparation order, the reasons for the delay, the anticipated burden of examination, and the reasons for dismissal on procedural grounds.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only the fact that Defendant B filed material around the time oral argument was drawing to a close and Plaintiff A contested it as an intentional delay. Since the cause of the lateness and the delaying effect of any additional examination cannot be known, whether the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness are met remains undetermined.
What this section permits is reassessing the entry of late assertions and evidence into the examination in light of the time of submission and the delaying effect, and what it does not permit is a determination that skips the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness on the strength of the material's importance alone. The premise that an amendment of the claim is likewise subject to the restriction on manifest delay operates here only as a prior condition to this question.
6.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The discussion up to the preceding stage has confirmed the direction that, even where important material is submitted late, the statutory conditions of delay must be examined separately, and this stage inherits that direction. In the scene where Defendant B files new material around the time oral argument is drawing to a close and Plaintiff A contests the submission as an intentional delay, the value of the material and the wrongfulness of the timing of submission are not reducible to one another. The more decisive the material, the stronger the demand that it be accepted, but it cannot be said that reaching a fair conclusion follows from not asking why the submission was late. The question this stage addresses is how to respond to the argument for permitting delay on the strength of the material's importance.
Article 149(1) of the Civil Procedure Act enumerates the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds of untimely means of attack or defense. Its text provides that, where a party, in violation of Article 146, submits a means of attack or defense belatedly through intent or gross negligence, thereby delaying the conclusion of the lawsuit, and this is recognized, the court may, ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon the other party's application, dismiss it by ruling. Here, what is subject to dismissal on procedural grounds is the means of attack or defense; the act is its belated submission; and the conditions are the violation of Article 146, the intent or gross negligence, and the delay of the conclusion of the lawsuit. Among these, the importance of the material is not included in the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds under this paragraph. Accordingly, importance is only a circumstance to be recorded separately in the determination of dismissal on procedural grounds, and does not substitute for one of the requirements.
This distinction is settled according to what kind of determination the reasons for the conclusion of hearings explain. Here, the reasons for the conclusion of hearings mean the determination that explains the need for further examination and the limits of the procedure; but to which does the importance of the material belong? The greater the importance, the more it is a circumstance pointing toward a need for further examination, whereas the statutory conditions of delay are circumstances asking whether the limits of the procedure have already been exceeded. Because the two circumstances answer different questions, mixing them in a single list blurs the basis of the determination. This is why the importance and the statutory conditions of delay are to be recorded separately so as to leave behind the reasons for acceptance or exclusion; and if the delay requirements are erased on the strength of importance alone without such a record, then even though the form of the determination remains, its content becomes empty.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that this distinction binds the procedural purpose of expedition too tightly. If detailed reasons are demanded, the judgment is delayed; while it is delayed, the parties must wait without a settled conclusion; and in the meantime there remains the loss that a procedure contesting a single item of material grows longer. The demand that important material be accepted regardless of timing in order to prevent a wrong judgment also lends weight to this counterargument. The inconvenience of the delay pointed out by the counterargument is a legitimate concern, but if, on the strength of the material's importance, one skips the very stage of asking about the time of submission and the delaying effect, then in place of expedition another loss enters: the loss of a conclusion changing without prepared contest. Thus the line drawn is not that importance must be ignored, but that importance cannot neutralize the other requirements.
What can be confirmed in this scene is only the fact that Defendant B filed new material around the time oral argument was drawing to a close and that Plaintiff A contested it as an intentional delay. On this fact alone it cannot be determined whether intent or gross negligence is recognized, whether the conclusion of the lawsuit was delayed, or how important the material is. Whether Article 146 was violated, the motive for the belated submission, and the delaying effect on the conclusion — all required by Article 149(1) of the Civil Procedure Act — all remain in a state that cannot be determined. The submission records, the preparation order, the reasons for the delay, the anticipated burden of examination, and the reasons for dismissal on procedural grounds are records to be verified. The point that the material is of great importance and the point that the delay requirements are recognized may together lie in this scene, but which of them prevailed has not been determined.
What this section permits is not the conclusion that importance must be ignored, but the conclusion of recording the value of the material and the wrongfulness of the submission side by side and determining them within the scope of not using importance as a substitute for the delay requirements. Conversely, a method that, on the strength of great importance alone, dispenses with asking about intent or gross negligence, the delay of the conclusion of the lawsuit, and the violation of Article 146 and goes beyond the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds is not accepted by this section. Even if material is late, if it does not fall within the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for untimeliness, or if it was lawfully accepted, the door to the examination opens; where the requirements are recognized and the means of attack or defense is dismissed without prejudice, it closes. In between, the state of being undetermined remains undetermined.
6.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Taking up the conclusion of the preceding section that importance alone cannot eliminate all the delay requirements, this stage now asks on what grounds the delay should be concluded when important material is submitted late. In the synthetic scene, Defendant B files new material around the time oral argument is drawing to a close, and Plaintiff A argues that it was an intentional delay. In this situation, the value the material possesses and the circumstance that it came in late are different questions, so a determination of acceptance or exclusion on the basis of one alone cannot accurately record the judgment of this scene.
The statute corresponding to this question is Article 149 of the Civil Procedure Act. The subject this provision addresses is the party who submitted the means of attack or defense; the act is the belated submission in violation of Article 146; and the conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds are the intent or gross negligence and the delay of the conclusion of the lawsuit. The importance of the material itself is not among the conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds enumerated in this provision.
Accordingly, the assessment that the material is important and the statutory conditions of a late submission are each items to be recorded. This distinction does not create a new requirement; it is an attempt not to mix the conditions prescribed in the above provision with the judgment of the material's value. As to the reasons in a judgment, Article 208(2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "it shall state the court's determinations on the parties' assertions and other means of attack or defense" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 208), and on this basis the determination of the material's importance and the determination whether the statutory conditions of delay are met must be recorded together, as reasons for acceptance or exclusion.
The strongest counterargument begins from the point that demanding detailed reasons may impair the purpose of expedition. Its contention is that important material should be accepted even if late in order to prevent a wrong judgment, and that the procedure of examining and recording the delay conditions only slows the lawsuit. Yet the value of expedition, like the value of importance, is only one consideration, and importance alone cannot eliminate all the delay requirements. While recognizing the benefit of preventing misjudgment emphasized by the counterargument, the path of confirming the delay conditions prescribed in Article 149(1) and leaving the determination of whether they are met as a judgment is not closed off.
The facts that can be confirmed in this scene amount only to this: Defendant B submitted new material at the close of oral argument, and Plaintiff A contested this submission as an intentional delay. Comparing these facts to the conditions of the above provision confirms that a determination is needed as to whether intent or gross negligence is recognized and whether the conclusion of the lawsuit is delayed. However, the cause of the delay and the delaying effect of additional examination cannot be confirmed from this scene alone, and thus remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the importance of the material and the statutory conditions of delay must each be recorded so as to leave behind the reasons for acceptance or exclusion; what it does not permit is eliminating all the delay requirements on the strength of importance alone. Even important material cannot be freed of the circumstances of its lateness, and even a late submission must not be excluded without the statutory conditions of delay having been verified.
6.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Asking about the value of new material and inquiring into the fault of that material's late arrival point to different paths, and neither one alone can justify the point at which the case is brought to a close. In this scenario, Defendant B submits new material as oral argument is drawing to a close, and Plaintiff A disputes this as intentional delay; this confrontation lays bare the question of how the delay of important material is to be concluded.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 149, paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. That provision states: "Where a party, in violation of Article 146, belatedly submits an attack or defense method through intent or gross negligence, and it is recognized that this delays the completion of the lawsuit, the court may, ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon application of the opposing party, dismiss it without prejudice (on procedural grounds) by decision" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 149).
When this condition is brought to bear on the scenario, two stages of judgment stand apart. The first is the importance of the material, that is, the work of distinguishing what weight that material may have on the conclusion. The second is the statutory conditions of delay, that is, the work of examining whether the late submission involves intent or gross negligence and whether it delays the completion of the lawsuit. Both must be recorded together for the reasons for acceptance or exclusion to remain, and importance alone cannot be substituted for the delay requirements. Even after dismissal on procedural grounds has been effected, the reasons must also meet the requirement to "state the determinations on the parties' contentions and other means of attack and defense to the extent sufficient to recognize that the operative part is proper" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 208).
The reason this distinction is burdensome is clear. If material that is truly important is shut out because of a formal delay, the judgment may move away from the truth. Here, the reasons for closing the hearing mean a judgment that explains the need for further examination and the limits of the procedure, and a counterargument that requiring detailed reasons may undermine the purpose of expedition targets this very point. Recording the statutory conditions of delay together is not a device that postpones closure but a marking of the limits of the procedure that leaves behind why the door is closed without further examination.
Returning to the synthetic scenario, Defendant B's new material was entered on the submission record as oral argument was drawing to a close, and Plaintiff A disputes that submission as intentional delay. The designated records are the submission record, the preparatory order, the reasons for delay, the anticipated hearing burden, and the reasons for dismissal on procedural grounds. On these facts alone, neither the cause of the lateness nor the delay effect of further examination can be fixed, and so whether intent or gross negligence and the delay of the completion of the lawsuit are recognized remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is as follows: by recording the importance of the material and the statutory conditions of delay separately, so that the reasons for acceptance or exclusion remain, and insofar as that judgment leads on to the reasons for closing the hearing, that is, to a judgment in the form of explaining the need for further examination and the limits of the procedure, the delay of important material can also be concluded. The conclusion not permitted is the one that abolishes all delay requirements on the ground of importance alone. Within that boundary, whether the court can add a performance it considers more just is not the task of this section.
6.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Here the question is whether the text of the two provisions should remain merely the basis that governs the admission of late assertions and evidence into the hearing. Why this distinction is necessary is examined below.
The first provision governing the admission of late assertions and evidence into the hearing is Article 149, paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. By its terms, the subject is the party that submitted them, the act is the late submission of an attack or defense method, and the conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds are the violation of Article 146, intent or gross negligence, and the delay of the completion of the lawsuit.
When the above provision is parsed into conditions, the importance of the material is not among the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds. Conversely, the mere fact that the material is of great importance does not resolve those requirements either. The author takes the view that the importance of the material and the statutory conditions of delay must be divided into separate items and the reasons for acceptance and exclusion recorded accordingly. This distinction is not the work of adding a new requirement but the work of simply reiterating the stages of judgment already separated within the above provision.
If the grounds for both acceptance and exclusion must be written out, the time taken to reach a decision increases, and the examination begun with the late material may undo a procedure that is already drawing to a close. If, disregarding such inconvenience, all delay requirements are abolished on the sole ground of importance, the very conditions set for prompt closure become meaningless. Accordingly, the author takes the view that, even for important material, whether to dismiss it without prejudice (on procedural grounds) must be decided only after the statutory conditions—late submission through gross negligence and the delay of the completion of the lawsuit—have been examined together, and that this judgment must not end with the decision alone but must also be contained in the reasons for closing the hearing, that is, in a judgment explaining the need for further examination and the limits of the procedure.
Returning to the synthetic scenario, Defendant B submits new material as oral argument is drawing to a close, and Plaintiff A disputes it as intentional delay. The facts confirmed in this scenario are only that the timing of the submission is late and that the plaintiff disputes the delay. The contents of the preparatory order, Defendant B's reasons for delay, the anticipated hearing burden that the new material will bring, and whether the court will give reasons for dismissal on procedural grounds cannot yet be known. Accordingly, whether intent or gross negligence and the delay of the completion of the lawsuit are recognized so that the relevant attack or defense method is dismissed (on procedural grounds), or whether, not falling within the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds due to untimeliness, it enters the hearing, cannot be determined on the basis of this scenario alone.
What this section permits is the method of separately recording the importance of the material and the reasons for its lateness and deciding accordingly whether to admit it into the hearing. What this section does not permit is the method of abolishing all delay requirements on the ground of importance alone. Admitting late assertions and evidence into the hearing does not mean that the reasons for the judgment can be read more broadly as a separate item, nor can other provisions not covered by the relevant text be taken as a basis. The reasons for closing the hearing do not go beyond the scope of a judgment that explains the need for further examination and the limits of the procedure.
6.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
On the premise that amendment of the claim is likewise subject to the restriction of manifest delay, the preceding analysis required importance and delay to be recorded separately, and the present stage narrows that requirement down to the question of which parts are to be separately adjudicated within the examination that accepts or excludes the late material. This adjudication is possible only insofar as it does not mix the point that inquires into the timing of submission and the effect of delay with the point, distinct from it, at which an explanation of material whose purpose is unclear is required.
Article 149, paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that, where a party, in violation of Article 146, belatedly submits an attack or defense method through intent or gross negligence, and it is recognized that this delays the completion of the lawsuit, the court may, ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon application of the opposing party, dismiss it (on procedural grounds) by decision (Civil Procedure Act, Article 149). The subject prescribed by this text is the party that belatedly submitted an attack or defense method, the act is that submission, and the conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds are the violation of Article 146, intent or gross negligence, and the recognition of the delay of the completion of the lawsuit. Paragraph (2) of the same Article separately deals with dismissal on procedural grounds where the party that submitted the attack or defense method fails to give the necessary explanation when its purpose is unclear, or fails to appear on the date set for the explanation. This question centers on the delay requirements of paragraph (1), and the explanation requirement of paragraph (2) is indicated only as a separate point of judgment.
This text is joined to the conclusion set out above. The detailed distinctions within the stage are limited to the conditions of operating, blocked, and undetermined. The parts to be adjudicated again are as follows. Where, on examining the timing of submission and the effect of delay, the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds (on procedural grounds) due to untimeliness are not met, or the relevant method has been lawfully accepted, the material enters the hearing. Where the statutory condition—that the completion of the lawsuit is delayed by late submission through intent or gross negligence—is recognized and the relevant attack or defense method is dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds), entry is blocked. Where the cause of the lateness or the delay effect of further examination cannot be known, whether entry occurs remains undetermined. The reason this distinction is needed is that the importance of the material and the statutory conditions of delay constitute different questions. Importance explains the value that is to be dealt with, and the delay requirements explain how and by when that value is to be received; if one is reduced to the other, the statutory conditions in effect disappear or important material is excluded without reason. No new stage is added here, and the reasons for closing the hearing mean a judgment that explains the need for further examination and the limits of the procedure.
The counterargument that requiring detailed reasons may undermine the purpose of expedition targets the losses and inconveniences that arise if, even in dealing with a single piece of late material, one is required to record the reasons for its lateness and the burden of the anticipated further examination—closure being delayed and the inconvenience to the waiting parties growing. It emphasizes in particular that, if the material is important, it must be accepted regardless of timing in order to prevent an erroneous judgment, and it regards the side that strictly inquires into the statutory conditions of delay as sacrificing the value of reaching substantive truth. That observation is the favorable part of the counterargument and is not erased. The text of Article 149, paragraph (1), which requires intent or gross negligence and the delay of the completion of the lawsuit together (Civil Procedure Act, Article 149), does not record those delay requirements in its place no matter how great the importance of the material, and rather requires importance and delay to be recorded side by side so that the reasons for acceptance or exclusion remain.
Contrasting this scenario with the conditions above, the plaintiff's contention is an argument aimed at the requirement of paragraph (1), namely intent or gross negligence, and whether the submission of the new material delays the completion of the lawsuit is a point to be examined separately. The requirements are not recognized on the plaintiff's assertion alone; the submission record, the preparatory order, the reasons for delay, the anticipated hearing burden, and the reasons for dismissal on procedural grounds are the items required as the record for this adjudication. Because the scenario has not determined the cause of the delay, how the submission dovetails with the preparatory order, or how much burden further examination will actually create, those items remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is to adjudicate the admission into the hearing of late material within the three conditions of operating, blocked, and undetermined, and to record the importance of the material and the statutory conditions of delay separately in the reasons for acceptance and exclusion. The conclusions it does not permit are to exempt all delay requirements on the sole ground of high importance, to fix at once matters left undetermined as exclusion or acceptance, or to add thereto a performance considered more just.
6.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
In this scenario, the single fact that the material was late does not clearly determine anything. The words of the person who submitted important material late and the words of the person who raises the delay as a problem may conflict with each other. The judgment that produces a fair closure must go beyond accepting one side's words and separately record the conditions for whether the delayed material is to be put into the hearing.
The provision corresponding to the present question prescribes the conditions and method when late-submitted attack or defense methods are dismissed (on procedural grounds). Article 149, paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Where a party, in violation of Article 146, belatedly submits an attack or defense method through intent or gross negligence, and it is recognized that this delays the completion of the lawsuit, the court may, ex officio (by the court's own authority) or upon application of the opposing party, dismiss it (on procedural grounds) by decision" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 149). The subject dealt with here is the party that belatedly submitted an attack or defense method, the act is the late submission that violates the preparatory order, and the conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds are the recognition of intent or gross negligence and the delay of the completion of the lawsuit.
This text does not bundle the conditions confirmed above into one but records them separately. The evaluation that the material is important and whether the statutory conditions of delay are established are different stages of judgment. Importance may be a reason for putting it into the hearing, but the threshold for dismissal on procedural grounds remains the conditions of intent or gross negligence and the delay of completion. So long as these two are not mixed, the conditions under which it is opened are where, examining the timing of submission and the effect of delay, the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds due to untimeliness are not met, or the relevant method has been lawfully accepted; and the conditions under which it is blocked are where the statutory condition—that the completion of the lawsuit is delayed by late submission through intent or gross negligence—is recognized and the relevant attack or defense method is dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds). The fact that dismissal on procedural grounds is effected by decision is likewise recorded as such here.
The counterargument this distinction targets is expedition. If late material greatly determines the accuracy of the judgment, a wrong conclusion may remain if that material is not accepted. Hence arises the demand that material judged important must be put into the hearing even if it is late. Yet such importance alone cannot abolish all delay requirements. A request made for the accuracy of the judgment must also meet the statutory conditions that inquire into the timing of submission and the effect of delay, and if these conditions are omitted without reason, the distinction between acceptance and exclusion set out above itself disappears.
Placed in the synthetic scenario, the facts to be compared are fixed. Here the submission record, the preparatory order, the reasons for delay, the anticipated hearing burden, and the reasons for dismissal on procedural grounds (on procedural grounds) are taken as the record. The scenario, however, has recorded only the timing of Defendant B's submission and Plaintiff A's contention, and does not indicate the cause of the lateness or how much further examination delays completion. So long as such facts remain, it is left undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is to judge the admission of late assertions and evidence into the hearing by dividing it into operating, blocked, and undetermined. It is operating where the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds (on procedural grounds) due to untimeliness are not met or the relevant method has been lawfully accepted; it is blocked where, the statutory conditions being recognized, the attack or defense method is dismissed without prejudice (on procedural grounds). If, between the two, the cause of the lateness or the effect of delay cannot be known, it remains undetermined. Conversely, the conclusion of abolishing all delay requirements on the ground of importance alone is not permitted under this distinction. Separately from that, the reasons of the judgment shall state the parties' contentions and other matters of attack and defense to the extent sufficient to recognize that the operative part is proper (Civil Procedure Act, Article 208).
6.12이 권의 결론과 남는 물음
Whether materials that emerged late bear a value sufficient to change the content of the judgment, and why those materials were late, are separate questions. The question that remains is on what ground the delay of important materials should be concluded upon. Only by writing separately, rather than asking together about the value of the materials and the timing of their submission, do the conditions of a fair conclusion come to light.
The provision corresponding to this section is Article 149 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides that where a party delays the conclusion of the lawsuit by belatedly submitting means of attack or defense through intent or gross negligence, the court may dismiss. Here the subject is the party who submitted the means of attack or defense, the act is the belated submission, and the condition is that intent or gross negligence and the delay of the conclusion are both established. This provision does not also determine the question whether the materials are important.
The above provision places the grounds for acceptance and the grounds for exclusion in separate positions. That the materials bear a value capable of affecting the judgment is a determination concerning the need for examination, and that their submission was delayed through intent or gross negligence so as to delay the conclusion is a determination concerning the limits of procedure. Only by distinguishing these two stages do the reasons for acceptance or exclusion remain. The reasons for the close of the hearing mean the determination that explains both the need for further examination and the limits of procedure, and only when the statutory conditions of importance and delay are written side by side within it does it become a record from which the judgment of dismissal on procedural grounds can be read.
A counterargument that requiring detailed reasons may impair the aim of expedition targets the loss and inconvenience at that point. Whenever a delayed submission occurs, requiring the reasons to be set out in detail postpones the conclusion, and in a lawsuit whose remaining schedule has been fixed, that burden is borne by the procedure as a whole in its entirety. However important the materials may be, it is one thing to enter into the examination after weighing the timing of the submission and the effect of the delay and finding that the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds of an untimely submission are not met, or that the relevant means have been lawfully admitted; it is another where the means of attack or defense in question is dismissed without prejudice on the finding that the conclusion was delayed through intent or gross negligence.
In this scene, Defendant B puts forward new materials around the time oral argument is drawing to a close, and Plaintiff A disputes this as an intentional delay, and on that record the submission record, preparation order, reason for delay, anticipated examination burden, and reasons for dismissal on procedural grounds have been determined. These facts alone cannot confirm the cause of the delay or the delaying effect of additional examination. Hence, to record the importance of the materials separately but fix the conclusion without also recording the statutory conditions of delay is to erase the part that cannot be confirmed from this scene.
Accordingly, this section permits a determination that records the importance of the materials and the statutory conditions of delay side by side and thereby leaves the reasons for acceptance or exclusion. It does not permit a conclusion that fills the blank of those reasons with importance alone and thereby erases the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds of an untimely submission; nor does it leave a conclusion that, conversely, retains only the wording of delay and thereby erases the need for examination. Where the cause of the delay or the delaying effect of additional examination has not been confirmed, it is left undetermined, and the reasons for the close of the hearing are described only within the scope of the conditions that have been confirmed. Can the court add a performance that it deems more just?
Statutes referred to
Questions left open
- What disadvantage is appropriate where a party holding a monopoly over the materials submits them late?
- How can the predictability of the close of the hearing be increased?
- What are the limits of adjusting the burden of additional examination in terms of cost?