Summary
This chapter distinguishes, as bases for execution, a final judgment that has become final and conclusive from a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
재심사유가 있어도 판결이 정당하다고 인정되면 재심청구를 기각해야 한다. 승소를 들었다는 사실만으로 재산에 손댈 권한이 생기지는 않는다. 이 결론에 이어 독자가 붙잡을 것은 채권자 A가 얻은 승소판결의 선고 사실 그 자체이다. 이 장면에서 A는 판결을 받았지만 채무자 B에게 송달되었는지, 그리고 집행문이 필요한지를 구별하지 않았다. 선고된 판결이면 모두 곧바로 집행할 수 있는가, 그리고 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준은 무엇인가.
이 물음에 답하는 문언은 민사집행법 제24조에 있다. 그 조문은 "강제집행은 확정된 종국판결이나 가집행의 선고가 있는 종국판결에 기초하여 한다"(민사집행법 제24조)고 선언한다. 이 문언이 다루는 행위는 강제집행이며, 그 기초가 되는 주체적 요건은 판결을 선고한 법원이 아니라 판결 자체의 상태이다. 문언은 종국판결을 확정 여부에 따라 두 갈래로 나누어 정리하고, 확정되지 않은 종국판결은 가집행의 선고가 있을 때에만 같은 자리에 놓는다.
그 구분은 이번 물음의 고정 결론과 그대로 맞닿는다. 집행의 기초, 곧 강제집행을 허용하는 법정 재판의 상태는 판결의 선고가 아니라 확정 또는 가집행 선고로 열린다. 저자는 여기에 더해, 이 구제의 입구는 권원 종류에 맞는 확정 또는 가집행·정본·집행문·조건 증명·송달이 갖추어지고, 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건이 청구취지에 특정되며, 선택한 소의 권리를 방어할 수 있을 때 열린다고 본다. 확정과 가집행 선고는 서로 다른 두 상태이므로 같은 조건으로 묶지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 그 두 상태 사이의 틈을 겨눈다. 확정을 기다리는 동안 채무자 B의 재산이 사라질 수 있고, 형식적 서류가 이미 확인된 권리를 다시 지연시킬 수 있다는 점에서, 이 지연이 낳는 손실은 말로 덮기 어렵다. 그러나 저자가 유지하는 답은 분명하다. 가집행 선고 없는 미확정 판결을 즉시 집행 가능한 권원으로 바꿀 수는 없다. 반론이 지적한 불편을 지우지 않으면서도, 확정의 결여를 가집행 선고의 부재와 같은 것으로 다루지 않는다.
합성 장면으로 돌아오면, A는 승소판결을 선고받은 사실만 확인되고 B에게 송달되었는지, 집행문이 필요한지에 관한 기록은 아직 정리되지 않았다. 판결 정본·확정 또는 가집행 표시·집행문·조건 증명서·송달증명서 가운데 무엇이 갖추어졌는지, A의 승소가 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건이 청구취지에 특정되었는지도 자료가 없다. 권원의 종류나 송달·확정 상태가 확인되지 않은 이상, 이 장면으로는 입구의 개폐를 단정할 수 없다. 다만 가집행 선고 없는 미확정 판결만 있다면 통로는 열리지 않는다는 조건만은 그대로 남는다.
그러므로 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 확정되었거나 가집행의 선고가 있는 종국판결을 기초로 하고, 권원 종류에 맞는 정본·집행문·조건 증명·송달이 갖추어져 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건이 청구취지에 특정된 경우에 한해, 이 구제의 입구가 열린다. 선고만으로 집행이 가능하다거나 미확정 판결을 곧바로 집행 가능한 권원으로 본다는 결론은 허용되지 않는다. 일반 판결이 이행권고 등 특례 권원으로 바뀌면 같은 집행문 규칙을 그대로 적용하지 않는다.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
채권자 A는 승소판결을 받았지만 채무자 B에게 송달되었는지와 집행문이 필요한지를 구별하지 않았다. 재심사유가 있어도 판결이 정당하다고 인정되면 재심청구를 기각해야 한다는 점을 전제로, 이제 남은 물음은 그 판결이 실제로 강제집행의 문을 여는가이다. 선고된 판결이면 모두 곧바로 집행할 수 있는가, 그리고 강제집행의 개시가 막히는 조건은 무엇인가가 이 자료에서 다루는 범위이다. 집행의 기초란 강제집행을 허용하는 법정 재판의 상태를 뜻하는데, 승소 판결의 선고 사실만으로는 그 상태가 갖추어졌는지 판정할 수 없다. 그래서 채권자 A는 송달 여부와 집행문 필요 여부를 각각 확인해야 할 처지에 놓인다.
그 조문은 "강제집행은 확정된 종국판결이나 가집행의 선고가 있는 종국판결에 기초하여 한다."고 규정한다. 이 문언은 강제집행의 주체는 집행을 신청하는 채권자이고, 그 행위는 강제집행이며, 조건은 종국판결이 확정되었거나 그 판결에 가집행의 선고가 있다는 점임을 가리킨다. 다시 말해 집행의 기초를 이루는 재판의 상태는 확정이라는 한편의 요건과 가집행 선고라는 다른 한편의 요건 가운데 하나로 정해진다. 여기서 집행의 기초는 강제집행을 허용하는 법정 재판의 상태를 뜻한다. 조문이 확정과 가집행 선고를 나란히 두는 까닭은, 확정되지 않은 판결이라도 가집행 선고가 붙어 있으면 집행의 기초가 될 수 있기 때문이다. 이 문언은 송달이나 집행문의 양식에 관한 다른 쟁점을 함께 정하는 것은 아니다.
확정된 종국판결과 가집행 선고가 있는 종국판결은 서로 다른 경로로 집행의 기초가 되므로, 두 상태를 구별해서 확인해야 한다. 확정 여부는 판결이 더 이상 다툴 수 없는 단계에 이르렀는지를, 가집행 선고 여부는 확정 이전이라도 집행을 미리 허용하는 표시가 붙었는지를 말한다. 가집행 없는 미확정 판결만 있거나 필요한 집행문·조건 증명·송달이 갖추어지지 않은 경우, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제 통로는 닫힌다. 이 판단은 강제집행의 개시 단계에 묶인다. 권원 종류에 맞는 확정 또는 가집행·정본·집행문·조건 증명·송달을 갖춘 경우에만 문이 열리고, 어느 하나라도 빠지면 열리지 않는다. 판결 정본·확정 또는 가집행 표시·집행문·조건 증명서·송달증명은 그 충족 여부를 확인하는 기록이다.
확정을 기다리는 동안 재산이 사라질 수 있다. 형식적 서류가 이미 확인된 권리를 다시 지연시킬 수 있다는 점도 부인할 수 없다. 판결로 권리가 인정되었는데 송달 증명이나 집행문 같은 형식이 없다는 이유로 집행을 미루는 동안 채무자 B의 재산이 옮겨지면 채권자 A는 확정 판결을 손에 쥐고도 빈손이 될 수 있다. 권리의 실질과 집행의 형식이 어긋나는 그 손실과 불편은 실제로 무겁다. 조문이 확정 또는 가집행 선고를 집행의 기초의 조건으로 정해 두었고, 가집행 선고가 없는 미확정 판결은 어느 쪽에도 해당하지 않기 때문이다. 사라질 위험이 크다는 사정은 가집행 선고를 구하는 경로를 가리킬 뿐, 미확정 판결을 그 자체로 집행 권원으로 승격시키지는 않는다.
송달 여부가 확인되지 않았으므로 송달증명이 갖추어졌는지, 즉 판결 정본·확정 또는 가집행 표시·집행문·조건 증명서·송달증명 가운데 송달증명 항목이 충족되었는지는 이 장면만으로 확정할 수 없다. A의 판결이 확정되었는지, 가집행 선고가 붙었는지도 장면에 적혀 있지 않다. 권원의 종류나 송달·확정 상태가 확인되지 않은 경우는 판정할 수 없는 상태로 남는다. 다만 분명한 것은 송달의 필요성과 집행문의 필요성을 구별하지 않은 채 승소 사실만으로 집행 단계에 나아갈 수는 없다는 점이다. 만약 가집행 선고 없는 미확정 판결을 즉시 집행 가능한 권원으로 본다면 결론은 성립하지 않는다. 만약 권원이 일반 판결에서 이행권고 등 특례 권원으로 바뀌는 것으로 확인되면 같은 집행문 규칙을 그대로 적용하지 않는다.
선고된 판결이면 모두 곧바로 집행할 수 있는가에 대해 이 자료가 허용하는 답과 허용하지 않는 답의 경계는 이렇다. 허용되는 답은 집행의 기초를 이루는 조건, 곧 확정된 종국판결이거나 가집행 선고가 있는 종국판결이라는 점과, 그에 맞는 정본·집행문·조건 증명·송달이 갖추어진 경우에 강제집행의 개시 단계가 열린다는 것이다. 허용되지 않는 답은 승소 판결의 선고 사실만으로 곧바로 재산에 손댈 권한이 생긴다는 쪽이다. 송달이나 확정 상태가 확인되지 않은 자료만으로는 열림과 닫힘을 확정할 수 없다는 미확정의 자리도 함께 남는다. 이 자료 부족은 곧바로 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않는다.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
이 장면에서 승소의 선고만으로는 무엇이 열리는지가 분명하지 않다. 과연 선고된 판결이면 모두 곧바로 집행할 수 있는가? 그리고 자료가 없어 확정할 수 없는 경계는 어디에 놓이는가? 지금 물음은 재산에 손댈 권한이 언제 생기는가에 한정된다.
이 물음에 답하는 문언이 민사집행법 제24조에 있다. 그 조문은 “강제집행은 확정된 종국판결이나 가집행의 선고가 있는 종국판결에 기초하여 한다”고 정한다. 이 문언은 강제집행의 주체를 적어 두지 않은 채 기초가 될 재판의 상태만을 가리킨다. 판결의 선고 사실만으로는 부족하고, 확정된 종국판결이거나 가집행의 선고가 있는 종국판결이어야 한다. 두 상태는 각각 별도의 경로로 집행을 허용하며, 여기서 말하는 종국판결은 소송을 종결짓는 판결을 뜻한다.
이 문언과 앞의 구별을 잇는다면 선고와 집행의 기초는 같은 단계가 아니다. 집행의 기초란 강제집행을 허용하는 법정 재판의 상태를 뜻하는데, 확정된 종국판결과 가집행 선고가 있는 종국판결은 그 상태를 각기 다른 방식으로 구성한다. 확정은 판결에 대한 불복이 더는 남지 않은 상태이고, 가집행 선고는 확정 전이라도 집행을 허용하는 선고이다. 따라서 판결을 선고받았다는 사실만으로 어느 쪽 상태에 해당하는지가 정해지는 것은 아니다. 이 둘을 구별해야 두 경로 중 어느 쪽으로 기초가 갖추어졌는지 판단할 수 있다.
그 구별이 만드는 불편은 분명하다. 확정을 기다리는 동안 채무자의 재산이 사라질 수 있고, 채권자는 그 사이 손해를 그대로 감수하게 된다. 집행을 서둘러야 하는 실질적 필요를 형식적 서류 검토가 늦출 수 있다는 점도 지적될 수 있다. 확정되지 않았고 가집행 선고도 없는 판결은 위 문언이 정한 어느 기초에도 해당하지 않으며, 그 결론은 채권자에게 불리한 부분을 함께 남긴다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가 보면, A에 대하여 승소판결이 선고되었다는 사실만 확인되어 있을 뿐 그 판결이 확정되었는지, 아니면 가집행의 선고가 있었는지는 확인되지 않았다. B에게 송달되었는지와 집행문이 필요한지도 함께 묻히어 있다. 송달은 판결의 효력이나 불복 기간의 기산과 관련되는 사정이고, 집행문은 집행력 있는 정본을 갖추는 문제인데, 이 둘은 확정 여부와 가집행 선고 여부와 같은 물음이 아니다. 다만 자료가 없어 권원의 종류와 송달·확정 상태가 확인되지 않으므로, 그 판결을 집행의 기초로 삼을 수 있는지는 판정되지 않았다.
이 절의 결론은 좁다. 확정된 종국판결이거나 가집행 선고가 있는 종국판결임이 확인되면 집행의 기초가 갖추어진 것이고, 둘 중 어느 쪽에도 해당하지 않음이 확인되면 기초가 없는 것이다. 확인되지 않은 사항은 그 경계 바깥에 두며, 판결문 사본을 받았다는 사실만으로 집행할 수 있는지가 정해지는 것은 아니다. 판결문 사본과 집행할 문서는 같은가?
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
이 장면에서 판결 자체가 있었다는 사정만으로는 강제집행의 개시라는 단계에 이르렀는지가 결정되지 않는다. 그러면 선고된 판결이면 모두 곧바로 집행할 수 있는가, 그리고 강제집행의 개시 여부를 판단하려면 어떤 기록이 필요한가라는 물음이 남는다.
민사집행법 제24조는 “강제집행은 확정된 종국판결이나 가집행의 선고가 있는 종국판결에 기초하여 한다”라고 규정한다(민사집행법 제24조). 이 문언이 말하는 주체는 강제집행을 하는 채권자이고, 행위는 강제집행이며, 조건은 기초가 되는 판결이 확정된 종국판결이거나 가집행의 선고가 있는 종국판결이라는 점이다. 문언은 이 두 상태 가운데 어느 한쪽에 해당하는 판결을 집행의 기초로 삼는다.
여기서 집행의 기초라는 용어는 강제집행을 허용하는 법정 재판의 상태를 뜻한다. 그런데 확정이라는 상태와 가집행 선고가 있다는 상태는 서로 다른 길이며, 제24조는 어느 쪽이든 그중 하나를 기초로 삼는다고 열거한다. 채권자는 판결 정본에 나타난 확정 표시나 가집행 표시, 그리고 그 판결이 종국판결인지를 같은 기록에서 확인한다. 따라서 단계 판정은 판결 정본·확정 또는 가집행 표시·집행문·조건 증명서·송달증명에 기록된 자료만으로 하고, 없는 기록은 추정으로 메우지 않는다. 확정의 상태 판정과 가집행 선고의 존재 판정을 구별해야 하는 까닭은, 집행의 기초를 이루는 두 경로 중 어느 쪽에 해당하는지가 다르게 적혀 있기 때문이다.
가장 강한 반론은 손실의 가능성에 있다. 확정을 기다리는 동안 채무자의 재산이 사라질 수 있고, 형식적 서류가 이미 확인된 권리를 다시 지연시킬 수 있다는 것이다. 이 불이익은 지워지지 않으며, 채권자 A에게는 가집행 선고를 받을 기회가 남아 있기는 하다. 그러나 그 반론이 겨냥하는 지연을 줄이는 방식으로 가집행 선고 없는 미확정 판결을 즉시 집행 가능한 권원으로 바꿀 수는 없다. 미확정 판결을 그대로 즉시 집행의 기초로 삼으면 제24조가 둔 두 가지 상태 구별이 무너진다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 채권자 A가 승소판결을 받았다는 것과, 채무자 B에게 송달되었는지와 집행문이 필요한지가 구별되지 않았다는 것뿐이다. 이 기록만으로는 판결 정본에 확정 표시가 있는지, 가집행 선고가 있는지, 그 판결이 종국판결인지를 특정할 수 없다. 송달증명이나 집행문이 실제로 필요한지도 이 장면의 사실만으로 정해지지 않으므로 미확정으로 남는다. 따라서 이 장면으로는 강제집행의 개시라는 단계에 이르렀는지, 또는 아직 이르지 않았는지 어느 쪽도 단정할 수 없다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은, 집행의 기초가 되는 확정 또는 가집행 표시가 판결 정본에 기록되어 있는지를 확인하는 것으로 단계를 판정한다는 것이다. 허용하지 않는 결론은, 승소판결을 받았다는 사실만으로 곧바로 집행할 수 있다고 보거나, 필요한 기록이 없어도 집행 가능하다고 추정하는 것이다.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The question is whether any judgment pronounced in this scene can be executed immediately. The question now is directed not at the propriety of a retrial but at whether the pronouncement of judgment, standing alone, permits the commencement of compulsory execution against property.
As the text answering this question, Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act divides into two branches the state of the judgment that serves as the basis for compulsory execution. The Article provides: "Compulsory execution is effected on the basis of a final and conclusive judgment or a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution" (Civil Execution Act, Article 24). Here, "final judgment" means the judgment that concludes the action in the relevant procedural chain; "final and conclusive" means the state in which no ordinary means of challenge remains and the content of the judgment has become settled; and "declaration of provisional execution" means a pronouncement permitting execution in advance even before finality. Compulsory execution is the procedure by which the debtor's property is reached to realize the creditor's right, and what the Article requires is not the pronouncement of judgment but one of these two statutory states.
The Article does not bind finality and a declaration of provisional execution into one but places them in parallel joined by "or," because each is a distinct ground permitting the commencement of execution. A final and conclusive judgment is itself the basis for execution, whereas a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution opens execution before finality in return for taking that declaration as a requirement. Whether the single fact that a judgment has been pronounced means that one of the two states above has been reached is precisely the standard of determination at this stage; without that confirmation, the commencement of compulsory execution does not open.
Yet, on the ground of the risk of loss, an unconfirmed judgment without a declaration of provisional execution cannot be turned into an immediately executable enforcement title. The Article requires only the statutory state of finality or a declaration of provisional execution; it does not accept urgency or the fear of concealment of assets as a substitute. If urgent need exists, the route of a declaration of provisional execution prescribed by legislation must be taken, and an interpretation that opens execution by the pronouncement alone destroys the required state.
In the synthetic scene, A obtained a favorable judgment, but whether it was served on B is unknown, and neither finality nor a declaration of provisional execution has been recorded. Confirmation of service is the starting point for gauging when the judgment can become final and conclusive, but this scene alone does not permit a determination whether it has become final and conclusive or whether a declaration of provisional execution has been attached. Accordingly, the determination on the commencement of compulsory execution remains undetermined, and what remains in the records is the certified copy of the judgment, the finality or provisional execution notation, the execution clause, the certificate of proof of conditions, and the certificate of service. If it is confirmed that the enforcement title has changed from an ordinary judgment to a special enforcement title such as a performance recommendation, the same execution clause rules are not applied as they stand, and the determination is redone from the stage of the commencement of compulsory execution.
What this section permits is to take as the basis for execution the confirmation of finality or a declaration of provisional execution required by the Article; what it does not permit is to take the pronouncement of the judgment itself as that basis. A judgment without finality cannot be turned into an immediately executable one, and what remains short of sufficient materials is undetermined, not immediately irremediable. The question that remains is the form of the very document carried into execution.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Even after the preceding stage confirmed that not every judgment pronounced is executed immediately, it must be examined afresh whether one can reach the debtor's property on the news alone that creditor A obtained a favorable judgment. As in A's case, where A failed to distinguish whether it was served on debtor B and whether an execution clause is required, the concern remains that assets may be moved or disappear while awaiting finality. On that very concern a demand arises to convert an unconfirmed judgment into an execution enforcement title, and whether this demand is allowed is the question now. It is here that the matter divides as to what the state of the judicial decision at the stage of the commencement of compulsory execution is taken to be.
The basis for execution means the state of the judicial decision that permits compulsory execution. As the text fixing this state, Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act provides: "Compulsory execution is effected on the basis of a final and conclusive judgment or a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution." The actor designated by this text is the creditor applying for compulsory execution, and the act is compulsory execution on the basis of a final and conclusive judgment or a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution. The condition is defined as satisfying one of two alternatives: the judgment is a final judgment and has become final and conclusive, or, even if not final and conclusive, it has received a declaration of provisional execution. Other issues concerning the execution clause or proof of conditions are not placed within the scope covered by this text.
The reason for setting this condition apart is that finality and a declaration of provisional execution each mark different states. Finality means the state in which the judgment can no longer be contested, and a declaration of provisional execution means the state in which execution has been pronounced open without waiting for finality. By permitting compulsory execution on the basis of a final judgment that has either one of the two, Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act leaves an unconfirmed judgment without a declaration of provisional execution outside both cases. This determination does not ask again into the rightness or wrongness of the merits of the success, but results from distinguishing the state of the judicial decision that forms the basis for execution.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the loss that the debtor's property may vanish while awaiting finality. If creditor A cannot reach property on the fact of success alone, debtor B may move or spend property before the judgment becomes final and conclusive, so that in the end, despite having the right, A cannot recover it. The inconvenience is also raised that formal documents may again delay a right already confirmed. This answer is maintained in a range that does not erase the inconvenience of blocking execution before finality, while not changing the conditions that fix the basis for execution. That the risk of property disappearing is great remains as the ground of the counterargument, but that risk does not become a ground for changing the requirements for execution.
Contrasting this fact with the conditions of Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act, it must first be confirmed whether the judgment has become final and conclusive or bears a declaration of provisional execution, and the record concerning these two states is examined through the finality or provisional execution notation appearing on the certified copy of the judgment. However, since the scene has not fixed service or finality, the state of the judgment cannot be confirmed at present. Proof of service and the presence or absence of the execution clause are among the records needed for the commencement of compulsory execution, but this scene alone does not tell whether those records are in place. If the enforcement title changes from an ordinary judgment to a special enforcement title such as a performance recommendation, the same execution clause rules are not applied as they stand, but this check is merely a comparison with altered conditions and not a fact occurring within the scene. The items left undetermined remain as they are, and judgment is reserved.
The conclusion this section permits is that even if there is an unconfirmed judgment without a declaration of provisional execution, it cannot of itself open execution. Conversely, if it is a final and conclusive judgment or a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution, it is regarded as satisfying the conditions of the basis for execution, and one may proceed to the stage of the commencement of compulsory execution. Beyond that, whether service or the execution clause is in place, what shall prove a performance subject to conditions, and how the name of the judgment shall be continued after a right has passed over, are not determined by this section. Even where the kind of enforcement title or the state of service and finality remains unconfirmed, no unconfirmed fact is invented. The possibility of loss while awaiting finality remains a counterargument, but it does not change the conditions fixing the basis for execution.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
In the preceding section, it was confirmed that an unconfirmed judgment without a declaration of provisional execution cannot be turned into an immediately executable enforcement title. Then, can creditor A apply compulsory execution to debtor B's property immediately on the sole circumstance that A obtained a favorable judgment? The question whether any judgment pronounced can be executed immediately opens here.
The text answering this question is found in Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act. The Article provides: "Compulsory execution is effected on the basis of a final and conclusive judgment or a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution." This text does not comprehensively treat the actor or method of compulsory execution. It merely records on what state of a judgment compulsory execution may alone stand, and narrows the kinds of judgment forming its basis into two branches.
The object the Article singles out is the judicial decision called a final judgment. One of the two is the case where the judgment has become final and conclusive; the other is the case where, though it has not reached finality, a declaration of provisional execution is attached. The reason the two are placed together yet not bundled as the same is that the routes by which a judicial decision acquires for itself the qualification to be the basis for execution differ from each other. The basis for execution means the state of the judicial decision that permits compulsory execution. Finality marks the route by which a final judgment reaches that state, and a declaration of provisional execution marks that state as attached before finality. This distinction is placed as the yardstick of determination for gauging the commencement of execution.
Of course, the concern that property may vanish while awaiting finality is real. Though the judgment confirming the right has already come, if the debtor's property is moved while waiting on documents, the favorable judgment itself may become an empty shell. The blame that formal procedures may delay a right already confirmed comes from the same place. The circumstance that the inconvenience of delay is great alone cannot newly create the state of the judgment required by the text. Unless it is denied that the statutory route runs through a declaration of provisional execution, one cannot open the door to compulsory execution holding only an unconfirmed judgment.
In this scene it is not settled whether it is to be regarded as a final and conclusive judgment, as a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution, or as a state reaching neither. The records called certified copy of the judgment, finality or provisional execution notation, execution clause, certificate of proof of conditions, and certificate of service set down the kinds of documents to be used in the determination, and do not mean that such records have actually been gathered in this scene. Since neither service nor finality has been confirmed, A cannot be asserted either to be able to commence compulsory execution now or to be unable to do so. What remains is to discern whether the finality or provisional execution notation fitting the kind of enforcement title has been obtained.
The position this section takes is narrow. The conclusion that any judgment pronounced can be executed immediately does not issue from this position, nor does the conclusion treating a final and conclusive judgment and a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution as the same. What is confirmed is that final judgments and judgments bearing a declaration of provisional execution are distinguished side by side as the basis for execution, and that an unconfirmed judgment without a declaration of provisional execution cannot fill that place. A scene where service or finality is not confirmed remains undetermined.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Putting first the point that even where grounds for retrial exist, if the judgment is found proper the petition for retrial must be dismissed, in the situation now at hand what remains is not the judgment itself but whether that judgment actually opens compulsory execution. The work of revealing why the news of success alone is insufficient lies here.
The text corresponding to this question is found in Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act. The Article records: "Compulsory execution is effected on the basis of a final and conclusive judgment or a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution" (Civil Execution Act, Article 24). The actor designated by this sentence is the creditor applying for compulsory execution; the act is compulsory execution itself; and the condition is the state of the judicial decision that can be made the basis for execution. Because the Article places a final and conclusive judgment and a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution side by side, on the fact alone that a judgment has been pronounced it may not yet fall within either.
Connecting this ground and conclusion yields the answer to the question whether any judgment pronounced can be executed immediately. The basis for execution means the state of the judicial decision that permits compulsory execution, and this definition, apart from what is written in the judgment document, asks whether that judgment has reached one of the two forms prescribed by law. Here too lies the reason the stage called finality and the stage called a declaration of provisional execution must be distinguished. The former is the state in which the judgment can no longer be contested, and the latter is the state of being permitted to execute first even before finality; the two open the same door by different routes. A judgment equipped with neither remains standing before that door.
The strongest counterargument is that property may vanish while awaiting finality. The complaint that formal documents may again delay a right already confirmed springs from the same root. Though the creditor has had the right acknowledged by the judgment, if the debtor's property is moved or diminished as time passes, the practical benefit of the success is reduced accordingly. Even though the loss and inconvenience are plain, the answer to this does not change. The magnitude of the risk the counterargument points out cannot become a ground for overturning this conclusion; it only serves as a reminder that the path of obtaining finality or a declaration of provisional execution remains.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that creditor A obtained a favorable judgment, and that it was not distinguished whether it was served on debtor B and whether the execution clause is needed. Contrasting these facts with the conditions above, it has not yet been settled which of the certified copy of the judgment, the finality or provisional execution notation, the execution clause, the certificate of proof of conditions, and the certificate of service has been obtained. Accordingly, on this scene alone it cannot be determined whether A's judgment has become final and conclusive, whether a declaration of provisional execution was made, or whether it was properly served on B. Where the kind of enforcement title or the state of service and finality is not confirmed, the matter remains undetermined. Only the condition is clear that, if the enforcement title changes from an ordinary judgment to a special enforcement title such as a performance recommendation, the same execution clause rules are not applied as they stand.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. To the question whether any judgment pronounced can be executed immediately, all that can be said from this position is the answer that a final and conclusive judgment and a final judgment bearing a declaration of provisional execution are distinguished as the basis for execution. The conclusion not permitted is to go beyond that distinction and raise an unconfirmed judgment itself into an immediately executable enforcement title. The details of service, the execution clause, and proof of conditions lie outside the scope of this question.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Whether the mere fact that a judgment has been pronounced brings into being at once the authority required for the commencement of compulsory execution must be determined separately. The preceding stage confirmed that even where grounds for retrial exist, the petition for retrial must be dismissed if the judgment is found proper, and that conclusion concerned the preservation of the original judgment. The question that follows is not the preservation of the judgment, but whether the judgment is in a state in which it can serve as the basis for execution. Only when that state is in place does the authority to reach into property first open.
The provision that determines this question is found in Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act. That Article provides that "compulsory execution shall be based on a final judgment which has become final and conclusive or a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution." The actor indicated by this provision is the creditor who carries out compulsory execution, and the act is compulsory execution. The conditions are set in two branches. One is a final judgment which has become final and conclusive; the other is a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution. Only if one of these two states applies is the basis for execution established. Since the Article does not make the fact of pronouncement of the judgment itself a condition, pronouncement alone does not reach the state required by this provision.
The point at which that provision meets the distinction confirmed above is clear. Viewed in the light of this definition, a final judgment which has become final and conclusive and a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution reach the same state of basis by two different routes. Finality is the stage at which the preservation of the judgment can no longer be contested, while a declaration of provisional execution is a separate indication, attached even before finality, that permits execution. The reason for distinguishing the two routes is that the proof each requires differs. Finality must show finality, and a declaration of provisional execution must show the existence of that indication. Where there is only a declaration of provisional execution without finality, and where there is only finality without a declaration of provisional execution, the question is whether the side required in each case has separately been furnished. This provision, however, does not go so far as to determine where that proof is to be recorded.
The counterargument arises from the risk of loss. If the door of execution does not open even though the claim is found meritorious, the concrete inconvenience of delayed recovery remains. Even without removing this adverse feature, the conclusion stands. The reason is that the provision in question enumerates only the two states of finality and a declaration of provisional execution as the basis for execution, while an unconfirmed judgment as such falls under neither. The way to reduce the cost of delay should be placed outside this provision, not created by adding new conditions to it.
Returning to this scene, the situation of creditor A falls within this distinction. Since A received a favorable judgment, the fact of pronouncement of the judgment itself is established. It has not been confirmed, however, whether it was served on B, and whether an enforcement clause is required. Whether service has been made is related to the stage of the procedure for finality at which the judgment stands, and whether an enforcement clause is required is related to which document opening execution must be furnished. Since neither is determined in this scene, both remain undetermined. It is also undetermined which of the certified copy of the judgment, the indication of finality or provisional execution, the enforcement clause, the certificate proving the conditions, and the certificate of service actually exists. Since, on the confirmed conditions alone, it is not made clear whether the judgment falls under a final and conclusive judgment or a judgment with a declaration of provisional execution, this scene alone cannot permit the commencement of compulsory execution. This determination rests not on the absence of the conditions but on the insufficiency of their confirmation.
The conclusion permitted in this section is narrow. It is that only the provision quoted above is used as the basis for determining the commencement of compulsory execution, and that only the language within the scope of that provision is applied. The distinction that separates a final judgment which has become final and conclusive and a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution as bases for execution is maintained within this scope. The conclusions not permitted are equally clear. Extensions such as that execution opens immediately upon a finding that the judgment is meritorious, or that an unconfirmed judgment becomes an enforceable title without a declaration of provisional execution, cannot be drawn from this provision. Broadening the determination by reference to the reasons for judgment also falls outside this scope. The determination in this section concerns the commencement of compulsory execution on the premise that the type of title and the presence of finality, the indication of provisional execution, the enforcement clause, the proof of conditions, and service have been furnished, and it does not address other issues.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
The question remains whether every judgment pronounced in this scene can be executed immediately. If the earlier analysis pointed out the gap between pronouncement and executability, the present stage must identify what is to be judged separately within the commencement of compulsory execution. That is to say, the issue now is what must be considered separately within a single stage.
As to this question, Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act provides that "compulsory execution shall be based on a final judgment which has become final and conclusive or a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution." This provision first makes clear what the act of compulsory execution rests upon. The actors are the creditor who claims compulsory execution and the execution agency that carries it out, and the object is the adjudication that has become final and conclusive, namely a final judgment. Compulsory execution means the procedure by which the creditor's right is realized through the coercive power of the State, and the Article has set down, by way of limitation, the state of the judgment that serves as its starting point. What matters is not the judgment itself but the legal state the judgment has achieved.
There is a reason why the Article places two cases side by side. A final judgment which has become final and conclusive is a judgment fixed in a state where it can no longer be contested, while a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution is one pronounced in a state that permits execution even before finality. The author explains that the two are to be regarded as the same basis for execution but, differing in nature, must be judged separately. If one of the two states applies, the door of execution opens; if neither applies, it does not. To judge execution by the fact of pronouncement alone, without this distinction, goes beyond the scope set by the Article.
The counterargument that formal documents may once again delay a right already confirmed arises in the same context. The creditor has confirmed success in the suit, yet may miss the timing of execution and lose the opportunity for recovery, and meanwhile the debtor's property may be transferred or diminished. Such inconvenience and loss are evident, yet the author's conclusion does not change. Without removing the weight of the counterargument, the boundary is maintained that a judgment falling outside the two states set by the Article cannot be extended so as to serve as the basis for execution.
Returning to the synthetic scene, creditor A received a favorable judgment but did not distinguish whether it had been served on debtor B and whether an enforcement clause is required. On this fact alone it cannot be confirmed which of the certified copy of the judgment, the indication of finality or provisional execution, the enforcement clause, the certificate proving the conditions, and the certificate of service has been furnished. Accordingly, this falls under the case where the type of title and the status of service or finality are unconfirmed, and executability cannot be determined at this stage. The point that, where an ordinary judgment is replaced by a special title such as a recommendation to perform, the same enforcement clause rules are not applied as they stand, is to be understood only in the sense that the determination changes when the conditions change. Whether service was actually made, and the outcome of performance, are not addressed in this scene.
The conclusion permitted in this section is limited to the conditions of the cases in which, within the commencement of compulsory execution, the detailed distinctions within the stage operate, are blocked, or remain undetermined. Where finality or provisional execution, a certified copy, an enforcement clause, proof of conditions, and service fitting the type of title are furnished, execution is possible; where there is only an unconfirmed judgment without provisional execution, or where the necessary documents are not furnished, execution is blocked; and where the type of title or the status of service or finality is unconfirmed, the matter remains undetermined. This section permits neither the addition of a new stage here nor the extension of allowing execution on the fact of pronouncement alone.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
That conclusion confirmed that a pronounced judgment cannot, without exception, be executed immediately, but what the preceding stage handed over was only a single summary line. The scene now at issue is one in which creditor A, though having obtained a favorable judgment, waits without distinguishing whether it has been served on debtor B and whether an enforcement clause is required, and the question is whether this judgment has actually reached a state in which it can touch property. To answer this question, what opens execution must first be settled.
Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act defines the basis of compulsory execution as follows. "Compulsory execution shall be based on a final judgment which has become final and conclusive or a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution." (Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act) In this provision, the basis for execution means the state of a judicial adjudication that permits compulsory execution. The actors enumerated in the Article are not the parties to the judgment but the execution agency; the act is not the pronouncement of judgment but the commencement of execution; and the condition is not the fact of pronouncement but the state in which the judgment has become final and conclusive or bears a declaration of provisional execution. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the basis for execution is furnished on the fact of pronouncement alone.
What connects the above provision with the conclusion of this section is the work of distinguishing the two branches of the conditions. In a final judgment which has become final and conclusive, the state of finality itself constitutes the basis for execution; in a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution, that declaration supplies the basis even before finality. Unless the point that the judgment must be a final judgment and the point that the separate conditions of entry, finality or a declaration of provisional execution, need only one of the two to be satisfied, are kept apart, the question whether a final and conclusive judgment alone suffices or a declaration of provisional execution alone suffices becomes muddled. This section is limited to dividing vertically the cases in which that basis is opened, the cases in which it is blocked because there is only an unconfirmed judgment without provisional execution, and the cases in which it remains undetermined because the type of title or the status of service or finality is unconfirmed.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that property may disappear while finality is awaited. If, while creditor A awaits finality, debtor B transfers property, the favorable judgment loses its substance, and the loss and inconvenience that formal documents may once again delay a right already confirmed are great. Yet one point remains that this counterargument cannot negate. Without denying the cost of delay the counterargument points out, the reason for binding the basis for execution to the statutory conditions is left unshaken.
The facts ascertainable in the synthetic scene are no more than that A received a favorable judgment and did not distinguish whether it had been served on B and whether an enforcement clause is required. Contrasting these facts with the conditions above, whether A's judgment has become final and conclusive, whether it bears a declaration of provisional execution, and whether a certified copy, an enforcement clause, proof of conditions, and service fitting the type of title have been furnished, all remain unconfirmed. Accordingly, on this scene it can be asserted neither that the basis for execution has been opened nor that it has been blocked, and the matter remains in the state of being undetermined because the type of title or the status of service or finality is unconfirmed. One thing, however, is clear.
The conclusion this section permits extends only to the distinction of the conditions. Where finality or provisional execution, a certified copy, an enforcement clause, proof of conditions, and service fitting the type of title are furnished, the basis for execution is opened; where there is only an unconfirmed judgment without provisional execution, or where the necessary documents or service are not furnished, it is blocked; and where the type of title or the status of service or finality is unconfirmed, it remains undetermined. Beyond this, this section does not address how changes in property during the wait for finality are actually settled, when service becomes fixed, or what the effect of execution without an enforcement clause is.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
The question remaining before this scene is whether every pronounced judgment can be executed immediately. The circumstance that a judgment has been pronounced and the determination that authority to touch property has arisen lie at different stages. The former announces the conclusion of the lawsuit; the latter requires the state of a judicial adjudication that permits execution. This section asks precisely where that distinction stands.
As the provision answering this question, Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act provides "Article 24 (Compulsory Execution and Final Judgment) Compulsory execution shall" and then sets out together a final judgment which has become final and conclusive and a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution. The actor addressed by this Article is the creditor who claims compulsory execution, and the act is compulsory execution based on the state of adjudication of finality or a declaration of provisional execution. The conditions are that the judgment be a final judgment and that, among such judgments, it has become final and conclusive or bears a declaration of provisional execution. The basis for execution spoken of here means the state of a judicial adjudication that permits compulsory execution. This definition points only to the form of the door that opens execution; it does not mean that the door led to actual payment.
This provision requires as the basis not the conclusion of success in the suit but the state of the judgment. On the strength of that requirement, the author judges that the basis for execution cannot be said to be furnished on pronouncement alone. A final judgment which has become final and conclusive and a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution must be distinguished as bases for execution, because the former indicates the state in which the effect of the judgment has been fixed, while the latter indicates the state to which is attached a declaration permitting execution even before finality. The two states are different keys opening the same door, so one cannot be recorded in place of the other. This distinction, however, does not mean that it also determines the manner in which an enforcement clause is issued.
The counterargument aims at the point that property may disappear while finality is awaited. If, even though the content of the judgment creditor A obtained is right, the opportunity for recovery is lost because of the formality of procedure, the criticism follows that the requirement of finality operates not as a device protecting the right but as a device delaying it. It is the complaint that formal documents may once again delay a right already confirmed. The author answers, however, that even so, an unconfirmed judgment without a declaration of provisional execution cannot be turned into an immediately enforceable title. The loss that may arise while finality is awaited does not give the creditor the power arbitrarily to attach to that judgment a declaration of provisional execution it does not bear.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that A received a favorable judgment, and that A did not distinguish whether it had been served on B and whether an enforcement clause is required. Contrasting these facts with the requirements for the basis of execution, the fact that the judgment was pronounced alone does not determine whether it is in a final and conclusive state or bears a declaration of provisional execution. Service and the need for an enforcement clause are likewise unconfirmed in this scene and therefore remain undetermined. Accordingly, on this scene alone it cannot be determined whether A is furnished with the title to claim the commencement of compulsory execution. The conditional distinction is maintained, however, that where an unconfirmed judgment without a declaration of provisional execution is confirmed, the commencement of compulsory execution is not permitted.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that, even for a pronounced judgment, whether the basis for execution is furnished differs according to whether it is a final judgment which has become final and conclusive or a final judgment accompanied by a declaration of provisional execution. Finality and a declaration of provisional execution are different states of adjudication and cannot be merged into one. Conversely, the conclusion this section does not permit is that the basis for execution arises immediately on the mere fact of success in the suit, or on the mere fact of receiving a copy of the written judgment.