Summary
Facts stated in the reasoning of another judgment are not automatically established as notorious facts, but they may be evaluated as evidence.
6.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Material that is not binding can nonetheless persuade a judgment, and one must therefore not confuse invalidity with the absence of binding force. A record of court settlement and the like has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and is thus distinguished from a mere negotiation memo. If the previous section examined the effect of finality, this stage must determine whether the earlier judgment bears even the force it did not possess. Plaintiff A asserts that, because ownership was written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that determination of ownership has also become final and conclusive in the new lawsuit. If this assertion were accepted, the scope of finality and the weight of the material would be confounded.
Accordingly, to the question whether the earlier judgment is entirely without meaning if it lacks res judicata, one first reads the boundary set by the language of the authority. Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019 proceeds on the premise that facts found in a final and conclusive judgment in a related civil case become powerful evidence unless there are special circumstances. The same language adds that, where, in light of the content of other evidence submitted in the civil trial concerned, it is difficult to adopt the finding of fact as it stands, the court may reject it by setting forth reasonable grounds.
The subject addressed by this language is the court presiding over the civil trial concerned; the act is the adoption or rejection of the finding of fact in the earlier judgment; and the condition is the submission of other evidence and the setting forth of reasons for rejection. Here, a judgment as evidence refers to material offered for the determination of facts, apart from binding force. Under this definition, facts stated in the reasoning of another judgment are not automatically established as notorious facts, but they may be evaluated as evidence.
The authority of the earlier judgment may, in practice, make rebuttal difficult. Nor can it be ignored that re-hearing the same issue produces contradictory judgments and duplicative costs. Even so, the absence of res judicata cannot be turned into a complete absence of evidentiary value. One must compare the objects of the earlier and later actions and distinguish the range bound by res judicata from the range outside it.
Where it is not confirmed what the earlier action adjudicated in its dispositive part, judgment is reserved. If what the earlier action addressed is confirmed to be a preliminary question rather than an object of the dispositive part, any claim of res judicata in its own right is withdrawn. The mere circumstance that ownership was written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment ordering delivery does not permit the definitive conclusion that finality is recognized in the new lawsuit. Even though evidentiary value remains, a conclusion going beyond the boundary that it may be rejected by setting forth reasonable grounds is not permitted.
What this section permits is a determination that recognizes both the absence of binding force and the continued existence of evidentiary value. What it does not permit is a determination that converts a notation of ownership in the reasoning into finality in the dispositive part. If that boundary is crossed, then, even though the concern remains that the authority of the earlier judgment may in practice make rebuttal difficult, the result amounts to converting the absence of res judicata into a complete absence of evidentiary value.
6.2The Conditions That Block Relief
At the previous stage the examination stopped at the point of distinguishing the effect of finality from the nature of negotiation records, and Plaintiff A asserts that, because ownership was written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that determination of ownership has also become final and conclusive in the new lawsuit. At the point of inquiring whether this assertion holds, the question newly arises whether the earlier judgment, if it cannot possess the force of finality, thereby loses all meaning, or whether it remains as a different kind of force.
The authority corresponding to this question is the designated phrase in Summary of Decision [1] of Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019. Its language confirms the following: "In a civil trial, facts found in a final and conclusive judgment in a related civil case become powerful evidence unless there are special circumstances; however, the legal principle that, where, in light of the content of other evidence submitted in the civil trial concerned, it is difficult to adopt the finding of fact in the final and conclusive judgment in the related civil case as it stands, the court may reject it by setting forth reasonable grounds (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2016Da46338, 46345 decided August 30, 2018), also proceeds on the premise that the facts, among the grounds of the civil judgment thus final and conclusive, do not constitute a notorious fact." The material spoken of here is a final and conclusive judgment in another civil trial, and the facts found therein; the position of becoming powerful evidence unless there are special circumstances is designated.
The latter part of the above phrase must be read separately from the former. Where it is premised that the facts, among the grounds of the judgment, do not constitute a notorious fact, the legal principle is established that, if they are difficult to adopt as they stand in comparison with the other evidence submitted, they may be rejected by setting forth reasonable grounds. Put differently, this material possesses only the power to persuade a finding of fact; it does not advance to the stage of being automatically established as a notorious fact, where rebuttal is foreclosed at the source. This distinction concerns not the scope of application of a statutory provision or a holding, but the separation of the stages of determination prescribed by this section, and it creates no new requirement or exception.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that the authority of the earlier judgment makes counterargument difficult in substance. If the same issue is re-heard, contradictory judgments and duplicative costs arise, and the concrete losses and inconvenience are raised that re-examining one by one matters already subjected to a public determination runs contrary to the economy of litigation. However, it is not settled that the only way to prevent these losses is the automatic establishment of notorious facts, or that the door must be closed so that rebuttal becomes impossible even in comparison with other evidence. The absence of res judicata does not mean that this material must be excluded from the determination; conversely, nor does it mean that the force of that material must be infinitely enlarged.
Among the facts of the synthetic scene, the only one bearing on this question is the single assertion of Plaintiff A. Plaintiff A asserts that, because ownership was written in the reasoning of the judgment ordering delivery, that determination of ownership has become final and conclusive in the new lawsuit; however, the premise of that language is the case where the facts among the grounds of the judgment do not constitute a notorious fact, and in that case they may be rejected by setting forth reasonable grounds in comparison with other evidence. The scene does not determine what the object of the earlier judgment's dispositive part was, what the scope of the statutory set-off determination is, or whether other evidence was submitted. Accordingly, where a new determination conflicting with the object of the dispositive part of the earlier final and conclusive judgment or the scope of the statutory set-off determination is demanded, no such new determination is permitted if even one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied; but on the given facts alone, which is the case cannot be discerned.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. Facts stated in the reasoning of another judgment are not automatically established as notorious facts, but may be evaluated as evidence; and a judgment as evidence is examined only within this definition, that it is material offered for the determination of facts, apart from binding force. What is not permitted is to elevate a finding of fact written in the reasoning to the status of an established matter in itself, or to close the path of rejection by placing other evidence before it; and likewise, to convert the absence of binding force into the invalidity of the material.
6.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Breaking down what this assertion rests upon, two parts of the earlier judgment divide out, namely the dispositive part and the reasoning, and these two exert different force in the new lawsuit. The criterion separating the range of effect established with finality from the persuasiveness of material that is otherwise begins with this distinction. If so, what this section asks is simple. Where it is not confirmed what the earlier action adjudicated in its dispositive part, to what extent must the ownership language written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment be received in the new lawsuit?
The original text corresponding to this problem contains the following language: "In a civil trial, facts found in a final and conclusive judgment in a related civil case become powerful evidence unless there are special circumstances; however, the legal principle that, where, in light of the content of other evidence submitted in the civil trial concerned, it is difficult to adopt the finding of fact in the final and conclusive judgment in the related civil case as it stands, the court may reject it by setting forth reasonable grounds, also proceeds on the premise that the facts, among the grounds of the civil judgment thus final and conclusive, do not constitute a notorious fact." (Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019) The subject spoken of in this language is the court of the new civil trial; the object is the facts found in a final and conclusive judgment in another civil case; and the condition is the submission of other evidence making it difficult to adopt that finding of fact as it stands. What the language addresses is the evidentiary status of the facts among the grounds of the earlier judgment, not the effect of those facts being automatically established.
Connecting this language with the conclusion of the present question reveals why a two-stage determination is necessary. The first stage is to examine whether that fact is a notorious fact, that is, whether it falls within an established status that may be accepted without separate proof; the second stage is to determine how persuasively to evaluate, as evidence, a fact that has not reached that status. If the former is barred, the question of what its range is arises first before proceeding to the latter determination. Where it is not confirmed what the earlier action adjudicated in its dispositive part, that is, where the range of the object of the dispositive part itself is not specified in the records, what remains is a matter for which the materials of determination are unspecified. This matter is not one where realization is barred physically or legally; there is merely no material by which to determine it, and it must therefore be left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. The case demanding a new determination conflicting with the object of the dispositive part of the earlier final and conclusive judgment or the scope of the statutory set-off determination is treated differently; but at the present stage, where the confirmation of the range that would furnish the premise of that conflict has not occurred, it cannot be so asserted either.
One must not turn away from the costs this distinction actually imposes. The appearance that the earlier judgment is a determination rendered after examination by a court imposes on a party equipped with contrary material in the new lawsuit a substantial burden of proof and difficulty of persuasion. If the same issue is re-heard, contradictory judgments and duplicative costs arise. If one court newly determines facts already handled by another court, the two judgments diverge from each other, and the cost of re-collecting the same material is added on top. These losses and inconvenience are real; but even so, the absence of res judicata cannot be turned into a complete absence of evidentiary value. Material that has no binding force is not entirely excluded from persuading a determination, and the facts found in the earlier judgment remain powerful evidence and compete with other evidence.
Placing this condition upon the synthetic scene makes clear what range alone can be established. Plaintiff A asserts that, because ownership was written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that determination of ownership has become final and conclusive in the new lawsuit; but the scene does not tell what was claimed in the complaint in the earlier action, or what the dispositive part of the final and conclusive judgment established as an order of delivery. Accordingly, no basis has been given for comparing the object of the earlier action with the object of the later action so as to divide the range bound by res judicata from the range outside it. If what the earlier action addressed were confirmed to be a preliminary question rather than an object of the dispositive part, any claim of res judicata in its own right would have to be withdrawn; but that confirmation has not occurred, and it therefore cannot be applied now. Leaving the range that remains undetermined as it stands lies within the limits of a permissible determination.
If so, the boundary between the conclusion this section permits and the conclusion it does not permit is summarized as follows. What is permitted is the determination that facts written in the reasoning of the earlier action are not automatically established as notorious facts but may be evaluated as evidence together with other material, and the distinction of calling the matter undetermined rather than impossible when it is not confirmed what the earlier action adjudicated in its dispositive part. What is not permitted is either of the two excesses of converting the absence of records directly into incurability, or, conversely, of asserting definitively that a separate claim has also been established on the basis of the reasoning of the earlier judgment alone. The state in which a legal avenue remains open must not be treated as identical to actual recovery results.
6.4The Records Needed for Determination
If res judicata is absent, is the earlier judgment entirely without meaning? To answer this question, one must first discern what the material at issue is.
In a civil trial, facts found in a final and conclusive judgment in a related civil case become powerful evidence unless there are special circumstances; however, the legal principle that, where, in light of the content of other evidence submitted in the civil trial concerned, it is difficult to adopt the finding of fact in the final and conclusive judgment in the related civil case as it stands, the court may reject it by setting forth reasonable grounds, also proceeds on the premise that the facts, among the grounds of the civil judgment thus final and conclusive, do not constitute a notorious fact (Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019). Here, "the civil trial concerned" is the trial newly hearing the matter, and "facts found in a final and conclusive judgment in a related civil case" refers to the findings of fact the earlier judgment has already recorded. Special circumstances and reasonable grounds are the conditions distinguishing whether the finding of the earlier judgment may be put forward as it stands.
If, on the basis of this language, one sets the criteria for stage determination, the materials of determination are limited to what is recorded in the complaints of the earlier and later actions, the dispositive part and reasoning of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion. Stage determination is made solely on the established records, and absent records are not filled in by presumption. This definition matters because the two stages of determination deal with different forces. One is the question of binding, namely whether the earlier judgment prevents the matter from being contested anew; the other is the question of evidence, namely how persuasive a material the earlier judgment is for the determination of facts. The absence of records concerning the former does not make the latter's character as material disappear, and the converse also holds.
If the same issue is re-heard, contradictory judgments and duplicative costs arise, and neither is the inconvenience small of conducting a new hearing while disregarding the determination the earlier judgment has already made. Because strongly persuasive material may operate as binding force in substance, this counterargument is persuasive. The costs the counterargument points out are left squarely in place, but the findings of fact of the earlier judgment remain nothing more than powerful evidence and stay in the position that, where, in light of the content of other evidence, it is difficult to adopt them as they stand, they may be rejected by setting forth reasonable grounds (Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019).
Returning to this scene, Plaintiff A asserts that, because ownership was written in the reasoning of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, that determination of ownership has become final and conclusive. The determination of this assertion, however, is made solely on the material recorded in the complaints of the earlier and later actions, the dispositive part and reasoning of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion. Since it remains unconfirmed what the earlier judgment adjudicated in its dispositive part, its object range is left undetermined. Only where this condition of comparison is satisfied and the range of the later action bound by res judicata and the range outside it are divided does a new adjudication outside the established object open up.
The conclusion this section permits stands narrowly, together with the range of material. The findings of fact of the earlier judgment are not automatically established as notorious facts, but neither may they be rejected on the ground of res judicata in their own right. The case in which the earlier judgment demands a new determination conflicting with the object of its dispositive part or the scope of the statutory set-off determination is barred. Judgment results or circumstances of performance outside the scene are not established in this section, and the insufficiency of material is left undetermined.
6.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
A record of court-supervised conciliation and the like has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment, and thus is distinguished from a mere negotiation memo. If there is no res judicata, is the earlier judgment of no significance whatever; and what kind of change overturns the existing stage determination — these are the questions here.
The textual basis for answering this question is as follows. Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019 proceeds on the premise that "in a civil trial, the facts found in a judgment in a related civil case that has already become final serve as persuasive evidence unless there are special circumstances." The subject indicated by this language is the judge in a civil trial, and the act is that of taking the facts found in the preceding final and conclusive related case as material for judgment in the trial at hand. The condition does not go beyond the qualification that the facts be those found in a judgment in a related civil case that has become final.
Here the author defines the judgment as evidence as material furnished for the finding of facts, separately from its binding force. The reason why the effect of finality and the force of the material as evidence must be viewed apart is that whether the earlier judgment legally blocks the judgment of the later lawsuit, and how persuasive that finding of facts is in the later lawsuit, are distinct questions.
The strongest counterargument is that the authority of the earlier judgment may in practice make rebuttal difficult. If the same issue is tried again, inconsistent judgments and duplicative costs arise, and for the parties the burden of adducing proof that overturns the earlier determination remains. While not denying such losses and inconvenience, the author answers that the absence of res judicata cannot be converted into the complete absence of evidentiary value. Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019 states that, where the finding of facts is difficult to adopt as it is, "the legal principle that it may be rejected by setting out reasonable grounds also proceeds on the premise that the facts among the reasons of the civil judgment thus finalized do not amount to a manifest fact." Rejection is possible, but reasonable grounds are required, and the mere possibility of rejection does not mean the extinction of evidentiary value.
The facts bearing on this question in this scene are only two: that ownership was stated in the reasons of the preceding judgment ordering delivery, and Plaintiff A's assertion taking that entry as the basis for finality. What the earlier judgment decided as its dispositive part has not been confirmed. Accordingly, whether the later lawsuit is divided into the scope bound by res judicata and the scope beyond it is also unverified. Still, the mere circumstance that it has not been confirmed whether the ownership determination stated in the reasons is a matter of the dispositive part or a preliminary question cannot be taken to mean that the force of finality or of evidence is extinguished together.
The conclusion this section permits is a narrow one: if the facts addressed in the reasons are preliminary questions outside the dispositive part, they do not by themselves block the later lawsuit, while remaining material evaluated in light of other evidence; and if the specified change is confirmed, the existing stage determination is discarded and the matter begins anew. To speak of a new adjudication outside the object already finalized, the result of comparing the objects of the earlier and later lawsuits must support it, and if there is no material, it remains undetermined. Demanding a new determination that conflicts with the object of the dispositive part of the prior final and conclusive judgment or with the scope of the judicial set-off determination is a direction this section does not permit. Extending this so as to deny evidentiary value entirely on the ground of the authority of the earlier judgment also exceeds the scope of this section.
6.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
This rests on the premise that a record of court-supervised conciliation and the like has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and is therefore distinguished from a mere negotiation memo. While acknowledging that difficulty, the present stage, which asks whether res judicata exists, must make clear what it does and does not determine. What force the facts found in the earlier judgment have in a subsequent lawsuit is a matter to be examined separately as a question of evidence.
This definition distinguishes the force by which the earlier judgment compels the court of the later lawsuit from the state in which the facts stated in that judgment are placed as material for the judgment of the later lawsuit. On the premise of this distinction, the author addresses a question concerning the presentation of material, not the existence or absence of res judicata. The ownership determination stated in the reasons of the earlier judgment is not automatically established as a manifest fact. A manifest fact means a matter treated like a fact widely known to the court without separate proof, and the mere circumstance that it was stated in the reasons for judgment does not elevate it to that position. Still, the point that such material may possess evidentiary value remains a separate matter.
This distinction arises from separating the blocking of judicial binding from the pathway of forming the court's conviction. The point that the facts stated in the reasons of the earlier judgment are not treated as manifest facts means that the court must not accept those facts as established without separate proof. At the same time, however, precedent states that facts found in a judgment in a related civil case that has become final serve as persuasive evidence unless there are special circumstances (Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019). The author's decision to accept and apply this precedent lies in the point that not amounting to a manifest fact and being capable of evaluation as evidence form distinct stages of determination. One stage must be placed in the court's establishment of facts, and the other in the material for forming the court's conviction, so that the two do not overwrite one another. The absence of res judicata cannot be converted into the complete absence of evidentiary value.
Against this, the strong counterargument is raised that trying the same issue again produces inconsistent judgments and duplicative costs. The loss the counterargument targets is real. If the court of the later lawsuit re-examines from the beginning the ownership issue already discussed in the earlier judgment, the two courts may reach different determinations on the same material, and the parties must again bear the cost of bridging the difference. Yet the author's answer does not erase the disadvantage the counterargument points to; it takes the view that such disadvantage cannot serve as grounds for converting the absence of res judicata into the nullity of the material. Even where the later lawsuit finds it difficult to adopt the finding of facts of the earlier judgment as it is, the legal principle remains that it may be rejected by setting out reasonable grounds (Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019). The unfavorable aspect of the counterargument does not disappear, but it does not lead to the conclusion of the complete absence of evidentiary value.
What can be confirmed in this scene is the fact that the plaintiff asserts finality in the later lawsuit on the basis of the ownership stated in the reasons of the preceding judgment ordering delivery. What precedent requires, however, is a method that takes as its turning point the premise that the finding of facts in the judgment does not amount to a manifest fact, and that sets out reasonable grounds for rejection. Thus, whether the ownership addressed in the earlier judgment was a matter of the dispositive part or a preliminary question is not confirmed at present, and where it is not confirmed what the prior lawsuit decided as its dispositive part, that fact alone cannot determine finality.
Therefore the permissible conclusion is narrow. Because the facts stated in the reasons of the earlier judgment are not automatically established as manifest facts, the court of the later lawsuit must not accept them as established without a separate proof procedure; yet it is not the case that such material possesses no evidentiary value whatever. Where the objects of the earlier and later lawsuits are compared and the later lawsuit is divided into the scope bound by res judicata and the scope beyond it, the court of the later lawsuit may evaluate the finding of facts of the earlier judgment as persuasive evidence while, in comparison with other evidence, setting out reasonable grounds to reject it. This does not change in the case where a new determination is demanded that conflicts with the object of the dispositive part of the prior final and conclusive judgment or with the scope of the judicial set-off determination, and that material cannot be read as a channel that converts it into judicial binding so as to replace a new adjudication.
6.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section answered, even against the strongest counterargument to this conclusion, that the absence of res judicata cannot be converted into the complete absence of evidentiary value. Plaintiff A's assertion that, because ownership was stated in the reasons of the preceding judgment ordering delivery, that ownership determination has been established in the new lawsuit as well, finds the basis of that finality in the relationship between the two judgments. The question here is what force the earlier judgment leaves for a new adjudication.
To answer that question, the source text says this: it makes clear that "the facts found in a judgment in a related civil case that has already become final serve as persuasive evidence unless there are special circumstances, but the legal principle that, where in the civil trial at hand it is difficult to adopt as it is the finding of facts of the judgment in the related civil case that has become final in light of the content of other evidence submitted in that civil trial, it may be rejected by setting out reasonable grounds" proceeds on the premise "that the facts among the reasons of the civil judgment thus finalized do not amount to a manifest fact" (Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019). This language sets the subject as the court of the civil trial, the object as the facts found in the earlier judgment, and the condition as comparison with other evidence.
The link joining this language to the conclusion of this section is the attitude of separating two determinations: whether the finding of facts of the earlier judgment is automatically established as a manifest fact, and how persuasive that finding is as material in a new adjudication. The former is a matter of binding force, and the latter a matter of evidentiary value. How the judgment viewed the facts given is the starting point of the hearing, but the court does not thereby bear the duty of simply yielding before other evidence.
The strongest of the counterarguments is aimed at the point that this distinction may become powerless in actual trial proceedings. From the standpoint of the person being tried, the first determination has already been made, yet the process of re-examining it demands time and effort anew. Yet one cannot, by invoking that disadvantage, convert the absence of res judicata into the complete absence of evidentiary value. What the source text leaves is room for evaluation as evidence, and that room does not vanish.
In the synthetic scene, the complaints of the earlier and later lawsuits, the dispositive part and the reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion must be compared so as to divide the later lawsuit into the scope bound by res judicata and the scope beyond it. Since what the object of the dispositive part of the preceding judgment ordering delivery was cannot be confirmed from the scene alone, that determination remains undetermined. What remains then is the judgment as evidence, and the facts in the reasons of the earlier judgment are not automatically established as manifest facts but may be evaluated as evidence.
What this section permits is the determination of treating the finding of facts of the earlier judgment as persuasive evidence while, where it is difficult to adopt as it is in light of other evidence, rejecting it by setting out reasonable grounds. What it does not permit are the two extremes: the assertion that that finding of facts is automatically established as a manifest fact, and treating the earlier judgment as a wholly useless material merely because there is no res judicata. The distinction between binding force and evidentiary value operates only within this narrow compass.
6.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
From the preceding section this carries over only the conclusion that a record of court-supervised conciliation and the like has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment and is therefore distinguished from a mere negotiation memo. Whether this assertion is correct connects directly to the question of which determination of the earlier judgment binds the Next trial. If there is no res judicata, is the earlier judgment truly of no significance at all?
As the language answering this question, Supreme Court Decision 2019Da222140 decided August 9, 2019 states: "In a civil trial, the facts found in a judgment in a related civil case that has already become final serve as persuasive evidence unless there are special circumstances, but the legal principle that, where in the civil trial at hand it is difficult to adopt as it is the finding of facts of the judgment in the related civil case that has become final in light of the content of other evidence submitted in that civil trial, it may be rejected by setting out reasonable grounds, also proceeds on the premise that the facts among the reasons of the civil judgment thus finalized do not amount to a manifest fact." Here "the civil trial at hand" refers to the courtroom of the new lawsuit, and "the related civil case that has become final" refers to the case addressed by the preceding judgment. The facts among the reasons are not the dispositive part of that judgment but the facts mentioned in the process by which the judgment was formed.
This language does not accept the assertion that the facts stated in the reasons of the earlier judgment are automatically established as manifest facts in a new lawsuit. A manifest fact is a fact recognized at once without requiring proof, and it is confirmed as a premise that the facts among the reasons of a finalized civil judgment do not fall within that scope. Instead, that fact is treated as persuasive evidence. In other words, the concept of the judgment as evidence — that is, material furnished for the finding of facts separately from binding force — operates here. The stage asking whether res judicata exists and the stage asking whether evidentiary value exists must be distinguished. The former determines in what scope the judgment of the next trial is bound, and the latter determines what can be raised as material for judgment in the scope not bound. One is not reduced to the other.
Nor does the authority of the earlier judgment thereby lose all meaning. The strongest of the counterarguments targets practical loss and inconvenience. If two courts record the same fact differently, it is difficult for the parties to know which judgment to follow, and there is the further burden that the effort expended in a lawsuit already concluded is demanded again in a new lawsuit. Yet even acknowledging these disadvantages, one cannot convert the absence of res judicata into the complete absence of evidentiary value. The risk of contradiction and the duplicative costs the counterargument points out are merely circumstances to be considered when evaluating the evidentiary value a judgment possesses; they are not grounds for closing off the path of treating a judgment as evidence material altogether.
The facts belonging to this question in this scene are in what form the earlier judgment dealt with ownership, and on what basis the plaintiff calls that determination final. Still, the complaints of the earlier and later lawsuits, the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion are records designated only as objects of confirmation. So long as it is not confirmed what the prior lawsuit decided as its dispositive part, whether the earlier judgment made ownership an object of its dispositive part or mentioned it only as a preliminary question remains undetermined. Even in that case, whether that fact can be submitted as persuasive evidence remains a separate question.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow: the facts stated in the reasons of the earlier judgment are not automatically established as manifest facts in a new lawsuit; instead, they may be evaluated as evidence. Here "Evidence" means merely material capable of persuading the determination, and does not mean the binding force that legally binds the judgment of the Next trial. Conversely, the conclusion of treating the earlier judgment as entirely meaningless merely because there is no res judicata is one this section does not permit either. Nullity and non-binding are different.
6.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
앞 절이 기판력이 없는 앞 판결의 의미를 다룬 데 이어, 이제 원고 A는 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 이유로 새로운 소송에서도 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장한다. 이 장면에서 정해진 판정은 앞 판결의 모든 문언을 새 심판의 근거로 삼을 수 있는지가 아니라, 확정된 대상 밖의 새 심판에서 앞 판결의 어느 문언을 어떤 힘으로 쓸 수 있는지이다.
이 물음에 해당하는 대법원 2019. 8. 9. 선고 2019다222140 판결의 문언은 다음과 같다. "민사재판에 있어서 이미 확정된 관련 민사사건의 판결에서 인정된 사실은 특별한 사정이 없는 한 유력한 증거가 되지만, 당해 민사재판에서 제출된 다른 증거 내용에 비추어 확정된 관련 민사사건 판결의 사실인정을 그대로 채용하기 어려운 경우에는 합리적인 이유를 설시하여 이를 배척할 수 있다는 법리도 그와 같이 확정된 민사판결 이유 중의 사실관계가 현저한 사실에 해당하지 않음을 전제로 한 것이다" (대법원 2019. 8. 9. 선고 2019다222140 판결). 이 문언에서 주체는 민사재판의 법관이고, 행위는 앞 사건 판결에서 인정된 사실의 채용 여부 판단이며, 조건은 다른 증거에 비추어 그 인정을 채용하기 어려운 경우이다.
이 문언은 앞 판결의 이유상 사실이 현저한 사실로 자동 확정되는 것을 전제로 삼지 않으며, 그 사실인정을 유력한 증거로 보고, 배척을 합리적인 이유 설시와 짝지어 설명한다. 따라서 해당 원문 문언만이 확정된 대상 밖의 새 심판의 판정 근거가 되고, 판결이유의 다른 항으로 확장할 수 없다. 구속력이 없는 판단과 증거로 제시되는 자료는 단계가 다르다. 전자는 새 심판의 결론을 정하고, 후자는 그 결론에 이르는 판단을 설득한다.
그러나 유력한 증거라는 지위는 증거가치의 전면 부재로 바꿀 수 없다. 법관은 다른 증거 내용에 비추어 채용하기 어려운 경우에 합리적인 이유를 설시하여 배척할 수 있으므로, 반박의 어려움은 있으되 닫힌 것은 아니다.
원고 A는 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다고 하여 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장하지만, 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나누면 현재 문언은 후자의 범위에서 증거가치로만 작동한다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않으므로 소유권 판단의 기판력 유무는 미확정이며, 전소에서 다룬 것이 주문 대상이 아닌 선결문제로 확인되면 그 자체의 기판력 주장을 거둔다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 앞 판결의 해당 문언이 확정된 대상 밖의 새 심판에서 증거로 평가될 수 있다는 것이고, 그 문언이 새 심판의 결론을 구속하거나 판결이유 전반을 확정한다는 결론은 허용하지 않는다. 확정되지 않았다는 사실과 판단에 설득력을 주는 자료라는 성질은 함께 성립한다.
6.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
앞 절이 법정 화해 등의 조서와 단순 협상 메모를 구분한 데 이어, 이제 기판력이 없으면 앞 판결은 아무 의미가 없는가라는 물음에 이른다. 이 주장 앞에서 판결의 다른 힘을 따로 읽어야 한다.
대법원 2019. 8. 9. 선고 2019다222140 판결은 "민사재판에 있어서 이미 확정된 관련 민사사건의 판결에서 인정된 사실은 특별한 사정이 없는 한 유력한 증거가 되지만, 당해 민사재판에서 제출된 다른 증거 내용에 비추어 확정된 관련 민사사건 판결의 사실인정을 그대로 채용하기 어려운 경우에는 합리적인 이유를 설시하여 이를 배척할 수 있다는 법리도 그와 같이 확정된 민사판결 이유 중의 사실관계가 현저한 사실에 해당하지 않음을 전제로 한 것이다."라고 설시한다. 이 문언은 앞 판결 이유에서 인정된 사실이 현저한 사실로 자동 확정되지 않음을 전제로 삼는다.
이 전제는 앞 판결의 사실인정이 증거로서의 판결, 즉 구속력과 별도로 사실 판단에 제공되는 자료에 해당함을 뜻한다. 기판력으로 묶이는 대상과 증거로 제공되는 자료는 그 힘이 다르다. 전자는 새로 다툼을 막고 후자는 새로 심리 중인 판단을 설득하므로, 이 둘을 하나로 합치면 배척 절차를 읽을 자리가 없어진다.
그렇다 해도 앞 판결의 권위가 사실상 반박을 어렵게 만들 수 있다는 불편은 지워지지 않는다. 재판부가 이미 쓴 사실인정에 대해 당사자가 반대 자료를 모으는 데는 비용이 들고, 심리자는 익숙한 인정에 기대기 쉽다. 확정되지 않았다는 이유만으로 자료의 힘을 영으로 만드는 것은 명시된 조건 밖의 판단이다.
앞선 인도 판결의 장면에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나누는 경우다. 이 경우 기판력 주장은 그 구속 범위에서만 작동하고, 그 밖에서는 증거로 평가할 자료로 남는다. 전소 확정판결의 주문 대상 또는 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단을 요구하면 막히고, 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않으면 미확정으로 둔다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 명시한 조건에 한정된 단계 안의 세부 구분이며, 추가 단계를 발명하는 것은 아니다. 앞 판결을 무효로 취급하는 것도, 그 사실인정을 현저한 사실로 자동 확정하는 것도 이 범위 밖이다.
6.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
앞선 단계에서는 법정 화해 등의 조서가 확정판결과 같은 효력을 가지므로 단순한 협상 메모와 구분된다는 점만 전제로 삼는다. 이 절에서 다루는 물음은 조금 더 뒤의 상황에 놓인다. 이 장면에서 확정된 대상 밖의 새 심판이 열리고, 막히고, 미확정으로 남는 조건을 어떻게 구별할 것인가가 문제로 남는다.
새 심판의 문을 여는 근거를 가리키는 문언이 확인된다. 이 문언이 다루는 주체는 앞선 판결의 사실을 원용하려는 민사재판의 법원이고, 행위는 그 사실인정의 채용이며, 조건은 다른 증거에 비추어 그대로 채용하기 어울리지 않는 사정이다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론 사이에는 두 판단 단계가 나뉘어 있다. 하나는 전소 확정판결의 주문이 무엇을 판단 대상으로 삼았는지를 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 가르는 일이며, 다른 하나는 그 밖의 범위에 놓인 자료를 후소의 사실 판단에 무엇으로 내놓는지 정하는 일이다. 앞선 판결의 주문 대상 또는 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단을 요구하면 후소는 막힌다. 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나눈 경우, 그 밖의 범위에 놓인 앞 판결의 이유상 사실은 현저한 사실로 자동 확정되지 않지만 증거로 평가될 수 있다. 이 구별은 뒤 문단의 반론을 다루는 데도 그대로 쓰인다.
법원이 앞선 인도 판결을 읽고 그 이유에 적힌 소유권을 존중하게 되면, 새로운 소송의 상대방은 다른 증거를 모으고 합리적 배척 사유를 설시하는 부담을 함께 떠안는다. 확정된 대상 밖의 앞 판결은 후소의 판단을 직접 묶지 못하지만, 그 안에 적힌 사실은 여전히 증거로서의 판결, 곧 구속력과 별도로 사실 판단에 제공되는 자료로 남는다. 확정되지 않았다는 사정이 그 자료를 무효로 만들지는 않는다.
합성 장면의 사실만으로 이 절의 범위를 판정해 보면, 원고 A는 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다고 주장할 뿐 앞선 판결의 주문이 무엇을 판단 대상으로 삼았는지는 확인되지 않았다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우, 후소를 열어 주는지 막는지의 판정은 미확정으로 남는다. 전소 확정판결의 주문과 이유, 전후 소장과 상계 주장 범위가 기록으로 대조되어야 그 경계가 정해진다. 다만 앞선 판결의 이유에 적힌 소유권 판단은 자동 확정을 의미하지 않으면서도 증거로 평가될 수 있다는 범위는, 지금 확인된 문언만으로도 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론과 허용하지 않는 결론은 이렇게 갈린다. 확정된 대상 밖의 자료도 판단을 설득할 수 있으므로 무효와 비구속을 혼동해서는 안 되고, 그렇다고 앞 판결의 이유상 사실이 후소의 판단을 묶지도 않는다. 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나눈 경우 새 심판이 열리고, 전소 확정판결의 주문 대상 또는 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단을 요구하는 경우 새 심판이 막히며, 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우 판정은 미확정으로 남는다. 이 경계를 넘어 증거로서의 판결을 구속력으로 바꾸거나, 그 구속력 부재를 증거가치의 전면 부재로 바꾸는 결론은 허용되지 않는다.
6.12이 권의 결론과 남는 물음
그 구분을 전제로 앞선 판결이 남긴 자료가 새 심판에서 어떤 힘을 가질지 따져야 한다. 앞 절이 다룬 확정 효력의 범위와 이번 절이 다루는 증거로서의 위력은 서로 다른 축에 놓여 있다.
이 절에서 다룰 문언은 이미 확정된 관련 민사사건의 판결에서 인정된 사실이 "특별한 사정이 없는 한 유력한 증거가 되지만, 당해 민사재판에서 제출된 다른 증거 내용에 비추어 확정된 관련 민사사건 판결의 사실인정을 그대로 채용하기 어려운 경우에는 합리적인 이유를 설시하여 이를 배척할 수 있다는 법리"가 전제로 삼는 대상을 밝힌다 (대법원 2019. 8. 9. 선고 2019다222140 판결). 그 전제는 "그와 같이 확정된 민사판결 이유 중의 사실관계가 현저한 사실에 해당하지 않음"이다 (대법원 2019. 8. 9. 선고 2019다222140 판결). 여기서 주체는 민사재판의 심리 주체이고, 행위는 다른 확정 판결이 인정한 사실의 채용 여부 판단이며, 조건은 그 사실이 현저한 사실에 해당하지 않는 경우다.
이 문언은 확정된 민사판결의 사실인정을 두 가지 단계로 나눈다. 첫째, 그 사실은 특별한 사정이 없는 한 유력한 증거로서 심리에 제공된다. 둘째, 당해 민사재판에 제출된 다른 증거 내용에 비추어 그대로 채용하기 어려운 때에는 합리적인 이유를 설시하여 배척할 수 있다. 이 구별이 필요한 까닭은 앞 판결의 이유에 적힌 사실이 현저한 사실로 자동 확정되지 않는다고 해서 심리 자료에서 빠지는 것은 아니기 때문이다. 따라서 원고 A는 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 이유로 새로운 소송에서도 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장하지만, 확정 주장과 증거 제시는 서로 다른 길이다.
가장 강한 반론은 앞 판결의 권위가 사실상 반박을 어렵게 만든다는 데 있다. 법원이 이미 내린 사실인정을 상대방이 뒤집으려면 별도의 증거와 설명을 갖추어야 하고, 그 부담 자체가 새 심판을 왜곡할 수 있다. 하지만 이 불이익을 인정하면서도 기판력 부재를 증거가치의 전면 부재로 바꿀 수는 없다. 반론이 지적한 설득력의 무게는 인정하되, 증거로서의 판결이란 구속력과 별도로 사실 판단에 제공되는 자료라는 정의는 유지한다.
이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 앞선 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 점과 원고 A가 그 인정을 확정의 근거로 주장한다는 점뿐이다. 전후 소장·확정판결 주문과 이유·상계 주장 범위가 모두 확인된 것은 아니어서, 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나눌 수 있는지 여부는 이 장면만으로 정해지지 않는다. 전소에서 다룬 것이 주문 대상이 아닌 선결문제로 확인되면 그 자체의 기판력 주장을 거둔다는 조건은 판정의 경계를 표시할 뿐, 이 장면에서 실제로 그런 확인이 있었다는 뜻은 아니다. 그러므로 소유권 판단의 확정 여부는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 기판력이 없는 앞 판결의 이유상 사실이라도 유력한 증거가 될 수 있고, 다른 증거에 비추어 그대로 채용하기 어려울 때에는 합리적인 이유를 설시하여 배척할 수 있다는 사실까지 확인된다. 이 결론이 허용하지 않는 것은 이유의 판단만으로 확정된 판결의 구속력을 인정하는 것이나, 증거가치를 아예 없는 것으로 취급하는 것이다. 기판력의 객관적 범위와 증명력의 경계가 확정되면 그 효력이 어느 당사자와 승계인에게 미치는지라는 주관적 범위의 검토로 이어진다.
Statutes referred to
Decisions referred to
Questions left open
- 쟁점효를 넓히려는 제안은 어떤 참여보장을 요구하는가?
- 동일한 사실의 모순 판단을 어느 절차에서 줄일 수 있는가?
- 기판력 없는 이유의 증거가치는 어떻게 설명할 것인가?