Summary
Exclusion is determined by statutory relationships and grounds of involvement, and is distinguished from a mere anticipation of the outcome.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
법관을 바꿀 이유는 그 사람에 대한 불만보다 구체적이어야 한다. 불리한 느낌만으로 법관이 배제되는가? 앞 절에서는 기록 접근의 허용과 명예·생활 평온을 해하는 이용의 금지가 별개의 판단이라는 점만 정리했다. 이 물음은 그 결론을 넘어서서, 재판장의 말이나 진행이 마음에 들지 않는다는 감정만으로 재판관을 교체할 수 있는가, 그리고 법이 정한 배제 통로가 실제로 열리려면 어떤 근거가 먼저 확보되어야 하는가를 묻는다. 이 물음에 답하려면 배제의 성격부터 가다듬어야 한다. 제척은 법정 사유에 따른 법관의 직무 배제를 뜻하며, 여기서 법정 사유란 법률이 미리 정해 둔 관계나 관여 행위를 말한다. 감정의 부침과 사법의 안정 사이에서 그 기준을 어디에 두는지가 이번 절의 쟁점이다.
이 절에서 다루는 법정 문언은 민사소송법 제41조다. 그 조문은 “제41조(제척의 이유) 법관은 다음 각호 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하면 직무집행에서 제척된다”라고 선언하면서 그 사유를 다섯 항목으로 한정한다. 1호는 법관이나 그 배우자·배우자였던 사람이 사건 당사자이거나 당사자와 공동권리자·공동의무자·상환의무자 관계에 있는 때이고, 2호는 법관이 당사자와 친족 관계에 있거나 있었던 때, 3호는 사건에 관하여 증언이나 감정을 한 때, 4호는 사건당사자의 대리인이었거나 된 때, 5호는 불복사건의 이전심급 재판에 관여한 때를 든다(민사소송법 제41조). 문언이 가리키는 주체는 사건을 담당한 법관이며, 행위는 그 법관이 지닌 관계나 과거의 관여이고, 조건은 각 호의 관계가 사건과 결합되어 있는 때로 정해진다. 따라서 조문은 추상적 불쾌감을 요건으로 삼지 않는다.
이 문언과 앞서 정한 제척의 정의가 결합되면 판단의 틀이 정해진다. 제척의 법정 사유 또는 적법한 기피사유가 구체 자료로 인정된 경우 이 구제의 입구가 열린다. 여기서 두 판단 단계를 나누어야 하는 이유는 사유의 인정과 소의 방어 가능성이 각기 다른 질문이기 때문이다. 전자는 법관에게 법정 관계나 관여 행위가 있는지, 후자는 그러한 자료가 청구의 특정된 구성 요소에 대응하여 방어 수단으로 작동할 수 있는지를 묻는다. 사유만으로 즉시 인용이 되거나, 형식만 갖추었으되 사유 자료가 비어 있어도 판정의 기준을 충족한다고 할 수 없다.
가장 강한 반론은 법정 목록의 한계를 겨눈다. 목록만으로는 드러나지 않는 편견, 예컨대 알게 모르게 스며든 선입견이나 이해충돌의 회색 지대를 다 담기 어렵고, 명확한 편향의 증거만 요구하면 외부에서 들여다보기 어려운 이해충돌은 끝내 통제되지 않는다는 것이다. 이 지적은 무시할 수 없다. 통로가 좁으면 은밀한 위험은 그대로 남고, 급부에 대한 당사자의 신뢰가 훼손될 수 있다. 그러나 앞의 답은 그대로다. 불리한 진행만으로 법정 제척사유를 만들 수는 없다. 반론이 지적한 불편은 제척이 아닌 다른 경로의 검토나 제도의 보완 문제로 남기며, 배제의 법정 사유를 넓히는 방식으로 해소하지 않는다.
이 장면에서 원고 A는 재판장의 질문이 불리하다며 기피를 원하지만 별도의 이해관계 자료는 제시하지 않았다. 이 사실만으로는 제41조 각 호의 관계나 관여 행위가 특정되지 않으므로, 제척의 법정 사유가 구체 자료로 인정된다고 단정할 수 없다. 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건이 청구취지에 특정되어 있다는 점이나 선택한 소의 권리를 방어할 수 있다는 점은 이 장면만으로도 확정되지 않으며, 사유 자료·인지 시점·본안 진술·기피신청·재판의 기록이 어떻게 구성되는지에 따라 판단이 갈린다. 사유를 알게 된 때나 문제 관계가 확인되지 않은 부분은 미확정으로 남긴다. 다만 법정 제척사유가 확인되면 결과가 공정해 보인다는 이유로 관여를 허용하지 않으며, 불리한 진행만을 그 사유로 삼는 것도 허용되지 않는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 명백하다. 제척은 법정 사유에 따른 법관의 직무 배제이고, 법정 사유 또는 적법한 기피사유가 구체 자료에 의하여 인정되며 특정된 청구취지와 방어 가능한 소의 권리가 뒷받침될 때 그 입구가 열린다. 허용되지 않는 결론은, 재판장의 질문이 불리하게 느껴졌다는 사실 하나로 배제 사유가 성립한다고 보는 판단이다. 자료가 부족하면 구제 불능이 아니라 미확정이며, 추가 확인 전에 성공 여부를 단정할 수도 없다.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
앞서 기록 접근의 허용과 명예·생활 평온을 해하는 이용의 금지는 별개의 판단이라는 결론만 짧게 이어받는다. 이 장면에서 재판장의 질문 태도에 대한 불만만으로 법관이 배제되는가, 아니면 구제가 막히는 별도의 조건이 있는가가 문제다. 제척이란 법정 사유에 따른 법관의 직무 배제를 뜻하는데, 법관을 교체할 근거는 개인의 느낌이 아니라 사건에 자리한 관계와 행위에서 찾는다. 따라서 이 절에서 묻는 것은 단순한 결과 예상과 제척 판단을 어떻게 구별하는지, 그 판단이 막히는 조건은 무엇인지로 좁혀진다.
이 물음에 답할 법정 문언은 민사소송법 제41조다. 그 조문은 “법관은 다음 각호 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하면 직무집행에서 제척된다”고 선언한 뒤, 제척의 이유를 제1호부터 제5호까지 법정 목록으로 정해 둔다(민사소송법 제41조). 이 문언은 법관 자신의 사건 이해관계, 배우자 관계, 친족 관계, 사건에 대한 증언·감정, 당사자 대리인 경력, 이전심급 재판 관여와 같은 주체·관계·행위를 제척 사유로 지정한다(민사소송법 제41조). 즉 이 조항이 말하는 제척은 관계와 관여라는 구체적 행위에 붙는 직무 배제이며, 추상적인 불쾌감이나 판결 결과에 대한 우려가 그 자리를 대신할 수 없다.
그러므로 구제 통로가 열리려면 제척의 법정 사유 또는 적법한 기피사유가 구체 자료로 인정되어야 한다. 재판장의 질문이 다소 불리하게 들렸다는 사정만으로는 제41조가 정한 어느 호에 해당한다고 단정할 수 없고, 저자의 결론에 따라 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제 통로는 닫힌다(민사소송법 제41조). 여기서 구별해야 할 것은 재판 진행에 대한 주관적 불만과 사건 이해관계·친족·증언·대리·이전 관여라는 법정 사유다. 이 둘은 대상과 근거가 다르므로, 법관의 불리한 진행을 걱정하는 마음을 그대로 제척의 법정 사유로 승격할 수는 없다.
다만 법정 목록이 지닌 한계는 분명히 짚어야 한다. 명확한 편향의 증거를 엄격히 요구하면 외부에서 드러나기 어려운 이해충돌이나 보이지 않는 편견을 통제하기 어렵고, 공정한 재판을 받을 권리라는 가치가 손상을 입을 수 있다. 이 불편을 지워버리지 않더라도 저자의 결론은 유지되는데, 그 까닭은 불리한 진행만으로 제41조의 제척 사유를 만들 수 없기 때문이다(민사소송법 제41조). 법정 목록이 모든 편견을 담지 못한다는 문제의식은 받아들이면서도, 제척의 법정 사유로 인정하는 요건을 무너뜨릴 수는 없으며, 다만 공정성을 해칠 구체적 사정은 다른 심사 단계에서 다루어야 한다.
합성 장면에 놓인 사실 가운데 이 물음과 관련된 것은 그뿐이다. 원고 A는 재판장의 질문이 불리하다고 느끼지만 이해관계 자료나 기타 제척 자료를 내지 않았고, 이 장면만으로는 제41조 각 호 가운데 어느 하나에 해당한다고 확정할 수 없다(민사소송법 제41조). 사유를 알게 된 때나 문제 관계의 존재 여부 역시 확인되지 않으므로 미확정으로 남긴다. 만약 법정 제척사유가 확인되면 결과가 공정해 보인다는 이유만으로 관여를 허용하지 않으므로, 장면 안의 확인되지 않은 사정을 이유로 문언을 확장할 수 없음이 분명해진다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 불리한 질문을 받았다는 느낌만으로는 법관을 배제할 수 없고, 제척은 법정 관계와 관여 사유를 확인하는 판단을 요구한다(민사소송법 제41조). 불리한 감정이나 불쾌한 진행을 이유로 결론을 내는 것은 허용되지 않지만, 미확인 자료나 미확정 관계가 있다 하여 곧 구제가 영원히 불가능하다는 뜻은 아니다. 사유 자료·인지 시점·본안 진술·기피신청·재판의 기록으로 확인되지 않은 사항은 그대로 미확정으로 남긴다.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
앞 절에서는 기피사유를 알면서 본안 진술을 한 법정 제한에 해당하거나 공정성을 해칠 구체적 정황이 인정되지 않는 경우에 그 구제가 막힌다고 보았다.
이 물음에 답하려면 해당 조문의 문언부터 놓아야 한다. 민사소송법 제41조는 「제41조(제척의 이유) 법관은 다음 각호 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하면 직무집행에서 제척된다.」라고 정하고, 이어서 「1. 법관 또는 그 배우자나 배우자이었던 사람이 사건의 당사자가 되거나, 사건의 당사자와 공동권리자·공동의무자 또는 상환의무자의 관계에 있는 때」부터 「5. 법관이 불복사건의 이전심급의 재판에 관여하였을 때. 다만, 다른 법원의 촉탁에 따라 그 직무를 수행한 경우에는 그러하지 아니하다.」까지 다섯 가지 경우를 열거한다(민사소송법 제41조). 이 문언이 가리키는 것은 법관 자신과 사건 당사자 사이의 특정한 법적 관계, 또는 그 법관이 사건에 관여한 구체적인 행위이다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 이어야 한다. 여기서 제척은 법정 사유에 따른 법관의 직무 배제를 뜻한다. 따라서 이 판단은 두 단계로 나뉜다. 첫째, 원고가 지적한 사정이 열거된 법정 사유나 그에 준하는 문제 관계에 속하는지 자료로 확인하는 단계이고, 둘째, 그 확인이 서지 않으면 인정과 기각 사이에서 확정하지 않고 미확정으로 남기는 단계이다. 구체적 자료가 확인되지 않은 채 남는 미확정은, 기피사유를 알면서 본안 진술을 한 법정 제한에 걸리거나 공정성을 해칠 구체적 정황이 인정되지 않아 구제가 막힌 경우와 같은 것이 아니다. 전자는 판단의 재료가 비어 있는 상태이고, 후자는 정해진 제한이 적용되어 통로가 닫힌 상태이다.
법정 목록만으로 드러나지 않는 편견을 다 담기 어렵다는 반론이 여기서 겨냥하는 것은, 이해관계가 밖에서 들여다보기 어려운 경우에 통제가 놓칠 수 있다는 점이다. 명확한 편향의 증거를 요구하면 외부에서 알기 어려운 이해충돌은 통제하지 못하며, 그 불편과 손실은 실제로 발생할 수 있다. 그렇더라도 저자의 답은 달라지지 않는다. 질문의 방향이 불리하게 느껴졌다는 사정만으로는 제41조가 열거한 관계나 관여 행위가 확인되지 않기 때문에, 그 느낌 자체를 법정 사유로 승격하지 않는 한계는 지켜진다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가면, 원고 A는 재판장의 질문이 불리하다고 느끼고 기피를 원하지만 별도의 이해관계 자료는 제시하지 않았다. 열거된 관계에 해당한다는 자료도, 법관이 사건에 관하여 증언이나 감정을 하였거나 대리인이었거나 이전심급 재판에 관여하였다는 자료도 이 장면에는 없다. 따라서 현재의 자료만으로는 제척 여부를 인정하기도 기각하기도 할 수 없으며, 판정은 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 사유를 알게 된 시점, 본안 진술의 유무, 기피신청과 그 재판에 관한 사정은 이 장면이 정하지 않았으므로 여기서 확정하지 않는다. 법정 제척사유가 확인되면 결과가 공정해 보인다는 이유로 관여를 허용하지 않는다는 점도 함께 열려 있다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 자료가 없을 때의 미확정과, 제한이 적용되어 구제가 막힌 경우를 서로 구별하여 읽는 일이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 질문이 불리하게 느껴졌다는 사정만으로 법정 제척사유를 만드는 일과, 미확정을 곧 구제 불능으로 바꾸는 일이다. 자료 부족은 자료 부족인 채로 남으며, 이는 법적 통로가 막힌 상태와 같지 않다. 여기서 확정할 수 없는 사항은 다음 확인을 위해 열어둔다.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
Under the text of Article 41, the statutory grounds for exclusion are limited to five relationships and acts of involvement. First, where the judge, or the judge's spouse or former spouse, is a party to the case or stands in the relationship of a co-obligee, co-obligor, or person liable for reimbursement with a party; second, where the judge is or has been a relative of a party. Third, where the judge has testified or rendered an expert opinion in the case; fourth, where the judge was or has become the agent of a party to the case. Fifth, where the judge participated in the trial at the previous instance of the case under appeal, except where the judge performed official duties at the request of another court (Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act). What the text of each of these subparagraphs requires is a specific legal relationship between the judge and a party, or a concrete act of involvement in the case; it is not a description of how the proceedings felt to the plaintiff, nor a forecast of which side the outcome will favor.
What links this text to the conclusion of this section is the demand concerning the scope of the record in the stage-based determination. The stage-based determination is made solely on the material recorded in the grounds material, the time of knowledge, the statement on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the ruling, and records that do not exist are not filled in by inference. The grounds material means the material bearing on the establishment of the grounds for disqualification; the time of knowledge is the time at which those grounds became known; the statement on the merits is the act of addressing the merits while aware of those grounds; the motion for recusal is an application seeking the exclusion of the judge from the performance of official duties; and the ruling is the court's decision on that application. Here two determinations must be distinguished. One is whether the statutory grounds are established; the other is the limitation arising from the time the grounds became known and the statement on the merits. If these two are combined into a single record, the grounds could be found established merely from the circumstance that the proceedings were unfavorable even though no statutory relationship was confirmed. Conversely, even where the grounds are established, the records of the time of knowledge and the statement on the merits are elements to be taken into account in the separate stage of adjudicating the application.
In the synthetic scene, the party moving for recusal is plaintiff A, the ground of the application is the feeling that the presiding judge's questions were unfavorable, and no separate material showing an interest was presented. On the record of this scene alone, neither the relationships nor the acts of involvement of the subparagraphs of Article 41 are confirmed, and the remaining record items were not presented in this scene either. The scope that this section can therefore determine is narrow. It is possible to determine that a feeling of unfavorable proceedings alone does not establish statutory grounds for disqualification, but how the respective records of the grounds material, the time of knowledge, the statement on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the ruling were actually left cannot be confirmed from this scene alone. Records that are not confirmed remain undetermined, and even if they are passed over without being known, the scope of the determination set out above remains unchanged.
The strongest counterargument raised in this section lies in a blind spot. It is said that a statutory list alone can hardly capture all the bias that does not appear on the list, and that if evidence of clear bias is required, conflicts of interest that are hard to perceive from the outside cannot be controlled. This loss is in fact not small. It is difficult for a party to grasp circumstances that proceed without appearing in the statutory relationships, and a determination standard requiring clear material may shift that difficulty of perception onto the party as it stands. The inconvenience is likewise plain. Even in situations where the proceedings are felt to be unfavorable, the channel for resolving doubts about fairness within the system narrows, and that inconvenience arises from circumstances that are hard to leave in the record. Still, the foregoing answer is maintained even while acknowledging the shadow of this counterargument. Exclusion means the removal of a judge from official duties on statutory grounds, and because the statutory grounds are limited to the relationships and acts of involvement of the subparagraphs of Article 41, unfavorable proceedings alone cannot create statutory grounds for disqualification. The reason why the invisibility of the bias pointed out by the counterargument does not alter this conclusion lies in the distinction that the problem of controlling bias is a question belonging to a stage other than the statutory grounds for exclusion.
If one of the determination conditions of this section is changed, the weight of that distinction can be confirmed. Once statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, involvement is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair. When this condition is applied, the scope of this section is narrow. The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that plaintiff A feels the presiding judge's questions to be unfavorable and wishes to seek recusal but presented no separate material showing an interest, and the year, amount, commencement date, and judgment outcome have not been set. Accordingly, from this scene alone it cannot be determined whether plaintiff A's motion for recusal supports statutory grounds, when the grounds became known, whether there was a statement on the merits, or how the ruling on the application was rendered. This item remains undetermined, and the circumstance that it is undetermined does not serve as a basis for presuming the establishment of statutory grounds for disqualification.
This section permits two conclusions. One is that exclusion means the removal of a judge from official duties on statutory grounds and that those grounds are limited to the relationships and acts of involvement of Article 41; the other is that the stage-based determination is made solely on the material recorded in the grounds material, the time of knowledge, the statement on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the ruling, and that records that do not exist are not filled in by inference. To hold, contrary to this, that unfavorable proceedings alone establish statutory grounds for disqualification is not permitted by this section. This conclusion, however, has not closed out every issue of recusal. The statutory grounds for exclusion have been treated in this section, but where circumstances not contained in that list are to be handled is a separate question.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Whether a feeling that the proceedings were unfavorable can serve as a basis for replacing the judge is the question of this chapter. From this scene alone it must be distinguished whether such a feeling constitutes statutory grounds for disqualification or is a matter belonging to another stage.
The source provision, Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act, enumerates the statutory grounds for exclusion and provides that "a judge is excluded from performing official duties if any one of the following subparagraphs applies." In this text, exclusion means the removal of a judge from official duties on statutory grounds. The subparagraphs take as their basis statutory relationships and grounds of involvement, such as the relationship between the judge or the judge's spouse and a party, a relationship of kinship, testimony or an expert opinion in the case, experience as an agent for a party, and participation in the trial at the previous instance of the case (Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act).
Exclusion is accordingly determined by statutory relationships and grounds of involvement and is distinguished from a mere expectation as to the result. This is why the two stages set out above must be read separately. One side is the question whether a statutory relationship or ground of involvement exists between the judge and the case; the other is the question whether the outcome of that trial appears favorable or unfavorable to one side or the other. However strong the latter expectation may be, it cannot create the former statutory grounds. The rule that once statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, involvement is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair also follows from this distinction.
The strongest counterargument is that a statutory list alone can hardly capture all the bias that does not appear on it. If evidence of clear bias is required, conflicts of interest that are hard to perceive from the outside cannot be controlled, and the party bears that loss. While acknowledging the blind spot pointed out by the counterargument, the conclusion is maintained only to the extent of not extending the statutory grounds for exclusion to mere expectations about the result. This answer, however, does not erase every significance of unfavorable proceedings, and how such circumstances are handled outside the statutory list remains a separate question.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that plaintiff A feels the presiding judge's questions to be unfavorable and wishes to seek recusal, but presented no separate material showing an interest. From these facts alone, the statutory relationships or grounds of involvement required by the subparagraphs of Article 41 are not confirmed. On the other hand, if statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, involvement is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair, so when grounds for disqualification are recognized on concrete material, the existing determination is overturned. On the material entered in the scene alone, whether plaintiff A's grounds for recusal are recognized and the resulting outcome of the procedure remain undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this chapter is confined to the narrow distinction that a judge is not excluded by a feeling of unfairness alone, and that exclusion is determined by statutory relationships and grounds of involvement. What is not permitted is the conclusion that the tone of the questions or an expectation about the result alone satisfies the subparagraphs of Article 41. The records of the grounds material, the time of knowledge, the statement on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the ruling are the kinds of records needed to confirm this distinction. Once statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, involvement is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair; and once the specified change is confirmed, the existing determinations of blocking and of effectiveness are discarded and the determination is redone from the stage onward.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
What the plaintiff puts at issue in this scene is the impression of the proceedings, not the existence of any relationship. Permission of access to records and the prohibition of use that infringes honor and the peace of life are separate determinations. Under this premise, the question now is whether a judge is excluded by a feeling of unfairness alone, and whether the standards of determination change because the statutory list of exclusion cannot contain such a feeling.
The statutory grounds for exclusion are enumerated in Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its text states that "a judge is excluded from performing official duties if any one of the following subparagraphs applies," and sets out five cases. The subjects prescribed by the respective subparagraphs are the judge and the judge's spouse, the parties to the case, and the agent; the acts are testimony or an expert opinion, representation, and participation in the trial at the previous instance. The conditions are indicated by statutory relationships such as a relationship of kinship or a relationship of co-obligee and the like. What this provision therefore requires is not dissatisfaction with the direction of the questions, but the existence of the relationship or involvement designated by that list.
This text connects to the settled conclusion set out above. Exclusion means the removal of a judge from official duties on statutory grounds, and the determination is therefore made at the stage of confirming the concrete material corresponding to those grounds. What must be distinguished here is the confirmation of a statutory relationship and the expression of an expectation about the result. The former is a determination pointing to material evidencing the relationship or involvement set down in the provision; the latter is a statement guessing what conclusion the presiding judge's questions will bring. If the latter is substituted for the former, the statutory grounds for exclusion are replaced, in place of the subparagraphs of the text, by dissatisfaction with the proceedings. The author's conclusion does not permit that substitution.
The strongest counterargument against this determination aims at the point that the eye is blinded to circumstances that a list of bias cannot reach. Conflicts of interest arise outside the record, and it is difficult for a party to know their content. If evidence of clear bias is required, there follow the loss that such conflicts remain as participation as they stand, and the inconvenience that the trial continues with doubts about fairness unresolved. Even so, the author maintains the answer that unfavorable proceedings alone cannot create statutory grounds for disqualification. That answer does not deny the blind spot pointed out by the counterargument. It means only that the statutory grounds for exclusion are not regarded as being extended merely by the existence of a blind spot.
What the plaintiff has presented in this scene is only the unfavorableness of the questions, and there is no material showing an interest. Contrasting this with the statutory grounds for exclusion, the relationship or involvement required by the provision is not confirmed in the scene. The stage of excluding a judge for risk to fairness operates where statutory grounds for exclusion or legitimate grounds for challenge are recognized on concrete material, and, conversely, does not open where no concrete circumstances prejudicing fairness are recognized. What cannot be determined from the scene alone is the time at which the plaintiff became aware of the grounds or the existence of the relationship in question, and these remain undetermined. The very fact that there is no material does not itself mean that no relief is available.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. Statutory grounds for exclusion are not established by the direction of the questions or the impression of the proceedings alone, and the meaning of exclusion as the exclusion from the performance of duties on statutory grounds is maintained. Conversely, what this conclusion does not permit is the determination that a judge must be excluded merely because a feeling of unfairness has been expressed.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The question is whether, merely because the questions put by the presiding judge are felt to be unfavorable, one can ask that the judge be removed from the case. The preceding section took as its premise that unfavorable proceedings alone cannot create statutory grounds for disqualification, and the analysis now turns to what standard of determination that premise leads to.
The provision prescribing the statutory grounds for exclusion shows its boundary. Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "a judge is excluded from performing official duties if any one of the following subparagraphs applies," and sets out one ground in each subparagraph. Those grounds are the relationship of co-obligee, co-obligor, or person liable for reimbursement between the judge or the judge's spouse and a party to the case, a relationship of kinship, testimony or an expert opinion in the case, experience as an agent for a party, and participation in the trial at the previous instance of the case under appeal. The subject indicated by the provision is the judge, the act is exclusion from the performance of official duties, and the condition is a relationship or ground of involvement corresponding to any one of the subparagraphs.
Although this list may outwardly resemble an expectation about the result, the two must be distinguished. What the subparagraphs ask is a matter of relationship and ground: who was entangled in the case in what relationship, and how the judge was previously involved in that case. By contrast, whether the outcome of the trial is expected to come out favorably to one side is no more than a forecast before it is fixed, and a forecast alone, unaccompanied by any confirmed relationship or ground, cannot be made a basis for exclusion. Exclusion means the removal of a judge from official duties on statutory grounds, and this definition is itself the criterion that divides the two determinations.
Even so, there is the counterargument that a statutory list alone can hardly capture all the bias that does not appear on it: conflicts of interest outside the list are hard to reveal from the outside, and if evidence of clear bias is required, circumstances that are hard to know go uncontrolled. The discomfort of feeling that the manner of the presiding judge's questions is unfavorable and the statutory ground that the judge has a relationship entangling him in the case do not overlap, and expanding the statutory grounds for exclusion in deference to the concern over unaddressed bias is a shift that this question does not permit.
What is confirmed in this scene is only the circumstance that the presiding judge's questions were felt to be unfavorable, and not any relational ground for exclusion. Since plaintiff A presented no separate material showing an interest, whether the relationships or grounds of involvement prescribed by the subparagraphs have been revealed in the material remains undetermined. Even if the plaintiff wishes to seek recusal, whether this falls under the statutory limitation of having addressed the merits while aware of the grounds, and the outcome of the ruling, are not settled in this scene. What is clear, however, is that if statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, involvement is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair, and this makes the distinction all the sharper.
In sum, exclusion means the removal of a judge from official duties on statutory grounds, and the judge is removed from the performance of official duties only where the relationships and grounds of involvement prescribed by the subparagraphs are confirmed. Dissatisfaction with unfavorable questions, an expectation as to which side the result will favor, and the wish to change the judge do not, in themselves, constitute grounds for exclusion. Conversely, once the statutory grounds have appeared in the form of relationships or grounds, the expectation of how the outcome will come out no longer serves as a further standard of determination.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In such a scene, when there is doubt about the impartiality of the court, the question presented is who may halt the procedure on what grounds, and how far that determination reaches in this section. Asking that a judge be replaced with someone else merely because the tone of the question-and-answer is jarring is a different demand from showing that the judge holds a legally prescribed relationship arising from entanglement in the case. If the former were simply accepted, the criterion for composing the bench would become the feelings of the person standing in the courtroom rather than the expectations of the plaintiff and the defendant.
Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "a judge shall be excluded from the performance of duties if he or she falls under any of the following subparagraphs," and lists as those subparagraphs such relationships as "where the judge or his or her spouse or former spouse is a party to the case," a kinship relationship with a party, testimony or expert opinion on the case, having been a representative of a party, and participation in the trial at the previous instance in a case subject to appeal (Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here the subject is the judge assigned to the case, the act is that judge's performance of duties, and the condition is that one of the relationships or involvement listed in the subparagraphs attaches to the case. The object this text addresses is a settled relationship between the case and the judge, not a prediction of which side the conduct of the trial appears to favor.
If the text of this Article and the distinction applied in applying that text are read together, exclusion is defined as the removal of a judge from duties on statutory grounds (Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act). The determination proceeds in two stages. First it is examined whether the judge bears any of the enumerated relationships or grounds of involvement with the case, and only when such a ground is confirmed is the judge removed from the performance of duties. The reason this differs from a simple prediction of the outcome is that the second object is different. Guessing the likelihood of prevailing and confirming whether the judge has already been involved in the case by giving testimony or an expert opinion do not ask the same question. If a ground is confirmed, involvement is not permitted on the expectation that an outcome that appears fair will then follow; if there is no ground, the statutory grounds for exclusion are not established even if the proceedings run unfavorably.
Even so, the criticism that it is difficult to capture all the bias that does not appear in the statutory list is not a small one. If clear evidence of bias is required, conflicts of interest that are difficult to perceive from the outside go uncontrolled, and the parties may end up merely receiving a judgment, unable to raise any objection concerning relationships that unfold in places beyond their knowledge. That loss is real. This criticism also targets the discomfort that a judge's tone and demeanor cause the parties, and the fact that such discomfort erodes trust in the trial. The answer, however, remains that adverse proceedings alone cannot create statutory grounds for disqualification. When a relationship falling within the statutory grounds is confirmed by concrete materials, the way is opened to remove the judge, but raising objections only to the manner in which the proceedings are conducted, without producing circumstances falling within those grounds, cannot serve as the key that opens the door to exclusion. The reason the conclusion is maintained without erasing the gap the counterargument points out is that the scope of the question exclusion addresses extends only that far.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene of this section is the fact that Plaintiff A felt the presiding judge's questions to be unfavorable and wished to seek recusal, and presented no separate materials concerning any interest. The rest was not confirmed. What the content of those questions was, whether the presiding judge is or was in a kinship relationship with a party to the case, or has given testimony or an expert opinion on the case, or participated in the trial at the previous instance in a case subject to appeal (Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act), cannot be determined from this scene. The fact that these facts are not confirmed does not mean that the substance of the recusal is denied; it means only that the materials are insufficient to recognize the statutory grounds for exclusion on this scene alone. The time at which the grounds for challenge became known, and whether the relationship in question is confirmed, likewise remain undetermined. Conversely, if the statutory grounds for exclusion are confirmed, the contrasting condition holds that involvement is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair.
Accordingly, the conclusion this section permits is narrow. For a demand to replace a judge to prevail, concrete materials must be presented showing that the judge bears a statutory relationship or ground of involvement entangled with the case, going beyond dissatisfaction with that person or impressions of the way the proceedings were conducted. Exclusion is the removal of a judge from duties on statutory grounds, and the judge steps down from the performance of duties only where such a ground is confirmed (Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act). So long as that boundary is not crossed, one cannot say that exclusion occurs merely because the questions and answers were not to one's liking; conversely, one cannot say that because there is no ground for exclusion, every grievance must be endured. Either way, it falls outside the scope of this section.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The question now is not whether exclusion is established in this scene, but how the text of the source provision makes the removal of a judge on grounds of fairness risk be determined. The observations of the preceding stage may stop here.
The source provision that settles this meaning is Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act, whose text declares, "A judge shall be excluded from the performance of duties if he or she falls under any of the following subparagraphs," and then sets out five subparagraphs. Subparagraph 1 covers cases where the judge or his or her spouse or former spouse is a party to the case or stands with a party in the relationship of co-obligee, co-obligor, or indemnity obligor; subparagraph 2 covers cases where the judge is or was in a kinship relationship with a party. The subjects this text captures are the judge of the case and the parties, and the requirements are met by relationships and past involvement rather than by conduct.
The remaining three subparagraphs continue the same structure. Subparagraph 3 addresses cases where the judge has given testimony or an expert opinion on the case, subparagraph 4 cases where the judge was or has become a representative of a party to the case, and subparagraph 5 cases where the judge participated in the trial at the previous instance in a case subject to appeal, while excluding the performance of duties by commission of another court. The determination therefore divides into two stages. First one looks for a relationship or ground of involvement specified by the text, and if there is one, that judge's performance of duties is excluded. If these two stages are mixed, the confirmation of a ground and dissatisfaction with that ground are no longer distinguished.
The objection that the list in this text cannot capture all bias targets a substantive loss. If a judge is ever so slightly inclined, there is no statutory relationship that would show from the outside, yet the party must carry the lawsuit forward bearing the burden that the hearing is already skewed. If conflicts of interest cannot be prevented in advance, that loss continues until the pronouncement of judgment. Nevertheless, the boundary the author draws does not shake. This answer does not deny the gaps in the list, but it puts it beyond doubt that filling those gaps with grounds absent from the text is outside the scope of this determination.
In the synthetic scene, what the plaintiff put forward was nothing more than the impression that the presiding judge's questions were unfavorable, and there were no materials concerning any interest. The subparagraphs of the text to be contrasted provide for a party relationship, kinship relationship, testimony or expert opinion, a record as an attorney, and participation in the trial at the previous instance, yet from the scene alone none of these relationships or grounds of involvement is confirmed. Accordingly, grounds for exclusion cannot be recognized on this scene alone, and the materials on the ground, the time of knowledge, the statement on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the records of the trial remain unconfirmed and undetermined here.
The conclusion this section's text permits is narrow. The removal of a judge obtains a basis for determination only where the relationships or grounds of involvement specified by that text are confirmed within the scope of the text, and dissatisfaction with the content of the questions cannot serve as that basis. Conversely, what this text does not permit is drawing in circumstances outside the text as grounds for exclusion, and no commentary extending the reasoning of the judgment or other paragraphs is included here. How circumstances outside the list of grounds for exclusion address fairness risk lies outside the determination of this text.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
The question whether a judge is excluded merely on the basis of an unfavorable feeling has already been distinguished from a simple prediction of the outcome, having passed through the determination of statutory relationships and grounds of involvement. Building on that, what this section addresses is what part, within a single stage of removing a judge on grounds of fairness risk, must be examined separately within the same determination. This definition proceeds on the premise that both the status of the judge being excluded and the basis for the exclusion are bound to statutory grounds.
The text prescribing the grounds for exclusion provides that a judge shall be excluded from the performance of duties if he or she falls under any of the following subparagraphs (Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subparagraphs then enumerate: where the judge or his or her spouse or former spouse is a party to the case or stands with a party in the relationship of co-obligee, co-obligor, or indemnity obligor; where the judge is or was in a kinship relationship with a party; where the judge has given testimony or an expert opinion on the case; where the judge was or has become a representative of a party to the case; and where the judge participated in the trial at the previous instance in a case subject to appeal (provided, however, that this shall not apply where the judge performed such duties by commission of another court) (Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject designated by this text is the judge; the acts are a party relationship, kinship relationship, testimony or expert opinion, representation, and participation at the previous instance in the case; and the condition is that the relationship or act under the subparagraphs is established in that case. The impression that the questions were unfavorable does not fall within this.
The point at which the conditions of the above text connect with the fixed conclusion of this section is how far distinctions within the stage are permitted. The removal of a judge on grounds of fairness risk functions as a single stage, but the determination within it operates where the statutory grounds for exclusion, or lawful grounds for challenge, are recognized by concrete materials. Concrete materials mean materials supporting the establishment of the relationships or involvement explained above, not the impression of the person making the determination. Within the same stage, operation is barred where the case falls within the statutory limitation applicable where a party, knowing the grounds for challenge, made a statement on the merits, or where no concrete circumstances prejudicing fairness are recognized. And where the time at which the grounds became known, or the relationship in question, is not confirmed, the determination remains undetermined. These three are merely conditions dividing the same determination into three states; they do not create any further stage of determination. Once the statutory grounds for exclusion are confirmed, involvement is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair.
The strongest objection lies in the fact that it is difficult to capture all the bias that does not appear in the statutory list. If clear evidence of bias is required, conflicts of interest that are difficult to perceive from the outside cannot be controlled. The loss this objection targets is clear. If a judge whose interests diverge in a relationship not on the statutory list continues to participate, the party endures an unfavorable hearing unable to show the basis for exclusion in documents, and that disadvantage does not become apparent until after the determination. Yet adverse proceedings alone cannot be made statutory grounds for disqualification as a means of relieving this disadvantage. The fact that the direction of proceedings felt unfavorable cannot serve as concrete material for recognizing the statutory grounds for exclusion or lawful grounds for challenge. Accordingly, while the gap in control the objection points out is acknowledged, the method of broadening the conditions of statutory grounds in order to fill that gap is not permitted.
In the synthetic scene, one fact is relevant to this question. Contrasting this fact with the conditions for recognition, no concrete material for recognizing the statutory grounds for exclusion or lawful grounds for challenge was submitted, and so the relevant condition cannot be regarded as satisfied. The case where no concrete circumstances prejudicing fairness are recognized is examined as well, but whether the case falls within the statutory limitation applicable where a statement on the merits was made knowing the grounds for challenge, when Plaintiff A came to know the grounds, and whether the relationship in question actually exists are not settled by the scene. This undetermined state, however, means only that the materials on the ground, the time of knowledge, the statement on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the records of the trial have not yet been organized; it does not mean that the challenge itself is immediately barred.
What this section permits is only the distinction following the stated conditions. If the statutory grounds for exclusion or lawful grounds for challenge are recognized by concrete materials, the removal of a judge on grounds of fairness risk operates; if the case falls within the statutory limitation applicable where a statement on the merits was made knowing the grounds for challenge, or no concrete circumstances prejudicing fairness are recognized, operation is barred. Where the time at which the grounds became known, or the relationship in question, is not confirmed, the determination is undetermined, and the lack of materials must not at that point be read straightaway as a bar to relief. Conversely, it is not permitted to create new statutory grounds for disqualification out of an unfavorable feeling or the proceedings alone, or to add a separate stage of determination.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The conclusion of the preceding section, that a judge is not excluded merely on the basis of an unfavorable feeling, carries over as is. What remains at issue is how to divide, in that scene, the cases where the conditions for removing a judge actually open, the cases where they are barred, and the cases where the determination must be deferred.
Under that text, it is set down as grounds for exclusion where the judge or his or her spouse or former spouse is a party to the case or stands with a party in the relationship of co-obligee, co-obligor, or indemnity obligor, and where the judge is or was in a kinship relationship with a party. Here exclusion means the removal of a judge from duties on statutory grounds. This is the task of confirming whether the relationships written in the statutory list attach to the case.
The above text also provides together as grounds for exclusion: where the judge has given testimony or an expert opinion on the case; where the judge was or has become a representative of a party to the case; and where the judge participated in the trial at the previous instance in a case subject to appeal (excluding cases where the judge performed such duties by commission of another court). When this material is taken as the basis, the condition that opens is set as the case where the statutory grounds for exclusion are recognized by concrete materials (Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act). The concept of exclusion defined above and the list of grounds in this text are two different stages. The former means the effect of removing a judge from duties; the latter is the basis determining when that effect arises. What the author has separated is precisely this distinction between basis and effect, and exclusion is determined according to statutory relationships and grounds of involvement, distinguished from a simple prediction of the outcome. Anticipating how a given judgment will come out favorably does not in itself fall under any subparagraph of the above text.
What the objection that it is difficult to capture all the bias that does not appear in the statutory list targets is the loss that conflicts of interest difficult to perceive from the outside go uncontrolled. Where clear evidence of bias is required and almost no one is in a position to have such evidence, the discomfort that the interest remaining within the judge exerts on the progress of the case remains as it is. Even without erasing this disadvantage, the answer the author sets does not change. The mere impression that the proceedings were unfavorable, without confirmation of the grounds specified by the text, does not reach the condition that opens, and falls under the barring condition of cases where no concrete circumstances prejudicing fairness are recognized.
The facts confirmed in this scene are only the feeling of the unfavorable nature of the questions and the wish to seek recusal, and no materials concerning statutory relationships or grounds of involvement corresponding to any subparagraph of Article 41 of the Civil Procedure Act were presented. Accordingly, this scene alone cannot be regarded as falling within the case where exclusion opens, and it is placed on the barring side, in the case where no concrete circumstances prejudicing fairness are recognized. However, when the grounds for challenge became known, and whether a relationship capable of raising an issue actually exists between the plaintiff and the presiding judge, are not confirmed in this scene. Those two remain undetermined. The determination cannot be fixed by adding years, amounts, or judgment outcomes not found in the scene.
What this section permits is the distinction that the removal of a judge opens where the statutory grounds for exclusion are recognized by concrete materials; what it does not permit is a determination that takes adverse proceedings alone as that ground. Nor does it advance to the categorical assertion of anticipating a settled judgment outcome or the performance of an actual case's enforcement, nor does it fill unverified relationships or the time of knowledge with conjecture.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
앞서 기록 접근의 허용과 명예·생활 평온을 해하는 이용의 금지는 별개의 판단이라는 결론에 이르렀고, 이제 그 사람에 대한 판단 기준을 마무리하면서 다음 논점의 문을 연다. 재판장의 질문이 불리하게 느껴진다는 감정만으로는 그 법관을 사건에서 빼야 한다는 주장이 충분한지는 의문이다. 불리한 느낌만으로 법관이 배제되는가, 그리고 이 판단이 끝난 뒤 남는 사정은 어디로 넘겨야 하는가가 지금 물음이다.
제척이 무엇인지를 먼저 문언으로 고정하면, 민사소송법 제41조는 “법관은 다음 각호 가운데 어느 하나에 해당하면 직무집행에서 제척된다.”라고 선언한다(민사소송법 제41조). 이어서 동조는 제척의 이유를 다섯 항목에 한정하여 열거한다(민사소송법 제41조). 여기서 가리키는 주체는 사건을 심리하는 법관이고, 배제되는 것은 그 사건에 관한 직무집행이며, 조건은 각 호가 정한 법정 관계나 관여 행위의 존재다. 결과가 어느 쪽으로 날 것 같은 예상이나 진행 태도에 대한 인상은 이 목록의 어느 호에도 해당 조건으로 들어 있지 않다.
문언이 정한 주체·행위·조건은 그대로 두고 판단 단계를 구별해야 하는 까닭은, 제척의 요건을 넓히는 순간 법정 사유의 한정 의미가 희석되기 때문이다. 제척은 법정 사유에 따른 법관의 직무 배제를 뜻하며, 단순한 결과 예상과 구별되는 것이 핵심이다(민사소송법 제41조). 재판장의 질문이 원고 A에게 불리하게 다가왔다는 사정은 진행에 대한 기대가 어긋난 것으로는 볼 수 있어도, 법관과 당사자 사이의 친족 관계나 사건 관여 같은 법정 관계·사유의 확인과는 다른 단계의 이야기다. 이 구별을 유지할 때에만 법정 목록의 의미가 남는다.
명확한 편향의 증거를 요구하면 외부에서 알기 어려운 이해충돌은 통제하지 못하고, 결국 목록 밖의 편향은 아무런 견제도 받지 않은 채 남게 될 것이라는 우려다. 이 우려가 지적하는 손실은 실재하며, 그 불리한 부분을 지울 필요는 없다. 그러나 답은 달라지지 않는다. 목록의 공백이 남기는 불안은 조문이 정한 요건의 존중과 맞바꾸는 것이 아니라, 목록 밖의 사정을 다루는 다른 통로에 맡기는 문제로 돌린다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 이에 그친다. 이 장면만으로는 제41조가 열거한 다섯 가지 사유 가운데 어느 것 하나도 확인되지 않고, 사유 자료·인지 시점·본안 진술·기피신청·재판에 관한 기록도 확정되어 있지 않다. 질문의 내용이나 진행 방식에 관한 별도 자료가 제시되지 않았으므로 공정성을 해칠 구체적 사정이 인정되는지도 장면만으로는 판단할 수 없고, 미확인 상태로 남는다. 이는 자료 부족이지 곧바로 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않는다.
따라서 이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 재판장의 질문이 불리하게 느껴진다는 사정만으로 법관을 배제하는 법정 제척사유가 성립한다고 볼 수 없다는 것이고, 제척은 법정 관계와 관여 사유에 따라 판단하며 단순한 결과 예상과 구별된다는 구별이 그 이유다. 반대로, 법정 제척사유가 확인되면 결과가 공정해 보인다는 이유로 관여를 허용하지 않으며, 그 확인에 이르는 자료가 없는 장면의 처리는 이 절의 범위 밖에 놓인다. 남는 물음은 그대로 다음으로 넘긴다. 제척 목록 밖의 사정은 어디에서 다루는가?