Summary
Records such as those of in-court settlement have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and are therefore distinguished from mere negotiation memos.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
확정판결이라는 제목이 붙지 않았어도 분쟁을 마무리하는 문서가 있다. 화해조서에도 확정 효과를 따져야 하는가, 그리고 그 문서를 두고 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준은 무엇인지가 지금의 물음이다. 앞 절에서는 전후 소송의 주문과 청구 대상을 대조해야 하며 사건 제목만으로 기판력의 범위를 정하지 않는다고 결론지었다. 같은 대조 작업을 화해가 적힌 조서에 적용할 때 무엇을 먼저 확인해야 하는지 따져보아야 한다.
화해조서의 효력에 관한 문언을 먼저 읽는다. 민사소송법 제220조는 “그 조서는 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다”고 규정한다(민사소송법 제220조). 여기서 조서란 화해, 청구의 포기 또는 인낙을 변론조서와 변론준비기일조서에 적은 문서를 말한다. 그러한 기록이 만들어지는 주체는 법정에서 합의를 맺은 당사자이고, 그 조서가 확정된 때에 법이 정한 절차적 지위가 뒤따라온다. 조서에 화해가 적힌다는 행위 자체가 분쟁을 종결시키는 요건이다.
이 문언은 화해조서를 단순한 협상 메모와 구별하는 근거가 된다. 협상 메모는 당사자의 의사 표시를 적어둔 것에 그쳐 언제든 수정하거나 버릴 수 있지만, 법정 화해 등의 조서는 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가지므로 사적 기록과 다르게 취급된다. 여기서 확정판결과 같은 효력은 법이 조서에 부여한 절차적 지위를 뜻한다. 이 절차적 지위와 기판력의 구속 범위는 나누어 살펴야 한다. 전소와 후소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나눈 경우, 구제의 길이 열린다.
당사자가 합의할 때 그 효과를 충분히 이해하지 못할 수 있다는 점은 실제로 가볍지 않은 반론이다. 화해의 법적 결과를 읽지 못한 채 서명한 사람이 나중에 뜻하지 않은 구속을 받게 되면 그 불이익은 오롯이 개인이 감당한다. 게다가 같은 쟁점을 다시 심리하면 모순된 판결과 반복 비용이 생긴다. 이러한 손실과 불편을 부정할 수는 없다. 다만 당사자의 이해 부족만으로 조서의 지위를 뒤집을 수는 없다. 화해조서를 언제든 철회 가능한 협상안으로 취급할 수는 없다.
합성 장면을 이 물음에 맞추어 대조한다. 원고 A는 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 점을 근거로 새로운 소송에서도 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장한다. 이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 앞 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 기록과 원고의 주장뿐이다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지는 확인되지 않았으므로, 그 소유권 기술이 주문 대상인지 선결문제에 불과한지 판단할 수 없다. 따라서 현재 기록만으로는 확정 효과가 어느 범위까지 미치는지 판정할 수 없으며, 원고의 주장은 확인되지 않은 것으로 남는다.
결국 화해조서에도 확정 효과를 따져야 하며, 구제의 길은 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 열린다. 이것이 허용하지 않는 것은 전소 확정판결의 주문 대상 또는 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단을 요구하는 경우이며, 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우에도 미확정을 넘어서 결론을 내릴 수 없다.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
화해조서에도 확정 효과를 따져야 하는가? 구제의 길이 막히는 조건은 무엇인가? 판결이라는 제목이 없어도 분쟁을 확정하는 문서가 있다. 전후 소송의 주문과 청구 대상을 대조해야 하며 사건 제목만으로 기판력의 범위를 정하지 않는다는 전제 아래, 화해조서의 효력을 그 절차적 지위와 함께 확인하고 그 확인이 어떤 조건에서 막히는지를 묻는다.
화해조서의 효력을 묻는 이 물음에 답하는 근거 문언은 하나뿐이다. 민사소송법 제220조는 "화해, 청구의 포기·인낙을 변론조서·변론준비기일조서에 적은 때에는" 그 조서가 "확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다"고 규정한다(민사소송법 제220조). 이 문언이 가리키는 것은 변론조서나 변론준비기일조서에 적힌 화해이며, 그와 함께 청구의 포기와 인낙도 같은 조서에 적히는 경우다. 여기서 주체는 조서에 화해를 적게 한 당사자이고, 행위는 화해의 성립과 그 기재이며, 조건은 그 화해가 변론조서 또는 변론준비기일조서에 적히는 것이다. 이 조문이 담당하는 것은 조서의 효력이라는 한정된 물음이다.
이 문언과 그에 따라 화해조서가 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다는 결론을 연결할 때, 두 구분이 그대로 성립한다. 하나는 단순한 협상 메모와 법정 화해 등의 조서를 나누는 구분이다. 다른 하나는 조서가 가진 확정판결과 같은 효력과 그 효력이 언제나 어떤 소송에서든 어떤 청구까지 막는지까지 스스로 알려 주지는 않는다는 점이다. 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 사정은 후자의 문제다. 조서가 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다는 것이, 전소 확정판결의 주문 대상 또는 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단을 막는 것은 아니다. 오히려 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나눈 경우에만 구제의 길이 열리며, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 그 길은 닫힌다.
이런 결론에는 분명한 불편이 따라붙는다. 당사자가 합의할 때 그 효과를 충분히 이해하지 못할 수 있다. 화해에 이르는 자리에서 상대와 조서에 남길 문구에 합의한 사람이, 그 문구가 훗날 다른 소송에서 무엇을 막고 무엇을 열어 두는지까지 파악하고 있었으리라 기대하기는 어렵다. 이 불리함은 지워지지 않는다. 그렇다면 그 조서가 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다는 법의 지정이 허언이 되고, 분쟁이 확정되는 문서라는 절차적 지위 자체가 남지 않는다. 이해가 불충분했다는 사정만으로 조서의 지위를 뒤집는 것은 이 단계의 답이 아니다.
합성 장면으로 돌아와 확인할 것은 단 하나다. 전소 확정판결의 주문 대상 또는 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단이 요구되었는지, 그리고 전후 소의 대상이 대조되어 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위가 나뉘었는지다. 장면에 주어진 것은 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 사정과, 원고 A가 그것의 확정을 주장한다는 사실뿐이며, 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않았다. 그 확인이 없는 한 그 판정은 미확정이다. 다만 전소에서 다룬 것이 주문 대상이 아닌 선결문제로 확인되면 그 자체의 기판력 주장을 거둔다. 어떤 판단이 화해조서의 효력을 확인하는 판정인지, 어떤 판단이 전소 판결 자체의 범위를 새로 정하는 판정인지도 이 경계 안에서 갈린다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 화해조서가 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다는 절차적 지위를 확인하고, 그 지위가 전소 확정판결의 주문 대상이나 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단으로 이어질 때 법정 요건이 하나라도 빠지면 그 구제 통로가 닫힌다는 판단이다. 허용되지 않는 것은, 그런 요건 확인 없이 조서의 효력을 확인하는 틀로 전소 판결의 이유에 적힌 판단까지 별도로 확정시킨다는 결론이다.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
전후 소송의 주문과 청구 대상을 대조해야 하며 사건 제목만으로 기판력의 범위를 정하지 않는다는 전제 위에서, 이번 단계는 자료가 없어 확정할 수 없는 경계를 묻는다. 그 경계는 무엇을 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 사항을 어떻게 다룰 것인가의 문제이며, 화해조서에도 확정 효과를 따져야 하는가라는 물음과 맞닿아 있다.
화해조서에도 확정 효과를 따져야 하는가라는 물음에 답하기 위해 해당 문언을 먼저 놓는다. 민사소송법 제220조는 "화해, 청구의 포기·인낙을 변론조서·변론준비기일조서에 적은 때에는"이라고 전제하면서, "그 조서는 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가진다"고 규정한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 화해·청구의 포기·인낙을 하는 당사자이고, 행위는 변론조서 또는 변론준비기일조서에 그 내용을 적는 것이며, 조건은 바로 그 기록이 조서에 남았다는 사실이다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론은 그대로 이어진다. 법정 화해 등의 조서는 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가지므로 단순한 협상 메모와 구분한다. 이 지위를 협상 문서의 기록과 구별해야 하는 이유는, 확정 효과를 묻는 판단과 판단 재료가 무엇인지 확인되었는지를 묻는 판단이 서로 다른 단계에 놓여 있기 때문이다. 전후 소송에서 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우, 그 사항은 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 것으로 남긴다. 이 경우를 불능으로 단정하지 않고 미확정으로 구별하는 것은, 자료 부족이 곧 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않기 때문이다.
당사자가 합의할 때 그 효과를 충분히 이해하지 못할 수 있다는 반론은, 조서의 효력을 강하게 잡을 때 생기는 손실을 겨눈다. 이해가 부족한 상태에서 맺은 합의가 곧바로 분쟁을 닫으면, 잘못된 양보가 되돌아오기 어렵고 당사자가 감당하기 어려운 불이익을 받게 된다는 점이다. 같은 쟁점을 다시 심리하면 모순된 판결과 반복 비용이 생긴다는 점도 이 반론의 반대편에 놓인다. 확정판결과 같은 효력이라는 절차적 지위가 바로 그 구분에 서 있다.
원고 A는 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 이유로 새로운 소송에서도 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장하는 장면에서, 이 물음에 속하는 사실은 전소의 무엇이 판단되었는지가 확인되지 않았다는 점이다. 전소에서 다룬 것이 주문 대상이 아닌 선결문제로 확인되면 그 자체의 기판력 주장을 거둔다는 조건은 이 장면에서 판단할 수 없다. 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 전소에서 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항을 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남긴다는 좁은 범위에 머문다. 허용하지 않는 것은 그 미확정을 곧 구제 불능으로 바꾸거나, 확인되지 않은 사실을 추측으로 채워 확정 판정을 내리는 쪽이다. 화해조서의 확정 효과는 여기서 절차적 지위로서만 다룬다.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
앞 절에서 전소에서 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우에는 판정을 미확정으로 남기며, 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별하기로 했다. 이 결론을 전제로 이번에 다루는 물음은 이 판정이 어떤 기록에 기대어 서 있는가이다. 화해조서에도 확정 효과를 따져야 하는가라는 물음에 대한 확인을 마친 뒤, 그 확인이 어떤 서류의 범위 안에서만 성립하는지를 적는다. 따라서 전후의 소장, 확정된 판결의 주문과 이유, 그리고 상계 주장의 범위를 기록 요건으로 삼는다. 여기서 말하는 전후 소장이란 앞선 소와 뒤이은 소에서 당사자가 청구의 대상으로 삼은 사항을 적은 문서를 말한다.
이 판정이 요구하는 기록의 범위는 네 가지로 정해진다. 먼저 전후 소장은 앞선 소와 뒤이은 소에서 당사자가 청구의 대상으로 삼은 사항을 적은 문서를 말한다. 확정판결의 주문은 법원이 청구에 대하여 내린 결론을 표시한 부분이고, 그 이유는 주문에 이르는 판단을 적은 부분이다. 상계 주장의 범위란 당사자가 상계 항변으로 내놓은 반대채권과 그에 관한 판단이 미친 범위를 말한다. 이 판정은 이 네 기록의 문언을 대조한 결과로만 선다. 법원이 주문에서 무엇을 판단했는지, 그 판단이 어떤 청구 대상에 걸쳤는지가 기록에서 읽히지 않으면 판단을 서둘러 정하지 않는다.
이 기록들과 앞의 결론이 만나는 지점은 대조에 있다. 확정판결과 같은 효력은 법이 조서에 부여한 절차적 지위를 뜻하는데, 이 지위는 조서에 적힌 사항이 분쟁을 확정한 것으로 다뤄진다는 뜻이다. 그런데 이 지위가 무엇에 대해 미치는지는 조서 바깥의 소장과 판결의 주문·이유를 대조해야 비로소 보인다. 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 사실만으로는, 뒤이은 소에서 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 단정할 수 없다. 그 소유권이 주문의 대상인지, 아니면 주문에 이르기 위한 선결 문제로만 다뤄졌는지가 전후 기록에서 확인되어야 하기 때문이다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지가 확인되지 않은 경우에는 결론을 미확정으로 남긴다.
이 판정에는 손실과 불편이 뒤따른다. 당사자가 합의할 때 그 효과를 충분히 이해하지 못할 수 있고, 조서에 적힌 사항이 어떤 범위에서 분쟁을 확정하는지 불확실한 채로 서명하는 일이 생길 수 있다. 그 결과 원고가 다시 다툴 수 있다고 여겼던 사항이 막히고, 재판을 다시 받아야 한다고 믿었던 당사자가 그 길을 잃는 불이익을 감수해야 한다. 조서가 확정판결과 같은 효력을 갖는 것은 그 자체의 절차적 지위인데, 이를 당사자의 이해 부족이나 협상의 미진함만을 이유로 뒤집을 수 있다면 조서를 협상 메모와 다르게 다루어야 할 이유가 사라진다. 반론이 지적하는 불이익은 인정하되, 그 때문에 조서의 효력 자체를 흔들지는 않는다.
합성 장면의 사실은 하나뿐이다. 이 주장은 앞에서 정한 기록 요건에 비추어 볼 때, 이유에 적혔다는 사실 하나만으로는 확인되지 않는다. 전후 소장에서 그 소유권이 청구의 대상으로 삼아졌는지, 확정판결의 주문이 그 소유권의 귀속을 판단했는지, 그리고 상계 주장이 그 범위를 가로질렀는지가 장면에 적혀 있지 않다. 이 자료가 없으므로 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었는지는 미확정으로 남는다. 이 미확정은 구제가 막힌 상태와 다르며, 기록이 채워지는 대로 대조하여 판정할 수 있는 범위를 정한다. 장면에 없는 사실로 그 범위를 채워 넣지 않는다.
이 절에서 말할 수 있는 것은 이 판정이 전후 소장·확정판결 주문과 이유·상계 주장 범위를 근거로 삼으며, 그 기록이 없으면 결론이 미확정으로 남는다는 사실까지이다. 앞선 소에서 무엇이 주문의 대상이었는지 확인되지 않은 채로 확정의 범위를 넓게 잡거나 좁게 잡을 수 없고, 조서의 절차적 지위만으로 개별 청구의 당부까지 함께 확정되었다고 볼 수도 없다. 반대로 기록이 모두 갖추어져도, 전소의 주문 대상이나 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단을 요구한다면 이 판정의 테두리 안에서는 그 요구를 받아들일 수 없다.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Yet even where a document does not take the form of a judgment, there are documents that determine the dispute itself. This determination rests on the complaint and the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, together with the scope of the set-off argument, in the respective lawsuits. If that record is absent, the conclusion remains undetermined. Taking up the conclusion, this time the question is not the scope of the determination confirmed earlier, but what becomes of the res judicata assertion in its own right if the circumstances change. That is, it must be determined under what conditions the determination is overturned.
The text serving as its basis is as follows. "Article 220 (Effect of a Transcript of Settlement, Waiver or Admission of a Claim) Where a settlement, a waiver of a claim, or an admission of a claim is entered in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings, such transcript shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment" (Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject indicated by this text is a party who settled in court or waived or admitted a claim; the act is entering such agreement in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings; and the condition is that the settlement or the like is actually entered in that transcript.
In this text, "the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment" means the procedural status the law confers upon the transcript. This status must be distinguished from whether the matter was the subject of the dispositive part in the previous action. That the transcript has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment means that the dispute is determined within the procedure in which that transcript was drawn up, but whether the matter dealt with in the earlier judgment was pronounced as the subject of the dispositive part, or was treated merely as a preliminary question, remains a separate question of confirmation. It is precisely this distinction that overturns the determination.
This distinction draws a counterargument, and that counterargument is aimed at the point that parties may not fully understand the effect when they reach an agreement. In fact, if in the course of settlement a party signed without grasping even the procedural status of the transcript, the disadvantage that the matter can later no longer be disputed becomes an unexpected loss to that party. The point that re-examining the same issue produces inconsistent judgments and repeated costs also lends weight to the counterargument. The mere circumstance of inadequate understanding does not bring down the procedural status of the transcript, and the inconvenience identified by the counterargument cannot be carried over into an exception to the conclusion.
Among the facts contained in the synthetic scene, those bearing on this question are that ownership was recorded in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, and that Plaintiff A asserts on the strength of that entry in the reasons alone, in the subsequent action, that the matter is determined. Setting this fact against the conditions above, if the matter entered in the reasons is not confirmed as the subject of the dispositive part, the res judicata assertion in its own right does not stand. However, unless the record of the complaint and the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, together with the scope of the set-off argument, in the respective lawsuits is secured, what was the subject of the dispositive part and what was a preliminary question cannot be confirmed, and so the conclusion remains undetermined. From the scene alone, the outcome of the judgment in the subsequent action or whether performance occurred cannot be determined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is a narrow determination: where a matter dealt with in the previous action is confirmed to have been a preliminary question rather than the subject of the dispositive part, the res judicata assertion in its own right is withdrawn. What is not permitted is the conclusion that a settlement transcript, being a provisional bargaining proposal, may be freely set aside; nor is the statutory fact that the transcript had the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment thereby erased. What divides the scope in which one may proceed to a new adjudication beyond the determined subject matter, from the scope beyond it, is the comparison of the records described above; and if one demands a new determination conflicting with the subject of the dispositive part of the final and conclusive judgment in the previous action, that path is closed.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The preceding discussion examined whether a settlement transcript also carries effect as a determination. The next question is whether the effect fixed in that document is of a character that can be undone at any time. One must compare the dispositive parts and the subject matters of the claims in the respective actions, and, under the condition that the scope of res judicata is not determined by the case title alone, the issue at this stage is how to handle the point that parties may not fully understand the effect when they reach an agreement.
The provision to be applied is Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act, and its text recognizes a particular status for that transcript "where a settlement, a waiver of a claim, or an admission of a claim is entered in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings" (Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here, settlement means an agreement by which the parties resolve a dispute by mutual concession, and waiver and admission of a claim mean, respectively, an indication withdrawing one's own claim or accepting the other party's claim. Cases in which these are entered in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings are the subject and the act targeted by this Article.
Under this text, what is conferred upon the transcript is "the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment," and this means the procedural status the law confers upon the transcript (Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act). Accordingly, a transcript of court settlement or the like has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and is distinguished from a mere bargaining memo. Having examined effect as a determination in the earlier stage, the question now is whether that status is of the same character as a provisional proposal in the course of bargaining. Since the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment is a status fixed by law, whether the parties' intentions had fully matured at the time the agreement was transcribed into the document remains a separate question.
If the status of the transcript is lowered to a provisional one on the ground of inadequate understanding at the time of agreement, room is opened for the dispute determined by the transcript to be reopened. If that happens, the same issue will be re-examined in a subsequent action, producing inconsistent judgments, and the costs of repeated examinations will be borne by the parties. So long as one grasps separately the scope in which new adjudications beyond the determined subject matter remain, and the scope in which new determinations conflicting with the subject of the dispositive part of the final and conclusive judgment in the previous action, or with the scope of the court's set-off determination, are blocked, the status of the transcript is maintained.
However, from the facts appearing in the synthetic scene alone, the circumstances in which the settlement transcript was drawn up, or the extent of the parties' understanding, cannot be determined. Plaintiff A asserts, on the ground that ownership was recorded in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that the ownership determination is also determined in the new lawsuit, and so this scene is used only for the task of comparing the dispositive parts and the subject matters of the claims in the respective actions. Where it is not confirmed what the previous action determined by its dispositive part, the scope in which the subsequent action is bound by res judicata also remains undetermined. Since the scene cannot be fixed by adding years, amounts, accrual dates, or judgment outcomes absent from the synthetic scene, no determination as to whether inadequate understanding on the parties' part actually occurred can be made on this scene.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted is one that recognizes the procedural status conferred upon the transcript by law while distinguishing it from a private agreement or a provisional proposal, and leaves the question of the formation of intention at the time the transcript was drawn up as a separate subject of determination. The conclusion that the transcript is a bargaining proposal that can be undone at any time is not permitted.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section concluded that a settlement transcript cannot be treated as a bargaining proposal that may be withdrawn at any time. This section again asks about the nature of the document that lies behind that conclusion. Not every record bearing the title of agreement receives the same treatment; the question is which document determines the dispute.
The text that answers this question is found in Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act. This Article provides that where a settlement, a waiver of a claim, or an admission of a claim is entered in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings, such transcript shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment (Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject spoken of here is the party who made the settlement, waiver, or admission; the act is entering such agreement or disposition in a court transcript; and the condition is that the record is included in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings. A memo or agreement that the parties separately drew up outside court does not satisfy the formal requirements of this text.
This distinction arises not from the texture of the paper of the transcript and the memo, but from the difference in the procedural status fixed by law. Therefore, whether it is a record entered in court must be examined before interpreting the content of the agreement or seeking remedies. The reason the effect of a transcript is handled on a par with the effect of a judgment is that the two documents stand in the same place, and there is no separate basis for raising a bargaining memo to that place.
When a person who came to court to save cost and time did not anticipate the consequences that follow from the transcript, the conclusion recognizing finality operates harshly against that person. The circumstance of inadequate understanding does not mean the transcript may be withdrawn at will, and the point remains that re-examining the same agreement produces inconsistent judgments and repeated costs.
The document of the previous action in this scene is a judgment, and within it the issue of what is the subject of finality is left to the preceding and following stages of the same section. The subject of this section is a court transcript, as in the case where a settlement, a waiver of a claim, or an admission of a claim is entered in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings; whether, unlike this, a private agreement memo is placed alongside a final and conclusive judgment is a matter on which the burden has already been shared with the earlier determination. However, whether a settlement transcript was also recorded within the earlier judgment ordering delivery and, if so, what its subject matter was, is nothing that the scene fixes, and remains undetermined.
What the reader may draw from this conclusion is that such a court transcript must be examined alongside a final and conclusive judgment; it does not mean that other agreement records automatically rise to the same place. Neither the specific wording of a bargaining memo nor the enforceability of a transcript is newly determined here.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
The conclusion of the preceding section as to the status of a transcript of court settlement or the like was that it is distinguished from a mere bargaining memo. What this section must confirm, then, is how that conclusion connects with the premise that the dispositive parts and the subject matters of the claims in the respective actions must be compared. Yet if the nature of that earlier document is a settlement transcript, the criterion of the preceding section—that the scope of res judicata cannot be determined by the case title alone—operates as before. That is, one must first determine with respect to which document effect as a determination is being examined, so that it becomes clear what the subsequent comparison is directed toward.
The relevant provision is Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act. This Article provides: "Article 220 (Effect of a Transcript of Settlement, Waiver or Admission of a Claim) Where a settlement, a waiver of a claim, or an admission of a claim is entered in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings, such transcript shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment" (Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here the subject is the party who made a settlement, a waiver of a claim, or an admission of a claim in court proceedings; the act is entering such declaration of intention in the transcript; and the condition is that the entry was made in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings. Since the law confers the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment upon a transcript satisfying the condition, the text speaks of the form of establishment of the transcript and its effect as one.
This basis stands on the same line as the conclusion of the preceding section. The reason the preceding section distinguished a transcript of court settlement or the like from a bargaining memo is that the former is a transcript satisfying the above conditions while the latter does not possess such form. Accordingly, that distinction is maintained in the determination that follows. To answer the question whether effect as a determination must also be examined for a settlement transcript, one must read the phrase "the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment" as the procedural status the law confers upon the transcript. This status derives not from the extent of the parties' understanding or the title of the document, but from the form of an entry in a transcript, and therefore the determination does not fall away from the preceding stage of comparing the dispositive parts and the subject matters of the claims in the respective actions.
However, the point that parties may not fully understand the effect when they reach an agreement is an inconvenience that cannot be set aside. If from the moment it is entered in a transcript in court withdrawal becomes difficult, then when circumstances change the room for renegotiation disappears, and there is also the risk that a mistaken agreement hardens as it stands. Even so, a settlement transcript cannot be treated as a bargaining proposal that may be withdrawn at any time. The legislature's choice to confer the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment is a procedural decision not to revisit an agreement entered in a transcript thereafter, and that decision cannot be lightly reversed on the ground of the parties' inadequate understanding.
Yet the condition preceding this section is that the dispositive parts and the subject matters of the claims in the respective actions must be compared, and that the scope of res judicata is not determined by the case title alone. If the earlier document is a transcript of court settlement or the like, its form is conferred the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment, but the reach of that effect must still be fixed by comparing the dispositive parts and the subject matters of the claims. However, so long as the nature of the earlier document and the result of the comparison are not confirmed by the record, the scope of the effect as a determination remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that a transcript of court settlement or the like has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment, and so is distinguished from a mere bargaining memo, and that this distinction rests upon the preceding premise of comparing the respective actions. Conversely, what is not permitted is either treating a settlement transcript as a bargaining proposal that may be withdrawn at any time, or an interpretation conferring the same effect upon any agreement document regardless of the form of the transcript. A settlement transcript or admission transcript having the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment under Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act not only carries res judicata but also, by Article 56, subparagraph 5 of the Civil Execution Act, becomes an enforceable title for compulsory execution within the scope for which an order for performance is specified; and where a ground prescribed in Article 451(1) exists, the parties may bring a retrial of the settlement or admission transcript, applying mutatis mutandis Articles 451 through 460 governing final and conclusive judgments (Article 461 of the Civil Procedure Act).
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Following the question whether effect as a determination must also be examined for a settlement transcript, this stage deals with a new adjudication taking place beyond the determined subject matter, as in the earlier judgment ordering delivery. Before this assertion, the question is what role the text of the Article in question plays.
The text provides: "Where a settlement, a waiver of a claim, or an admission of a claim is entered in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings, such transcript shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." The subject indicated by this text is the party who made the settlement, waiver, or admission; the act is entering that agreement in the transcript of oral argument or the transcript of the date for preparatory proceedings; and the condition is that it was so entered.
This text and the conclusion of this section connect as follows. What may be taken as the basis of determination in a new adjudication beyond the determined subject matter is the text of the relevant provision alone, and its application is confined to the text within the scope of that provision. Expanding to determinations entered in the reasons for judgment or to other items is not permitted. The text fixing the procedural status of the transcript must be distinguished from determinations made in the reasons for judgment. The former speaks to the effect fixed by law, while the latter is a separate determination exceeding the reach of that effect; if the two are mixed, other grounds come into the new adjudication as well.
The counterargument is aimed along two lines. One is that parties may not fully understand the effect when they reach an agreement; the other is that re-examining the same issue produces inconsistent judgments and repeated costs. If the transcript was drawn up without properly understanding the ramifications of the agreement, that disadvantage is concretely heavy, and the costs of repeated examination and the discrepancies between judgments are also real losses. In that the procedural status conferred upon the transcript is not a provisional proposal that may be undone on the ground of inadequate understanding in the course of agreement or for the convenience of re-examination, this answer stands.
The facts in the synthetic scene relevant to this question are that ownership was recorded in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, and that Plaintiff A asserts in the new lawsuit that the ownership determination is already determined. Setting these facts against the conditions above, the text in question fixes the effect when a transcript of settlement or the like is entered, but does not extend to the finality of determinations entered in the reasons for judgment. However, so long as it is not confirmed what the previous action determined by its dispositive part, whether the matter was a preliminary question cannot be determined from this scene alone.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that, in a new adjudication beyond the determined subject matter, only the text of the relevant provision is taken as the basis of determination, its application is held within the relevant scope, and it is not widened to the reasons for judgment or to other items. The conclusion not permitted is either borrowing the text of the transcript to make determinations in the reasons for judgment final as well, or, conversely, invoking the agreement parties' inadequate understanding to return the transcript to the status of a provisional proposal. Gaps where the material is insufficient remain undetermined.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Even after the conclusive effect of the settlement record has been examined above, a newly opened adjudication outside the scope of what has been finalized remains. In this scene, the question is how far the portions reach that the new adjudication will divide and adjudicate anew.
The statutory text addressed in this section is Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act. That provision provides: "Where a settlement, a waiver or acknowledgment of a claim is entered in the record of oral argument or the record of the preparatory hearing, that record shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment" (Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject to which this wording refers is the party who has made a settlement or a waiver or acknowledgment of a claim in the course of the litigation proceedings; the act is the entry of such a settlement or such a waiver or acknowledgment of a claim in the record of oral argument or the record of the preparatory hearing; and the condition is the time when that statement is entered in that record.
The status established by this wording and the detailed distinctions within the new adjudication stand at different stages. The determination that the record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment ends with deciding what procedural status that document acquires. Only where one compares the objects of the prior and later suits and divides the range in which the later suit is bound by res judicata from the range outside it does it first become open to decide which portions the new adjudication divides and adjudicates anew. If these two are mixed, the determination of the status of the record becomes, as it were, the determination of the scope of adjudication in the new adjudication, and a stage outside the earlier conditions is created anew.
The reason for insisting on this distinction lies in the difficulty that the parties may not fully understand the effect when they reach agreement. If the party who left behind the record did not know how that document would operate in later litigation, then, if the detailed distinctions in the new adjudication were to become vaguely broad, that disadvantage would remain exactly as it is. The counterargument that re-hearing the same issue gives rise to contradictory judgments and repeated costs is left as it stands, yet the order this section permits is to confirm first the procedural status of the record and only then to divide the range outside it.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene go no further than that plaintiff A asserts, on the strength of the ownership written in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that that determination has become final in the new lawsuit. Confronting these facts with the earlier conditions, cases that demand a new determination conflicting with the object of the dispositive part of the prior final and conclusive judgment or with the scope of the legal set-off determination are barred by the detailed distinctions of this section. Where it is not confirmed what the prior suit determined by its dispositive part, the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. The determination that the record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment, and the determination of the portions to be divided and adjudicated anew in the range outside it, are placed in different positions. The detailed distinctions operate only where the new adjudication divides into a range bound by res judicata and a range outside it, and a new determination conflicting with the object of the dispositive part of the prior final and conclusive judgment cannot enter.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Upon the carried-over premise that the dispositive parts and objects of claim of the prior and later actions must be compared and that the scope of res judicata is not determined by the title of the case alone, this stage asks how one should divide up the results of the adjudication newly demanded outside the scope of what has been finalized. The scene in which plaintiff A asserts, on the ground that ownership was written in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that that ownership determination has become final in the new lawsuit as well, holds this question in place.
The statutory provision corresponding to this question is Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act. Here the subject is the party who has made a court settlement or a waiver or acknowledgment of a claim; the act is the entry of that agreement in the record of oral argument or the record of the preparatory hearing; and the condition is the case where such a record has been drawn up. What this wording addresses is the effect conferred on the record; how an individual claim has been finalized is not determined by this provision alone.
Connecting that wording with the distinction drawn in this section reveals why the conclusive effect of a settlement record must also be examined. The same effect as a final and conclusive judgment is the procedural status that the law confers on the record (Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act), and this status and the range within which res judicata operates are stages of determination different from each other. The former decides whether to treat the record as a document duly created; the latter, by comparing the objects of the prior and later suits, divides the range in which the later suit is bound from the range outside it. That the parties who have completed a settlement cannot reduce this to a mere memo in their books is due to the fact that the former stage has already been settled; whether it prevents a new adjudication is a matter to be determined at the latter stage.
The counterargument that the parties may not fully understand the effect when they reach agreement is aimed at this very point. It is the concern that a party who, in the setting of exchanging agreement, could not set down the scope of res judicata as well may later be bound by the finality and suffer losses that are difficult to recover or reverse, and may even have to bear the inconvenience of contradictory judgments and repeated costs. This answer does not erase the disadvantage of the lack of understanding spoken of by the counterargument, yet it does not arbitrarily strip away the procedural status conferred on the record.
In the synthetic scene, only the assertion of plaintiff A is fixed, and it has not been confirmed where the object of the dispositive part of the earlier judgment ordering delivery and the adjudicative scope of its reasons come to an end. Since this is a case where it is not confirmed what the prior suit determined by its dispositive part, its result remains undetermined. The undetermined state cannot be filled with years, amounts, or results of performance that are absent from the scene.
What the foregoing permits is a determination that compares the objects of the prior and later suits, divides the range in which the later suit is bound from the range outside it, and separates the adjudication newly opened in that outside range from the adjudication that is barred because it conflicts with the object of the dispositive part or with the scope of the legal set-off determination; and it is an attitude that leaves what is not confirmed as undetermined. It is not a permitted conclusion to hold that any claim is barred merely because the record has conclusive effect, or conversely to hold that the record can be reverted to a bargaining proposal.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
There is a document called a settlement record. This document bears no title of "judgment" rendered by the court. Yet the fact that it can perform the function of finally settling the dispute between the parties is the starting point of the question. The dispositive parts and objects of claim of the prior and later actions must be compared, and the scope of res judicata is not determined by the title of the case alone. On the basis of this premise, this stage addresses the question of whether the conclusive effect must also be examined for a settlement record. This is because the task of determining the range of res judicata of the earlier judgment and the question whether the settlement record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment are stages of determination different from each other. If the former is the task of asking the object of the subject matter of suit, the latter is the task of confirming the status that the law confers on the document format of a record. Plaintiff A asserts, on the ground that ownership was written in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that that ownership determination has become final in the new lawsuit as well, but apart from this assertion there remains the process of confirming the effect of the record by the statutory text.
Article 220 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "Article 220 (Effect of Records of Settlement, Waiver or Acknowledgment of Claim) Where a settlement, a waiver or acknowledgment of a claim is entered in the record of oral argument or the record of the preparatory hearing, that record shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment." The subject to which this wording refers is the party who makes a settlement or a waiver or acknowledgment of a claim, and the act is the entry of such a declaration of intention in the record of oral argument or the record of the preparatory hearing. The condition is that the agreement or declaration of intention of the party is entered in the specified documents, namely the record of oral argument or the record of the preparatory hearing. When that condition is satisfied, the statutory text declares that the record shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. This wording does not address the issues of other provisions. It is clear, however, that records of court settlement and the like have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and are therefore distinguished from a mere bargaining memo. The law does not confer on a bargaining memo any procedural status directly.
Where the statutory text expresses this as the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment, "effect" here means the procedural status that the law confers on the record. This definition does not mean that actual payment or delivery has already been made. The fact that a legal channel has been opened for records of court settlement and the like, and the fact that the realization of concrete rights has succeeded, must be determined separately. The work of comparing the object of the suit and the dispositive part in order to divide the scope of res judicata was, in itself, a determination permitting a new adjudication outside the scope of what has been finalized. The basis for dividing the range bound by res judicata from the range outside it is derived from cross-checking against the record the complaints of the prior and later actions, the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion. In the case of a record as well, in the same way, what the record has finalized and the procedural status the record holds are confirmed separately. Where it is not confirmed what the prior suit determined by its dispositive part, what range has been finalized remains undetermined.
That the parties may not fully understand the effect when they reach agreement is the strongest counterargument making it difficult to accept the effect of a settlement record. If the record is drawn up without the parties fully grasping the legal meaning contained in the wording of the agreement, recognizing the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment may operate to their disadvantage. It creates a constraint upon the record's later being updated or renegotiated. Yet even if this loss is acknowledged, the settlement record cannot be treated as a bargaining proposal that may be withdrawn at any time. Records of court settlement and the like, whose same effect as a final and conclusive judgment is recognized, are distinguished from a mere bargaining memo. As set out in the preceding section, the criterion that the dispositive parts and objects of claim of the prior and later actions must be compared and that the scope of res judicata is not determined by the title of the case alone applies as it is. The unfavorable circumstance of the lack of understanding pointed out by the counterargument must also be placed alongside it.
In the scene where plaintiff A asserts, on the ground that ownership was written in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that that ownership determination has become final in the new lawsuit as well, whether that assertion is well founded and the effect of the settlement record are objects of determination different from each other. Whether a preliminary question written in the reasons is to be regarded as finalized so as to bind separate claims as well belongs to the area of the question left by the preceding section, whereas this section asks whether the record has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment. Since the scene does not specify the fact that a settlement record was created, the determination as to whether such a record was drawn up remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that records of court settlement and the like have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and are therefore distinguished from a mere bargaining memo. The same effect as a final and conclusive judgment means the procedural status that the law confers on the record, and this status must not be lowered into a bargaining proposal that may be withdrawn at any time. This conclusion, however, neither always permits nor always bars a new adjudication outside the scope of what has been finalized. Only where the objects of the prior and later suits are compared and the range in which the later suit is bound by res judicata is divided from the range outside it is that boundary fixed. Where a new determination is demanded that conflicts with the object of the dispositive part of the prior final and conclusive judgment or with the scope of the legal set-off determination, that path is barred. The conclusive effect and the scope of res judicata must each be determined separately, and the other force possessed by the earlier judgment must be examined separately. Even as to findings of fact in the reasons for a judgment to which res judicata does not extend, what probative value they possess in the later suit as material of strong evidentiary weight must be examined separately.