Summary
For the determination of whether the claim used for set-off exists, there is a statutory exception limited to the amount for which set-off was asserted in opposition.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
원칙만 기억하면 상계에서 이미 소진된 다툼의 범위를 놓친다. 그 원칙은 이유의 판단에 기판력이 생기지 않는다는 뜻으로 자주 옮겨 적히지만, 이 문장만으로는 상계 항변에서 어느 범위까지 논쟁이 소진되었는지 가려내지 못한다. 앞 절에서 해당 판례는 인도청구 판단의 전제가 된 소유권에까지 기판력이 미치지 않는다고 구분했고, 이 구분은 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 점을 들어 원고 A가 그 소유권 판단이 새 소송에서도 확정되었다고 주장하는 장면에도 그대로 적용된다. 다만 이 구분이 정한 것은 어디까지나 후소의 기판력 구속 범위의 나눔이고, 그 나눔의 문을 여는 기준은 따로 확인해야 한다. 그래서 이번에 묻는 것은 이유의 판단에 언제나 기판력이 없는지, 그리고 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준은 무엇인지이다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민사소송법 제216조의 상계 판단에 관한 조항이다. 민사소송법 제216조 제2항은 “②상계를 주장한 청구가 성립되는지 아닌지의 판단은 상계하자고 대항한 액수에 한하여 기판력을 가진다.”라고 적는다. 이 문언이 지정하는 주체는 상계를 주장한 쪽과 그 대항 상대로, 다루는 행위는 상계 항변의 방어이다. 그 판단은 청구의 성립 여부에 관해 내려지지만, 그 구속은 상계하자고 대항한 액수라는 범위에 묶인다. 여기서 상계 판단의 기판력은 법정 범위에서 상계 채권 판단에 생기는 구속을 뜻한다. 다만 이 항은 다른 쟁점까지 정하지 않고, 상계 청구 성립 여부 판단의 구속 범위만 한정한다.
이 문언과 앞선 구별이 맞물리면서, 판정의 기준이 나온다. 이유의 판단에 기판력이 없다는 원칙을 상계 항변의 경우까지 한결같이 적용하면, 이미 대항한 액수 안에서 확정된 상계 채권 판단이 다시 심리되는 결과가 생긴다. 반대로 그 성립 판단에 예외 없이 구속을 주면, 후소의 기판력 범위 밖에 있는 청구까지 묶이는 결과가 나온다. 따라서 저자는 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나누고, 그 나눔 뒤에 구제의 길이 열린다고 정한다. 여기서 급부란 청구가 구하는 급부의 내용, 당사자는 청구의 양쪽 당사자, 조건은 청구의 존립 조건을 가리키며, 세 가지가 특정되어야 후소의 방어 대상이 정해진다. 결국 그 대상이 정해진 뒤에야 후소가 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나눌 수 있다.
이 기준이 겨냥한 손실은 상계 항변만으로 별도 청구권이 구속되는 효과의 무게이다. 피고가 방어 수단으로 꺼낸 상계 항변 한 번으로, 청구의 성립 여부 판단이 별도 청구권에까지 구속이 미치면 그 권리는 뒤이은 소송에서 다시 내세울 수 없게 된다. 이 경우 피고는 방어의 범위를 넘어서 권리를 잃고, 원고는 처음 예상하지 못한 범위에서 확정을 받는 불이익을 감수한다. 저자는 이런 불이익과 부담을 인정하면서도, 그 때문에 이유의 판단에 예외 없이 기판력이 없다고 정할 수는 없다고 말한다. 왜냐하면 그런 원칙으로는 상계에서 이미 소진된 다툼의 범위를 지킬 수 없기 때문이다. 그러므로 법정 범위에 한한 구속만 인정하는 문언에 따라, 이 문은 상계 대항액을 넘어 확장을 하지 않되 그 안에서의 반복 심리를 막는 방향으로만 열린다.
이 장면의 사실과 이 조건을 대조해 보면 경계가 분명해진다. 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 것은 확인된 사실이고, 원고 A는 그로써 새 소송에서 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장한다. 그러나 앞 절의 구별에 따르면 인도청구 판단의 전제가 된 소유권은 후소에서 구속되는 대상이 아니므로, 이 사실만으로 통로가 열리는지 여부는 결정되지 않는다. 통로를 열려면 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나눈 뒤, 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건이 청구취지에 특정되는지, 선택한 소의 권리를 방어할 수 있는지 확인해야 한다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우에는 이 절차의 판단을 미확정으로 남긴다. 다만 전소에서 다룬 것이 주문 대상이 아닌 선결문제로 확인되면 그 자체의 기판력 주장을 거둔다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론과 허용되지 않는 결론의 경계는 이렇게 갈린다. 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나누고, 급부·당사자·조건이 청구취지에 특정되며 선택한 소의 권리를 방어할 수 있을 때, 이 구제의 입구는 열린다. 이때 상계한 청구의 성립 여부 판단은 상계하자고 대항한 액수에 한한 구속을 받는다. 반면 그 나눔 없이 이유의 판단에 예외 없이 기판력이 없다고 쓰는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다. 같은 기준으로 확정된 대상 밖의 새 심판은 전소 확정판결의 주문 대상이나 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하지 않는 한 열려 있고, 그 충돌이 있거나 전소의 주문 대상이 확인되지 않은 때에는 이 통로가 막힌다. 다만 그 판단은 법정 통로의 개방에 관한 것이고, 실제 지급·인도·회수의 성과를 확정하는 것이 아니다.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
이전 분석 단계에서 해당 판례는 인도청구 판단의 전제가 된 소유권에까지 기판력이 미치지 않는다고 구분하였다. 원고 A는 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 점을 들어 새로운 소송에서도 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장한다. 이 주장이 지나는 관문이 이번 단계의 물음이다. 이유의 판단에는 언제나 기판력이 없는가? 이 물음은 앞에서 세운 구분을 유지한 채 구제의 길이 막히는 조건이 무엇인지를 정하는 데에 있다.
이 물음에 해당하는 법문은 다음과 같은 문언을 둔다. 민사소송법 제216조 제2항은 “상계를 주장한 청구가 성립되는지 아닌지의 판단은 상계하자고 대항한 액수에 한하여 기판력을 가진다.”라고 규정한다. 이 문언에서 기판력이 생기는 대상은 상계를 주장한 청구가 성립하는지 아닌지에 관한 판단이다. 행위란 피고가 반소청구권으로 상계 항변을 내세우고 법원이 그 항변에 대하여 청구의 성립 여부를 판단한 경우를 말한다. 조건은 그 판단이 상계하자고 대항한 액수라는 한정된 범위 안에 드는 경우이다. 이 조문에 관하여 이 절에서 다루는 범위는 같은 조 제2항 하나뿐이다.
그 문언과 이 절의 결론을 잇는 사슬은 범위의 대조이다. 앞 절이 이유의 판단에 일반적으로 기판력이 없다고 정리한 것은 주문 대상이 아닌 판단이므로 그 자체로 확정되지 않는다는 뜻이다. 그런데 상계 청구의 성립 여부 판단은 법정 범위 안에서 예외적으로 기판력을 갖는다. 그러므로 주문에 확정된 대상과 법정 상계 판단의 범위를 먼저 나누어 본 다음, 새 소송에서 요구되는 판단이 어느 쪽과 충돌하는지를 살핀다. 그 충돌하는 판단이 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않은 채 내세워지면, 확정된 대상 밖의 새 심판으로 나아가는 구제의 길은 닫힌다.
가장 강한 반론은 그 효과의 무게를 겨냥한다. 상계 항변 하나를 방어 수단으로 제기한 결과 그 별도 청구권 자체가 구속을 받게 되면, 항변을 꺼낸 쪽이 의도하지 않았던 결과에 놓인다. 같은 쟁점을 다시 심리하면 모순된 판결과 반복 비용이 생긴다는 우려도 함께 작동한다. 이런 손실과 불편은 지워지지 않는다. 그러나 그 무게만으로 이유에는 예외 없이 기판력이 없다고 쓸 수는 없다. 법정 문언이 정한 한정된 범위에서의 구속을 읽어내지 못하면, 이미 소진된 다툼의 범위를 새로이 열어 모순과 비용을 오히려 키운다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 것과, 원고 A가 그 소유권 판단이 새로운 소송에서도 확정되었다고 주장하는 것뿐이다. 앞의 조건과 대조하면 판결 주문이 무엇을 판단 대상으로 삼았는지, 전후 소의 대상이 각각 무엇인지, 상계 주장이 어느 액수를 대항한 것인지 는 이 장면에 정해져 있지 않다. 그 기록은 전후 소장·확정판결 주문과 이유·상계 주장 범위에서 찾을 일이다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우 그 실효는 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 조건을 바꾸어 전소에서 다룬 것이 주문 대상이 아닌 선결문제로 확인되면 그 자체의 기판력 주장을 거둔다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 이유의 판단이라는 사유만으로 무조건 구속이 없다고 보지 않고, 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 전소 주문 대상을 대조하여 충돌 여부를 따진 뒤, 법정 요건이 충족되지 않으면 구제의 길이 닫힌다고 판단하는 것이다. 반대로 상계 항변에 부수된 모든 별도 청구권이 언제나 구속된다는 뜻이나, 다른 쟁점의 판단까지 기판력을 끌어낸다는 뜻은 이 절의 결론이 아니다. 사건명이 같은지를 물어 청구의 동일성을 따지는 일도 이 절의 범위가 아니다.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
앞선 절이 전소 확정판결의 주문 대상 또는 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단을 요구하는 경우에는 이 구제가 막힌다고 정리한 데서 나아가, 원칙만 기억하면 상계에서 이미 소진된 다툼의 범위를 놓친다. 이렇게 상계에서 이미 소진된 다툼의 범위를 놓치지 않으려면, 자료가 없어 판정할 수 없는 경계는 어디인가? 원고 A는 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 점을 들어 새로운 소송에서도 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장하는 장면을 전제로, 확정이 되었는지 아직 알 수 없는 경우를 따로 다루어야 한다.
이 물음에 대해 민사소송법 제216조 제2항은 “상계하자고 대항한 액수에 한하여 기판력을 가진다”고 규정한다(민사소송법 제216조). 이 문언은 상계 항변에 대항하여 제출된 청구권이 성립하는지 여부에 대한 판단에 대해서만, 상계에 쓰겠다고 내세운 액수의 한도 안에서 기판력을 인정하는 것으로 읽힌다. 그 판단을 내린 주체는 법원이며, 대상이 되는 행위는 상계로 대항한 청구의 성립 여부에 관한 판단이고, 기판력이 생기는 조건은 그 판단이 상계로 대항한 액수의 한도 안에 머문 경우이다. 이 문언은 주문과 이유의 구분이나 다른 쟁점에 대해서는 별도로 말하지 않는다.
그 문언과 이번 절의 결론을 이으면, 상계 판단의 기판력이란 법정 범위에서 상계 채권 판단에 생기는 구속을 뜻한다는 정의가 그 자리를 잡는다. 이 구속은 별도 청구권 전체를 묶는 것이 아니라 상계에 쓰인 액수 안에서만 묶는다는 점이 핵심이다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우에는, 그 판단이 법정 범위에 들었는지 알 수 없으므로 판정을 미확정으로 남겨야 한다. 이 미확정은 앞 절이 정한 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별된다. 막힌 경우는 확정된 대상과 충돌하는 새 판단을 요구하여 생기지만, 미확정은 자료가 없어 판단 자체를 아직 내릴 수 없는 상태이다.
그 구분은 가볍지 않은 반론을 받아들이면서도 결론을 바꾸지 않는다. 상계 항변만으로 별도 청구권이 구속되는 효과가 무겁다는 지적은, 소액의 상계 항변 하나로 별도 청구권을 꽁꽁 묶어 버리는 결과가 생길 수 있다는 점에서 설득력이 있다. 같은 쟁점을 다시 심리하면 모순된 판결과 반복 비용이 생긴다는 우려 역시, 상계 판단의 범위를 넓게 볼수록 줄어든다. 그렇더라도 이유에는 예외 없이 기판력이 없다고 쓸 수는 없다. 법정 예외가 상계 채권 판단에만 머물지만, 그 예외 범위 안에서는 기판력이 생기므로, 이유의 판단에 언제나 기판력이 없다는 식으로 총괄적으로 정리하면 법정 예외를 지워버린다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 것은 원고 A가 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 점과, 이를 근거로 새로운 소송에서 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장한다는 사실뿐이다. 앞선 판결의 주문이 무엇이었는지, 그 이유의 소유권 판단이 상계 주장의 범위 안에 들었는지는 장면에서 정해지지 않았다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 이상, 그 판단이 상계 채권의 성립 여부에 관한 것이었는지, 주문 대상이 아닌 선결문제에 머물렀는지 가릴 수 없다. 그러므로 확정 여부는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우에는 판정을 미확정으로 남기며, 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별한다는 것에 한정된다. 확인되지 않은 자료를 넘겨짚어 확정이 되었다고도, 확정이 되지 않았다고도 단정할 수 없고, 구제가 막힌 경우로 끌고 가서도 안 된다.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
상계 판단의 기판력에 관한 앞선 분석에서는 해당 판례가 인도청구 판단의 전제가 된 소유권에까지 기판력이 미치지 않는다고 구분했다. 이 점을 밝히려면 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 이유로 새로운 소송에서도 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장하는 원고 A의 주장을 둘러싸고, 이유의 판단에는 언제나 기판력이 없는가라는 물음과 더불어, 판단을 위하여 어떤 기록이 필요한가라는 물음이 함께 놓인다.
이 물음에 답하는 문언은 민사소송법 제216조에 있다. 그 제216조 제2항은 "②상계를 주장한 청구가 성립되는지 아닌지의 판단은 상계하자고 대항한 액수에 한하여 기판력을 가진다"고 정한다. 이 문언은 상계를 주장한 당사자가 대항한 청구, 즉 상계 채권의 성립 여부를 다룬 판단의 구속을 다룬다. 그 구속은 상계하자고 대항한 액수에 한한다. 따라서 그 액수를 넘는 부분의 판단은 이 문언이 말하는 기판력의 범위에 들어가지 않는다.
문언이 정한 한정과 앞의 결론을 이어 보면, 상계 판단의 기판력은 법정 범위에서 상계 채권 판단에 생기는 구속을 뜻한다. 이 한정을 구별해야 하는 까닭은, 상계 채권 판단의 구속과 다른 청구에 대한 판단의 구속이 서로 다른 범위에서 생기기 때문이다. 이 구별에 따라 단계 판정의 기준도 정해진다. 전후 소장·확정판결 주문과 이유·상계 주장 범위에 기록된 자료만으로 단계를 판정한다. 단계 판정은 정해진 기록으로만 하고, 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다.
그렇다고 상계 판단의 기판력을 가볍게 여길 수는 없다. 상계 항변만으로 별도 청구권이 구속되는 효과는 그 자체로 무겁다. 같은 쟁점을 다시 심리하면 모순된 판결과 반복 비용이 생긴다는 점도 빼놓을 수 없다. 하지만 이 불리한 점을 지운다고 해서 기록 요건이 달라지지는 않는다. 이유에는 예외 없이 기판력이 없다고 쓸 수는 없다. 반론이 겨냥한 손실과 비용은 남겨 둔 채, 기록으로만 단계를 판정한다는 결론은 그대로 유지된다.
이 점을 앞선 인도 판결의 상황에 두어 보면, 원고 A가 손에 쥔 것은 그 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 기록일 뿐이다. 이 기록은 전후 소장·확정판결 주문과 이유·상계 주장 범위라는 정해진 기록의 일부에 해당할 뿐, 그 자체로 소유권 판단의 확정을 가리키지 않는다. 무엇보다 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우 단계는 미확정으로 남는다.
따라서 확인할 수 있는 것은, 상계한 청구의 성립 여부 판단에는 상계로 대항한 액수에 한한 법정 예외가 있다는 점과, 그 판단의 확정 여부는 정해진 기록에 적힌 범위에서만 가릴 수 있다는 점이다. 정해진 기록을 벗어난 확정이나 구속의 범위를 단정할 수는 없다.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The distinction in ownership that underlay the earlier determination of the delivery claim is placed here only as background. The question now opened is: when that distinction leads to a determination on the set-off defense, what scope of determinations on preliminary issues may be repeated in another lawsuit, and how must the subject matter of the preceding and succeeding judgments be compared in order to overturn the findings of the earlier stage?
In answering this question, one first examines the wording of the statutory exception. The party designated by that wording is the party who asserted set-off as a defense; the act is the determination as to whether that claim is established; and the condition under which res judicata arises is where that determination takes as its scope the amount asserted by way of set-off.
The limitation of amount set by the provision is not merely a matter of indication. Within the statutory scope, binding effect also attaches to the reasoning for that limitation, while determinations extending beyond that scope are not accorded the same binding effect. Accordingly, if it is confirmed that what was addressed in the reasoning of the earlier action was a preliminary issue rather than the subject of the dispositive part, res judicata cannot be asserted on that basis alone. At the same time, if that preliminary-issue determination pertains to within the amount asserted by way of set-off, that binding effect is preserved through the statutory exception. Unless the two scopes are separated, reading the exception leaves one unable to tell what portion has been exhausted.
The effect whereby a separate claim is bound by the set-off defense alone is a weighty one. The counterargument forcefully points out that reexamining the same issue produces inconsistent judgments and duplicated costs. Even so, and without dispelling that inconvenience, one cannot write that determinations in the reasoning never carry res judicata. The statutory exception already permits a different conclusion, and the review demanded by the counterargument is confined to the remaining segment after the scope of the exception has been confirmed.
All that can be confirmed in this scene is the structure of contentions surrounding that assertion. The complaints in the earlier and later actions, the dispositive part and reasoning of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion must be compared on the record before it can be determined what the earlier judgment decided by its dispositive part. Until the results of that comparison are confirmed, win or loss, performance, and recovery remain undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow, as follows. Only where the subject matter of the earlier and later actions is compared and the scope within which the later action is bound by res judicata is separated from the scope beyond it does the determination stand on that distinction. Beyond this, this section permits neither a conclusion that erases the meaning of the earlier judgment in its entirety nor a conclusion that treats all determinations in the reasoning as settled without distinction.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
After distinguishing that res judicata does not extend to the ownership that formed the premise of the determination of the delivery claim, the next question is where the boundary of that distinction lies from the position in which the set-off defense stands. Yet the effect whereby a separate claim is bound by the set-off defense alone is weighty, and that weight constitutes the strongest counterargument. The counterargument is aimed at the point that reexamining the same issue produces inconsistent judgments and duplicated costs.
The wording relevant to this question is Article 216 paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act (Civil Procedure Act Article 216). That wording provides that the determination as to whether the claim asserted by way of set-off is established carries res judicata only within the amount asserted by way of set-off. Here, "the claim asserted by way of set-off" means the claim raised as a set-off defense, and "the determination as to whether it is established" refers to the determination whether that claim exists and can be used to extinguish the opposing claim by set-off. "The amount asserted" means the range within which the defendant, as a defense, demanded that set-off be applied, and any portion exceeding that amount is not treated as settled. The statutory exception opens only where the party, the act, and the condition are defined in this manner.
Connecting that basis with the conclusion of this section yields the answer that one cannot write that determinations in the reasoning never carry res judicata. The premise that determinations in the reasoning are in principle not the object of res judicata, and the determination that there is an exception, limited to the amount asserted, for the determination whether a claim raised by way of set-off is established, are situated at different stages. The former is a matter of determining which parts of a final and conclusive judgment prevent a renewed dispute; the latter is a matter that the law separately stipulates as to the scope within which the dispute has already been exhausted where a set-off defense is raised. If the two stages are merged into one, the existence of the exception is erased; if the exception is made the principle, the limitation to the amount asserted disappears. The res judicata of a set-off determination means the binding effect arising, within the statutory scope, on the determination of the set-off claim, and this binding effect is treated as a narrow scope distinct from the finality of the dispositive part.
The strongest counterargument targets the weight of that binding effect directly. If a separate claim is legally bound by a set-off defense alone, the party must bear the consequence that a claim it has raised becomes tied up in an unforeseen place. If the values of procedural economy and consistency of judgments are pushed to the fore, the costs of inconsistent determinations and repeated hearings are reduced, but the disadvantage remains that an unexpected preclusive effect attaches to a single defensive measure. One must answer without dispelling this disadvantage. Insofar as the statutory exception imposes binding effect on the determination of the set-off claim on the premise of the limitation to the amount asserted, an explanation that empties the exception at the root merely because the matter is weighty cannot stand. The duplicated costs pointed out by the counterargument are, if anything, addressed by settling the set-off determination within a limited scope.
Among the facts of the synthetic scene, those bearing directly on this question are only two: that ownership was written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, and that Plaintiff A asserts that the ownership determination has also become settled in the new lawsuit. Set against the preceding conditions, the earlier distinction that res judicata does not extend to the ownership that formed the premise of the determination of the delivery claim, and the statutory exception for set-off determinations, are each situated within their own scope. What the earlier action determined by its dispositive part, and how far the scope of the set-off defense extended, are matters to be confirmed on the record, and are not settled by the scene alone. The facts, service, and performance results of the actual case also lie outside this scene and thus cannot be confirmed.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. An explanation that pushes the principle that determinations in the reasoning carry no res judicata all the way to the position where a set-off defense is raised, and thereby erases the statutory exception, is excluded. The determination stands that the determination whether a claim raised by way of set-off is established carries res judicata limited to the amount asserted by way of set-off, and separate claims outside that scope are not bound by this determination alone. Conclusions not permitted are treating determinations beyond the amount asserted as settled, or erecting the ownership written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment as a settled right in itself.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Taking up the conclusion of the preceding section that one cannot write that determinations in the reasoning never carry res judicata, this section continues the question. To judge whether this argument succeeds, one must first separate the scope already settled in the earlier judgment. What is being addressed is the distinction between a determination that was the subject of the dispositive part and a preliminary issue determined before reaching the dispositive part. And within that distinction, the analysis examines where the set-off determination is situated.
The statutory criterion for the res judicata of a set-off determination lies in Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act. Article 216 paragraph (2) provides: "The determination as to whether a claim asserted by way of set-off is established or not shall have res judicata only within the amount asserted by way of set-off." The party indicated by this wording is the party who, by a set-off defense, put forward its own claim as a defensive means; the act is that party's setting up of its claim against the other party's claim. The condition is the amount asserted, and res judicata arises only within that amount. The remainder of the set-off assertion, or a separate claim itself, is not treated by the same criterion. The scope is fixed by reading the condition written in the statutory text.
Connecting that wording with the conclusion of this section yields the determination that, for the determination whether a claim raised by way of set-off is established, there is a statutory exception limited to the amount asserted by way of set-off. The reason the two stages must be separated is clear. One side is the binding effect that ties to the amount defended by the set-off defense; the other is the domain that remains without that binding effect. If the former and latter determinations are mashed into one lump, the result appears as though portions exceeding the amount asserted were also settled. The statute draws the boundary by amount so that this distinction is not lost.
The effect whereby a separate claim is bound by the set-off defense alone is weighty. The opposing party must bear the disadvantage that a single use of a defensive measure binds the determination of its own claim, and the benefit of efficiency in not addressing the same issue twice is also included in this weight. That Article 216 paragraph (2) stipulates res judicata only within the amount asserted means that, within that amount, the determination of the establishment of the set-off claim has binding force. The way to reduce the costs pointed out by the counterargument is not to erase the exception but to apply the binding effect precisely within the boundary of the amount asserted.
In the scene where Plaintiff A asserts, on the ground that ownership was written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that the ownership determination has become settled in the new lawsuit as well, two things must be confirmed. First is whether the ownership determination in the earlier judgment was the subject of the dispositive part or a preliminary issue to the delivery claim; next is, if there was a set-off defense, what the amount asserted was. On this record alone, the subject of the dispositive part of the earlier judgment and the scope of the set-off assertion are not confirmed, and that part therefore remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that the determination whether a claim raised by way of set-off is established carries res judicata only within the amount asserted by way of set-off. What is not permitted here is the attitude of recognizing binding force in a separate action for any determination written in the reasoning, or, conversely, of flatly asserting that no determination in the reasoning has any binding effect. This distinction operates only when the dispositive part of the earlier judgment is compared with the scope of the set-off assertion and the scope within which the later action is bound is separated from the scope beyond it. How the premise received earlier—that one cannot write that determinations in the reasoning never carry res judicata—connects with this conclusion is left for what follows.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Yet among the determinations written in the reasoning of that judgment ordering delivery, there may also be mixed in the establishment of a claim that a party separately drew in by way of set-off. In that case, does an exceptional binding effect arise? That is the question of this section. Whether determinations in the reasoning always lack res judicata, and the scope and determinations to which the res judicata of a set-off determination gives rise as binding effect, are settled here.
The relevant wording is Article 216 paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. That wording provides: "(2) The determination as to whether a claim asserted by way of set-off is established or not shall have res judicata only within the amount asserted by way of set-off" (Civil Procedure Act Article 216). Here, "the claim asserted by way of set-off" means the claim asserted defensively by way of set-off, and the subject of that determination is the court of the preceding proceeding. And "the determination as to whether it is established" means the conclusion whether that asserted claim exists. The provision binds the binding effect of that conclusion not to all other determinations but to the condition of the amount asserted by way of set-off. Issues under other provisions are not addressed here.
Connecting this wording with the conclusion inherited from before reveals that the principle that determinations in the reasoning carry no res judicata and the binding effect of a set-off determination operate at different stages. The author holds that one must read separately whether every determination written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment is a subject of inquiry, and whether among those determinations only the establishment of the claim asserted by way of set-off is subject to binding effect within the statutory scope. The res judicata of a set-off determination means the binding effect arising, within the statutory scope, on the determination of the set-off claim (Civil Procedure Act Article 216). If these two distinctions are mashed together, either a determination on a preliminary issue not addressed by the dispositive part is misread as binding the next trial, or, conversely, the result arises that a dispute over the scope already exhausted by set-off is reopened.
The strongest counterargument targets the weight of this effect. That a separate claim is bound by a set-off defense alone imposes great inconvenience and loss on a party. For once the determination of the establishment of the amount asserted by way of set-off gains binding effect, the dispute surrounding that claim is not reopened within that scope. Yet the value gained thereby is not small either, because reexamining the same issue produces inconsistent judgments and duplicated costs. The author, however, preserves the range the counterargument cannot erase, and answers that even so one cannot write that determinations in the reasoning never carry res judicata. The burden is handled by keeping the object and scope of the binding effect narrow within the limits set by the provision.
Among the facts of this scene, those directly touching this question are whether the dispositive part of the earlier judgment addressed the delivery claim, and whether the ownership determination written in its reasoning is connected to the set-off assertion. The distinction of the earlier stage—that res judicata does not extend to the ownership that formed the premise of the determination of the delivery claim—applies as it stands. However, since the complaints in the earlier and later actions, the dispositive part and reasoning of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion have not been confirmed, whether that ownership determination falls within the establishment of the amount asserted by way of set-off remains undetermined here.
The conclusion permitted by this section is clear. It is not permitted to establish the principle that determinations in the reasoning carry no res judicata without exception, and there is a statutory exception, limited to the amount asserted by way of set-off, for the determination whether a claim raised by way of set-off is established. But the conclusion that the exception binds all separate claims is likewise not permitted. The res judicata of a set-off determination is the binding effect arising, within the statutory scope, on the determination of the set-off claim (Civil Procedure Act Article 216).
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
On the premise of such a distinction, the question that follows is how the wording of the relevant provision is applied in a new adjudication outside the determined subject matter. This question opens only after the preceding section separated the determinations in the reasoning from the subject matter of the dispositive part. Only once it is first settled what the determined subject matter is does it become apparent what adjudication newly begins within the range beyond it. Here, a new adjudication means a determination made within a range not reached by the determined subject matter of the preceding judgment.
The relevant provision is Article 216 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. Its wording reads as follows: "The determination whether the claim asserted by way of set-off exists or not has res judicata only as to the amount set up for set-off." (Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act) In this wording, the subject is the determination whether the claim asserted by way of set-off exists or not, and the scope of its res judicata is limited to the amount set up for set-off. The statutory exception is read to mean that that determination is binding only within the limited scope of the amount set up for set-off. What the wording designates is not the determined subject matter stated in the dispositive part but rather the determination as to the existence of the claim attached to the set-off defense.
When this wording is applied to a new adjudication outside the determined subject matter, it is used as the basis of determination as written, while remaining within the scope prescribed by the wording. That is, as to the determination of whether the claim used for set-off exists, there is a statutory exception limited to the amount set up for set-off; this is the conclusion of this section. The reason for dividing the analysis into two stages here is that what the binding effect attaches to and how far the scope of that binding effect extends are different questions. The former is the task of distinguishing whether it is a determination in the reasoning or the subject matter of the dispositive part; the latter is the task of asking whether the binding effect arises only within the limit of the amount set up. Going one step further from the earlier stage, which distinguished that res judicata does not extend to the ownership that formed the premise of the determination on the claim for delivery, this time only the scope of the wording itself is applied without extending the reasons for the judgment to other items. Only in this way does the role that the relevant provision plays in the new adjudication become clear.
What this application targets by way of loss is the inconvenience borne by the opposing party. The counterargument that the effect of binding a separate claim on the strength of a set-off defense alone is heavy points specifically to that burden. If, even though the existence of the same claim has already been litigated and determined, that determination can be challenged again in a later action, the parties must prepare the same arguments anew and the court must examine the same evidence again. The cost and delay incurred at that point are the repetition that the counterargument fears. Beyond this, there also arises the possibility that the earlier and later courts may reach different determinations regarding the existence of the same claim. The observation that reexamining the same issue produces contradictory judgments and repeated costs is aimed precisely at this point. Even so, the foregoing answer remains unshaken. The inconvenience spoken of by the counterargument is left as it is, but the answer is not given in a way that erases the exception prescribed by the wording.
This argument is a matter to be examined by cross-checking the pleadings of the earlier and later actions, the dispositive part and reasoning of the final and conclusive judgment, and the records of the scope of the set-off assertion. Since it has not yet been confirmed what the preceding judgment ordering delivery determined in its dispositive part, whether the ownership stated in its reasoning falls within the determined subject matter remains undetermined. However, the limitation of this section that the reasons for the judgment are not extended to other items applies to this scene as well. If it is confirmed that what the earlier action addressed was a preliminary question rather than a subject matter of the dispositive part, the plaintiff's assertion that the ownership has been determined is withdrawn. Cross-checking must also be made against the scope of the amount set up for set-off, and any binding effect beyond that scope is not recognized.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. Only the wording of the relevant provision is used as the basis of determination in a new adjudication outside the determined subject matter, and only the wording within the scope of the relevant provision is applied. An interpretation that reads the reasons for the judgment as broadening to other items is not permitted. Conversely, what this section does not permit is equally clear. Both the categorical assertion that determinations in the reasoning never have res judicata, and the view that a separate claim is bound merely because the determination is one stated in the reasoning of the judgment, fall outside the conclusion of this section. The binding effect arising from the determination on the set-off claim occurs only within the statutory scope, and what determines that scope is the element designated by the wording.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
This carries forward, from the preceding stage of analysis, the conclusion that it cannot be categorically asserted that determinations in the reasoning never have res judicata. In this scene, what portion is to be separately determined within the new adjudication outside the determined subject matter must be ascertained by the criterion that divides the range over which the dispute has already been joined through the set-off defense and the range beyond it. To answer this question, the boundary of the determined subject matter must first be drawn.
Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "(2) The determination whether the claim asserted by way of set-off exists or not has res judicata only as to the amount set up for set-off." This wording designates which claim was contested as to its existence in the assertion of set-off, and within the limit of what amount that determination is binding. Here, 'the claim asserted by way of set-off' is the own claim of the party asserting set-off, used by that party to raise the set-off defense, and 'the determination whether it exists or not' means the conclusion of the dispute over the existence of that claim. The statutory exception is limited to the amount set up and does not extend to the range beyond the assertion of set-off.
The reason the wording of the preceding paragraph prescribes that the binding effect arises only as to the amount set up is that the dispute within that limit has already been heard and concluded. Contrasting the subject matters of the earlier and later actions so as to divide the range to which the later action is bound by res judicata from the range beyond it is precisely an act following this distinction. A determination within the limit cannot be disputed again, while a determination outside the limit remains the subject of a new adjudication. There is no need to add any new step here.
The counterargument that the effect of binding a separate claim on the strength of a set-off defense alone is heavy fears the burden whereby the claim itself is bound merely because a single means of defense was raised. The point that reexamining the same issue produces contradictory judgments and repeated costs also grounds this counterargument. Yet even while acknowledging these costs and inconvenience, one cannot write that determinations in the reasoning never have res judicata. The fact that the statutory exception prescribes a binding effect only as to the amount set up is a compromise designed to close the dispute within that limit so as to prevent contradiction, while leaving the range outside the limit open so as not to lose the determination of substantive rights. The heaviness pointed out by the counterargument remains, but it is not resolved by deleting the exception.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that ownership is stated in the reasoning of the preceding judgment ordering delivery, and that Plaintiff A asserts that the ownership determination has become final. Where cross-checking the pleadings of the earlier and later actions, the dispositive part and reasoning of the final and conclusive judgment, and the records of the scope of the set-off assertion does not confirm what the earlier action determined in its dispositive part, that determination remains undetermined. Meanwhile, where a new determination is demanded that conflicts with the subject matter of the dispositive part of the final and conclusive judgment in the earlier action or with the scope of the statutory set-off determination, it does not pass as such. Since the scene alone does not confirm within the limit of what amount the set-off assertion was made, the actual breadth of the determined scope cannot be fixed within this material.
What is permitted is the determination that contrasts the subject matters of the earlier and later actions so as to divide the range bound by res judicata from the range beyond it. The statutory exception binds the determination on the existence of the set-off claim only as to the amount set up, while determinations outside that limit still remain the subject of a new adjudication. What is not permitted is writing that determinations in the reasoning never have res judicata, and extending and applying the set-off determination without the limitation of the amount set up.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The relevant precedent distinguishes that res judicata does not extend to the ownership that formed the premise of the determination on the claim for delivery. Now the adjudication newly proceeding outside the determined subject matter of the previous judgment actually opens, and it is necessary to examine separately when it is blocked and when the determination must be reserved. To review this argument, it is first necessary to confirm from the settled wording what the res judicata of that set-off determination designates.
The statutory wording applicable to this issue is Article 216 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. That wording uses the expression "the determination whether it exists or not has res judicata only as to the amount set up for set-off," and delimits the range in which the determination as to whether the claim asserted by way of set-off exists has res judicata. Here the subject is the party who raised the set-off defense, the act is that party's contesting the existence of the claim asserted by way of set-off on the basis of the amount set up, and the condition is limited to the range not exceeding that amount set up. In other words, this wording is read as providing that the res judicata of the set-off determination means the binding effect arising from the determination on the set-off claim within the statutory scope. Accordingly, this wording does not directly address whether another determination was assumed in the reasoning.
Connecting this wording with the conclusion of this section reveals the criterion that divides the adjudication that opens from the adjudication that is blocked. When the subject matters of the earlier and later actions are contrasted so as to divide the range to which the later action is bound by res judicata from the range beyond it, the new adjudication outside the determined subject matter opens. Conversely, it is blocked where a new determination is demanded that conflicts with the subject matter of the dispositive part of the final and conclusive judgment in the earlier action or with the scope of the statutory set-off determination. The reason for distinguishing here the scope of the subject matter of the dispositive part from the scope of the determinations assumed in the reasoning is that the latter does not automatically draw along the binding effect of the former. In addition, where what the earlier action determined in its dispositive part is not confirmed, it must be left undetermined.
The counterargument that the effect of binding a separate claim on the strength of a set-off defense alone is heavy is at its sharpest. Reexamining the same issue produces contradictory judgments and repeated costs, and brings with it the anxiety that even the range that could already have been contested in the earlier action is overturned. These losses and inconvenience cannot be denied, and the value of preventing cases in which an already-exhausted dispute is repeated is equally clear. The answer of this section is that, insofar as the statutory exception operates within the range in which the set-off defense was raised, a determination falling within that range may be subject to the binding effect of res judicata. However, this binding effect does not exceed the amount set up for set-off, and it does not support the assertion that the ownership determination stated in the reasoning of the preceding judgment ordering delivery immediately fixed a separate claim as well.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene treated in this section are that ownership is stated in the reasoning of the preceding judgment ordering delivery, and that Plaintiff A asserts in a new lawsuit that the ownership determination has already become final. On these facts alone, it is not confirmed how the claim subject matters of the earlier and later actions overlap, what the dispositive part of the final and conclusive judgment in the earlier action was directed to, or within what range the set-off assertion was raised. Accordingly, where it falls within the case in which what the earlier action determined in its dispositive part is not confirmed, it is left undetermined. Yet since the actual records—the pleadings of the earlier and later actions, the dispositive part and reasoning of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion—have not yet been confirmed, this scene alone cannot settle either side.
Accordingly, the new adjudication outside the determined subject matter opens where the subject matters of the earlier and later actions are contrasted so as to divide the range to which the later action is bound by res judicata from the range beyond it, and it is blocked where a new determination is demanded that conflicts with the subject matter of the dispositive part of the final and conclusive judgment in the earlier action or with the scope of the statutory set-off determination. If what the earlier action determined in its dispositive part is not confirmed, it is left undetermined, and the res judicata of the set-off determination is assessed only within the confirmed range. Conversely, to assert categorically that a separate claim is bound on the strength of a set-off defense alone, or conversely to generalize that determinations in the reasoning are never binding in any case, is to lose sight of this distinction.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The question whether determinations in the reasoning never have res judicata, if one remembers only the principle, misses the range of disputes already exhausted in set-off. The conclusion carried forward through the preceding section presupposes that there is a range in which binding effect arises even in the reasoning of the set-off determination. This section holds that conclusion in place while leaving a question to be passed on to the next section.
Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "(2) The determination whether the claim asserted by way of set-off exists or not has res judicata only as to the amount set up for set-off." Here, the amount set up for set-off means the amount among the defendant's own claims raised by way of set-off defense that was consumed in opposing the claim in suit, and the subject of that determination is the court that rendered the final judgment in the above lawsuit. In the end, the object of determination is the existence of the counterclaim used for set-off.
This wording makes clear that even a determination stated in the reasoning does not acquire res judicata if it goes beyond the statutory scope. Accordingly, only by examining separately the determination that the claim used for set-off exists and the binding effect that determination has on other claims can the ownership determination case of the preceding section and this exception be dealt with by the same standard.
The defendant, by a single defense, merely consumed the counterclaim as a means of defense; if that determination binds him even in a separate lawsuit, he may lose the opportunity to contest matters even beyond the intended range. Precisely within the range in which Article 216 (2) recognized res judicata for the set-off determination, the claim used for set-off enters a state in which it can no longer be contested.
In the scene where Plaintiff A asserts, on the ground that ownership is stated in the reasoning of the preceding judgment ordering delivery, that the ownership determination has become final even in a new lawsuit, what must be confirmed is what the preceding judgment determined in its dispositive part and how far the set-off assertion extended. If cross-checking the pleadings of the earlier and later actions, the dispositive part and reasoning of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion still does not reveal what the subject matter of the earlier action was, whether that ownership determination falls within the statutory exception remains undetermined.
Therefore, the conclusion permitted by this section is that a binding effect arises within the statutory scope even for determinations in the reasoning, while what is not permitted is a generalization beyond that scope. The matter cannot be closed with a single line to the effect that determinations in the reasoning have no res judicata. Furthermore, to determine whether the res judicata of the earlier and later lawsuits conflict, the comparison must be made on the basis of the subject matter of suit and the time of the close of oral arguments in the court of fact, not on the basis of the case name.