Summary
Grounds relating to the crime in question are subject to an additional threshold: a final and conclusive conviction or the like, or a statutory reason why such a final determination cannot be obtained.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
중대한 비난일수록 그 비난이 절차를 다시 여는 근거가 되는 조건도 분명해야 한다. 위조나 거짓 진술을 주장하면 바로 재심사유가 되는가, 하는 물음이 여기에 해당한다. 상소에서 주장했거나 알고도 주장하지 않은 사유에 관한 제한을 함께 적용하는 데서 이 절의 논의는 이어진다. 원고 A는 확정판결 뒤 새 문서를 얻었으나 그 문서가 어떤 민사재심사유에 해당하는지는 아직 설명하지 못한다. 이 장면에서 정해진 것은 문서의 취득 시점과 원고의 설명 부족뿐이며, 문서의 성격이나 작성 경위는 아직 열려 있다. 그러므로 비난의 무게만으로 절차의 문이 열리는지부터 가려야 한다. 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준은 무엇인지가 지금의 물음이다.
민사소송법 제451조 제2항은 이렇게 정한다. “제1항제4호 내지 제7호의 경우에는 처벌받을 행위에 대하여 유죄의 판결이나 과태료부과의 재판이 확정된 때 또는 증거부족 외의 이유로 유죄의 확정판결이나 과태료부과의 확정재판을 할 수 없을 때에만 재심의 소를 제기할 수 있다.” 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 재심의 소를 제기하려는 당사자이고, 행위는 처벌받을 행위이며, 조건은 유죄의 확정판결이나 과태료부과의 확정재판이 확정된 경우 또는 증거부족 외의 이유로 그 확정재판을 할 수 없는 경우이다. 조문은 여기에 “에만”을 두어 그 밖의 시점으로 재심의 소가 열리지 않음을 분명히 한다.
이 문언과 앞서 정한 결론은 서로 어긋나지 않는다. 해당 범죄 관련 사유에는 유죄 등 확정 또는 법이 정한 확정 불가능 사유의 추가 문턱이 있고, 이 문턱을 선행 확정 요건이라 부른다. 선행 확정 요건이란 특정 재심사유에 추가된 형사 판단 등의 조건을 뜻한다. 이 요건을 법정 재심사유와 구별해야 하는 까닭은, 전자는 어떤 사유를 원용할 수 있는지의 문제이고 후자는 그 사유가 실제로 충족되었는지의 문제이기 때문이다. 두 단계를 나누지 않으면 재심사유의 존재 여부와 그 사유를 뒷받침하는 선행 판단의 확정 여부가 한 덩어리로 뒤섞인다.
이 구별이 불러일으키는 손실은 형사절차가 끝나기 전에 피해가 고착될 수 있다는 점이다. 민사 확정판결의 효력은 그대로 남고, 형사 판단을 기다리는 동안 당사자가 입은 불이익은 줄어들지 않는다. 지연이 길어질수록 증거의 상태나 당사자의 사정도 달라져, 나중에 사유가 인정되더라도 원상회복이 어려워질 수 있다. 그 불리한 부분을 감추지 않으면서도 범죄 의혹 제기만으로 추가 요건을 충족했다고 쓸 수는 없다. 형사 절차의 결과를 기다리는 비용은 크지만, 그 비용을 이유로 문언이 요구한 확정을 건너뛸 수는 없는 것이다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 관련된 사실은 세 가지뿐이다. 원고가 확정판결 뒤 새 문서를 얻었다는 점, 그 문서가 어떤 민사재심사유에 해당하는지 설명하지 못한다는 점, 그리고 장면에 연도·금액·기산일이 정해져 있지 않다는 점이다. 이 사실들을 선행 확정 요건에 견주어 보면, 문서의 성격이 미정인 이상 어떤 재심사유를 원용할 수 있는지부터 정해지지 않았다. 사유의 특정이 선행하지 않으면 유죄 확정 등 선행 판단의 확정 여부를 물을 대상도 없다. 따라서 장면만으로는 이 구제의 입구가 열렸다고도 닫혔다고도 단정할 수 없고, 자료가 부족한 상태는 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 한 가지는 분명하다. 재심사유가 있어도 원판결 결과가 정당하다고 인정되면 재심 인용이 아닌 청구 기각으로 바뀐다는 조건은, 이 문턱을 통과한 뒤의 별개 판단이다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 법정 재심사유·선행 확정 요건·기간 또는 그 예외를 충족하고 원판결 결과의 정당성까지 다시 심리할 수 있는 경우 이 구제의 입구가 열린다. 반대로 위조나 거짓 진술이라는 주장만으로 문이 열리지 않으며, 어떤 사유인지 특정하지 못한 새 문서의 취득만으로도 마찬가지다. 여기에 재심사유가 인정된 뒤 원판결이 반드시 뒤집히는지, 또는 기간을 어떻게 계산하는지를 함께 결론 내리지는 않는다.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
위조나 거짓 진술을 주장하면 바로 재심사유가 되는가? 그 결론은 상소에서 주장했거나 알고도 주장하지 않은 사유에 관한 제한을 함께 적용한다는 점을 확인한 것이었다. 이제 그 위에 놓인 별도의 문턱을 살펴야 한다. 확정판결 뒤에 얻은 새 문서로 범죄를 지적해도, 곧바로 열리는 통로가 있는지는 따로 가려야 한다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 민사소송법 제451조 제2항이다. 그 문언은 "제1항제4호 내지 제7호의 경우에는 처벌받을 행위에 대하여 유죄의 판결이나 과태료부과의 재판이 확정된 때 또는 증거부족 외의 이유로 유죄의 확정판결이나 과태료부과의 확정재판을 할 수 없을 때에만 재심의 소를 제기할 수 있다"고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 재심의 소를 제기하려는 자이고, 행위는 처벌받을 행위이며, 조건은 유죄의 확정판결 등이 있거나 법이 정한 확정 불가능 사유가 확인된 때이다. 이 항은 해당 범죄 관련 사유에 관한 것이며, 조문의 다른 항에 속한 다른 쟁점은 다루지 않는다.
이 문언이 가리키는 것은 소를 낼 수 있는 시점의 조건이다. 곧, 처벌받을 행위에 대한 확정된 판단이 있거나 확정판결을 할 수 없음이 확인되어야만 그 사유를 내세워 재심의 소를 제기할 수 있다. 여기서 선행 확정 요건은 특정 재심사유에 추가된 형사 판단 등의 조건을 뜻한다. 이 요건과 앞서 확인한 상소 미주장 제한·기간 제한은 서로 다른 문턱이다. 하나는 사유의 존부와 성격에 부가된 조건이고, 다른 하나는 사유가 있어도 제기할 수 있는지를 가르는 제한이므로, 어느 한쪽만 충족되었다고 해서 다른 쪽도 충족되었다고 쓸 수 없다. 법정 사유가 없거나 상소 미주장 제한, 기간 제한에 걸리고 해당 예외도 없으며 단순한 새 불만만 남은 경우 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 재심의 구제 통로는 닫힌다.
형사절차가 끝나기 전에 피해가 고착될 수 있다. 형사 확정을 기다리는 동안 민사 확정판결에 따른 불이익이 그대로 남고, 그 기다림 자체가 권리구제의 지연이 될 수 있다는 점에서 이 반론은 실질적인 손실을 겨냥한다. 그렇다고 형사 절차가 끝나기 전에 범죄 의혹을 제기한 것으로 이 추가 문턱을 넘었다고 기록할 수는 없다. 오히려 문언은 유죄의 확정판결 또는 법이 정한 확정 불가능 사유를 요구하므로, 의혹의 제기만으로는 충분하지 않다. 지연이라는 불편이 남는다고 해서 그 문턱을 낮추는 것은 결론을 바꾸지 못하며, 확인되지 않은 범죄 관련 사유는 그대로 미확정으로 남는다.
이를 앞의 조건과 대조하면, 새 문서가 특정 재심사유에 해당하는지부터 정해지지 않았다. 그렇다면 그 문서에 범죄 관련 사유가 담겨 있는지, 담겨 있다면 처벌받을 행위에 대한 유죄의 확정판결이나 과태료부과의 확정재판이 있는지, 또는 증거부족 외의 이유로 확정재판을 할 수 없는지 확인할 자료도 함께 제시되지 않았다. 기록으로 확인해야 할 선행 자료는 확정판결·사유 발생과 인지·상소 경과·형사 확정 등이다. 따라서 장면만으로는 선행 확정 요건의 충족 여부를 판정할 수 없고, 이는 자료 부족에 따른 미확정이지 곧바로 구제 불능을 뜻하지는 않는다.
따라서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 범죄 의혹 제기만으로는 추가 요건을 충족했다고 볼 수 없다.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
위조나 거짓 진술에 관한 비난은 판결의 근거를 흔들 만큼 무겁다. 이 장면에서 먼저 물어야 할 것은 위조나 거짓 진술을 주장하면 바로 재심사유가 되는가이다. 법정 사유가 없거나 상소 미주장 제한·기간 제한에 걸리고 해당 예외도 없으며 단순한 새 불만만 남은 경우에는 이 구제가 막힌다. 그 막힌 경우와 자료가 없어 판정하지 못하는 경우는 서로 다르다. 이번에는 판정을 미확정으로 남겨야 하는 경계를 구별한다.
그 경계를 정하는 문언이 민사소송법 제451조에 있다. 여기서 말하는 주체는 재심의 소를 제기하려는 자이고, 행위는 처벌받을 행위를 근거로 한 재심 청구이며, 시점은 그 소를 제기할 수 있는 때이다. 조문은 제1항제4호 내지 제7호로 한정된 사유에 대해 문언상의 문턱을 더한다.
이 문언이 요구하는 선행 확정 요건은 특정 재심사유에 추가된 형사 판단 등의 조건을 뜻한다. 그 조건은 재심사유 자체가 아니라 그 사유를 들어 소를 제기할 수 있는지에 관한 것이다. 따라서 사유가 있는지 없는지와 그 사유로 소를 낼 수 있는 때에 이르렀는지는 서로 다른 판정이다. 앞 단계에서 범죄 관련 사유로 볼 여지가 생겨도, 뒤 단계의 선행 확정 요건을 확인하지 못하면 이 문턱을 넘었다고 쓸 수 없다. 반대로 선행 확정 요건을 확인하지 못했다는 것은 문턱이 없다는 뜻이 아니다. 확인 자료가 아직 없을 뿐이다.
형사절차가 끝나기 전에 피해가 고착될 수 있다는 반론이 이 구별을 겨냥한다. 확정판결의 집행이 이어지는 동안 형사 절차가 길어지면, 자산이나 권리가 굳어진 뒤에는 늦었다는 걱정이다. 그 걱정은 실제로 무겁고, 기다리는 동안의 불편을 지우지 않는다. 그래도 범죄 의혹 제기만으로 추가 요건을 충족했다고 쓸 수는 없다. 의혹은 의혹일 뿐, 문언이 정한 확정 또는 확정 불가능의 조건을 대체하지 않는다. 다만 조건을 확인하지 못했다는 사실만으로 청구를 받아들일 수 없다고 단정하는 것도 별개의 과제로 남는다.
이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 사유 발생과 인지, 확정판결의 존재이며, 형사 확정 등 선행 자료는 아직 대조되지 않았다. 확정판결·사유 발생과 인지·상소 경과·형사 확정 등 선행 자료가 갖춰졌는지를 보아야 그 문턱의 충족 여부를 말할 수 있다. 지금은 사유를 안 때나 범죄 관련 선행 확정 조건을 확인할 수 없는 경우에 해당하므로, 판정을 미확정으로 둔다. 확정판결이 이미 내려졌다는 사실만으로 구제가 막혔다고도 할 수 없다.
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 조건부 구별뿐이다. 범죄 관련 사유에 유죄 등 확정 또는 법이 정한 확정 불가능 사유의 추가 문턱이 있다는 점은 분명하다. 그렇다고 자료를 더 보지 않고도 사유가 없다거나 청구가 막혔다고 쓸 수는 없으며, 자료가 없어 판정할 수 없다는 점을 확인했다는 사실도 구제의 성공을 뜻하지는 않는다. 다음에는 그 미확정을 풀어낼 자료의 종류를 정한다.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
위조나 거짓 진술을 주장하면 바로 재심사유가 되는가, 그리고 판정에 어떤 기록이 필요한지가 지금 놓인 물음이다. 이전 분석 단계는 상소에서 주장했거나 알고도 주장하지 않은 사유에 관한 제한을 함께 적용한다는 전제를 넘기며, 그 제한의 내용을 다시 논증하지는 않는다. 이 물음은 여기서 한 걸음 더 나아가, 어떤 자료가 기록되어야 비로소 단계 판정이 가능한지를 묻는다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민사소송법 제451조 제2항이다. 그 조문은 "②제1항제4호 내지 제7호의 경우에는 처벌받을 행위에 대하여 유죄의 판결이나 과태료부과의 재판이 확정된 때 또는 증거부족 외의 이유로 유죄의 확정판결이나 과태료부과의 확정재판을 할 수 없을 때에만 재심의 소를 제기할 수 있다."고 규정한다(민사소송법 제451조). 여기서 말하는 주체는 재심의 소를 제기하려는 자이고, 행위는 처벌받을 행위이며, 조건은 유죄의 판결이나 과태료부과의 재판이 확정된 때이거나 증거부족 외의 이유로 확정재판을 할 수 없을 때이다. 이 문언은 제1항 제4호 내지 제7호의 사유에 한정하여 추가 문턱을 설정한다.
이 근거와 결론을 연결하면, 위조나 거짓 진술을 주장하는 것만으로 재심사유가 곧바로 성립한다고 쓸 수 없음이 분명해진다. 해당 범죄 관련 사유에는 유죄 등 확정 또는 법이 정한 확정 불가능 사유의 추가 문턱이 있다. 이 문턱은 앞서 확인한 상소 제한과는 별개의 판단 단계이다. 상소 제한이 어떤 사유를 소송 안에서 아낄 수 있었는지를 다루는 데 반해, 선행 확정 요건은 그 사유가 범죄 관련인 경우에 추가로 요구되는 형사 판단 등의 조건이 충족되었는지를 다룬다. 단계 판정은 정해진 기록으로만 하며, 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다.
형사절차가 끝나기 전에 피해가 고착될 수 있다는 점은 반론이 겨냥하는 손실이다. 유죄 판결이 확정되기를 기다리는 동안 그 판결을 기초로 한 권리를 회복할 시기를 놓치거나, 원판결의 효력이 굳어지는 불편이 생길 수 있다. 열거된 사유 밖의 중대한 오판에는 구제 공백이 남는다는 다른 반론이 같은 결을 이룬다. 그러나 앞의 문언은 제4호 내지 제7호의 경우에만 추가 문턱을 요구하므로, 반론이 지적하는 불리한 부분을 지우지 않으면서도 그 문턱을 우회할 수는 없다. 확정 판결이 없다면 그 사실은 기록에 없을 뿐이다.
합성 장면에서 원고 A가 얻은 새 문서는 확정판결 이후에 발생했으나, 사유 발생과 인지의 시점이나 상소 경과가 어떻게 되는지, 형사 절차의 확정이 있었는지는 기록되어 있지 않다. 선행 확정 요건으로 지정된 확정판결·사유 발생과 인지·상소 경과·형사 확정 등 선행 자료 가운데 어떤 항목이 확보되었는지조차 확인되지 않는다. 따라서 이 장면만으로는 해당 범죄 관련 사유의 추가 문턱이 충족되었는지 판정할 수 없다. 사유를 안 때나 범죄 관련 선행 확정 조건을 확인할 수 없는 경우는 미확정으로 남는다. 확정이 없다는 판단과 기록이 없다는 판단은 같은 것이 아니다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 범죄 관련 재심사유를 주장하는 자가 선행 확정 요건에 해당하는 형사 확정 자료를 기록으로 제시하지 못하면, 단계 판정은 그 요건을 충족하지 못한 것으로 끝나며, 추가 요건을 추정으로 채우는 판단은 허용되지 않는다. 허용되지 않는 결론도 분명하다. 형사 확정만으로 재심이 인용된다고 단정하거나, 반대로 의혹이 제기된 사실만으로 문턱이 넘어섰다고 보는 것은 모두 벗어난다. 재심사유가 있어도 원판결 결과가 정당하다고 인정되면 재심 인용이 아닌 청구 기각으로 바꾼다.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Even where a person seeking to reopen the proceedings on the basis of a new document obtained after a final and conclusive judgment asserts forgery or false statements, it is at issue whether the assertion alone establishes grounds for retrial. It further asks together whether, once a specified change has been confirmed, the stage determination previously rendered may be left as it is. For the weightier the censure seeking to reopen the proceedings, the more clearly it must be settled under what conditions alone that censure opens the door of the stage.
The statutory wording corresponding to this question is Article 451, paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. That wording provides: "(2) In cases under subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1), an action for retrial may be filed only when a guilty judgment or a ruling imposing a fine on the punishable act has become final and conclusive, or when a final and conclusive guilty judgment or a final and conclusive ruling imposing a fine cannot be rendered for reasons other than lack of evidence." As to the grounds under paragraph (1), subparagraphs 4 through 7, this paragraph makes filing an action for retrial conditional on the requirement that a guilty judgment or a ruling imposing a fine on the punishable act has become final and conclusive, and the requirement that the time has arrived when such final and conclusive ruling cannot be rendered for reasons other than lack of evidence. The author calls this condition the antecedent finality requirement, that is, the condition such as a criminal determination added to specific grounds for retrial.
The reason for dividing grounds equipped with the antecedent finality requirement from those not so equipped is that the determination of whether grounds for retrial are established and the outcome determination that follows that determination are different questions. The fact that this former requirement is fulfilled means that the door to filing an action for retrial has been opened; it does not mean that one has passed through that door and reached the outcome of a grant of retrial. Conversely, if the fulfillment of a specified change—that is, of a requirement that overturns the existing blocking and effectiveness determinations—is confirmed, the blocking and effectiveness determinations of the previous stage are discarded and the stage is determined anew from the beginning.
The counterargument that harm may become fixed before the criminal proceedings are concluded targets the point that, while awaiting criminal finality, the rights relations based on the final and conclusive judgment or the state of enforcement harden, leaving losses that are difficult to restore and temporal inconvenience. This disadvantage is real and is not erased. Until a guilty judgment becomes final and conclusive or a reason prescribed by law for the impossibility of finality is confirmed, it cannot be said that the antecedent finality requirement is fulfilled, and the raising of a suspicion does not turn into the fact of fulfillment of that requirement.
In this case, whether the newly obtained document pertains to the grounds under paragraph (1), subparagraphs 4 through 7, and further what antecedent conditions such as criminal finality are required for those grounds, are not confirmed in the record. Accordingly, on this scene alone the fulfillment of the antecedent finality requirement cannot be fixed, and what remain necessary are antecedent materials such as the final and conclusive judgment, the occurrence and awareness of the ground, the lapse of appeal, and criminal finality. That said, undergoing such confirmation does not mean that a grant of retrial immediately follows. The lack of verification of materials is merely a state of undeterminedness and does not lead to a judgment of no remedy.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where grounds for retrial relating to a crime are asserted, in determining whether those grounds are established the antecedent finality requirement must be asked separately; and the confirmation of that requirement becomes the basis for discarding the existing blocking and effectiveness determinations and for re-determining the stage. What this section does not permit is to assert that grounds for retrial are immediately established on the strength of an assertion of forgery or false statements alone; to write that the additional requirement is fulfilled on the strength of suspicion prior to criminal finality alone; and to recognize, on the strength of the establishment of grounds for retrial alone, the overturning of the outcome of the original judgment as well.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Having decided to apply together the restriction that reserves for retrial grounds that could have been contested on appeal at the appellate stage or that were known and yet not asserted, harm may become fixed before the criminal proceedings are concluded. Whether it is possible to open the door of retrial, at a point in time when the criminal proceedings have not yet ended, with a single document newly obtained after a final and conclusive judgment, is the question now.
Article 451, paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act writes as follows: "In cases under subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1), an action for retrial may be filed only when a guilty judgment or a ruling imposing a fine on the punishable act has become final and conclusive, or when a final and conclusive guilty judgment or a final and conclusive ruling imposing a fine cannot be rendered for reasons other than lack of evidence." (Article 451 of the Civil Procedure Act) The subject prescribed by this wording is the party seeking to file an action for retrial; the act is the finalization of a criminal determination concerning the punishable act; and the condition is that there be a final and conclusive guilty judgment or a final and conclusive ruling imposing a fine, or that the time be reached at which such final and conclusive ruling cannot be rendered for reasons other than lack of evidence.
If this wording is joined with the appeal-related restriction decided in the preceding section to be applied together, one cannot write that the additional requirement is fulfilled merely by raising suspicion of a crime. The fact that criminal proceedings are in progress, or the fact that a suspicion has been raised, is not the same as meaning that the finality required by the wording has been reached. The state in which the criminal proceedings have not yet ended refers precisely to the point of time lying between these two states, and whether an action for retrial may be filed at that point is determined only by inquiring whether the antecedent finality requirement has been fulfilled.
The point that harm may become fixed before the criminal proceedings are concluded is no light inconvenience. While the enforcement of the final and conclusive civil judgment continues, the harm hardens, and even if a censure is confirmed late, that censure may end up remaining as actual loss. While acknowledging the loss targeted by the counterargument, writing a conclusion that skips the additional threshold prescribed by the wording lies outside the scope of determination of this section.
In this scene, the final and conclusive judgment, the occurrence and awareness of the ground, the lapse of appeal, and whether criminal finality has occurred remain as antecedent materials to be verified, and it is only after those materials are gathered that it is determined whether the finality prescribed by the wording has been reached. Since criminal finality itself cannot be confirmed in the scene, the possibility of filing an action for retrial cannot be asserted at the present point.
Accordingly, what is permitted in this section is to write that an action for retrial may be filed only after separately confirming the threshold of finality added to crime-related grounds and only in the case of crossing that threshold. What is not permitted is to assert, at a point where the criminal proceedings have not yet ended or where matters have stopped at the raising of a suspicion, that the additional requirement is already fulfilled. Do all retrials mechanically apply the same period?
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section confirmed that one cannot write that the additional requirement is fulfilled merely by raising suspicion of a crime.
"(2) In cases under subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1), an action for retrial may be filed only when a guilty judgment or a ruling imposing a fine on the punishable act has become final and conclusive, or when a final and conclusive guilty judgment or a final and conclusive ruling imposing a fine cannot be rendered for reasons other than lack of evidence." The subject this wording points to is a person seeking to file an action for retrial, and the act is filing an action for retrial. The condition is one of the following: the time when a guilty judgment or a ruling imposing a fine has become final and conclusive, or the time when a final and conclusive ruling cannot be rendered for reasons other than lack of evidence.
The link joining this wording with the conclusion of this section is the distinction of stages. Although the establishment of grounds for retrial may be possible only where there is a ground that a criminal act occurred, the time at which an action for retrial may be filed requires a separate antecedent finality requirement. Taken together, these two yield the conclusion that an action cannot be filed on suspicion of a crime alone. Conversely, after the antecedent finality requirement has been confirmed, whether that criminal determination has become final and conclusive must be separately ascertained.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that harm may become fixed before the criminal proceedings are concluded. If the effect of the civil final and conclusive judgment takes shape and a ground requiring retrial arises in the meantime, and the criminal determination comes only afterward, the victim has no choice but to keep pace with the speed of the criminal proceedings. In particular, if one must wait until a final and conclusive ruling cannot be rendered for reasons other than lack of evidence, that period may become long. Yet one cannot write that the additional requirement is fulfilled merely by raising suspicion of a crime. If an action could be filed before confirming the reason prescribed by law for the impossibility of finality, the meaning of setting the antecedent finality requirement would disappear.
Whether this document supports forgery or false statements, and whether the finalization of the criminal determination prescribed in Article 451, paragraph (2) can be confirmed, do not appear in the record. Accordingly, on the present scene alone it cannot be determined whether an action for retrial may be filed. Since the antecedent finality requirement cannot be confirmed, the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that to crime-related grounds for retrial there is attached an antecedent requirement of finality such as a guilty judgment or a reason prescribed by law for the impossibility of finality. The conclusion it does not permit is that the very fact of asserting forgery or false statements enables the filing of an action for retrial. It cannot be said that the requirements for filing an action are fulfilled merely by the circumstance of having obtained a new document.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In this scene, before inquiring what the new document proves, what must first be confirmed is whether the door of retrial opens on an assertion pointing to a crime alone.
Article 451, paragraph (2) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "In cases under subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1), an action for retrial may be filed only when a guilty judgment or a ruling imposing a fine on the punishable act has become final and conclusive, or when a final and conclusive guilty judgment or a final and conclusive ruling imposing a fine cannot be rendered for reasons other than lack of evidence." This wording sets the subject as a person seeking to file an action for retrial, the act as a criminal determination concerning the punishable act, and narrows the condition to the time of finality of guilt or a time when finality is impossible. What is dealt with here is not criminal substantive law, but what kind of preparatory material a criminal determination is required to be in a civil retrial.
This condition is called the antecedent finality requirement. The antecedent finality requirement means a condition such as a criminal determination added to specific grounds for retrial, and this is a determination at a stage different from the grounds for retrial themselves. Grounds for retrial are a framework distinguishing the assertion that some defect existed in the original judgment, while the antecedent finality requirement is a threshold requiring that, for some crime-related portion among those grounds, the criminal proceedings have already been tied off. If the two are written without being divided, the mere fact that a certain assertion is enumerated as a ground ends up being described as though criminal finality had also been secured.
Meanwhile, the rights relations under the final and conclusive judgment are maintained, and from the plaintiff's position the time at which the wrong determination is corrected is delayed. That one must await criminal finality even though the suspicion concerning the crime is already concrete is a not inconsiderable burden in practice. Even so, one cannot write that the additional requirement is fulfilled merely by raising suspicion of a crime. Since the tying-off of the criminal proceedings is the core of the antecedent finality requirement, the distinctness of the suspicion does not substitute for that requirement.
Whether this document is a basis for asserting forgery or false statements, or material concerning other grounds, is also not settled. Even if it is shown to fall under crime-related grounds, if antecedent materials such as the final and conclusive judgment, the occurrence and awareness of the ground, the lapse of appeal, and criminal finality have not been confirmed, the fulfillment of the antecedent finality requirement remains unverified. The very fact that materials are lacking does not immediately mean the nonexistence of the requirement.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. One cannot say that asserting forgery or false statements immediately makes out grounds for retrial; to the crime-related grounds in question there is added the further threshold of finality such as a guilty judgment or a reason prescribed by law for the impossibility of finality, and that threshold is called the antecedent finality requirement—such is the distinction. By contrast, the question of relief for serious errors outside the enumerated grounds, or the direction of the examination after retrial is opened, is not this section's share.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The restriction concerning grounds that were asserted on appeal or that were known and yet not asserted is applied together. Along with the question whether asserting forgery or false statements immediately makes out grounds for retrial, what remains is to clarify what conditions attach additionally to that assertion. How far the wording of the condition points is this question.
The relevant original passage is Article 451 of the Civil Procedure Act. Article 451, paragraph (2) provides: "In cases under subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1), an action for retrial may be filed only when a guilty judgment or a ruling imposing a fine on the punishable act has become final and conclusive, or when a final and conclusive guilty judgment or a final and conclusive ruling imposing a fine cannot be rendered for reasons other than lack of evidence." This wording takes as its object the grounds under paragraph (1), subparagraphs 4 through 7, and additionally requires the finalization of a guilty judgment or a ruling imposing a fine concerning the punishable act, or a reason prescribed by law for the impossibility of finality. Circumstances concerning grounds outside subparagraphs 4 through 7 or the reasons for the judgment are not the object of this wording.
This wording separately prescribes the grounds for retrial themselves and the requirements for the point of time at which those grounds may be asserted. The antecedent finality requirement, meaning a condition such as a criminal determination added to specific grounds for retrial, attaches as a threshold of entitlement to file an action, separately from the requirement determining the existence or nonexistence of the ground. Accordingly, an explanation that a matter falls under crime-related grounds alone does not mean that the two requirements are fulfilled together. That only the wording within the scope of the relevant original passage is taken as the basis for determination, without extending to the reasons for the judgment or other paragraphs, also follows from this distinction.
The counterargument that harm may become fixed before the criminal proceedings are concluded targets the loss this threshold creates. If the enforcement or performance of the final and conclusive judgment hardens first, however grave a censure a belated criminal finality confirms, a state difficult to undo in civil matters may remain. Whether to bear the delay and inconvenience the counterargument points out is a separate determination, and the wording given now requires either finality or a reason for the impossibility of finality.
Actual materials concerning the final and conclusive judgment, the occurrence and awareness of the ground, the lapse of appeal, and criminal finality have not been collected. Whether the newly obtained document falls under crime-related grounds relating to forgery or false statements, and whether the antecedent finality requirement attaches to that ground, cannot be determined on this scene either. Even if grounds for retrial exist, if the result of the original judgment is acknowledged to be just, the conclusion changes to a dismissal of the claim rather than a grant of retrial, which means that a separate determination independent of the existence or nonexistence of the ground remains.
What this section permits is the distinction that the wording of Article 451, paragraph (2) additionally requires the antecedent finality requirement for crime-related grounds, and that it is not extended beyond the scope that wording points to. What it does not permit is the reading that treats the raising of suspicion itself as fulfillment of the requirement, or that broadens the determination by other wording. What can be regarded as finality is bound to the materials and the wording, and what is presently lacking is undeterminedness.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
This restriction narrows the very scope of the grounds that can open the door to retrial, but it does not, for that reason, remove the additional conditions attached to particular grounds. What is to be probed at this scene is not the authenticity of the new document, but what the prior finalization requirement is that must be satisfied when one seeks to bring an action for retrial on a ground taking the form of a criminal crime.
This threshold is placed in Article 451 of the Civil Procedure Act. The provision states: "(2) In cases falling under subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1), an action for retrial may be brought only where a judgment of guilty or a ruling imposing an administrative fine for the act subject to punishment has become final and conclusive, or where such final and conclusive judgment or ruling cannot be rendered for reasons other than insufficient evidence" (Article 451 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject to which this language refers is the person seeking to bring an action for retrial, and the act is the bringing of an action based on a ground falling under subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1). The condition is limited to the time when a judgment of guilty or a ruling imposing an administrative fine for the act subject to punishment has become final and conclusive, or when such a final and conclusive ruling cannot be rendered for reasons other than insufficient evidence.
This basis touches the conclusion of this section. The detailed distinctions are confined to the conditions of the case where it operates, the case where it is blocked, and the case where it remains undetermined. This term does not refer to a general requirement demanded in common across all grounds for retrial, but to the additional threshold that attaches only to crime-related grounds such as those in subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1). Accordingly, the fact that one asserts forgery or false statements and the question whether the prior finalization requirement is satisfied must be treated as separate determinations. The former constitutes the assertion forming the basis of the grounds for retrial, while the latter determines the point in time and the qualification at which an action may be brought on that ground. If the two are combined and handled as a single step, the point in time separately fixed by the provision is missed.
While the enforcement of a final and conclusive civil judgment, or the rights and relations based on that judgment, become settled, the criminal determination may not yet have arrived, and in the meantime room remains for a party to suffer irreparable disadvantage. What the provision demands is not the raising of suspicion, but the finalization of a judgment of guilty or a ruling imposing an administrative fine, or the arrival of a state in which such a final and conclusive ruling cannot be rendered for reasons other than insufficient evidence. The burden of time and cost pointed out by the counterargument is not removed, but it does not serve as a basis for lowering the threshold.
What can be confirmed at this scene is only the place of the prior materials that would contain the existence of the final and conclusive judgment, the occurrence of the ground, and whether that ground became known. Whether the new document supports forgery or false statements, which of subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1) it falls under, and whether a final and conclusive ruling on the act subject to punishment has been reached all remain undetermined. Therefore, it cannot be asserted categorically which of the blocked case or the undetermined case it is placed in. One condition to be left as a check is that, even where grounds for retrial exist, if the result of the original judgment is recognized as justifiable, it is changed not to a grant of retrial but to a dismissal of the claim.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow: where crime-related grounds for retrial are asserted, the prior finalization requirement is demanded separately, and that requirement is, as the language reads, a final and conclusive judgment of guilty or the impossibility of finalization for reasons other than insufficient evidence. What is not permitted is a determination that treats that requirement as satisfied merely on the basis of suspicion of a crime or the existence of a new document; a determination asserting that the requirement can never be fulfilled at a point where no materials exist likewise lies outside the scope of this section.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
A retrial against a final and conclusive civil judgment is a special procedure in which one requests that a judgment already in effect be heard again, and the question at hand is to distinguish whether this procedure actually opens, is blocked, or remains in a state where it cannot be determined. The preceding stage confirmed that a ground does not come into existence merely because forgery or false statements are cited, while also applying the restriction concerning grounds asserted on appeal or knowingly not asserted. This conclusion means that the restriction must not be omitted when examining the conditions under which the door to retrial opens; it is not a signal to unfold the arguments already discussed anew here. What remains is the question of how, after obtaining a new document without being able to explain which ground for retrial that document falls under, one distinguishes the effectiveness, blocking, and undetermined status of the retrial.
The statutory language that answers this question sets a separate threshold for crime-related grounds for retrial. Article 451 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that, with regard to grounds falling under subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1), an action for retrial may be brought only where a judgment of guilty or a ruling imposing an administrative fine for the act subject to punishment has become final and conclusive, or where a final and conclusive judgment of guilty or a final and conclusive ruling imposing an administrative fine cannot be rendered for reasons other than insufficient evidence (Article 451 of the Civil Procedure Act). The subject to which this language refers is the party seeking to bring an action for retrial; the act is the criminal determination on the act subject to punishment, and the condition is that such determination becomes final and conclusive or reaches the state of impossibility of finalization prescribed by law. What is confirmed here is the existence of the provision's language; how it is applied in civil retrial is a separate determination.
The core linking this language to the conclusion of this section is the place of the prior finalization requirement. Accordingly, the fact that one asserted forgery or false statements and the fact that the criminal determination attendant on that assertion became final and conclusive are placed at different stages, and the former alone cannot substitute for the latter. In the same vein, the conditions for opening a retrial are set as the case where the statutory grounds for retrial, the prior finalization requirement, and the time period or its exception are satisfied and where the justifiability of the result of the original judgment can also be heard again. That is, the determination that grounds for retrial exist and the determination whether those grounds can in fact overthrow the original judgment must both stand, and one axis cannot be filled in by the mere assertion of forgery or false statements.
The loss that this counterargument targets is that, while the exercise of rights based on a final and conclusive judgment or its enforcement is under way and the criminal determination has not yet come forth, the matter may reach a state that is hard to reverse even if the truth is revealed later. Where a new document has practically significant meaning, the objection is raised that, if the procedural threshold stands high, the time for remedying the right is missed, and the criticism is also made that a remedial gap arises when a serious misjudgment remains outside the enumerated grounds. Yet the value on the opposing side—that the stability of final and conclusive judgments is shaken if retrial is opened while the finalization requirement is unmet—cannot be erased, and the law sits between them by requiring the finalization of a criminal determination and the like as a separate condition. Thus it cannot be written that the additional requirement is satisfied merely by raising suspicion of a crime, and, leaving the burden of delay and gaps pointed out by the counterargument as they are, the existence of the ground and the prior finalization requirement are examined separately.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only the fact that Plaintiff A obtained a new document after the final and conclusive judgment but has not yet explained which ground for civil retrial that document falls under. On this scene alone, one cannot determine which subparagraph of the statutory grounds for retrial the new document falls under, whether there is a criminal determination satisfying the prior finalization requirement, when that ground became known, or which side the time period or its exception falls on. If, however, one seeks to assert crime-related grounds in the absence of any explanation of the ground, the condition that the additional threshold of finalization of guilt or the like, or a statutory reason for impossibility of finalization, must be confirmed can clearly be set in contrast. Whether the justifiability of the result of the original judgment can also be heard again is likewise not determined by the facts of this scene alone, and before that determination is made, neither effectiveness nor blocking can be fixed. Accordingly, the state that remains at present is closer to undetermined, and until further materials are produced, no conclusion is fixed without them.
The conclusion permitted by this section is as follows. The door to retrial opens where the statutory grounds for retrial, the prior finalization requirement, and the time period or its exception are satisfied and where the justifiability of the result of the original judgment can also be heard again; and even then, if the result of the original judgment is recognized as justifiable, it is changed not to a grant of retrial but to a dismissal of the claim. The conclusion not permitted is a determination that retrial opens in a case where there is no statutory ground, where the restriction on grounds not asserted on appeal or the time limitation applies and no relevant exception exists, and where only a new grievance remains. And where the time of becoming aware of the ground or the crime-related prior finalization condition cannot be confirmed, it is left as undetermined rather than blocked.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
Premised on this conclusion, the question now concerns whether asserting forgery or false statements immediately constitutes grounds for retrial, and together with that, what is handed over to the next section.
The relevant language in Article 451 of the Civil Procedure Act is as follows: "(2) In cases falling under subparagraphs 4 through 7 of paragraph (1), an action for retrial may be brought only where a judgment of guilty or a ruling imposing an administrative fine for the act subject to punishment has become final and conclusive, or where a final and conclusive judgment of guilty or a final and conclusive ruling imposing an administrative fine cannot be rendered for reasons other than insufficient evidence." This language addresses the qualification to bring an action for retrial, and its subject is limited to the time when the criminal determination on the act subject to punishment becomes final and conclusive, together with the case of a statutory reason for impossibility of finalization separately prescribed by law.
The connection between this language and the conclusion of this section is the existence of an additional threshold. Whether a ground for retrial applies and whether the prior finalization requirement is satisfied must be examined separately. If the former is a matter of which ground's framework the new document enters, the latter is a matter of when the conditions required for that ground, such as a criminal determination, are met.
If rights and relations are determined under a final and conclusive civil judgment and only after its result is reflected in reality does the criminal determination come forth, the loss in the interval is hard to reverse. The raising of suspicion and the satisfaction of conditions such as a criminal determination are distinct states, and while the disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument is acknowledged, it cannot be regarded as having fulfilled in advance the threshold set by the language.
In the synthetic scene, only the fact is fixed that Plaintiff A obtained a new document after the final and conclusive judgment but has not yet explained which ground for civil retrial that document falls under. On this fact alone, the applicability of the relevant crime-related ground and the satisfaction of the prior finalization requirement cannot both be fixed. This is because, in a state where the applicability of the ground cannot be explained, it cannot be regarded as having progressed to satisfying the conditions such as a criminal determination. The kinds of prior materials—the final and conclusive judgment, the occurrence of and awareness of the ground, the course of appeal, criminal finalization, and the like—are set, but whether those materials have been filled cannot be adjudged on this scene and remains undetermined.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is that a mere assertion of forgery or false statements does not immediately give rise to grounds for retrial, and it stops at the confirmation that an additional threshold exists for the relevant crime-related ground. Writing that the additional requirement is satisfied merely by raising suspicion of a crime is not permitted.