Summary
A final appeal is grounded on a violation of law that affected the judgment, and is distinguished from the binding effect of lawfully established facts.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The expression 'receiving further adjudication' does not mean that all the facts are to be begun anew. What is now at issue is when the entrance to this relief opens. The preceding section concluded by distinguishing permitted reasons for citation from statutory exclusions and by declining to infer the absence of any examination from the manner of citation alone. Building on only this conclusion, Plaintiff A considers it unjust that the court below did not believe the witness, but has not yet identified which legal provision was violated. A feeling of injustice alone does not specify what is in dispute, so the shape of the grounds required by the procedure of a final appeal must first be discerned.
The provision that answers this question is laid down in Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act. It draws the line: "A final appeal may be taken only on the ground that there is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, a decree, or a rule that affected the judgment." (Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act) Here the subject is the party seeking the final appeal, the act is the submission of grounds as reasons, and the condition is that the violation affected the judgment. What may serve as grounds is limited to violations of the Constitution, an Act, a decree, or a rule. This Article addresses no other issue; it only fixes the shape of the grounds.
Joining this provision to the foregoing distinction makes the meaning of the grounds for final appeal clear. Grounds for final appeal means an allegation of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment (Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act), and this allegation stands alongside the binding effect prescribed in Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act: "The facts duly found by the judgment of the court below shall bind the court of final appeal." (Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act) One determines what may be contested; the other determines what must be accepted as it stands. These two criteria interlock to open the entrance to this relief. This is not to add a new requirement, but to place the two criteria each in its own position.
The strongest counterargument rests on the point that when the finding of fact is wrong, a substantive error remains because of the limitation to review on issues of law. A wrong finding of fact may lie at the core of substantive injustice. If what occurred in the process of evaluating the witness's statements was the cause of the harm, doubt remains whether it is just to close the procedure with the error left in place. Yet the inconvenience targeted by this counterargument remains unremoved, and the finality is maintained. A demand merely that the evidence be believed anew cannot be used as an independent ground of appeal, because a request to look at the facts again is not, in itself, an allegation of a violation of statutes.
Placing the standard set by this section upon the synthetic scene shows where Plaintiff A's position becomes caught. The fact that the court below did not believe the witness is part of the records, and the complaint that its evaluation is unjust has not yet taken the form of any violation of a legal provision. In this situation, if all that remains is a demand that the facts be determined anew from the beginning, no ground of a statute violation that affected the judgment has been specified, and thus the examination of statute violations at the final appeal stage does not open. However, if Plaintiff A specifies that a statute violation occurred in that evaluation process and duly submits it, the matter may be viewed differently, and if the case is classified as a small-claim case, the permissible grounds under the special Act are contrasted in place of the general grounds for final appeal. The parts that cannot be determined from the synthetic scene alone remain undetermined.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. Where a statute violation that affected the judgment, or a ground for final appeal under the relevant special Act, is specified and duly submitted, the entrance to this relief opens. Where there is only a demand that the facts duly determined be newly evaluated, it does not open. The point that a final appeal is not a procedure that determines the facts anew from the beginning follows from this distinction.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
On the premise that the preceding stage distinguished permitted reasons for citation from statutory exclusions and did not infer the absence of any examination from the manner of citation alone, the present question is whether a final appeal is a procedure for determining the facts anew from the beginning, and what the conditions are under which the relief channel of the final appeal stage is closed.
The first provision that answers this question is Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides: "A final appeal may be taken only on the ground that there is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, a decree, or a rule that affected the judgment." What is fixed here is that the subject is the party seeking the final appeal, the act is the filing of the final appeal, and the condition is the presentation of the reason of a statute violation that affected the judgment. What this provision addresses is the limitation on grounds for final appeal, not a procedure that separately re-examines the appropriateness of the finding of fact.
Set in contrast with that provision is Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act. That Article provides: "The facts duly found by the judgment of the court below shall bind the court of final appeal." The reason these two provisions must be placed together is that the limitation on grounds for final appeal and the binding of the facts constitute different stages of decision. The former determines on what grounds alone a final appeal may be taken; the latter determines that the court of final appeal does not redetermine the facts duly found by the court below. Where there is only a demand that the facts duly determined be newly evaluated and no ground of a statute violation to examine, if even one of the statutory requirements is not met, the relief channel of the final appeal stage is closed.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that an error in the finding of fact may lie at the core of substantive injustice. If the judgment not to believe the witness's statements was wrong, the loss and inconvenience are great, in that the substantive error remains because of the limitation to review on issues of law. A party may feel that the weight of the evidence the party experienced was not properly reflected in the judgment, and that injustice is not resolved by settlement or voluntary performance. Yet at the final appeal stage the foregoing answer is clear. Without erasing the possibility of substantive injustice pointed out by the counterargument, grounds for final appeal can be submitted only within the limitation that they are an allegation of a statute violation that affected the judgment.
In the synthetic scene, the fact relevant to this question is one. Plaintiff A considers it unjust that the court below did not believe the witness, but has not yet identified which legal provision was violated. Contrasting this situation with the foregoing conditions, since the allegation of a statute violation has not been specified, it cannot be determined whether the requirement for grounds for final appeal under Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act is met. However, if the case is classified as a small-claim case, the permissible grounds under the special Act are contrasted in place of the general grounds for final appeal. From the scene alone it cannot be confirmed whether a statute violation occurred in the actual process of finding fact, or whether it affected the judgment, so such matters remain undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that a final appeal is not a procedure for determining the facts anew from the beginning, and that where there is only a demand that the facts duly determined be newly evaluated and no ground of a statute violation to examine, the relief channel is closed if the statutory requirements are not met. By contrast, the conclusion that grounds for final appeal may be formed solely from a demand that the credibility of the evidence be judged anew is not permitted by this section. However, where it is unclear whether the matter is a dispute over facts or an allegation of a statute violation in the process of finding fact, the determination remains undetermined.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Up to the previous stage, permitted reasons for citation were distinguished from statutory exclusions, and the absence of any examination was not inferred from the manner of citation alone. The present situation, however, is different. What the final appeal asks in this scene is not whether the finding of facts by the court below may be begun anew, but what assertions may be dealt with as grounds for final appeal. Here grounds for final appeal means an allegation of a statute violation that affected the judgment. By that definition, what comes first as an issue is not whether a final appeal is a procedure for determining the facts anew from the beginning, but what has been specified as the subject of examination.
The statutory provision that answers this question limits the grounds for final appeal. The Civil Procedure Act provides that "A final appeal may be taken only on the ground that there is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, a decree, or a rule that affected the judgment" (Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act). In this provision, the subject of the grounds for final appeal is the party filing the final appeal, the act is that party's taking of the final appeal on the ground of a statute violation that affected the judgment, and the condition is the taking of that violation of the Constitution, an Act, a decree, or a rule as the ground. Accordingly, the subject of determination is not the exercise of discretion itself as to whether to believe the witness's statements, but whether the grounds submitted constitute an allegation of such a violation as this provision prescribes. This does not mean that the provision addresses other issues as well.
Between this provision and the conclusion matched to it there are two stages of decision. The first is whether the court of final appeal follows the facts duly found by the judgment of the court below, and the Civil Procedure Act provides that "The facts duly found by the judgment of the court below shall bind the court of final appeal" (Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act). The second is whether a statute violation was pointed out in that process of finding facts, and whether it affected the judgment. The reason these two must be distinguished is that the former is the stage that prevents a new determination of facts, while the latter is the stage that asks whether the process constituting those facts observed the law. Where it is unclear whether the matter is a dispute over facts or an allegation of a statute violation in the process of finding fact, matters for which the materials of decision have not been specified are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility.
It follows that the counterargument that a wrong finding of fact may lie at the core of substantive injustice cannot be erased. If the court below misunderstood the statements or wrongly assessed their credibility, the loss and the injustice felt by the party reach the content of the judgment itself. Nor is the inconvenience left to the party by the narrowness of the means to correct errors at the stage of review on issues of law small. This is because, if the demand ends with the demand itself, it becomes a re-evaluation of facts departing from the binding effect of the facts duly determined. The conclusion is maintained, leaving the unfavorable aspect pointed out by the counterargument in place, but on the ground that the demand cannot be raised as grounds for final appeal.
The facts revealed in the synthetic scene go no further than this. Contrasting these facts with the foregoing conditions, since which legal provision was violated has not been specified, whether any ground for final appeal applies has likewise not yet been determined. Nor does the scene show what was written in the statement of grounds for final appeal, or what effect the assertion had on the judgment. If this case were classified as a small-claim case, the permissible grounds under the special Act would be contrasted in place of the general grounds for final appeal. This contrast is merely a check that changes one condition of decision, not a fact that actually occurred, and cannot be determined from the scene alone. For that reason this matter remains undetermined rather than unamenable to relief.
The conclusion permitted by this section is brief. Grounds for final appeal are an allegation of a statute violation that affected the judgment, and where no such allegation has been specified, grounds for final appeal demanding only a re-evaluation of facts cannot be established. Matters for which the materials of decision have not been specified cannot be declared impossible. The conclusions not permitted are that, on a mere suspicion that the assessment of evidence by the court below was not right, the court of final appeal may determine the facts anew; and, conversely, that the door of relief is closed merely because there is no material.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
According to the conclusion confirmed above, the attitude of distinguishing permitted reasons for citation from statutory exclusions and of not inferring the absence of any examination from the manner of citation alone is confirmed. On that foundation, Plaintiff A considers it unjust that the court below did not believe the witness, but has not yet identified which legal provision was violated. In this scene it is unclear whether this is an objection to the result of the finding of fact, or an assertion that a legal provision was violated in the process by which the facts were determined. The inquiry is therefore confined to asking what the stage of a final appeal deals with, and, together with that, to examining what must remain in the record in order to judge that stage.
The Article setting out the scope of the grounds for final appeal limits the grounds a final appeal may have. Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "A final appeal may be taken only on the ground that there is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, a decree, or a rule that affected the judgment." The subject indicated by this provision is the party seeking the final appeal, the act is the assertion specifically advanced as grounds for final appeal, and the condition is that it is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, a decree, or a rule that affected the judgment. Accordingly, what must be recorded as grounds for final appeal is not dissatisfaction with the assessment of evidence, but a specification of which legal provision was violated, in what way, and how it affected the judgment. This Article only addresses the limitation of grounds for final appeal; it does not determine the other issues of the case.
Another Article separately provides for the effect of the determination of facts. Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "The facts duly found by the judgment of the court below shall bind the court of final appeal." In the light of this provision, a final appeal is not a procedure for determining the facts anew from the beginning, and the facts duly determined bind the court of final appeal. By contrast, what is made the grounds for final appeal is not a re-evaluation of the facts themselves, but an allegation of a statute violation that affected the judgment. The two provisions serve to distinguish the stage of determining facts from the stage of examining statute violations. Because the former Article restricts the content of the grounds for final appeal and the latter Article prescribes the binding effect of the determination of facts, if the stages are mixed, the dissatisfaction of a wrong finding of fact and an allegation of a statute violation are treated as the same thing.
The loss left by that distinction is not small. There are those who feel that, when the finding of fact is wrong, a substantive error remains because of the limitation to review on issues of law, and if the conclusion could have varied according to how the witness's statements were evaluated, that injustice may lie at the core of substantive injustice. Such inconvenience attends even the demand to believe again the testimony the court below did not believe. This answer does not erase the injustice pointed out by the counterargument; it requires one to ask whether that dissatisfaction can be moved to the place of the grounds for final appeal fixed by law, that is, whether it can be distinguished and recorded as an assertion that a statute violation occurred in the process of finding fact.
The determination of the stage is made only on the basis of the established records. The materials used for the determination are limited to what is recorded in the finding of fact by the court below, the statement of grounds for final appeal, the effect of the statute violation, and the classification of the case under the special Act, and gaps in the records are not filled with conjecture. In the present scene Plaintiff A has not identified which legal provision was violated, so it is unclear whether the matter is a dispute over facts or an allegation of a statute violation in the process of finding fact. In that case the inquiry is confined to contrasting the facts determined by the court below with the assertions written in the statement of grounds for final appeal, to see whether a statute violation that affected the judgment has been specified. Even if there is no material in the records showing that some permissible ground under a special Act exists, the matter of the classification applicable to that case and the scope of the records remaining undetermined is a separate thing.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. A final appeal is bound by the facts duly determined and is the stage that examines on the ground of a statute violation that affected the judgment, and therefore it is not a procedure for determining the facts anew from the beginning. The determination of the stage is made on the materials recorded in the finding of fact by the court below, the statement of grounds for final appeal, the effect of the statute violation, and the classification of the case under the special Act, and gaps in the records are not filled with conjecture. It is not within this conclusion to determine impossibility of relief where there is no material such that the matter cannot be determined on the facts determined by the court below alone, or where an assertion of some procedural defect has not been sufficiently specified in the records. Dissatisfaction with the assessment of evidence may remain, but the channel of raising grounds for final appeal on that alone is not included in this section.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Even at the stage of a final appeal, if the same court takes as its starting point for review the facts as previously found by that court, that procedure is distinguished from the place where facts are newly established. Is a final appeal a procedure for re-determining facts from the beginning? What kind of change overturns the determination made at the existing stage?
That provision states the grounds for final appeal in limited terms. "A final appeal may be taken only on the ground that there is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, a Decree, or a rule that affected the judgment." In this language, the subject is the party seeking the final appeal, the act is the bringing of the final appeal, and the condition is the presentation of the ground that a violation of statutes affected the judgment. Here, grounds for final appeal means an assertion of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment. Other issues not stated by the provision are not determined at this point.
The reason for dividing the stage of determination from what Article 423 requires is that Article 432 provides separately. Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "facts lawfully determined in the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal." A final appeal lies on the ground of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment, and is distinguished from the binding effect of facts lawfully determined. This distinction is precisely what divides the two stages. At the former stage, the facts lawfully determined are taken as the standard, and at the latter stage, it is asked whether the statutes applied to those facts were correct. This distinction is the designated standard of determination.
Yet the counterargument that an error in fact-finding does not seem like someone else's affair has deep roots. If the judgment that did not credit testimony distorted the substance of the case, the contention that such distortion corresponds to the very essence of the dispute gains force. Notwithstanding the complaint that a substantive error remains, the law addresses that complaint only in another form. The loss the counterargument targets does not disappear, but the form in which that loss is asserted does not match the language of the grounds for final appeal.
Applied to the synthetic scene by this standard, what the plaintiff now puts forward is still insufficient. From the scene, only the fact that the court below did not credit a witness is confirmed; which statute was violated, and whether that violation affected the judgment, remain undetermined. If this condition is confirmed, the existing determinations of blocking and of effect are discarded and the determination is redone from the stage onward. Yet on the scene alone it is unclear whether this is a dispute over facts or an assertion of a violation of statutes in the fact-finding process, and so it cannot be said with certainty whether that designated change has actually been made.
What this section permits is narrow. What may serve as grounds for final appeal is an assertion of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment. What may not serve as grounds for final appeal is an assertion that amounts to no more than a demand for reevaluation of facts lawfully determined. What kind of procedural defect does the law regard as specially serious?
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
It asks what more is needed for this grievance to become a ground of appeal that the law addresses. The language that answers this question is found in Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act. Here, 'grounds for final appeal' means an assertion of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment. In light of this definition, the subject of the grounds for final appeal is the party seeking the final appeal, the act he must assert is a violation of statutes committed in the course of the trial below, and the condition that the violation affected the conclusion of the judgment must also be specified together.
Alongside this, Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act declares that "facts lawfully determined in the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal." Read together, the two provisions reveal that the grounds for final appeal and the determination of facts are two distinct stages. The former deals with which statute was violated, while the latter prevents the final appeal court from arbitrarily changing the facts already determined by the court below. Even if erroneous fact-finding may lie at the core of substantive injustice, this is why a demand merely that the fact-finding be credited anew does not by itself constitute separate grounds for final appeal.
The counterargument that most strongly runs against this distinction is no mere matter of convenience. When fact-finding is wrong, a real loss arises in that, because of the limitation of review to questions of law, the substantive error remains in the judgment as it stands. If a judgment rendered on a mistaken understanding of a witness's statement becomes final, the detriment that error causes to the plaintiff's rights is hard to express in words. Nevertheless, where there is only a demand that the facts already determined be reevaluated and no violation of statutes to be reviewed is specified, the court of final appeal does not accept it as independent grounds for final appeal. Without erasing the point that a grievance remains, it answers that this alone does not open the door to a final appeal.
This standard is now contrasted with this scene. Plaintiff A resents that the court below did not credit a witness, but has not distinguished which statute was violated. Among the records items—the fact-finding of the court below, the statement of grounds for final appeal, the effect of the violation of statutes, and the classification of the case under a special Act—what is confirmed at present is only the scene. Whether what A presented is a simple dispute over facts, or an assertion that a violation of statutes occurred in the fact-finding process, is not yet clear. Whether it falls within this condition remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. What may be handled as grounds for final appeal is an assertion of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment, and a demand that the facts lawfully determined be newly fixed does not of itself open the door to a final appeal. This does not mean that there is no controversy over a violation of statutes in the evaluation of evidence. That is a different question.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Whether such a complaint is a protest against the finding of facts, or an assertion that the rules prescribed by law were violated in the process of determining facts, changes the way it is handled at the final appeal stage. The preceding section confirmed the restraint that a demand merely to credit the evidence anew cannot be used as independent grounds for final appeal. The next question is whether a final appeal is a procedure for re-determining facts from the beginning.
The first provision that answers this question is Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act. That provision provides that "a final appeal may be taken only on the ground that there is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, a Decree, or a rule that affected the judgment" (Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject indicated by this language is the party intending to bring a final appeal, the act is the contention that party raises as the ground for the final appeal, and the condition is the case in which that contention points to a violation of the Constitution, an Act, a Decree, or a rule and affected the judgment. This provision sets forth only the requirements for grounds for final appeal, and does not newly prescribe the method of evaluating evidence at the trial of fact itself.
If the grounds for a final appeal are limited to violations of statutes, the manner in which the final appeal stage deals with facts is likewise determined within that limitation. Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that "facts lawfully determined in the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal" (Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act). This binding means that the court of final appeal cannot alter the facts determined by the court below through a new review, and it is precisely for this reason that a final appeal cannot be called a procedure for re-determining facts from the beginning. The two provisions take charge of different stages of determination. Article 423 determines what contention may be taken as the grounds for a final appeal, and Article 432 determines, even when review proceeds on that ground, the range within which the facts are bound. This is why the requirements for grounds for final appeal and the binding of facts must be viewed separately.
The loss this distinction leaves is clear. If the fact-finding of the court below was wrong and substantive injustice resulted, the error may remain uncorrected at the final appeal stage owing to the limitation of review to questions of law. In particular, a complaint as to how a witness's statement should be evaluated remains, as such, without taking the form of a violation of statutes. That, however, does not shake the conclusion. This is because a demand merely to credit the evidence anew cannot be used as independent grounds for final appeal. The possibility of substantive error that the counterargument points out remains, but the channel through which that error is dealt with at the final appeal stage must assume the limited form of an assertion of a violation of statutes.
In the synthetic scene, plaintiff A feels aggrieved that the court below did not credit a witness, but has not yet distinguished which violation of statutes is at issue. On this fact alone, one cannot determine whether the fact-finding of the court below constitutes facts lawfully determined, or whether a violation of statutes intervened in the process of that determination. If the plaintiff's contention is a mere demand to reverse the evaluation of evidence, it corresponds to a demand that the facts lawfully determined be reevaluated anew, and there is no ground of a violation of statutes to review. Conversely, if a contention that a particular statute was violated is specified and duly submitted, the matter passes to the stage of reviewing violations of statutes at the final appeal. So long as it is unclear whether it is a dispute over facts or an assertion of a violation of statutes in the fact-finding process, it remains undetermined.
What this conclusion permits is reviewing the effect upon the judgment of the violation of statutes specified as grounds for final appeal; what it does not permit is opening the final appeal stage on a mere demand that the facts lawfully determined be reevaluated anew. Whether the demand to credit the evidence anew has donned the clothing of an assertion of a violation of statutes is judged not by the content of the contention but by the violation of rules it designates. Matters that remain undetermined are simply undetermined until further materials are furnished, and that does not mean that relief is impossible.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Borrowing the attitude of distinguishing between permitted quotation of grounds and statutory exclusion, and of not asserting the absence of review merely from the manner of citation, what must be asked this time is narrow and clear. It is whether a party who is aggrieved that the court below did not credit a witness, upon coming to the review on questions of law, may have that determination taken up anew from the beginning. The empirical feeling of receiving one more stage of trial and the scope of review actually performed by the court of final appeal belong to different dimensions.
The provision setting out the basis on which a final appeal is permitted is the starting point of this problem. Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act provides as follows. "A final appeal may be taken only on the ground that there is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, a Decree, or a rule that affected the judgment." (Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act) The subject this language sets is the party bringing the final appeal, the act is the bringing of the final appeal, and the condition is that it is brought on the ground of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment. The grounds for final appeal are precisely an assertion of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment.
Reading this condition as an assertion of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment makes plain what must be added for a grievance surrounding facts to become grounds for final appeal. What must be at issue is not the result of fact-finding but whether the rules of law were observed in that process of finding. Facts lawfully determined in the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal. (Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act) Accordingly, one must judge separately the stage of being bound by the facts lawfully determined and the stage of asking whether a violation of statutes intervened in that determination. Skipping the former, one cannot put forward a demand to re-determine facts as grounds for final appeal.
Yet the counterargument that, if fact-finding is wrong, the substantive detriment can reverse the conclusion of the case as a whole cannot be taken lightly. The judgment of how far to credit a witness's statement is decisive of the outcome, and so long as the error remains, the remedy is empty, so it is said. The loss and inconvenience this counterargument targets are real. The foregoing answer, however, does not change. Recognizing the weight of the counterargument while not expanding the definition of the grounds for final appeal is the attitude this section adopts.
Returning to this scene, plaintiff A is aggrieved that the court below did not credit a witness, but has not yet distinguished which violation of statutes is involved. On this fact alone, one cannot determine which grounds for final appeal it corresponds to. What is to be compared against the judgment records are four items: the fact-finding of the court below, the statement of grounds for final appeal, the effect of the violation of statutes, and the classification of the case under a special Act. So long as it is unclear whether it is a dispute over facts or an assertion of a violation of statutes in the fact-finding process, it remains undetermined. However, if one condition of determination is changed—that is, if the case is classified as a small-claim case—then, in place of the general grounds for final appeal, the grounds permitted under the special Act are compared.
The conclusion this section permits is the fact that a final appeal is not a procedure for re-determining facts from the beginning, and that the grounds for final appeal are an assertion of a violation of statutes that affected the judgment. At the same time, the binding of facts lawfully determined and the lawfulness of the process of that determination are judged separately. Making a demand to reevaluate the evidence as grounds for final appeal in itself is not permitted.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
허용된 이유 인용과 법정 제외를 구분하고 인용 방식만으로 심리 부재를 단정하지 않는 이 흐름 안에서, 원고 A는 원심이 증인을 믿지 않은 것이 억울하다고 하지만 어떤 법규 위반인지 아직 구별하지 않았다. 이 장면에서 상고심이 사실을 처음부터 다시 정하는 절차인가 하는 물음이 열리고, 여기에는 원심이 확정한 사실을 다시 뒤집는 일과 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반을 심리하는 일이 놓여 있다. 상고이유란 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반의 주장을 뜻하는데, 원고가 억울함을 표시한 사실인정 불복은 아직 그 주장의 형태를 갖추지 않았다. 이 구별이 다음에 확인할 문언과 어떤 심리의 판정 근거를 가르는지가 이 물음이다.
이 물음에 해당하는 첫 문언은 민사소송법 제423조이다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 상고를 하려는 사람이고, 행위는 상고의 제기를, 조건은 상고사유로서 헌법·법률·명령 또는 규칙 위반이 있고 그것이 판결에 영향을 미친다는 점의 주장이다. 이와 나란히 민사소송법 제432조는 "원심판결이 적법하게 확정한 사실은 상고법원을 기속한다"고 적고 있다(민사소송법 제432조). 여기서 주체는 상고법원이며, 기속의 대상은 원심이 적법하게 확정한 사실이고, 조건은 그 확정이 적법한 절차에 따른 것이다. 이 두 문언은 같은 심리를 앞뒤에서 제한하는 구실을 한다.
이 문언들이 확정하는 바는 상고심의 법령 위반 심리가 판결에 영향을 미친 법규의 위반을 판정 근거로 삼는다는 것이고, 적법하게 확정한 사실은 상고법원을 기속하므로 그 사실을 새로 정하지 않는다는 점이다. 두 판단을 나눈 까닭은 판정의 재료가 다르기 때문이다. 하나는 어떤 법규를 위반했고 그 위반이 판결에 영향을 미쳤는지를 따지는 질문이고, 다른 하나는 원심이 확정한 사실을 상고심이 쓰는 기초로 삼아야 한다는 한계이다. 앞의 것이 법령 위반 심리의 출발점이고, 뒤의 것이 그 심리가 넘지 않는 경계이므로, 판정 근거와 사실의 기속을 함께 묶으면 상고이유의 특정 여부와 사실의 재평가 요구가 구별되지 않는다. 원고가 억울하다고 한 사실인정의 문제는 여기서 두 번째 경계 쪽에 놓이며, 법령 위반의 특정 없이 독립 상고이유로 서지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 사실인정의 오류가 실체적 부당함의 핵심일 수 있다는 데서 나온다. 증인을 믿지 않은 판단이 틀렸다면 판결의 결론 자체가 어긋날 수 있고, 법률심의 문을 좁힌 대가로 그런 실질적 오류가 그대로 남는 불편이 생긴다. 다만 이 반론은 인정되는 손실을 지우지 않으면서도 같은 결론을 되돌리지 못한다. 상고심은 사실을 처음부터 다시 정하는 절차가 아니므로, 확정된 사실을 새 평가로 바꾸어 달라는 요구만으로는 판정 근거가 서지 않는다. 이것이 어려움을 남기는 반론이지만, 법령 위반의 특정이 없는 재심의 문을 열어두는 일은 이 문언들이 정한 판정 근거와 상충한다.
이 장면에 놓인 것은 원심이 증인을 믿지 않은 사실인정에 대한 억울함뿐이고, 어떤 법규를 위반했는지는 아직 구별되지 않았다. 이 사실은 민사소송법 제423조가 요구하는 상고사유의 특정 요건과 대조된다. 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반이라는 주장이 특정되어 제출되지 않은 한, 상고심의 법령 위반 심리는 시작점을 찾지 못한다. 또한 민사소송법 제432조의 조건에 비추면, 원심이 적법하게 확정한 사실을 새로 평가해 달라는 요구는 상고법원을 기속하는 한계에 막힌다. 반면 장면만으로는 원고의 억울함이 사실 다툼인지, 사실인정 과정에서 법령 위반이 있었다는 주장인지 아직 분명하지 않다. 이 구별이 확정되면 달라지겠지만, 현 단계에서 장면만으로 어느 쪽인지 판정할 수 없으므로 그 점은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 한정되어 있다. 해당 원문 문언만 상고심의 법령 위반 심리의 판정 근거로 쓰고, 해당 범위 안의 문언만 적용하며, 판결이유나 다른 항으로 확장하지 않는다. 이에 따라 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반이 특정되어 적법하게 제출된 경우에는 심리의 통로가 열리고, 적법하게 확정한 사실을 새로 평가해 달라는 요구만 있고 심리할 법령 위반 사유가 없는 경우에는 길이 막힌다. 여기에 증거를 다시 믿어 달라는 요구만을 독립 상고이유로 쓰는 것은 이 문언들이 정한 판정 근거 밖에 놓인다.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
앞서 상고가 사실을 처음부터 다시 정하는 절차가 아니라는 점을 확인한 바 있다. 이제 그 결론 위에서 상고심이 실제로 심리할 대상의 경계를 더 정밀하게 그어 볼 필요가 있다. 이 장면에서 법원이 먼저 결정할 것은 상고심에 올려진 사유가 상고이유에 해당하는지의 여부이다.
이 절의 두 조문은 그 성격을 문언으로 먼저 못 박는다. 「민사소송법 제423조」는 "상고는 판결에 영향을 미친 헌법·법률·명령 또는 규칙의 위반이 있다는 것을 이유로 드는 때에만 할 수 있다"라고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 상고를 제기하는 당사자이고, 행위는 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반의 특정이며, 조건은 그 위반이 상고이유로 적법하게 제출되는 것이다. 조문이 말하는 것은 이 한정된 이유의 제출이지, 사실 다툼의 자체적 허용이 아니다.
「민사소송법 제432조」는 반대편 기준을 맡는다. 그 조문은 "원심판결이 적법하게 확정한 사실은 상고법원을 기속한다"라고 정한다. 적법하게 확정한 사실의 기속과 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반이라는 상고이유는 서로 다른 판단 단계이다. 전자는 원심에서 확정된 사실이 상고심에서 다시 열릴 수 있는지를 가르고, 후자는 그 확정된 사실을 전제로 판결에 영향을 미친 법규 위반이 있는지를 가른다. 이 둘은 명시한 조건에 한정되어 판정되며, 여기에 새로운 단계를 끼워 넣을 근거는 없다.
그렇다면 잘못된 사실인정이 실체적 부당함의 핵심일 수 있다는 반론은 어디에 닿는가. 원심이 증인을 믿지 않은 판단이 오류였다면, 그 오류는 결과적으로 당사자에게 불리한 손실을 남긴다. 사안의 실체에 다가가지 못한 채 절차만 거친다는 비난도 같은 뿌리에서 나온다. 그러나 확정된 사실을 새로 평가해 달라는 요구만 있고 심리할 법령 위반 사유가 없는 경우, 상고심은 그 요구를 독립 상고이유로 받을 수 없다. 증거를 다시 믿어 달라는 요구만을 독립 상고이유로 쓸 수는 없다는 결론은 반론의 아픔을 지우지 않은 채 성립한다.
이 조건들을 합성 장면에 놓고 대조하면 구분이 선명해진다. 원심 사실인정, 상고이유서, 법령 위반의 영향, 특별법상 사건 분류의 기록이 놓여 있다. 원고가 내세우는 것은 증인 진술의 평가가 억울하다는 주장이며, 어떤 법규가 위반되었는지 특정되지 않았다. 이 경우 적법하게 확정한 사실을 새로 평가해 달라는 요구에 머물고 있어 막히는 경우에 가깝다. 다만 사실 다툼인지 사실인정 과정의 법령 위반 주장인지 분명하지 않은 경우에는 미확정으로 남아야 하며, 장면만으로 확정할 수 없다.
따라서 상고심의 법령 위반 심리 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 명시된 세 조건의 대조에 한정된다. 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반 또는 해당 특별법의 상고사유를 특정해 적법하게 제출한 경우 심리가 열리고, 적법하게 확정된 사실의 재평가 요구만 남은 경우 열리지 않는다. 그 사이가 분명하지 않은 경우는 미확정으로 두어 판단을 유보한다. 이 결론이 허용하지 않는 것은 사실심을 대신해 증거를 처음부터 다시 훑는 심리이며, 자료가 부족하다는 이유로 구제가 불가능하다고 단정하는 것도 아니다.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
앞 단계에서 상고는 사실을 처음부터 다시 정하는 절차가 아니라 허용된 이유 인용과 법정 제외를 구분하는 작업임을 확인했고, 인용 방식만으로 심리가 없었다고 단정하지 않는 태도를 받아들였다. 이 장면에서 상고이유로 열리는 길과 닫히는 길, 그리고 판단을 미룰 수밖에 없는 자리를 어떻게 나눌 것인가.
이 문언은 상고의 이유로 삼을 수 있는 주장을 ‘판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반’으로 한정한다. 여기서 법령 위반은 헌법·법률·명령 또는 규칙의 위반을 가리키고, 그 위반이 판결에 영향을 미쳤다는 연결까지 주장되어야 한다. 이 조문에 따라 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반의 주장을 상고이유라고 부른다.
민사소송법 제432조는 “원심판결이 적법하게 확정한 사실은 상고법원을 기속한다”고 선을 긋는다. 이 근거와 앞의 결론을 이어 보면 심리의 문이 열리는 경우와 막히는 경우가 갈린다. 문이 열리는 조건은 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반, 또는 해당 특별법의 상고사유를 특정해 적법하게 제출한 경우이고, 문이 막히는 조건은 적법하게 확정된 사실을 새로 평가해 달라는 요구만 있고 심리할 법령 위반 사유가 없는 경우다. 사실의 확정과 사실 확정 과정에서 벌어진 법령 위반의 주장은 다른 단계에 놓인다.
가장 강한 반론은 잘못된 사실인정이 실체적 부당함의 핵심일 수 있다는 점이다. 원심이 증거를 잘못 읽어 진실과 어긋난 사실을 판결의 토대로 삼았다면, 판결의 결론 자체가 부당할 수 있고 당사자는 상고심에서라도 바로잡히기를 기대한다. 법률심의 범위가 좁기 때문에 실질적인 오류가 그대로 남는다는 손실도 크다. 그러나 앞의 답은 흔들리지 않는다. 증거를 다시 믿어 달라는 요구만을 독립 상고이유로 쓸 수는 없고, 그 요구는 사실심의 전권 아래 놓인 사실의 재평가에 해당한다. 반론이 지적한 부당함의 가능성은 지워지지 않지만, 그 부당함을 상고이유로 삼으려면 사실 다툼이 아니라 사실인정 과정의 법령 위반이라는 점을 특정해 적법하게 제출해야 한다.
이 장면만으로는 원고의 불만이 증거평가의 결과에 대한 사실 다툼인지, 증인을 믿지 않는 판단 과정에서 법령이 정한 규칙을 어겼다는 주장인지 분명하지 않다. 민사소송법 제423조의 요건과 제432조의 기속을 대조해 보면, 후자라면 어떤 법규 위반이 어떤 판단에 영향을 미쳤는지가 특정되어야 하고, 전자라면 심리할 상고이유로 자리하기 어렵다. 다만 장면에 원고가 어떤 법규를 들었는지, 상고이유서에 어떤 표현을 적었는지 기록되어 있지 않아, 이 사안이 어느 쪽인지 여기서 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 조건부의 구별에 그친다. 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반 또는 해당 특별법의 상고사유를 특정해 적법하게 제출했다면 심리의 문이 열리고, 적법하게 확정된 사실을 새로 평가해 달라는 요구만 놓였다면 닫힌다. 전자와 후자가 섞여 구별되지 않으면 미확정으로 남긴다. 문이 열렸다는 것은 법적 통로가 열린 상태를 뜻할 뿐, 상고가 인용되거나 어떤 결과가 실제로 이뤄졌다는 뜻이 아니다.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
허용된 이유 인용과 법정 제외를 구분하고 인용 방식만으로 심리 부재를 단정하지 않은 결론 아래에서, 상고심이 나아가는 방식을 이제 따로 묻는다. 이 장면에서 억울함의 원인이 무엇인지 밝히지 않은 채 상고의 심리 범위를 논할 수 없다. 그래서 먼저 상고 절차가 재심 사유를 새로 확정하는 자리인지, 아니면 이미 정해진 사실 위에서 법령 위반만을 가리는 자리인지 나누어 본다.
그 구별의 출발점은 상고이유를 정한 조문이다. 민사소송법 제423조는 "상고는 판결에 영향을 미친 헌법·법률·명령 또는 규칙의 위반이 있다는 것을 이유로 드는 때에만 할 수 있다"고 규정한다. 이 문언은 상고의 사유를 네 법령의 위반 가운데 판결에 영향을 미친 것으로 한정한다. 즉 주장이 가리키는 대상은 사실 자체가 아니라 판결을 만든 판단 과정에서 벌어진 법령 위반이다. 그러므로 사실을 다시 정해 달라는 요구는 이 조문이 정한 사유의 모양을 갖추지 못하면 그대로 남는다. 조문의 다른 쟁점, 예를 들어 영향의 판단 방법까지 이 자리에서 다루지는 않는다.
이 문언과 상고심의 지위는 맞물려 있다. 기속이란 상고법원이 그 사실을 바꾸지 않고 받아들인다는 뜻이다. 제423조가 상고의 문을 법령 위반으로 열어 둔 것과, 제432조가 그 문을 지나면서도 사실관계는 제자리에 묶어 두는 것은 서로 다른 두 단계다. 전자는 무엇을 다툴 수 있는가를 정하고 후자는 다투어도 남는 사실이 무엇인가를 정한다. 두 단계를 섞으면 사실의 재심리라는 결과가 나오지만, 법은 사실심의 전권을 인정하면서 상고심의 심리 대상을 법령 위반으로만 남긴다. 어떤 절차 하자를 법이 특별히 무겁게 보는가에 답할 때에도 이 구분이 기준이 된다.
가장 강한 반론은 사실인정 오류가 남긴 실질적 손실을 겨냥한다. 증인의 진술을 잘못 읽어 진실과 다른 판결이 내려졌다면, 그 부당함은 어떤 법규의 이름으로도 다루기 어려운 채 남는다. 상고심이 법률심이라서 오류를 바로잡지 못한 채 종결된다면 패소한 쪽에 남는 것은 회복되지 않은 손해이고, 판단의 근거가 되지 않은 증거는 조용히 묻힌다. 그러나 이 반론이 제기하는 불편을 인정한다고 해서 상고이유의 모양까지 바뀌는 것은 아니다. 반론이 지적한 오류의 가능성을 지운 채 결론을 유지하는 것이 아니라, 그 오류가 상고심에서 다루어질 조건이 따로 있다는 점을 분명히 하는 것이다.
이 장면으로 돌아가면, 원심이 증인을 믿지 않은 판단을 법령 위반의 주장으로 특정할 수 있는지는 아직 미정이다. 원고 A가 겪은 억울함이 증거평가라는 사실심의 권한 밖에서 벌어진 위반에 해당하는지, 아니면 적법하게 확정한 사실에 대한 다른 평가를 구하는 것인지는 기록에 따라 갈린다. 만약 원고가 요구하는 것이 사실의 새로운 평가뿐이고 심리할 법령 위반 사유가 없다면 상고심은 그 요구를 받아들이지 않는다. 반대로 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반이 특정되어 적법하게 제출되었다면 상고심은 그 위반을 심리한다. 소액사건으로 분류되면 일반 상고사유 대신 특별법의 허용 사유를 대조하는 조건도 달라지는 지점이다.
정리하면, 상고는 사실을 처음부터 다시 정하는 절차가 아니며 판결에 영향을 미친 법령 위반만을 심리하는 자리다. 이 판단이 허용하는 것은 상고이유를 법령 위반의 주장으로 구별한 뒤, 적법하게 확정한 사실의 기속 아래에서 그 위반의 영향을 살피는 것이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 사실관계를 새로 쌓아 올리는 심리를 상고심에 기대하는 일이거나, 증거평가라는 이유만으로 상고심의 문을 두드리는 일이다. 확정할 수 없는 것은 원고의 요구가 어느 쪽에 해당하는지이며, 이는 기록이 채워지기 전에 단정할 수 없다.