Summary
Because the statutory text addresses facts lawfully established by the lower court's judgment, dissatisfaction with findings of fact must be separated from questions of legality.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The fact that a contention concerns facts alone is no reason to erase the question of statutory violation as well. The limits of the grounds for final appeal and the objection determine the scope of the review before the court. Within that scope, the question at this stage is which facts bind the court of final appeal. This channel of relief opens; only after the criterion by which its entrance opens has been fixed is the range of facts to be reviewed by the court of final appeal determined.
Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act declares that "the facts duly determined by the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal." In this language, the object of binding force is the very facts determined by the court of fact, and the condition is whether that determination stood on due procedure. In other words, a lawful determination of fact means a finding of fact that passed through the process of judgment prescribed by law, and this condition operates as the threshold dividing the authority of the court of fact from the scope of review of the court of final appeal.
Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that a final appeal may be taken "only on the ground that there is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, an order, or a rule that affected the judgment." Here the entrance to this remedy opens when a violation of statute that affected the judgment, or a ground for final appeal under the relevant special Act, is specified and duly raised. Dissatisfaction with the result of fact-finding and an assertion of statutory violation in the process of fact-finding have different objects and must therefore be judged separately.
The expression "lawfulness" can be used to circumvent a dispute over facts. This is because a demand to re-evaluate determined facts, if packaged as a question of statutory violation, would have the court of final appeal infringe the exclusive authority of the court of fact. Even so, not all fact-related contentions can be dealt with wholesale as unreviewable. To bundle together and exclude even contentions that specifically raise circumstances of violation of legal rules in the process of fact-finding would result in ignoring the fact that the conditions of binding force and the scope of review are situated at different stages.
Plaintiff A complains that the court below's refusal to credit a witness is unjust, but has not yet specified which legal rule was violated. In this scene, if the judgment declining to credit the witness's statement itself constitutes a finding of fact duly determined, it binds the court of final appeal. However, at the present stage, where the legal rule violated has not been specified, it cannot be decided whether this is a violation in the process of judgment or dissatisfaction with the result of judgment. If the case is classified as a small-claims case, the permitted grounds under the special Act are compared instead of the ordinary grounds for final appeal.
The conclusion of this section is that, if a violation of statute that affected the judgment, or a ground for final appeal under the relevant special Act, has been duly raised, the entrance to this remedy opens. Conversely, if there remains only a demand to re-evaluate duly determined facts and there is no ground of statutory violation to review, the channel is closed. Where it is unclear whether the matter is a dispute over facts or an assertion of statutory violation in the process of fact-finding, it remains undetermined.
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Whether that complaint is a mere dissatisfaction with fact-finding, or an assertion that the process of judgment prescribed by law was violated in the process of fact-finding, has not yet been settled. Depending on which of the two it is, the subject that the court of final appeal may review changes. Accordingly, what must be asked now is, in addition to which facts bind the court of final appeal, under what conditions the channel of relief in the appeal stage is closed.
First, confirm the statutory text corresponding to this question. Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act (Grounds for final appeal) provides that "a final appeal may be taken only on the ground that there is a violation of the Constitution, an Act, an order, or a rule that affected the judgment." The subject indicated by this language is the party taking the final appeal; the act is a final appeal taken on the ground of a violation; and the conditions are that the violation affected the judgment and that it has been duly raised as a ground. What the language requires is not dissatisfaction with the result of fact-finding itself, but a violation of the Constitution, an Act, an order, or a rule. Therefore, unless a contention specifying which legal rule was violated in which process of judgment is submitted as grounds for final appeal, the requirement demanded by this Article remains unmet.
Connecting this basis with the conclusion of this section, where there remains only a demand to re-evaluate duly determined facts and there is no ground of statutory violation to review, the channel of relief in the appeal stage is closed if even one of the statutory requirements is unmet. Here two stages of judgment must be distinguished. Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act (Exclusive Authority of the Court of Fact) provides that "the facts duly determined by the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal," and here a lawful determination of fact means a finding of fact that passed through the process of judgment prescribed by law. The earlier stage determines what the content of the determined facts is; the later stage asks whether that determination passed through the process prescribed by law, and thereby addresses whether there is a statutory violation. So long as the two stages are not mixed, a complaint about fact-finding remains an object of the first stage, and an assertion of statutory violation can be reviewed only in the second stage.
But this distinction should not be accepted merely because it is convenient. The strongest counterargument is directed at the point that the expression "lawfulness" can be used to circumvent a dispute over facts. What the party feels to be unjust is the result of declining to credit the witness's statement; yet if only the form of having passed through the process of judgment prescribed by law is satisfied, the loss arises that that substantive error in fact-finding remains unaddressed in the law court. To the party, the appeal stage may look like a procedure without relief, and that inconvenience is not small. Among fact-related contentions, there are cases in which the contention that the judgment procedure prescribed by law was violated in the process of fact-finding is included together, and in that case the latter part of the contention becomes an object of review in the second stage. The possibility of the substantive error that the counterargument points out is not erased; the channel merely opens or closes on the criterion of whether the ground was specified and submitted as a statutory violation.
Placing this distinction in the present scene, Plaintiff A says only that the result of the court below declining to credit a witness is unjust, and has not yet specified which legal rule was violated. On this scene alone it is not clear whether this is a mere dissatisfaction with fact-finding or an assertion of statutory violation in the process of fact-finding, and this judgment remains undetermined. The records for adjudication are the court below's fact-finding, the grounds for final appeal, the effect of the statutory violation, and the case classification under the special Act. However, because the scene does not settle whether the case is classified as a small-claims case, this condition remains unapplied.
What this section permits is, within the limits of the grounds for final appeal and the objection, to take as an object of review a violation of statute that affected the judgment when it has been specified and submitted; and to judge that the channel of relief in the appeal stage is closed when only a demand to re-evaluate duly determined facts remains and no ground of statutory violation has been specified. What this section does not permit is the treatment of erasing the question of statutory violation as well merely because the contention is said to concern facts.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Whether this grievance is a mere dissatisfaction with fact-finding, or an assertion that the procedures prescribed by statute were not observed in the process of fact-finding, cannot be determined from the materials now at hand. The question of which facts bind the court of final appeal wavers especially where that boundary has collapsed. Since the court of final appeal is not the place where new facts are determined from the beginning, only after what shall be regarded as facts with binding force is first determined can the remaining judgment proceed.
Because the statutory text takes as its object the facts duly determined by the judgment of the court below, dissatisfaction with fact-finding and the question of lawfulness must be separated. The Civil Procedure Act provides that the facts duly determined by the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal (Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act). In this language, the object is the facts determined by the judgment of the court below, and "duly," modifying that phrase, places a condition on the manner of determination. In other words, only a finding of fact that passed through the process of judgment prescribed by law is a fact that binds the court of final appeal. A contention that simply contests the court below's assessment of credibility does not fall within this range.
Accordingly, the reason these two questions must be distinguished is that their starting points of judgment differ. If it is a demand to change the result of fact-finding, it comes close to a demand to re-evaluate facts already duly determined and is barred where there is no ground of statutory violation to review. By contrast, if it is an assertion that a statute was violated in the process of fact-finding, it moves into the scope of grounds for final appeal, namely a violation of the Constitution, an Act, an order, or a rule that affected the judgment (Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act). If, without dividing that boundary, the two are bundled together on the ground that it is "a contention concerning facts," the very question of statutory violation that ought to be reviewed is erased along with them.
The work of discerning whether a contention is merely packaged in the word "lawfulness" involves real losses. There arises at once the risk that a contention genuinely aimed at a statutory violation is driven into and buried as a dispute over facts, and, conversely, the inconvenience that a genuine dispute over facts re-enters the appeal stage under the name of lawfulness. Even so, a matter whose materials of judgment have not been specified cannot be immediately treated as unreviewable. Where, for lack of materials, what is being contested has not been determined, that is not unreviewability but an undetermined state, and judgment must be suspended while that boundary is left open.
In the synthetic scene, the facts belonging to this question are all of the following. Plaintiff A says that the court below's refusal to credit a witness is unjust, yet has not specified which legal rule was violated. The records for adjudication—the court below's fact-finding, the grounds for final appeal, the effect of the statutory violation, and the case classification under the special Act—are settled, but within those records it is not confirmed which contention is contained. If it were confirmed to be classified as a small-claims case, the conclusion would change, since the permitted grounds under the special Act would apply instead of the ordinary grounds for final appeal; but the present scene does not fix the case classification. Therefore, on this scene it cannot be determined whether this is a dispute over facts or an assertion of statutory violation in the process of fact-finding.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. A matter whose materials of judgment have not been specified is left as undetermined rather than unreviewable, and that state of being undetermined does not serve as a basis for excluding fact-related contentions wholesale. Here "effect" is tied to the stage of reviewing statutory violations in the appeal stage, and the path of that review opens only when a violation of statute that affected the judgment, or a ground for final appeal under the relevant special Act, has been specified and duly submitted. Conversely, where only a demand to re-evaluate duly determined facts remains and there is no ground of statutory violation to review, the path is closed.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
On the premise that the limits of the grounds for final appeal and the objection determine the scope of the review before the court, what remains to be asked this time is which facts bind the court of final appeal and which records must be checked in order to adjudicate that stage. What the court must first confirm in this scene is not the question of how the court below determined the facts, but whether that determination passed through the process of judgment prescribed by law.
The statutory text that answers this question is Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act. This Article provides that "the facts duly determined by the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal" (Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act). Here the subject bound is the court of final appeal, and its object is those among the facts determined by the judgment of the court below that were duly determined. A lawful determination of fact means a finding of fact that passed through the process of judgment prescribed by law. Accordingly, it is not the facts themselves adopted by the court below, but whether the process prescribed by law was observed in that finding of fact, that draws the boundary the court of final appeal will newly examine.
Because the language of Article 432 limits the object of binding force to facts duly determined, the stage adjudication is conducted only on the records necessary to determine whether those facts were duly determined. The materials to be compared in the appeal stage are limited to the materials recorded in the court below's fact-finding, the grounds for final appeal, the effect of the statutory violation, and the case classification under the special Act. The court below's fact-finding shows what was determined; the grounds for final appeal show what statutory violation was pointed out in that determination. The effect of the statutory violation shows the degree to which the violation affected the judgment, and the case classification under the special Act fixes the framework of the grounds for final appeal to be applied. The stage adjudication is conducted only on the established records, and no absent record is filled in by assumption.
The losses and inconveniences that this distinction produces are clear. If the court below's judgment declining to credit a witness's statement in fact arose from a misunderstanding, the path to correct that error in the law court is narrow. There is also the risk that the expression "lawfulness" is used as a signboard closing off disputes over facts. An assertion that the process of judgment prescribed by law went astray in the process of fact-finding is itself a question of statutory violation, and such contentions are handled separately, distinguished from disputes over facts. Accordingly, the conclusion is maintained in the direction of not rejecting contentions merely on the ground that they concern facts.
Measured against the facts recorded in this scene, Plaintiff A says that the court below's fact-finding, declining to credit a witness, is unjust, yet has not yet specified which legal rule was violated. That the court below's fact-finding exists and that grounds for final appeal were submitted is confirmed by the scene, but whether a statutory violation was specified within the grounds for final appeal, and whether that violation affected the judgment, is not settled by the record. In this case it is unclear whether this is a dispute over facts or an assertion of statutory violation in the process of fact-finding, so the stage remains undetermined. Whether this condition is even satisfied cannot be determined from the scene alone.
What this section permits goes no further than discerning the lawfulness of the fact determination on the established records, and separating dissatisfaction with fact-finding from assertions of statutory violation for examination. What it does not permit is establishing facts not in the record in order to fix the stage, or declaring contentions unreviewable without so much as hearing fact-related contentions. The judgment in the appeal stage concludes by asking whether the materials presented within the limits of the grounds for final appeal and the objection show the effect of the statutory violation.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
그 결론은 상고이유와 불복신청의 한도가 당해 심리의 범위를 정한다는 것이었다. 그런데 그 한도 안에서 다루는 주장이 과연 무엇에 관한 것인지를 밝히지 않으면, 심리 범위를 정하는 일 자체가 흔들린다. 이 장면에서 바로 어떤 사실이 상고법원을 기속하는가라는 물음이 열린다.
이 물음에 답하는 법문이 민사소송법 제432조에 있다. 그 조문은 "원심판결이 적법하게 확정한 사실은 상고법원을 기속한다"고 선언한다(민사소송법 제432조). 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 상고법원이고, 기속의 대상은 원심판결이 확정한 사실이며, 그 사실이 적법하게 확정된 것에 한정된다. 여기서 적법한 사실 확정은 법이 정한 판단 과정을 거친 사실 인정을 뜻한다. 따라서 확정 사실 자체와 그 확정이 적법한지의 문제는 별개의 판단 대상이다.
제432조가 적법성이라는 조건을 둔 것은 사실인정 불만과 적법성 문제를 구별해야 하기 때문이다. 원심이 증인을 믿지 않은 결론이 마음에 들지 않는다는 것은 확정 사실에 대한 불만이고, 그 사실 인정 과정에서 법이 정한 판단 절차를 지키지 않았다는 주장은 적법성에 관한 것이다. 같은 조의 전권 규칙은 전자에 대해서는 상고법원이 원심의 판단을 존중하도록 하고, 후자에 대해서는 별도의 심사 통로를 남긴다. 그런데 이 통로가 열리는 조건은 민사소송법 제423조가 정한다. 그 조문은 상고를 "판결에 영향을 미친 헌법·법률·명령 또는 규칙의 위반이 있다는 것을 이유로 드는 때"에만 허용한다(민사소송법 제423조). 즉 법령 위반이 판결에 영향을 미쳤다는 점이 특정되어야 비로소 상고심이 심리할 사유가 된다.
그런데 적법성이라는 표현으로 사실 다툼을 우회할 수 있다는 반론이 가장 강하게 겨누는 지점은 바로 이 구별이다. 상고인이 단지 증인에 대한 판단이 마음에 들지 않을 뿐인데, 그 판단 과정에 무슨 법규 위반이 있었는지 캐묻는 심사를 거치게 되면 사실상 원심의 사실인정을 다시 들여다보는 결과가 된다. 그 경우 법률심으로서의 상고심이 사실심의 전권을 허물고, 당사자는 상고이유서에 법령 위반의 형식을 갖추어 쓰는 것만으로 심사받지 못할 주장을 끌어올린다. 이 손실은 상고제도가 의도한 심급 분업을 무너뜨리는 불편을 낳는다. 사실인정 과정에서 법이 정한 판단 절차를 실제로 어겼다는 주장이 특정되어 있고 그 위반이 판결에 영향을 미쳤다는 점이 함께 제시된 경우라면, 그 주장은 사실 다툼과 구별되는 적법성 문제로 심리 대상이 된다. 반론이 지적한 형식적 우회의 위험은 지워지지 않지만, 그 위험만으로 적법성 주장을 모두 배척할 수는 없다.
지정된 변경 조건이 하나 더 있다. 만약 사건이 소액사건으로 분류되는 것으로 확인되면 판정 기준이 바뀐다. 즉 일반 상고사유를 나열해 놓고 대조하는 일이 아니라, 해당 특별법이 허용한 사유 목록에 그 주장을 대조해야 한다. 그런데 현재 합성 장면에는 사건 분류가 소액사건인지 일반 사건인지 정해져 있지 않다. 따라서 이 조건이 실제로 충족되었다고 확정할 수 없고, 분류가 확인되는 시점에 어떤 사유 기준을 적용할지가 갈린다. 다만 현재 이 사건에서 확정할 수 있는 것은, 사실인정 불만이라는 이유만으로 법령 위반 문제를 지워서는 안 된다는 좁은 결론뿐이다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론과 허용하지 않는 결론을 나누면 이렇다. 원심이 적법하게 확정한 사실은 상고법원을 기속하므로, 단순한 사실 재평가 요구는 상고심에서 심리할 사유가 되지 않는다. 그러나 어떤 법규 위반이 사실 인정 과정에서 벌어졌는지, 그 위반이 판결에 영향을 미쳤는지가 구체적으로 특정된 주장이라면, 그 주장은 사실 다툼으로 몰아 배척할 일이 아니다. 적법성이라는 형식만으로 우회하려는 시도가 의심된다고 해서 그 주장을 심리 대상에서 통째로 제외하면, 법이 정한 판단 과정의 위반을 다루는 길을 함께 막게 된다. 원고 A는 지금 어떤 법규 위반인지 구별하지 않았으므로, 이 시점에서 상고심이 심리할 사유가 특정되었다고 볼 수 없다.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
상고이유와 불복신청의 한도가 당해 심리의 범위를 정한다는 전제 위에서, 적법성이라는 표현이 사실 다툼을 우회하는 통로가 될 수 있다는 반론이 남는다. 이 장면에서 확정할 수 없는 것은 그 불만이 사실심의 전권 밖으로 나갈 근거가 되는지이다.
민사소송법 제432조는 “제432조(사실심의 전권) 원심판결이 적법하게 확정한 사실은 상고법원을 기속한다.”고 정한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 상고법원이고, 대상은 원심판결이 확정한 사실이며, 기속하는 조건은 그 확정이 적법한 경우이다. 민사소송법 제423조는 “제423조(상고이유) 상고는 판결에 영향을 미친 헌법·법률·명령 또는 규칙의 위반이 있다는 것을 이유로 드는 때에만 할 수 있다.”고 정하여 상고의 사유를 법령 위반으로 한정한다.
이 두 문언을 함께 놓으면 판단의 단계가 갈린다. 민사소송법 제432조의 기속은 적법하게 확정된 사실에 적용되는 것이므로, 원심이 판단 과정을 법이 정한 대로 거쳤는지는 그 사실이 기속력을 갖기 전에 따져야 할 조건이다. 반면 민사소송법 제423조가 요구하는 법령 위반은 판결에 영향을 미친 것이어야 하므로, 사실인정 과정의 하자가 있다는 주장과 단순한 사실 평가 불만은 그 자체로 같은 것이 아니다. 이 구별이 없으면 사실심의 전권 조문이 사실인정의 하자 문제까지 함께 덮는 셈이 된다.
가장 강한 반론은 적법성이라는 표현이 사실 다툼을 그대로 법령 위반 문제로 옮겨 실질적인 오류를 남기는 통로가 된다는 것이다. 사실인정이 틀렸을 때 법률심의 제한 때문에 그 오류가 교정되지 않는다는 손실, 그리고 다툼의 실질을 잃지 않으려는 가치가 반론의 목표이다. 이 불이익을 숨길 필요는 없다. 다만 그 반론이 겨냥하는 대상은 사실 관련 주장 전체의 심리 가능성이라기보다, 확정된 사실을 다시 평가해 달라는 요구이다. 따라서 원심의 사실인정 과정에서 법령 위반이 특정되고 그것이 판결에 영향을 미쳤다는 주장은 그대로 남는다. 결론은 그 주장에 관하여 모든 사실 관련 주장을 심리 불가능하다고 일괄 처리할 수는 없다는 것이다.
합성 장면에 주어진 사실로 한정하면, 원고 A는 증인의 진술을 믿지 않은 원심 판단에 억울함을 표시했을 뿐 어떤 법규를 어떻게 위반했는지는 아직 적시하지 않았다. 그 주장이 민사소송법 제432조의 적법한 사실 확정을 흔드는지, 아니면 민사소송법 제423조가 요구하는 법령 위반을 특정한 것인지는 이 장면만으로 정해지지 않는다. 이 불분명함은 심리 불능의 근거가 아니라 구별이 더 필요한 상태이다. 소액사건 분류 여부는 장면에 지정되지 않았으므로 이 대조의 결과는 미확정으로 둔다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 적법성 문제를 사실 관련 주장에서 가려내야 하며 그 가림으로 모든 사실 관련 주장을 심리 불가능하게 만드는 것은 허용되지 않는다는 것이다. 원심 사실인정의 불만만 있고 법령 위반의 특정이 없는 경우까지 법원이 새로 사실을 정해야 한다는 결론은 이 절에서 허용되지 않는다. 다만 어떤 주장이 사실 다툼인지 사실인정 과정의 법령 위반 주장인지는 그때마다 사유의 구체성과 제출 범위를 보아야 한다.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
앞 절에서 모든 사실 관련 주장을 심리 불가능하다고 일괄 처리할 수는 없다는 전제를 받아들인다고 해도, 원심이 어떤 경로로 그 증언을 배척했는지 적법성의 문제로 옮겨 적는 작업이 남는다. 이 작업 없이는 상고법원이 무엇을 기속된 것으로 볼지 정할 수 없다.
민사소송법 제432조는 “원심판결이 적법하게 확정한 사실은 상고법원을 기속한다”고 정한다. 이 문언은 상고법원이 아니라 원심판결이 사실을 확정한 주체임을 분명히 하고, 상고법원이 그대로 받아들일 대상을 ‘적법하게 확정한 사실’로 한정한다. 기속의 대상이 되는 행위는 사실 인정이고, 그 인정이 적법이라는 조건이 함께 붙는다. 조문이 사실 확정의 방식이나 쟁점의 분류에 관해 더 말하지 않으므로 그 밖의 문제로 문언을 넓혀 읽지 않는다.
제432조의 조건과 이 절의 결론 사이에는 하나의 분기점이 있다. 원심이 증인을 믿지 않은 결과 자체가 억울하다는 불만은 적법하게 확정된 사실의 평가를 다시 해 달라는 요구에 머무르고, 그대로 두면 상고법원을 기속하는 사실의 테두리 안에 남는다. 반면 원심이 증언의 신빙성을 판단하는 과정에서 법이 정한 판단 절차를 벗어났다는 주장은 적법한 사실 확정, 즉 법이 정한 판단 과정을 거친 사실 인정이라는 용어가 붙는 대상의 조건 자체를 겨냥한다. 두 이야기를 섞으면 법문이 남긴 조건이 사라지고, 나누어야 법문의 한정이 남는다.
가장 강한 반론은 그 구별이 말로만 그칠 수 있다는 점을 겨냥한다. 상고 측이 사실 담론을 ‘적법성’이라는 표현으로 옮겨 적기만 하면 실질적으로는 사실심의 전권을 뒤집는 주장이 그대로 올라오고, 법률심의 제한 때문에 사실인정이 틀렸을 때 오류가 남는 불이익은 그대로 상고인에게 돌아간다는 것이다. 이 점은 지우지 않는다. 다만 이 반론에 답하는 것은 불이익을 없애는 일이 아니라 범위를 정하는 일이다. 법이 정한 판단 과정을 거친 사실 인정에 관한 주장인지, 그 과정의 법령 위반 주장인지 아직 가려지지 않았다면 심리 불가능하다고 일괄 단정할 수 없고, 남는 불확실성은 그 자리에 둔다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 것은 원고 A가 증인을 믿지 않은 판정의 결과가 억울하다고 말했고 어떤 법규를 위반했는지 아직 특정하지 않았다는 사실뿐이다. 이 사실만으로는 제432조가 말하는 적법한 사실 확정에 해당하는지, 아니면 판단 과정의 법령 위반이라는 주장에 가까운지 확정할 수 없다. 원심 사실인정, 상고이유서, 법령 위반의 영향, 특별법상 사건 분류라는 기록은 정해져 있으나 그 기록의 내용은 합성 장면에 설정되어 있지 않다. 따라서 이 장면만으로 남는 답은 미확정이다. 만약 소액사건으로 분류되는 것으로 확인되면 일반 상고사유 대신 특별법의 허용 사유로 결론이 달라지지만, 이는 이 절이 현재 확인한 사실을 늘려 주지는 않는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 원심이 적법하게 확정한 사실에 상고법원이 그대로 기속된다고 보고, 사실인정 불만과 적법성 문제를 나누어 심리할 법령 위반이 제출되어 있는지를 살피는 한정된 판단이다. 이 절이 허용하지 않는 것은 어떤 사실 관련 주장도 법령 위반 문제로 다루지 못하게 일괄 차단하거나, 그 반대로 모든 주장이 법령 위반으로 이미 성립한 것으로 보는 판단이다. 제423조가 “상고는 판결에 영향을 미친 헌법·법률·명령 또는 규칙의 위반이 있다는 것을 이유로 드는 때에만 할 수 있다”고 정한 것은 이 구별의 마지막 경계를 표시할 뿐이고, 그 위반이 판결에 미친 영향까지 이 절의 범위 밖에서 새로 정하지는 않는다.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
이 장면에서 물어야 할 것은 어떤 사실이 상고법원을 기속하는가이다. 증인에 대한 불신을 느낀 당사자가 이를 항변으로 삼아도, 상고법원이 그 판단을 다시 심리하는지의 문제는 별도로 남는다. 불만의 대상과 심리의 대상이 같지 않을 때 그 구별이 앞의 한계와 어떻게 맞물리는지 밝혀야 한다.
민사소송법 제432조는 “원심판결이 적법하게 확정한 사실은 상고법원을 기속한다”라고 선언한다. 이 문언은 두 부분으로 읽힌다. ‘원심판결이 확정한 사실’은 무엇을 대상으로 삼는지를, ‘적법하게’라는 수식어는 그 확정이 어떤 조건 아래 있어야 하는지를 정한다. 기속의 주체는 상고법원이고 기속을 받는 것은 재심리 대신 그대로 둘 사실이다. 확정의 주체는 원심이고, 확정의 방식이 앞의 수식어에 걸리는 만큼 사실의 내용과 확정 절차는 함께 보아야 한다.
민사소송법 제423조는 “상고는 판결에 영향을 미친 헌법·법률·명령 또는 규칙의 위반이 있다는 것을 이유로 드는 때에만 할 수 있다”라고 정한다. 두 조문을 맞대면 사실인정 불만과 적법성 문제를 나누어야 할 이유가 드러난다. 사실인정이 틀렸다는 주장은 원심이 확정한 사실의 내용을 겨냥하고, 적법성 문제는 그 사실을 확정하는 과정이 법이 정한 판단 과정을 거쳤는지를 겨냥한다. 이 구별에 따라 상고법원을 기속하는 사실이 무엇인지 정해지고, 심리할 법령 위반 사유가 별도로 특정되어야 한다.
원고의 입장에서는 원심이 믿지 않은 증언의 신빙성을 재검토해 달라는 요구가 실질적 도움일 텐데, 그 요구를 법령 위반 주장으로 포장하는 경로가 이 표현에 숨어 있다. 법률심 제한은 실제 오류를 남긴다는 손실도 함께 떠안는다. 사실인정의 내용을 다시 평가해 달라는 요구는 남기고, 사실인정 과정에 법령 위반이 있었다는 주장을 심리할 사유로 다루는 대답이 이 범위에서 유지된다. 반론이 지적한 우회와 오류 잔존이라는 불리한 부분은 그대로 남는다.
이 장면에서 구체적으로 놓인 것은 원심이 증인을 믿지 않았다는 사실과, 원고가 그 점을 억울하다고 느끼며 어떤 법규 위반인지 아직 구별하지 않았다는 상태뿐이다. 이 상태로는 다툼이 사실인정의 내용을 겨냥하는지 사실인정 과정의 법령 위반을 겨냥하는지 가르기 어렵다. 만약 사건이 소액사건으로 분류되는 것으로 확인되면 일반 상고사유 대신 특별법의 허용 사유를 대조한다. 어떤 법령 위반이 판결에 영향을 미쳤는지, 원고가 상고이유서에 이를 특정해 제출했는지는 자료로 정해져 있지 않다. 따라서 이 장면만으로는 상고심의 법령 위반 심리가 열리는지 닫히는지 확정할 수 없고, 구별이 되지 않은 상태는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 원심판결이 적법하게 확정한 사실이 상고법원을 그대로 기속하며, 사실인정의 내용을 다시 평가해 달라는 요구만으로는 심리할 법령 위반 사유가 없다는 한정이다. 허용되지 않는 쪽은 사실 관련 주장이라는 이름만으로 법령 위반 문제를 처음부터 지워 버리거나, 그 반대급부로 모든 사실 다툼을 법률심에서 다시 심리하는 확장이다. 반대로, 모든 사실 관련 주장을 심리 불가능하다고 일괄 처리하는 접근도 이 범위에서 받아들여지지 않는다. 이 선이 어디까지 이어지는지는 다음 물음의 몫으로 남긴다.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
In the preceding analytical step, which facts bind the court of final appeal was discussed; in this step, the question posed is how the wording of the source text applies to the review of violations of statutes and regulations in the final appeal stage. What the court addresses in this scene is not the rightness or wrongness of the witness assessment itself, but on what grounds a final appeal may be taken and what may be made the subject of review.
The first wording that responds to this question is found in Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act. That provision declares: "A final appeal may be taken only on the ground that there has been a violation of the Constitution, an Act, an order, or a rule that affected the judgment" (Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act). This wording designates the starting conditions of the review in three parts. That is, the subject is the party taking the final appeal, the act is to rely upon a violation of statutes and regulations that affected the judgment, and the condition is that the violation belongs to the category of the Constitution, an Act, an order, or a rule.
The specification of the violation of statutes and regulations required by Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act and the fact-binding force set forth in Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act, that "facts lawfully determined by the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal" (Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act), are not determinations at the same stage. The former divides up the grounds on which the final appeal stage receives the final appeal and opens the review; the latter divides up the range of facts that, once the review has opened, the court of final appeal cannot renew. If this distinction is not maintained, the requirements of lawful fact determination—that is, the requirements for a finding of fact that has passed through the judgment process prescribed by law—come to be read as overlapping with the requirements of grounds for final appeal. Accordingly, the work of first distinguishing whether the plaintiff's assertion is a dissatisfaction with the fact determination or an allegation of a violation of statutes and regulations in the course of that determination is necessary.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that the expression "lawfulness" can itself become a channel for concealing disputes of fact. When a finding of fact is wrong, the loss follows that the substantive error remains uncorrected because of the limits of review on issues of law, and the inconvenience arises that a party dresses the same assertion in the clothing of a violation of statutes and regulations and repeats it. Even without erasing these disadvantages, the confirmed conclusion is maintained. This is because not all fact-related assertions can be dealt with wholesale as unreviewable. If the assertion contests the effect upon the judgment of a violation of statutes and regulations specified as grounds for final appeal, it cannot be excluded at the threshold merely on the ground that it also touches upon a question of fact.
In the above synthetic scene, it is established only that what the plaintiff pointed to was the court below's assessment of the witness, while which rule of law was violated, and how, has not yet been specified. In this state, it cannot be asserted categorically that the requirements of the grounds for final appeal demanded by Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act are satisfied; conversely, it cannot be said that the matter is excluded from the subject of review merely on the ground that it is a dissatisfaction with the facts. Because the scene contains no year, amount, or outcome of the judgment, neither which classification of the case is correct nor whether the final appeal will be sustained can be determined from this material alone.
What this section permits is to take as the basis for determining the review of violations of statutes and regulations in the final appeal stage only the wording of the source text, that is, the wording placed in Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act and Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act; it does not permit widening the reasoning by means of separate explanations advanced as reasons for the judgment or items not covered by these two provisions. Even where the same fact is asserted, the distinction is drawn not by the outcome of the witness assessment but by whether a violation of statutes and regulations was specified in the process of that assessment. Undetermined items remaining after this distinction is drawn are left as blanks.
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
On the premise that the limits of the grounds for final appeal and of the objection (challenge to ruling) determine the scope of the review at hand, what this step addresses is the part to be separately determined anew within those limits. In this scene, what is the part to be separately determined anew within the review of violations of statutes and regulations in the final appeal stage?
Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act declares: "Facts lawfully determined by the judgment of the court below bind the court of final appeal." The subject of this wording is the court of final appeal, and the object of the binding is the facts determined by the judgment of the court below. However, the facts as to which the binding arises are limited to those determined 'lawfully.' Lawful fact determination means a finding of fact that has passed through the judgment process prescribed by law, and this definition becomes the condition defining the scope of the object of the binding. Meanwhile, Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that a final appeal may be taken "only on the ground that there has been a violation of the Constitution, an Act, an order, or a rule that affected the judgment," thereby limiting the grounds for review to violations of statutes and regulations.
Placing the two wordings side by side, the lawfulness of the fact determination and the result of the finding of fact itself are separate objects of determination. While one is bound by the content of the determined fact—such as which witness the court below believed, whether that determination passed through the judgment process prescribed by law can be examined separately. The reason this distinction is necessary is that the requirement of grounds for final appeal that there be a violation of statutes and regulations affecting the judgment cannot be closed by the former alone. Accordingly, the detailed subdivisions within the step are confined to the stated conditions of the case where it operates, the case where it is blocked, and the undetermined case. The three are: where a ground of violation of statutes and regulations to be reviewed is specified and properly submitted; where only a re-evaluation of a lawfully determined fact is demanded; and where it is unclear whether the matter is a dispute of fact or an assertion of a violation of statutes and regulations in the process of finding fact.
The strongest counterargument lies in the point that the expression "lawfulness" becomes a channel for bypassing disputes of fact. If the evidence assessment of the court below is in substance reviewed afresh under the form of a violation of statutes and regulations affecting the judgment, the result is that the final appeal stage, which is a review on issues of law, disturbs the plenary authority of the trial of fact. In truth, when a finding of fact is wrong, the loss that the substantive error remains because of the limits of review on issues of law is also great. Nevertheless, not all fact-related assertions can be dealt with wholesale as unreviewable. This is because the question whether, in the process of finding fact, the judgment process prescribed by law itself was observed remains an object of examination for violations of statutes and regulations. The risk of bypass pointed out by the counterargument does not disappear, but it is not a matter to be answered by wholesale exclusion.
The fact ascertained in the synthetic scene is that plaintiff A resents the court below's disbelief of the witness yet has not yet distinguished which rule of law was violated. Contrasting this circumstance with the conditions of the case where it operates, it is difficult to regard a violation of statutes and regulations affecting the judgment, or a ground for final appeal under the relevant special Act, as having been specified and properly submitted. Contrasting it with the conditions of the case where it is blocked, it is still too early to assert categorically that there is only a demand for a fresh evaluation of a lawfully determined fact and no ground of violation of statutes and regulations to be reviewed. Above all, because which violation of which rule of law is at issue has not been distinguished, this scene lies in the undetermined case—that is, the case where it is unclear whether the matter is a dispute of fact or an assertion of a violation of statutes and regulations in the process of finding fact. If it is confirmed to be classified as a small claims case, the conclusion changes to the permitted grounds under the special Act instead of the general grounds for final appeal.
The conclusion this section permits is that the issue of violations of statutes and regulations must not be erased merely under the name of an assertion concerning fact, but that the issue is separately determined anew only within the three stated conditions. A fact satisfying the requirements of lawful fact determination is binding; where only a demand for re-evaluation remains, there is no ground for review; and where the distinction cannot be drawn, the matter is left undetermined. The marking "undetermined" is not a declaration of unrelievability but means that the classification is not yet complete. Conversely, a conclusion that deals wholesale with all fact-related assertions as unreviewable is not permitted by this section.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
From the preceding analytical step, only one sentence is carried over: that the limits of the grounds for final appeal and of the objection (challenge to ruling) determine the scope of the review at hand. In this scene, dissatisfaction with the results of the court below's findings of fact does not immediately point to an assertion of a violation of statutes and regulations. The question here is which facts bind the court of final appeal. The conditions under which the review opens and closes must first be fixed.
The subject of this wording is the court of final appeal; the object is the facts lawfully determined by the judgment of the court below; and the effect is that they bind the court of final appeal. Accordingly, the starting point of the review is to distinguish which of the facts determined by the court below may be regarded as lawful. Only the facts bearing the word "lawfulness" become the object of the binding discussed here.
Next, Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act limits a final appeal to being taken "only on the ground that there has been a violation of the Constitution, an Act, an order, or a rule that affected the judgment." Placing these two wordings side by side, the stage of determination divides in two. The first is which facts are the object of the binding; the second is whether the violation asserted with respect to those facts was specified and submitted as a violation of statutes and regulations affecting the judgment. Lawful fact determination means a finding of fact that has passed through the judgment process prescribed by law, and this definition is placed at the first stage of distinguishing the object of the binding. What opens is the case that has passed both stages; what closes is the case in which, at the second stage, no ground for review remains.
The strongest counterargument is the point that disputes of fact can be bypassed by the expression "lawfulness." That is, when a finding of fact is wrong, a loss arises in that the substantive error remains owing to the limits of review on issues of law, and the criticism is that the party is left with only the form while the substance is lost. The author answers that, without erasing this disadvantage, not all fact-related assertions can be dealt with wholesale as unreviewable. This is because within an assertion that appears to be a question of fact there may lie a violation of statutes and regulations in the process of finding fact.
In the synthetic scene, plaintiff A considers only the court below's decision not to believe the witness to be unjust. If this dissatisfaction amounts only to a demand for a fresh evaluation of a lawfully determined fact, it becomes a matter of overturning facts that, under Article 432 of the Civil Procedure Act, bind the court of final appeal, and no review can be opened. Conversely, if that dissatisfaction is organized as an assertion that the judgment process prescribed by law was not observed in the process of finding fact, room arises for regarding it as a violation of statutes and regulations affecting the judgment. However, because which violation of which rule of law is at issue has not yet been distinguished in the scene, at present it is unclear whether the matter is a dispute of fact or an assertion of a violation of statutes and regulations in the process of finding fact.
The conclusion of this section is that the review opens where a violation of statutes and regulations affecting the judgment, or a ground for final appeal under the relevant special Act, has been specified and properly submitted, and that it is blocked where only a demand for a fresh evaluation of a lawfully determined fact remains and there is no ground of violation of statutes and regulations to be reviewed. A conclusion that deals with all fact-related assertions as unreviewable beyond this distinction is not permitted here. Leaving, as in this scene, cases where disputes of fact and assertions of violations of statutes and regulations remain unseparated as undetermined is also part of this distinction, and the matter must not be fixed by filling in unconfirmed grounds with conjecture.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The preceding section concluded that the limits of the grounds for final appeal and of the objection (challenge to ruling) determine the scope of the review at hand. This step addresses which questions of fact can rise as far as the court of final appeal within those limits. The question the court of final appeal faces in this scene is whether the complaint is that the court below's assessment of the witness was wrong, or whether the assertion is that the process of that assessment did not pass through the procedure prescribed by law. This distinction causes questions of fact and questions of violations of statutes and regulations to be seen at different stages.
This wording limits the object bound to facts lawfully determined. The court of final appeal does not re-determine those facts but accepts them as they are. If they were not lawfully determined, those facts are not the object of the binding spoken of in this provision. At the same time, a final appeal "may be taken only on the ground that there has been a violation of the Constitution, an Act, an order, or a rule that affected the judgment" (Article 423 of the Civil Procedure Act). Accordingly, for a question of fact to reach the court of final appeal, it must cross, in one way or another, the threshold prescribed by the statutory text.
The reason Article 432 provides for the binding of determined facts and Article 423 limits the grounds for final appeal to violations of statutes and regulations is that the two do different work. This definition focuses not on the product of the finding of fact but on the manner of reaching that product. If the assessment of whether to believe a witness passed through the process prescribed by law, its result binds the court of final appeal. If in that process a violation of statutes and regulations affected the judgment, that violation becomes a ground of appeal under Article 423. A dissatisfaction with a finding of fact demands a fresh evaluation, whereas a question of lawfulness contests the process already undergone against the standards of law; if the two are mixed, it cannot be known which threshold was crossed.
The counterargument that "disputes of fact can be bypassed by the expression 'lawfulness'" targets this distinction. If the court below's disbelief of a witness is merely named a violation of a rule of law, a dissatisfaction with the evaluation of fact is transformed into an assertion of a violation of statutes and regulations. In that case, the threshold of Article 423 is easily passed, and there is a risk that the court of final appeal will, bypassing the plenary authority of the trial of fact, look at the facts afresh. This loss is not light, in that it shakes the character of the final appeal stage as a review on issues of law. Cases in which a violation of statutes and regulations actually arises in the process of finding fact remain, and such cases can still become grounds for review.
The facts ascertained in this scene are that the court below did not believe the witness, that the plaintiff regards this as unjust, and that which rule of law was violated has not yet been distinguished. Against the threshold of Article 432, the binding of determined facts turns on whether the judgment process prescribed by law was passed through. Against the threshold of Article 423, a ground for review must specify a violation of statutes and regulations that affected the judgment. Which of the two standards applies has not yet been decided. Where a violation of statutes and regulations affecting the judgment, or a ground for final appeal under the relevant special Act, is specified and properly submitted, the review opens; where only a demand for a fresh evaluation of a lawfully determined fact remains, it does not open. Which of the two the records show cannot be determined from this scene alone.
The conclusions this section permits are limited to not erasing the issue of violations of statutes and regulations merely under the name of a fact-related assertion, and to viewing separately the lawfully determined facts and the lawfulness of the process of their determination. No conclusion is reached here that the witness assessment was wrong, or that any specific rule of law was violated. Nor were the records or the win and loss of an actual case confirmed in this section. Conversely, this section does not permit bundling all fact-related assertions as unreviewable. Can the same grounds for final appeal be used in every case?