Summary
The restriction on challenge where a party, with knowledge of the ground, engaged in oral argument on the merits or made a statement at a preparatory hearing must be examined separately.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Reasons raised only after one has seen an adverse outcome shake confidence in procedure. In the preceding section, recusal was viewed as a separate channel for determining whether circumstances exist under which a fair trial cannot be expected. Then, is the case different where a party who, knowing the grounds, made statements on the merits and only later applies for recusal—that is, where the party knew the grounds for challenge and made statements on the merits? In dealing with this case, what must be settled together is the question of what standard opens the entrance to this remedy. The conclusion of the preceding section is carried over only briefly as to the character of the channel.
The Civil Procedure Act contains language capable of answering this question. Article 43 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "(2) Where a party, knowing that there are grounds to challenge a judge, argues on the merits or makes a statement at a preparation date for oral argument, the party may not file a motion for recusal" (Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject indicated by this language is the party wishing to seek recusal, the act is oral argument on the merits or a statement at a preparation date for oral argument, and the condition is that the act was committed while knowing that there were grounds for challenge. When all three are present together, the restriction on the filing of a motion for recusal stated in paragraph (2) comes into issue.
The requirements of the above language and the entry standard for this remedy belong to different stages of determination. Article 43 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act lays down a restriction that turns on the relationship between the grounds known and the statements on the merits—that is, a rule restricting the exercise of the right to seek recusal. By contrast, the channel of this remedy is opened when the statutory grounds for exclusion or lawful grounds for challenge are recognized in specific materials, when the requested relief, parties, and conditions are specified in the prayer for relief, and when the right underlying the chosen action can be defended. The former restriction concerns whether an already open channel can be closed, while the latter standard concerns whether one can enter the channel at all. Only by keeping the two determinations from being mixed together can the restriction on recusal in the case of a party who made oral argument on the merits or statements at a preparation date while knowing the grounds be examined separately.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that awareness of the grounds itself may come late. That is, a party may come to know the legal significance of the grounds only belatedly. The substance of a conflict of interest often does not reveal itself externally, and if clear evidence of bias is required, conflicts of interest that are difficult to perceive from the outside cannot be controlled. The channel of excluding a judge is a device that responds to fairness risks; if the textual restriction alone is applied without capturing that risk, the loss falls squarely on the party. The relaxation demanded by the counterargument, however, does not change the standard of adjudication. The answer is maintained that one cannot declare the loss of the right to seek recusal without ascertaining when the grounds became known, and the disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument remains as it is.
In the synthetic scene of this section, Plaintiff A seeks recusal on the ground that the presiding judge's questions were unfavorable, but presented no separate materials concerning interest. What can be confirmed in this scene is only the statement of an unfavorable feeling, and it is also confirmed whether separate materials concerning interest were presented. Comparing the facts of this scene with the foregoing condition—that is, the case where the statutory grounds for exclusion or lawful grounds for challenge are recognized in specific materials—the question whether specific materials are recognized cannot be determined on the basis of this scene alone. Whether the requested relief, parties, and conditions are specified, and whether the right underlying the chosen action can be defended, likewise remain undetermined. As to when the grounds became known and whether statements on the merits were made, this scene likewise settles nothing. All that is furnished is the contrast that, if statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, participation is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair, and this scene does not answer whether that condition has been met.
The conclusion this section permits is this. If the statutory grounds for exclusion or lawful grounds for challenge are recognized in specific materials, the requested relief, parties, and conditions are specified in the prayer for relief, and the right underlying the chosen action can be defended, then the channel of this remedy is opened. By contrast, where a party has made oral argument on the merits or statements at a preparation date for oral argument while knowing the grounds, the restriction that a motion for recusal may not be filed is a condition that must be examined together, and this section does not reach the conclusion that the loss of the right to seek recusal is to be declared without ascertaining when the grounds became known. Neither is the channel to be regarded as opened on the basis of an unfavorable feeling alone, nor, conversely, does an open channel mean actual success in obtaining recovery.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
If such experiences are repeated, abuse may arise in which grounds for recusal are raised every time a judge's questions are felt to be unfavorable, and the calculus of the trial is thrown into disarray. Recusal is a separate channel for determining whether circumstances exist under which a fair trial cannot be expected. This section examines under what conditions this channel is closed, and in particular what legal restrictions apply where a party made statements on the merits while knowing the grounds for challenge.
Article 43 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "(2) Where a party, knowing that there are grounds to challenge a judge, argues on the merits or makes a statement at a preparation date for oral argument, the party may not file a motion for recusal." The subject of this language is the party, and the act is arguing on the merits or making a statement at a preparation date for oral argument. The condition is the state of awareness expressed as "knowing that there are grounds to challenge a judge." That is, this restriction applies only where a party made statements on the merits despite already knowing the grounds, and other grounds for restricting recusal or other procedural requirements are determined separately.
The reason why awareness under this provision and statements on the merits together constitute requirements is that their relationship determines the character of the institution known as the restriction on exercising the right to seek recusal. Here, the restriction on exercising the right to seek recusal means a restriction that turns on the relationship between the grounds known and the statements on the merits. That is, if a party continues oral argument on the merits despite knowing the grounds and later applies for recusal, that application is blocked by the statutory restriction. This restriction is a determination separate from whether statutory grounds for exclusion exist, and an accurate conclusion is reached only by asking the two stages separately.
However, criticism has been raised against this restriction to the effect that conflicts of interest are difficult to control. A party may come to know the legal significance of the grounds only belatedly, and if clear evidence of bias is required, conflicts of interest that are difficult to perceive from the outside cannot be controlled. This argument points out that, even where there is no intent, declaring the loss of the right to seek recusal without ascertaining when the grounds became known risks restricting that party excessively. Even without denying that disadvantage, the standard is maintained that one cannot declare the loss of the right to seek recusal without ascertaining when the grounds became known.
Applying this to the present scene, Plaintiff A seeks recusal on the ground that the presiding judge's questions were unfavorable, but presented no separate materials concerning interest. In this scene, the mere fact that the presiding judge's questions were felt to be unfavorable is not sufficient to regard the grounds for challenge as specifically recognized. So long as it is not confirmed whether Plaintiff A made oral argument on the merits or statements at a preparation date while knowing the grounds, it is difficult to conclude that the restriction on exercising the right to seek recusal applies. What cannot be adjudicated on the basis of this scene alone remains undetermined. If statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, participation is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair.
Accordingly, what is settled is that the channel of relief is closed if any one of the statutory requirements is not met—that is, where the case falls under the statutory restriction of having made statements on the merits while knowing the grounds for challenge, or where no specific circumstances prejudicing fairness are recognized. Conversely, if the statutory grounds for exclusion or lawful grounds for challenge are recognized in specific materials, the channel of excluding a judge is opened. What this paragraph does not address, however, is that even where a fairness risk is recognized and the judge is excluded, it does not follow that the merits claim in that case is itself justified.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Plaintiff A seeks recusal on the ground that the presiding judge's questions were unfavorable, but presented no separate materials concerning interest. The channel itself has not collapsed. Then how should the case where a party proceeded with the merits while knowing the grounds for excluding the judge who participated be distinguished from the case where no materials for determination remain at all?
The language that answers this question is settled. Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act states: "(2) Where a party, knowing that there are grounds to challenge a judge, argues on the merits or makes a statement at a preparation date for oral argument, the party may not file a motion for recusal" (Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here the subject is the party, the act is oral argument on the merits and a statement at a preparation date for oral argument, and the condition is that such an act was committed while knowing that there were grounds for challenge. The language of this paragraph finds the occasion on which the motion for recusal is obstructed in the combination of the point of awareness and the statements on the merits. It does not, however, draw in matters addressed in the other paragraphs of this Article as well.
To connect this language with the conclusion of this section, two stages of determination must be distinguished. The first is the establishment of the statutory restriction; the second is whether the materials supporting that establishment are sufficient. The requirements for establishment comprise the party, awareness, and statements on the merits, and the materials are sought in the materials on the grounds, the point of awareness, the statements on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the records of the trial (Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act). If the point of awareness and the relationship at issue cannot be confirmed among these, the materials for determination remain unspecified. That state differs from a determination that recusal is impossible. The time when the grounds became known, or matters whose confirmation is lacking, must be left undetermined rather than declared impossible.
The counterargument that a party may come to know the legal significance of the grounds only belatedly is aimed at this distinction. This counterargument is persuasive in that, if clear evidence of bias is required, conflicts of interest that are difficult to perceive from the outside cannot be controlled. Neither is small the loss of falling into opportunism in raising the grounds only after seeing an adverse outcome, nor the inconvenience of having left unattended what could have been known long before. Yet this counterargument alone cannot establish the statutory restriction. If the loss of the right to seek recusal is declared without ascertaining when the grounds became known, the result is to close the very channel for dealing with circumstances that are difficult to perceive from the outside. The gap in control pointed out by the counterargument is left in place, but the loss is not made final merely because that gap could not be confirmed.
This scene is compared against this condition. Plaintiff A wishes to seek recusal while feeling that the questions were unfavorable, but presented no separate materials concerning interest. The scene does not show when the party came to know that there were grounds for challenge, when the statements on the merits occurred, or in what order the two were placed. The feeling that the questions were unfavorable and the specific materials falling within the grounds for challenge are not the same thing. Accordingly, on the basis of this scene alone, one can say neither that the requirements of the restriction under Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act are satisfied nor that they are violated. That is only an assumption for cases where the materials are confirmed, and it does not convert unconfirmed cases into impossibility.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted in this section is limited to two layers. Where oral argument on the merits or statements at a preparation date were made while knowing the grounds, the restriction on recusal must be examined separately, and the establishment of that restriction is found in the relationship between the grounds known and the statements on the merits (Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act). Conversely, matters whose point of awareness or relationship at issue is not specified are left in the realm of the undetermined, and the lack of such materials is not converted immediately into impossibility of relief or loss of the right to seek recusal.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
In the preceding section, it was confirmed that recusal is a separate channel for determining whether circumstances exist under which a fair trial cannot be expected. The question to be addressed at this stage is how the case where a party knew the grounds for challenge and made statements on the merits is to be handled within that channel. To settle the treatment of this case, it must be made clear what materials for determination remain. That is, what records are to be used for the stage determination is at the core of this problem.
The language that serves as that standard is Article 43 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. It provides: "Where a party, knowing that there are grounds to challenge a judge, argues on the merits or makes a statement at a preparation date for oral argument, the party may not file a motion for recusal" (Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act). This language fixes the subject as the party, the act as oral argument on the merits or a statement at a preparation date for oral argument, and the condition as the act having been committed while knowing that there were grounds for challenge. The language of this paragraph addresses only this limited question.
This language connects with the settled conclusion of this stage as follows. The stage is determined only by the materials on the grounds, the point of awareness, the statements on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the materials recorded in the trial, and the stage determination is made only on the basis of the established records. Here, awareness and statements are different stages of determination. That a party knew the grounds for challenge, and that the party made statements on the merits despite knowing that fact, are separate objects of confirmation. If the two stages are merged into one, it does not appear which records were used to determine what. Records that do not exist are not filled in by conjecture.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that a party may come to know the legal significance of the grounds only belatedly. It also points to the loss that, if clear evidence of bias is required, conflicts of interest that are difficult to perceive from the outside cannot be controlled. Yet there is one fact this counterargument cannot dislodge: one cannot declare the loss of the right to seek recusal without ascertaining when the grounds became known. If the point of awareness cannot be confirmed from the records, that stage remains undetermined. The lack of materials called the undetermined is not converted immediately into impossibility of relief, and the blind spot in control pointed out by the counterargument also remains as it is. This is because the stage determination is bound to the established records.
What is confirmed in this scene is the intent to seek recusal and the feeling of disadvantage, while the materials on the grounds and the point of awareness are not confirmed. Compared with the foregoing condition, two of the five elements of the records for determination—the materials on the grounds and the point of awareness—are empty. Accordingly, on the basis of this scene alone, one cannot determine at which stage to place the matter. If statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, participation is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair; this operates only when those grounds have been confirmed, and it is not adjudicated by this scene.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. It is that the relationship between the grounds known and the statements on the merits is examined on the basis of the materials on the grounds, the point of awareness, the statements on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the materials recorded in the trial, and that the stage is fixed only on the basis of the confirmed materials. What is not permitted is fixing the stage by inferring the outcome without confirming any records. What is also not permitted is declaring, merely because the records are empty, that there are no grounds or that the right to seek recusal has already lapsed. The inconvenience pointed out by the counterargument remains, but the conclusion does not change. The next question to be addressed is whether grounds are recognized merely because a motion for recusal has been filed.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Is the case different where a party, aware of the grounds for challenge, has made a statement on the merits? The restriction on recusal where a party, aware of the grounds, has engaged in oral argument on the merits or made a statement at a preparatory hearing must be examined separately. This question is addressed in the following order: first fixing the meaning of the restriction on the exercise of the right to move for recusal, and then determining what change would overturn the determination reached at the preceding stage.
The relevant text for this issue is Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides: "Where a party, while aware that there are grounds to challenge a judge, argues the merits or makes a statement at a preparatory hearing for oral argument, the party may not file a motion for recusal." Here the subject is the party who knows that there are grounds to challenge, and the act is arguing the merits or making a statement at a preparatory hearing for oral argument. The condition is framed as the coexistence, in a single party, of awareness and a statement on the merits.
According to this text, the restriction on the exercise of the right to move for recusal means a restriction that turns on the relationship between the grounds of which the party was aware and the statement on the merits. This restriction stands at a different stage from a determination that establishes whether grounds themselves exist. The preceding stage, which deals with the existence of the grounds, and the present stage, which asks whether a party who knew of the grounds may still apply after making a statement on the merits, must be distinguished.
The strongest of the counterarguments is aimed at the point that a party may come to know the legal meaning of the grounds belatedly. Where the structure of a conflict of interest does not appear externally, requiring evidence of clear bias produces a loss that remains uncontrolled. This answer does not mean that the restriction may readily be accepted even without confirming the point in time of awareness; it means that any definitive declaration of forfeiture is deferred.
This scene designates only the absence of materials on the grounds, and remains in a state where neither the time of learning of the grounds nor the relationship in question has been confirmed. Accordingly, whether the conditions for the restriction on the exercise of the right to move for recusal are met cannot be established on the scene alone. If statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, the view is taken that participation is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair.
The conclusion permitted in this section is a limited determination of procedure that confirms the relationship between awareness and the statement on the merits. Beyond that boundary it does not presume to decide the substance of the grounds or whether the motion for recusal will be granted. If the forfeiture of the right to move for recusal were declared without confirming the time of learning of the grounds, this determination would not hold.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Yet a party may come to know the legal meaning of the grounds belatedly. How is this strongest counterargument answered?
The relevant text provides: "(2) Where a party, while aware that there are grounds to challenge a judge, argues the merits or makes a statement at a preparatory hearing for oral argument, the party may not file a motion for recusal." (Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject indicated by this text is the party who wishes to file a motion for recusal; the act is oral argument on the merits or a statement at a preparatory hearing; and the condition is that the act was performed while aware that there were grounds to challenge.
This text fixes the relationship between a statement on the merits made with awareness and a motion for recusal; what is distinct from it is when the grounds came to be known. The latter is a prior determination that decides whether the condition of the restriction—namely, the relationship between the grounds of which the party was aware and the statement on the merits—is met. The premise that the restriction on recusal where a party, aware of the grounds, has engaged in oral argument on the merits or made a statement at a preparatory hearing must be examined separately operates here. Where the point in time of awareness is not confirmed and only the statement is confirmed, the same restriction cannot be applied.
The loss targeted by the counterargument—that if evidence of clear bias is required, conflicts of interest that are difficult to know from the outside cannot be controlled—is the gap in that control. Interests that do not appear externally are difficult to present as concrete materials, and because a party may come to know the legal meaning of the grounds belatedly, confirmation of the point in time of awareness is delayed in a place where materials are lacking. If in the meantime the trial proceeds with such involvement, confidence is shaken. Even so, and without erasing this disadvantage, the forfeiture of the right to move for recusal cannot be declared without confirming the time of learning of the grounds. The delay in confirmation cannot be converted into a ground for forfeiture.
This scene does not record, together, whether a statement on the merits was made and when the grounds came to be known. Whether the time of receiving the unfavorable question and the time of learning the legal meaning of the grounds coincide is also not settled by the scene. Whether, if statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, participation is not permitted merely because the outcome appears fair lies outside the scope of this section. Accordingly, among the materials on the grounds, the point in time of awareness, the statement on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the trial, what is presently confirmed is only the question and the wish to challenge, and the point in time of awareness remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the relationship between the point in time of awareness and the statement on the merits is first confirmed, and only then is the restriction on the exercise of the right to move for recusal determined; what it does not permit is declaring forfeiture solely on the ground that the legal meaning of the grounds may be learned belatedly, or without confirming the point in time of awareness.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section took the view that the forfeiture of the right to move for recusal cannot be declared without confirming the time of learning of the grounds. With that question of confirmation still open, what now remains is whether the case differs where a party, aware of the grounds for challenge, has gone so far as to make a statement on the merits. Whether this case too can be handled in the same manner as the preceding section, or whether a separate restriction must be imposed, is the question of the present section.
The basis for answering this question lies in one specified paragraph of the statutory text. Article 43 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Where a party, while aware that there are grounds to challenge a judge, argues the merits or makes a statement at a preparatory hearing for oral argument, the party may not file a motion for recusal" (Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act). This text specifies the subject as 'a party' and the act as 'arguing the merits or making a statement at a preparatory hearing for oral argument.' The condition lies in the fact that the act was performed 'while aware that there are grounds to challenge a judge.'
The two elements of this condition ask different questions. One is whether grounds for challenge exist; the other is whether the party, while aware of those grounds, made a statement on the merits. Therefore, the restriction on recusal where a party, aware of the grounds, has engaged in oral argument on the merits or made a statement at a preparatory hearing must be separated from the foregoing question and examined on its own. The question whether the grounds themselves are concretely established and the question whether the party proceeded with the procedure while aware of those grounds cannot be bundled together for determination.
The determination that a given circumstance constitutes grounds for challenge may itself be difficult, and a party may wait for clear evidence that the judge is biased and thereby miss the timing of the application. The loss—that conflicts of interest difficult to verify from the outside cannot be controlled—also remains within the counterargument. It cannot be erased that only once it is confirmed when the 'awareness' required by the statutory text occurred does this restriction become an issue.
On this scene alone, neither when the party came to know the grounds for challenge nor whether those grounds are concretely established has been settled together. Accordingly, it cannot be asserted that the restriction under Article 43 (2) applies immediately to this scene, and the relationship among the materials on the grounds, the point in time of awareness, the statement on the merits, the motion for recusal, and the trial must be confirmed. The treatment of the case where that confirmation is made, however, remains outside the scope of this section.
What this section permits is the distinction that a separate restriction on recusal is imposed where a party, aware of the grounds, has engaged in oral argument on the merits or made a statement at a preparatory hearing. This restriction does not immediately mean the dismissal of every motion for recusal, and even where the point in time of awareness is not confirmed, forfeiture cannot be declared. Nor has this section determined the substance of the grounds for challenge or the effects of other procedure.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Earlier it was confirmed that recusal is a separate avenue for inquiring whether circumstances exist that make a fair trial difficult to expect. In this scene, where a party, though aware of the grounds, spoke on the merits and only afterward brought up an application, the question is whether those grounds can still be raised separately now.
Article 43 of the Civil Procedure Act fixes that limit directly. Here the subject is the party who participated in the lawsuit, and the required act is oral argument on the merits or a statement at a preparatory hearing for oral argument. The condition is that the act was performed while aware that there were grounds to challenge a judge, and the effect designated by the statutory text concerns the motion for recusal thereafter.
The two conditions that the statutory text has kept separate must be read together. One is that the party had grounds to challenge; the other is that the party, while aware of them, made a statement on the merits. Because the restriction under this paragraph is not complete on either alone, the restriction on the exercise of the right to move for recusal in this section means a restriction that turns on the relationship between the grounds of which the party was aware and the statement on the merits. The fact that grounds existed and the point in time at which the grounds became known are different stages of determination, and the latter does not follow immediately upon confirmation of the former. If this distinction is blurred, the result is to speak of forfeiture of the right without confirming the point in time of awareness.
The strongest of the counterarguments is aimed at the point that that distinction fails to cover the losses of practice. The counterargument noting that a party may come to know the legal meaning of the grounds belatedly holds that if evidence of clear bias is required, conflicts of interest difficult to know from the outside cannot be controlled. From this vantage point, insisting on the point in time of awareness amounts in fact to protecting the practice of challenging only after an unfavorable outcome has been perceived. The foregoing answer is maintained even without erasing the inconvenience the counterargument identifies, because to declare forfeiture on grounds whose timing is unconfirmed is to skip over the requirement of awareness demanded by the text of this paragraph.
What is confirmed in this scene is the fact that Plaintiff A felt the presiding judge's question to be unfavorable, wished to challenge, and presented no separate materials on interest. Placing this fact alongside the conditions of the text, whether the grounds are established by concrete materials is undetermined, and the scene does not settle when Plaintiff A came to know of the grounds. The point in time of awareness is not fixed by the mere impression that the question was unfavorable, and whether oral argument on the merits was conducted or a statement was made at a preparatory hearing for oral argument also lies outside the scene. Only one confirmed condition is clear. It merely points to a case where participation itself cannot be undone even after the recognition of the grounds and the point in time of awareness have been confirmed; it does not fill in the undetermined items of the scene.
Accordingly, the conclusion this section permits is narrow. The restriction on recusal where a party, aware of the grounds, has engaged in oral argument on the merits or made a statement at a preparatory hearing must be examined separately, and the determination is made on the standard of a restriction that turns on the relationship between the grounds of which the party was aware and the statement on the merits. The conclusions that are not permitted are broader. Neither from the mere feeling that the question was unfavorable nor from the mere fact that materials on interest were not presented can it be said that the right to challenge survives or has already been lost, and forfeiture must not be declared while the point in time of awareness remains unconfirmed. Whether the application itself brings the grounds into being is also outside the range that the text of this section answers.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
What the preceding stage leaves behind is the point that recusal is a separate avenue for inquiring into circumstances that make a fair trial difficult to expect. The question now addressing that avenue is narrow: how the relevant source text fixes the treatment of the case where a party, aware of the grounds for challenge, has made a statement on the merits.
The relevant text is Article 43 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. Here the subject is a party, the act is oral argument on the merits or a statement at a preparatory hearing for oral argument, and the condition is that the act was performed while aware that there were grounds to challenge. The text bars a motion for recusal where these three elements are established together.
When connecting this text with the restriction it produces, two stages must be distinguished. First there is the awareness of whether one knew there were grounds to challenge; next there is the act of whether, after acquiring that knowledge, one argued the merits or made a statement at a preparatory hearing. The ground of determination is this text alone, and it is not broadened beyond this scope to the reasons for the judgment or to other paragraphs.
The strongest of the counterarguments lies in that a party may realize the legal meaning of the grounds belatedly. The grounds themselves may already have existed, while the legal assessment that those grounds constitute grounds for recusal may come only later, and it would be a grave loss to brand such a party as having forfeited the right merely because the application followed a determination that turned out unfavorable to that party. The point that conflicts of interest difficult to perceive from the outside are not controlled by clear evidence of bias alone also operates at the same time. Even so, and notwithstanding that counterargument, the answer is given only within the range that the application of the relevant text is maintained but that the forfeiture of the right to move for recusal cannot be declared without confirming the time of learning of the grounds.
Plaintiff A wished to challenge on the ground that the presiding judge's question was unfavorable but presented no separate materials on interest. What can be confirmed in this scene is only the feeling that the question was unfavorable and the wish to challenge; neither the awareness of grounds to challenge required by the text nor the timing of the statement on the merits appears in the materials. Accordingly, on this scene alone it cannot be found that the party, while aware of the grounds, engaged in oral argument on the merits or made a statement at a preparatory hearing. So long as the point in time of awareness is unconfirmed, whether the restriction on the exercise of the right to move for recusal is established remains undetermined. The contrasting condition—that if statutory grounds for disqualification are confirmed, participation is not permitted on the ground that the outcome appears fair—is understood only within the scope of application of this text.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. It goes no further than the point that the case where a party, aware of the grounds for challenge, has argued the merits or made a statement at a preparatory hearing for oral argument becomes subject to the restriction of being unable to file a motion for recusal as the text provides. Conversely, where it is not confirmed whether the party knew of the grounds, when the party came to know them, or whether a statement on the merits was made, the mere fact that the grounds were put forward late cannot support a statement that the right has been lost. The outcome of the actual case and the results of recovery likewise are not established by this scene.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
기피사유를 알고 본안 진술을 한 경우는 다른가 하는 물음에서, 지금 문제는 그 한정된 사유를 안 뒤에 어떤 행위가 있었는지에 따라 기피권 행사 제한이 갈리는지 확인하는 것이다. 이 제한은 인지한 사유와 본안 진술의 관계에 따른 제한을 뜻한다. 따라서 이 절이 묻는 것은 공정성 위험에 대한 법관 배제 안에서 어떤 부분을 다시 나누어 판정해야 하는가이다.
민사소송법 제43조는 기피를 제한하는 문언으로 "당사자가 법관을 기피할 이유가 있다는 것을 알면서도 본안에 관하여 변론하거나 변론준비기일에서 진술을 한 경우에는 기피신청을 하지 못한다"고 규정한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 당사자이고, 문제 행위는 본안에 관한 변론과 변론준비기일의 진술이며, 요건은 그 행위 이전에 기피 사유를 알았다는 점이다. 사유를 알면서 본안 변론이나 준비기일 진술을 한 경우의 기피 제한은 바로 이 요건의 배치에서 나온다. 문언은 사유의 법적 의미를 언제 깨달았는지까지 적지 않으므로, 여기서는 문언이 정한 주체·행위·조건의 대응만 살핀다.
이 조건의 배치는 단계 안의 세부 구분을 작동하는 경우·막히는 경우·미확정인 경우로 제한하는 까닭과 맞닿는다. 앞서 확인한 기피가 별도의 통로라는 점은 이 제한이 제척 사유 자체의 판단과 섞이지 않는다는 뜻이다. 따라서 판정은 세 단계로만 갈린다. 제척의 법정 사유나 적법한 기피사유가 구체 자료로 인정되면 작동하는 경우에 해당하고, 사유를 알면서 본안 진술을 한 법정 제한이나 구체적 사정의 부재가 확인되면 막히는 경우에 해당한다. 추가 단계를 새로 발명해 결과의 공정성 여부를 별도 심사하는 식으로 나아가면, 문언이 정한 인지와 본안 진술의 관계라는 구분 기준이 무너진다.
가장 강한 반론은 사유의 법적 의미를 당사자가 뒤늦게 알 수 있다는 점에 겨눈다. 명확한 편향의 증거를 요구하면 외부에서 알기 어려운 이해충돌은 통제하지 못하며, 사유를 알아도 그 법적 의미를 파악하지 못한 당사자에게까지 상실을 적용하는 것은 가혹하다. 이 손실은 사라지지 않는다. 그러나 사유를 알게 된 때를 확인하지 않고 기피권 상실을 단정할 수는 없으므로, 이 반론은 판정을 미확정인 경우로 되돌릴 뿐 막히는 경우를 확정하지는 않는다. 기피권 행사 제한이 인지한 사유와 본안 진술의 관계에 따른 제한이라면, 인지 시점과 본안 진술의 순서가 확인되지 않는 한 상실의 요건은 갖춰지지 않았다.
이 장면의 사실은 불리한 질문에 대한 느낌과 기피 의사뿐이며, 사유 자료·인지 시점·본안 진술·기피신청·재판 가운데 확인되는 것은 그 기피 의사에 국한된다. 구체 자료 없이 불리한 느낌만 제시된 상태라면 공정성을 해칠 구체적 사정이 인정되지 않아 막히는 경우에 놓인다. 동시에 원고가 언제 사유를 알았는지, 본안 변론이나 준비기일 진술이 있었는지가 확인되지 않으므로 기피권 상실 쪽 판단은 미확정인 경우로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 사유를 알면서 본안 변론이나 준비기일 진술을 한 경우에는 기피신청이 제한된다는 문언의 조건 대응을, 그 대응이 작동하는 경우, 막히는 경우, 미확정인 경우로만 나눈다는 한정이다. 이 절이 허용하지 않는 것은 그 세 조건 밖에 새로운 판정 단계를 두거나, 인지 시점과 본안 진술의 순서 없이 기피권 상실을 확정하는 일이다. 기피를 신청했다고 사유가 곧 인정되는지도 여기서는 답하지 않는다.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
이 통로 위에서 이번에 다룰 물음은, 기피사유를 알면서 본안 진술을 한 경우의 처리가 앞서 본 다른 장면과 어떻게 구별되는지다. 이 경우에 불리한 느낌만으로 열린다고 말할 수 없는 것과 마찬가지로, 알고 진행한 사정도 그 자체로 곧바로 차단된다고 말할 수 없는 셈이다. 따라서 이번 단계에서는 인지한 사유와 본안 진술이 겹치는 경우에만 적용되는 제한의 문언과 그 전제를 차례로 확인한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 민사소송법 제43조 제2항이다. 해당 문언은 “②당사자가 법관을 기피할 이유가 있다는 것을 알면서도 본안에 관하여 변론하거나 변론준비기일에서 진술을 한 경우에는 기피신청을 하지 못한다”라고 정하고 있다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 기피를 원하는 당사자이고, 행위는 본안에 관하여 하는 변론 또는 변론준비기일에서의 진술이다. 그리고 조건은 그 법관을 기피할 이유가 있다는 것을 알면서 그 행위를 한 경우다. 세 요소가 함께 겹칠 때 비로소 기피신청이 막힌다는 뜻이지, 그중 하나만으로는 이 항의 문언이 적용되지 않는다. 조문이 다루는 다른 항이나 다른 요건까지 이 자리에서 넓혀 읽을 것은 아니다.
이 문언은 그 앞의 기피사유 판단과 구분되는 별도의 제한으로 읽힌다. 앞 단계에서 사유의 존부를 따지는 통로는 공정한 재판을 기대하기 어려운 사정이 있는지 보는 작업이고, 이 항의 제한은 그 사유를 알면서도 본안에 진술한 당사자의 신청 자체를 막는 작업이다. 전자가 사유의 실체를 다룬다면 후자는 행사의 시기와 태도를 다룬 것이다. 같은 이유로 이 제한은 기피사유가 없다는 판단과도 다르다. 사유는 존재하지만 그 사유를 알면서 본안에 진술한 경우에는 신청이 막힐 뿐이고, 사유 자체가 부정되는 것은 아니다. 이 두 판단을 나누어 두어야 인지한 사유와 본안 진술의 관계를 전제로 하는 기피권 행사 제한이라는 정의가 제 자리를 잡는다.
가장 강한 반론은 그 인지의 시점을 겨냥한다. 당사자가 그 사유의 법적 의미를 뒤늦게 알게 될 수 있다는 것이다. 외부에서 드러나지 않는 이해충돌의 경우에, 법관의 편향을 보여주는 명확한 증거를 요구하면 그 갈등을 통제할 길이 닫힌다는 걱정이 뒤에 있다. 어떤 자료가 사유에 해당하는지 법적으로 평가할 줄 몰라 본안에 진술한 사람을, 사유를 알면서 진술한 사람과 같은 자리에 놓을 수 없다는 뜻이다. 그렇다고 이 반론이 문언의 제한을 없애지는 않는다. 이에 대한 답은 사유를 알게 된 때를 확인하지 않고 기피권 상실을 단정할 수는 없다는 데에 있다. 인지의 시점이 확인되지 않은 경우는 차단으로 몰지 않고 미확정으로 남겨 두어야 한다.
이 장면에서는 인지의 시점과 사유의 내용 모두가 미확인이다. 원고 A는 재판장의 질문이 불리하다고 느꼈고 기피를 원하지만, 별도의 이해관계 자료는 제시하지 않았다. 이 사실만으로는 공정성을 해칠 구체적 사정이 인정되지 않는 경우에 해당하는지, 또는 그 사유를 알면서 본안에 대하여 진술한 경우인지 판단할 근거가 없다. 만약 법정 제척사유가 확인되면 결과가 공정해 보인다는 이유만으로 관여를 허용하지 않는다고 하더라도, 이 장면에는 확인된 제척사유가 없다. 따라서 장면만으로는 열림도 막힘도 확정할 수 없고, 사유 자료·인지 시점·본안 진술·기피신청·재판의 기록이 모이기 전까지 미확정으로 남는다.
정리하면, 기피의 문은 구체 자료가 사유로 인정될 때 열리고, 사유를 알면서 본안에 진술한 제한에 걸리거나 구체적 사정이 없을 때 막히며, 인지 시점이나 문제 관계가 확인되지 않을 때는 미확정이다. 앞의 판단을 이어받아도 그 경계는 그대로다.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
그 별도의 통로와 이번 물음은 서로 다르다. 지금 묻는 것은 공정성 의심 자체가 아니라, 그 사유를 이미 알았던 당사자가 본안 진술까지 마친 뒤에 기피를 구할 수 있는가이다. 앞 절이 다룬 사유의 존부와 이번 절이 나누는 행사 시기의 문제를 겹쳐 읽으면, 법관을 배제하는 근거가 있는지와 그 배제를 지금 구할 수 있는지를 따로 놓지 못하게 된다. 이 절에서 기피는 두 시기 사이의 균형을 전제로 검증되지 않는 제도가 아니다. 사유의 인지와 본안 진술이라는 두 사건이 전후 관계를 이루는지, 그 순서가 기피권의 행사에 어떤 제한을 두는지가 이 절의 물음이다. 기피사유를 알고 본안 진술을 한 경우는 다른가 하는 물음에 접근하는 자리가 여기에 있다.
그 물음에 답할 때 해당 문언은 민사소송법 제43조 제2항이다. 그 조항은 ‘당사자가 법관을 기피할 이유가 있다는 것을 알면서도 본안에 관하여 변론하거나 변론준비기일에서 진술을 한 경우에는 기피신청을 하지 못한다’고 적는다. 이 문언이 먼저 정하는 주체는 당사자이고, 행위는 두 가지로 나뉜다. 하나는 본안에 관하여 변론하는 것이고, 다른 하나는 변론준비기일에서 진술하는 것이다. 그 두 행위는 기피사유를 안다는 인식 아래에서 이루어져야 한다. 사유를 모르고 진행한 진술은 이 항의 문언이 걸어둔 조건에 닿지 않는다. 따라서 이 조항은 본안 진술이라는 외형만 보고 기피를 막는 규칙이 아니라, 인지와 진술이 결합된 경우에만 작동하는 조건 규정이다. 사유를 알면서 본안 변론이나 준비기일 진술을 한 경우의 기피 제한을 따로 살펴야 하는 까닭이 바로 이 조건부 문언에 있다.
위에서 확인한 문언과 이 절의 결론을 이으면, 기피권 행사 제한은 인지한 사유와 본안 진술의 관계에 따른 제한을 뜻한다. 이 정의에는 두 단계가 들어 있다. 첫째는 당사자가 사유를 알고 있었는지이고, 둘째는 그 인식 아래 본안 변론이나 준비기일 진술이 있었는지이다. 이 두 단계를 구별하지 않고 하나로 뭉개면, 사유의 존재만으로 곧 기피권이 막혔거나 지켰다고 말하게 된다. 인지한 사유가 무엇인지 확인하는 문제와 그 사유를 알면서 어떤 절차 행위를 했는지 확인하는 문제는 다루는 대상이 다르다. 앞의 것이 사유의 실체를 겨냥한다면, 뒤의 것은 당사자의 절차상 선택과 그 시점의 조합을 겨냥한다. 기피를 신청했다고 사유가 인정되는가 하는 물음도 같은 구분 안에서만 놓일 수 있다. 신청의 유무가 사유의 인정 여부를 곧바로 뒤바꾸는 것이 아니라는 점이, 이 절이 그 다음에 남겨둔 자리다.
가장 강한 반론은 당사자가 사유의 법적 의미를 뒤늦게 알 수 있다는 데 겨눈다. 사유의 외형을 보았다고 해서 그 사유가 법적으로 어떤 의미를 갖는지까지 곧바로 파악했다고 단정하기는 어렵다. 명확한 편향의 증거를 요구하면 외부에서 알기 어려운 이해충돌은 통제하지 못하고, 반대로 그 해석을 기다려 주지 않으면 알면서도 회피한 사람과 늦게 알게 된 사람이 한 묶음으로 처리된다. 이 불이익은 사유의 법적 의미를 뒤늦게 이해한 당사자가 기피권을 잃는 결과로 그대로 닿는다. 반론이 지적하는 손실은 분명하다. 그러나 이 반론은 기피권 상실을 뒤집지는 못한다. 오히려 이 절의 답은 그 반론을 전제로 삼는다. 인지 시점이 확정되지 않은 상태에서 제한 조항의 문언을 그대로 적용하면, 그 조항이 정한 인지라는 조건이 채워졌는지조차 판단하지 않은 채 결론에 이른다.
이 장면으로 돌아가면, 원고 A는 재판장의 질문이 불리하다며 기피를 원하지만 별도의 이해관계 자료는 제시하지 않았다. 이 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 질문이 불리하게 느껴졌다는 것과 기피를 원한다는 것이고, 여기에 이해관계 자료는 없다. 그러므로 이 장면만으로는 제43조 제2항의 조건이 모두 채워졌다고 말할 수 없다. 인지한 사유가 무엇인지, 그 사유를 언제 알았는지, 그 인식 아래 본안 변론이나 준비기일 진술이 있었는지가 장면에 드러나 있지 않다. 그 셋 가운데 하나라도 확인되지 않으면, 기피 신청의 가부를 묻는 이 항의 적용 대상 여부 자체가 미확정으로 남는다. 이 대조는 결과가 예상된다는 이유로 정해진 사유의 검토를 건너뛰지 말라는 뜻으로, 현재의 미확정을 확정으로 바꾸지는 않는다.
정리하면, 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 인지한 사유와 그 인식 아래의 본안 진술이 확인될 때 비로소 기피권 행사 제한이 문제된다는 것이지, 그 제한으로 곧바로 사유의 부존재나 기피의 불가능을 선언하지는 않는다. 사유를 알게 된 때가 확인되지 않은 채 기피권 상실을 단정하는 것은 이 절의 결론을 넘어서는 것이다. 장면의 느낀 불리함만으로 기피사유가 없다고 할 수도 없고, 이해관계 자료가 없다는 사실만으로 기피 신청이 무의미하다고 할 수도 없다. 남은 것은 사유 자료·인지 시점·본안 진술·기피신청·재판이라는 기록을 통해 두 단계가 실제로 어떻게 조합되었는지 살펴보는 일이다. 기피를 신청했다고 사유가 인정되는가?