Summary
This chapter distinguishes the special rule that a final and conclusive judgment revoking dispositions, etc. is also effective against third parties from the scope of civil judgments.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
There are cases in which the revoked administrative status cannot be maintained separately for each person. Taking up the conclusion of the preceding section—that the channel for revoking a suspension opens when there is a serious effect on the public interest or the grounds for suspension have ceased to exist—the analysis now turns to the question whether a judgment revoking a disposition affects only the parties to the lawsuit. In the scene, applicant A has obtained a judgment revoking the refusal disposition, but administrative agency B sent a reply refusing the same application once again. In this situation, whether the effect of the final and conclusive judgment of revocation remains only with the parties A and B, or extends beyond them, divides the standard by which the channel of this remedy opens.
Article 29(1) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides: "①A final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is effective also against third parties." The subject indicated by this language is a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition; the act is a judgment of revocation that has become final and conclusive; and the condition is that it has become final and conclusive in the form of revoking a disposition, etc. Here, the erga omnes effect of a judgment of revocation means the quality whereby the effect of revocation reaches even third parties. This special rule, under which the effect of the finalized revocation spreads to include persons who could not participate in the judgment, is distinguished from the scope in which civil judgments, in principle, take effect only between the parties to the lawsuit.
The ground that the language of this provision takes a broad view of the scope of the effect of a final and conclusive revocation, and the conclusion that the entrance to this remedy opens, connect in the same direction. The reason is that the two determinations must be examined separately. One is on whom the effect of the final and conclusive revocation falls; the other is whether the channel for compelling post-judgment measures has acquired the required conditions. If the former determination sets the scope of the judgment's effect, the latter examines whether a re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment has been made, or whether the statutory channel of indirect compulsory execution against nonfeasance and re-dispositions void by operation of law has opened. That entrance opens.
The most persuasive counterargument targets the point that the interests of persons who could not participate may be altered. This counterargument concretely shows the loss that the rights and interests of persons who could not participate in the judgment may not be settled by a single final and conclusive judgment, and the inconvenience and impairment of values that arise when this is ignored. Even so, the author's answer is that the effect of the final and conclusive revocation cannot be confined to the parties alone. Even without erasing the disadvantage the counterargument points to, the statutory special rule that a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is effective also against third parties takes precedence.
What can be confirmed from the synthetic scene is only that applicant A obtained a judgment revoking the refusal disposition, and that administrative agency B sent a reply refusing the same application once again. Placing these facts alongside the foregoing conditions, whether the effect of the final and conclusive revocation reaches third parties is determined by the statutory special rule. However, whether the newly issued refusal reply is a re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment, or is a disposition contrary to that purport or void by operation of law, cannot be confirmed from this scene alone and remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the effect of a final and conclusive revocation may extend beyond the parties to the lawsuit, and that when the conditions for re-disposition or for the statutory channel of indirect compulsory execution are met, the entrance to this remedy opens. By contrast, it is not permissible to confine the effect of the final and conclusive revocation to the parties alone, or to deem the channel open at once without examining whether the conditions for nonfeasance and re-dispositions void by operation of law are met.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
This proceeds on the premise that, where there is a serious effect on the public interest or the grounds for suspension have ceased to exist, the channel for revoking a suspension opens. The synthetic scene placed behind it is as follows. The question of this scene is whether a judgment revoking a disposition affects only the parties to the lawsuit, and what the cases are in which the remedy is blocked.
To answer this question, the analysis first looks to the language of the relevant text. Article 29(1) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides: "①A final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is effective also against third parties." (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 29) The subject spoken of here is a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc.; the act is the occurrence of effect consequent upon the revocation becoming final and conclusive; and the condition is that that effect is not confined to the plaintiff and defendant, the parties to the lawsuit, but reaches third parties. This language points to the quality of erga omnes effect, meaning that the revocation of a disposition leaves the same status for anyone standing in an interest surrounding that disposition.
That language and the conclusion of this section connect as follows. Once it is settled that erga omnes effect is the quality whereby the effect of revocation reaches even third parties, an interpretation that confines that effect to the parties on the ground that the interests of persons who could not participate may be altered runs contrary to the language. Accordingly, the effect of a final and conclusive revocation cannot be confined to the parties alone. This conclusion does not, however, solve every subsequent question at once. What this section asks is the scope of effect, and the pressure of performance directed at a re-disposition must pass through separate statutory requirements. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is that the former determines on whom the judgment's effect falls, while the latter determines whether the means of enforcing that judgment open.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that the interests of persons who could not participate may be altered. A third party who did not receive the judgment of revocation may wish to protect rights or expectations acquired before that judgment, and the loss is raised that, the broader the scope of the successful judgment, the more that person must bear results they did not anticipate. It also targets the inconvenience that, if the administrative agency repeatedly raises new grounds, victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. Yet the foregoing answer does not change. Since the language expressly provides for effect upon third parties, that disadvantage is to be accepted as a consequence entailed by erga omnes effect, but it cannot serve as a ground for reverting to an interpretation confining the effect to the parties alone.
These conditions are placed against the synthetic scene and compared. A has already obtained a judgment revoking the refusal disposition, and B sent a reply refusing the same application once again. If this subsequent reply is a valid re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment, then even if A seeks indirect compulsory execution for failure to dispose on the ground alone of the adverse result, the channel of relief does not open. If, instead, it is confirmed to be not an adverse re-disposition but a re-disposition void by operation of law for violation of binding force, the same determination as nonfeasance applies. Conversely, where it is not confirmed whether the new reply is contrary to the purport of the judgment or is void, the matter lies outside the categorical assertions of this section, and the mere fact that no confirming material exists does not at once settle that no relief is available.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted in this section is that the special rule that a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is effective also against third parties applies, distinguished from the scope of civil judgments. The impermissible conclusions are to treat the results of every subsequent disposition as compliance with the same judgment by reason of this special rule, or to open the door of indirect compulsory execution for failure to dispose on the basis of an adverse re-disposition alone. That door closes where, although a valid re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment has been made, relief is sought on the ground alone that the result is adverse, if even one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The preceding section took the view that where a valid re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment has been made and indirect compulsory execution for failure to dispose is sought on the ground alone that the result is adverse, this remedy is blocked. Yet whether the disposition newly issued between A and B runs counter to the purport of the final and conclusive judgment of revocation, or is void by operation of law, is an issue in itself. If, for want of materials, one cannot determine which of the two it is, where should that boundary be drawn?
This question starts from the language that a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is effective also against third parties (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 29). This language proceeds on the premise that the subjects bound by the effect of the final and conclusive revocation are not limited to the parties who participated in the lawsuit. Here, a third party is a person who is not among the plaintiff and defendant, the parties to the lawsuit, and a final and conclusive judgment is a judgment that has reached a state where it can no longer be contested. Therefore, whether the effect of the final and conclusive revocation falls on a person is not divided according to whether that person participated in the lawsuit.
Once the subject and act indicated by this provision are fixed, there arises the quality whereby the effect of the final and conclusive judgment revoking the disposition extends beyond the parties who received the judgment—that is, the erga omnes effect of the judgment of revocation. Erga omnes effect means the quality whereby the effect of revocation reaches even third parties. Consequently, whether the new disposition accords with the purport of the judgment cannot be reduced to a question aimed only at the parties who received the judgment. However, the quality of this determination and the conclusion on the illegality or invalidity of the new disposition are distinct, and the conclusion of this section presupposes the case in which neither has been confirmed.
The loss this distinction targets is the inconvenience that the interests of persons who could not participate are altered. If the reach of the final and conclusive revocation is taken broadly, the legal relationship of persons who could not participate in the lawsuit is shaken without notice. Even so, the author's answer is that the effect of the final and conclusive revocation cannot be confined to the parties alone. This answer does not mean ignoring the interests of participants; it is a measure taken so as not to mix the question of the scope of effect with the separate determination of the illegality or invalidity of the new disposition. Both sides may be disadvantaged.
What can be confirmed from this scene is only the procedural flow that B sent a reply refusing the same application once again, and the prior history that A obtained the judgment of revocation. Whether the subsequent application was re-disposed in accordance with the purport of the judgment that binds it, or in a sense denying the judgment, and whether that new reply is void, is not settled by these materials alone. Accordingly, the determination remains undetermined. This indeterminacy differs in nature from the case in which, even after a valid re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment has been made, one seeks indirect compulsory execution for failure to dispose on the ground of an adverse result alone and is blocked.
Even while judgment is held in reserve until the character of the new disposition is confirmed, it cannot be said that the effect of the final and conclusive revocation is confined to the parties alone. Nor does it mean that the conclusion of running counter to the purport of the judgment has been reached, or that the conclusion of invalidity has been reached. The boundary at which, for want of materials, no determination can be made lies precisely at the point that neither of the two can be fixed.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
Following, in this scene, the question whether a judgment revoking a disposition affects only the parties to the lawsuit, what now at issue is what records support that determination. The preceding section leaves the determination undetermined where it is not confirmed whether the new disposition is contrary to the purport of the judgment or is void, and distinguishes this from cases where the remedy is blocked. It must be confirmed on what grounds that very boundary between indeterminacy and unavailability of relief is drawn.
The statutory provision corresponding to this question is Article 29(1) of the Administrative Litigation Act, whose language declares: "①A final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is effective also against third parties." (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 29) The subject indicated by this language is the person subject to the effect of the final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc., and its scope is not limited to the parties who participated in the lawsuit. The act is the revocation of the disposition, etc., and the condition is that the judgment has reached final and conclusive form.
This provision distinguishes the special rule that a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is effective also against third parties from the scope of civil judgments. Unlike civil judgments, where the effect is confined to the parties, the effect of a final and conclusive revocation reaches even persons who could not participate in the lawsuit. When this distinction has come to hold, this determination rests on the final and conclusive judgment of revocation, the binding determination, the prior application, the subsequent disposition, and the application for indirect compulsory execution. The reason the two stages must be looked at separately is that the determination fixing the scope of effect and the task of confirming that determination against the actual records are different questions.
Nevertheless, the strongest counterargument is directed at the point that the interests of persons who could not participate may be altered. If a person who had no opportunity to defend in the lawsuit suffers detriment because of that judgment, the loss remains that procedural fairness is shaken. The inconvenience is equally great that, if the administrative agency repeatedly raises new grounds, victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. Yet the author's answer does not change. If erga omnes effect is denied in order to eliminate the disadvantage the counterargument points to, the contradiction arises that the revoked administrative status must be maintained separately for each person.
What can be confirmed from this scene are the two points that A obtained the judgment of revocation and that B sent a reply refusing the same application once again. Which of the records required by this determination—the final and conclusive judgment of revocation, the binding determination, the prior application, the subsequent disposition, and the application for indirect compulsory execution—was actually obtained is not settled by the scene. Without those records the conclusion remains undetermined, and this is distinguished from cases where the remedy is blocked. However, where it is not confirmed whether the new disposition is contrary to the purport of the judgment or is void, the determination is left undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is confined to the determination that the effect of the final and conclusive revocation is not limited to the parties to the lawsuit. The outcome of victory or recovery cannot be fixed from the scene alone. A person seeking to finalize the determination must come forward furnished with the records listed above, and cannot hasten to a conclusion without them. Should any circumstance come to be confirmed, the determination may change.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
On the premise that the path to revoking the suspension opens where there is a serious impact on the public good or where the grounds for suspension have ceased to exist, the question examined is whether the judgment operates only between the parties who participated in the lawsuit or extends to other persons as well. In addition, it must also be determined, if a later disposition is confirmed to be of a certain character, whether the determination made at the preceding stage must be set aside and examined anew. This section addresses only the scope of the judgment's effect and the conditions for revisiting the determination.
The statutory text corresponding to this question is clear. A final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is also effective against third parties (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 29). In this text, 'third parties' refers to persons other than the two persons called the plaintiff and the defendant in the revocation lawsuit, that is, other than the parties to the lawsuit, and 'effective' means that the result of the revocation extends to them as well. Accordingly, a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. makes no exception for persons who did not participate in the lawsuit. The result of the revocation is maintained as it is even between third parties who have no relationship with the parties who received the judgment. The subject, act, and conditions targeted by the provision are confined to this point alone, and other paragraphs of the same Article and issues relating to the duty to make a re-disposition are not addressed here.
The path connecting this statutory text with the conclusion of this section is short. The erga omnes effect of a judgment of revocation means the character by which the effect of the revocation extends to third parties as well, and the above text is precisely the special rule confirming that character. This special rule must be distinguished from the scope of a civil judgment. Whereas the effect of a civil judgment is in principle confined to the parties, a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. goes beyond that scope. The reason the two must be distinguished is that the range of persons to whom the effect extends differs between them, and that difference becomes the standard for the subsequent stage determinations. If it is confirmed that the re-disposition is not an adverse re-disposition but a re-disposition that is void by operation of law for violation of binding force, the same determination as that for no disposition is applied; and if a specified change is confirmed, the existing blocking and effectiveness determination is discarded and the stages are determined anew from the beginning.
This conclusion, however, entails a not inconsiderable inconvenience. A person who could not participate in the judgment had no opportunity in that lawsuit to state their own circumstances, yet the effect of the judgment may extend to that person as well and change their interests. To this is joined the concern that, if the administrative agency repeatedly presents new grounds for the same application, a single victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. Even without denying these losses and inconvenience, the effect of a final revocation cannot be confined to the parties alone. In order to prevent the result of emptying the purpose of the judgment and to avoid the confusion of maintaining the state of the revoked disposition differently for each person, the effect on third parties is maintained as provided by statute. The possibility of shifts in interests noted by the counterargument remains, but the scope of the effect is not narrowed on that account.
Looking only at the facts of this scene, Applicant A obtained a judgment revoking the refusal disposition, and Administrative Agency B sent another refusal reply to the same application. The Records confirmed in this scene are the final and conclusive judgment of revocation, the binding determination, the earlier application, the subsequent disposition, and the application for indirect enforcement. Measured against the foregoing standard that the effect of the judgment extends to third parties as well, the determination branches according to whether the subsequent reply sent by Administrative Agency B is a valid re-disposition consistent with the purpose of the judgment or a re-disposition that is void by operation of law for violation of binding force. Yet on the scene alone the character of the subsequent reply has not been fixed, and so that part remains undetermined. Years, amounts, and commencement dates not present in the scene are not added.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section is that the effect of a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. does not remain with the parties but extends to third parties as well, and that, if the re-disposition is confirmed not to be an adverse re-disposition but to be void by operation of law for violation of binding force, the same determination as that for no disposition is applied. Conversely, the conclusions not permitted are confining the effect of a final revocation to the parties alone, and leaving the existing blocking and effectiveness determination intact without confirmation of a specified change. Where it is not confirmed whether the new disposition runs counter to the purpose of the judgment or is void, nothing is finalized and the analysis stops at a conditional distinction. This is set out separately from the next question, which grapples with how far the scope of this determination reaches.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The preceding analysis confirmed only the condition that the path to revoking the suspension opens where there is a serious impact on the public good or where the grounds for suspension have ceased to exist. Here, without rearguing that transition, the question taken up is the range over which this judgment extends to persons other than the parties to the lawsuit. The question whether a judgment revoking a disposition extends only to the parties to the lawsuit is the starting point of this section.
The statutory text on this question is found in paragraph (1) of Article 29 of the Administrative Litigation Act. That provision declares: "(1) A final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is also effective against third parties." The subject fixed by this text is a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc., and the effect attached to it is effectiveness against third parties. The third parties spoken of by this text point in a direction that carries the declared effect of the judgment beyond the parties to the lawsuit named above, drawing in even persons who do not stand in the position of parties. Other paragraphs of the provision and other issues are not addressed here.
The core linking the above text with the conclusion lies in the distinction between the relative effect of a civil judgment and this special rule. A civil judgment fixes only the relationship between the parties, whereas the provision confirmed here declares effect against third parties only for a final and conclusive judgment of revocation. Thus, if this judgment rendered the revoked administrative state null only between parties A and B while leaving it intact for others, the same administrative state would exist differently for each person. The reason this section determines that the effect of a final revocation cannot be confined to the parties alone lies in this distinction.
Even so, a person who had no opportunity to participate may raise the unease that the interest they expected is unsettled by this judgment. They did not stand in the place of the lawsuit, and could neither foresee nor defend against that judgment. The inconvenience and loss they will thus suffer are real. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the confirmed text declares effect against third parties, the court cannot, on the ground of that inconvenience, return the scope of the effect to the parties alone. The author reaches the conclusion of preserving this inconvenience while maintaining the provision of the text that broadened the scope of the effect.
In the synthetic scene, the only fact from which the relationship appears is the confrontation between A and B. A has already obtained the final and conclusive judgment of revocation, and B sent another refusal reply to the same application. On this scene alone it is not confirmed whether B's reply is a re-disposition consistent with the purpose of the judgment, a re-disposition void by operation of law for violation of binding force, or a state in which its weight cannot be gauged. Years, amounts, and commencement dates not present in the scene are not supplemented. Accordingly, what can be finalized in this section is only the conditional distinction that the direction of the effect points beyond the parties to the lawsuit, and the character of the subsequent reply remains undetermined.
What this section permits is narrow. The effect of a final revocation cannot be confined to the parties alone, and this text declares effect against third parties. What is not permitted is the attitude of going beyond confirming that the effect extends to third parties and adjudicating here as well whether the subsequent reply is void by operation of law for violation of binding force.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Although the preceding section adopted the premise that the effect of a final revocation cannot be confined to the parties alone, the question now concerns the range that effect itself reaches. Applicant A obtained a judgment revoking the refusal disposition, but Administrative Agency B sent another refusal reply to the same application, and the issue is whether the effect of this judgment remains only between A and B, who participated in the lawsuit, or extends to other persons as well. Because there are cases in which different legal positions cannot be recognized for each person with respect to the state produced by the final revocation, this question leads on to inquiring into what the erga omnes effect of a judgment of revocation is.
The original text answering this question is in Article 29 of the Administrative Litigation Act. The relevant provision declares: "(1) A final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is also effective against third parties." (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 29) The subject spoken of by the text is the final and conclusive judgment; its object is a judgment revoking a disposition, etc.; and the range to which its effect extends is not confined to the parties to the lawsuit but reaches third parties. This provision does not simultaneously regulate the meaning of dispositions, etc., the grounds for revocation, or the requirements for finality; it determines only to whom the effect of a final and conclusive judgment of revocation extends.
Connecting the above text with the premise of the preceding section, the conclusion is established that the effect of a final revocation cannot be confined to the parties alone. The reason is that this provision sets up a special rule distinct from the scope of the effect of a civil judgment. Whereas the effect of a civil judgment in principle remains between the parties to the lawsuit, a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. is also effective against third parties (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 29). Accordingly, this distinction points to the fact that the judgment of revocation did not merely end the dispute between A and B, but that others too must accept the state in which the disposition has been revoked. Only, this provision does not separately fix the range of those third parties or the content of the effect upon them, and so it cannot be read as extending beyond the range fixed by the text.
Nor does this conclusion erase every inconvenience. The point at which the counterargument that the interests of a person who could not participate in this judgment may change aims its sharpest thrust is precisely that that person's legal position is altered irrespective of their own will. That rights or expectations already held by a person who had no opportunity to participate in the judgment may be affected by a single final revocation cannot be treated lightly. Even so, the effect of a final revocation cannot be confined to the parties alone. The fact that the interests of a person who did not participate may change reveals the burden borne by erga omnes effect; it does not serve as a ground for turning that effect back only to the parties to the lawsuit.
The facts that can be confirmed in the fixed scene are only that Applicant A obtained a judgment revoking the refusal disposition and that Administrative Agency B sent another refusal reply to the same application. Here the object revoked by the judgment is the refusal disposition, and that judgment enters the scope of effect spoken of in paragraph (1) of Article 29 only when it takes the form of a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. Whether this judgment became final and conclusive, when that finality was achieved, and whether the content of the subsequent reply accords with the purpose of the judgment were not fixed in the synthetic scene and therefore remain undetermined. Accordingly, this time it is held, as to the single question of the range of persons reached by the judgment, that the effect extends to third parties beyond A and B as well.
What this section permits is the determination that a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. does not remain with the parties to the lawsuit but is also effective against third parties, and understanding this determination as a special rule distinguishing it from the scope of the effect of a civil judgment. Conversely, what this section does not permit is an interpretation confining the effect of a final revocation to the parties alone, or the attitude of transposing the character of erga omnes effect as it stands onto the effect of a civil judgment. The concrete content of the effect upon third parties, and the respective legal positions altered by it, are not finalized here.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Unlike the path to revoking the suspension addressed at the preceding stage, the scene now laid out is a situation after a judgment of revocation has already been pronounced. What must be asked first in this scene is whether a judgment revoking a disposition extends only to the parties to the lawsuit. Unless the range over which the effect of the revocation spreads is fixed, not even a standard for evaluating the administrative agency's subsequent reply can be set.
The text answering this question is provided in the Administrative Litigation Act. Article 29, paragraph (1) declares: "is also effective against third parties" (Administrative Litigation Act, Article 29). Here, a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. refers to a case in which a judgment ordering the revocation of a disposition in a lawsuit has become final and conclusive, and third parties mean persons who are not parties to that lawsuit. The expression 'is effective' is read to mean that the revocation, which is the result of the judgment, extends to persons outside that lawsuit as well.
This text must be distinguished from the scope of the effect of a civil judgment. Whereas a civil judgment stops at fixing the rights relations between the parties, a final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. lays down the special rule that it is also effective against third parties. This distinction is needed because, if the effect of the revocation were confined to the parties alone, the same disposition would survive differently for each person. The word 'erga omnes' refers to the character of the range to which the effect extends, and creates no separate new requirement or exception.
However, once this special rule exists, the interests of a person who could not participate may change. From the standpoint of a third party who could not participate in the lawsuit, in that the disposition is revoked as the result of a procedure unrelated to them and the effect reaches them as well, there is room for them to be placed at a disadvantage without any opportunity to defend themselves. This loss is not erased. Inasmuch as the text has expressly provided for effectiveness against third parties, the scope of the effect cannot be narrowed on the basis of participation alone, and that inconvenience remains as the share borne together by the institution that recognizes effect against third parties.
Returning to this scene, the determination concerning the scope of a final revocation already stands. Where the refusal disposition was revoked in a lawsuit in which A sued and that judgment became final and conclusive, the effect of that revocation does not remain only between parties A and B but extends to third parties as well. Yet on this scene alone it has not been confirmed whether the subsequent refusal reply is a re-disposition consistent with the purpose of the judgment or a void disposition that violates binding force. That comparison is a question to be handled outside the scope of this section, and it remains unconfirmed.
Accordingly, what this section permits is the determination that the effect of a final revocation extends beyond the parties as well, and what it does not permit is the interpretation that turns that effect back and confines it to the parties alone. This determination concerns the scope of the effect of the revocation, and does not separately fix the lawfulness of the subsequent disposition or the means of enforcement.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
앞의 단계에서 확인한 것은 공공복리에 중대한 영향이나 정지사유 소멸이 있으면 정지 취소의 통로가 열린다는 점이다. 이 결론은 그 문장의 사실관계만 옮긴 것이며 앞 단계의 논증을 다시 펼치지 않는다. 이어지는 물음은 해당 조문 문언이 소송 밖의 삶에 어떤 범위로 적용되는지에 관한 것이다. 특히 신청인 A는 거부처분을 취소하는 판결을 받았지만 행정청 B는 같은 신청에 다시 거부 회신을 보낸 장면에서, 판결의 효력이 당사자 A와 B에게만 묶여 있는지가 문제 된다.
이번 단계에서 다룰 원문은 행정소송법 제29조 제1항이다. 그 문언은 “①처분등을 취소하는 확정판결은 제3자에 대하여도 효력이 있다.”(행정소송법 제29조)고 선언한다. 여기서 문언이 가리키는 주체는 확정판결을 받은 소송 당사자에 더해, 그 소송 절차에 참여하지 않은 제3자를 포함한다. 행위는 처분등을 취소하는 확정판결의 선고와 그 확정이며, 조건은 판결이 확정판결의 지위에 이르렀다는 사실이다. 이 문언은 취소 확정판결의 효력이 어떤 범위에 미치는지만을 말할 뿐, 판결이유의 구체적 판단이나 별도 항에서 다루어지는 다른 쟁점까지 함께 규율하지 않는다.
제3자에게도 효력이 있다는 문언은 판결의 확정에 따른 대세적 효력을 선언한 특칙이다. 민사 판결의 경우 판결의 효력이 원칙적으로 소송 당사자 사이에 한정되는 것과 달리, 처분등을 취소하는 확정판결은 제3자에 대하여도 효력이 있다는 점에서 둘은 범위가 갈린다. 이 구별은 이번 해당 원문이 설정한 조건부 판단 기준이며, 문언이 이렇게 정해져 있다는 사실과 저자가 이를 해설한 내용을 나누어 보아야 한다. 따라서 확정 이후의 재처분을 판정할 때는 당사자 사이의 소송 효과에 국한된 기준이 아니라, 제3자에게도 미치는 효력을 전제로 삼아야 한다.
그러나 참여하지 못한 사람의 이해가 바뀔 수 있다는 점은 가볍게 지나갈 문제가 아니다. 소송에 참가할 기회 없이 권리를 주장한 사람조차, 판결 하나로 기존의 행정상 상태가 소멸하는 결과를 감수해야 한다. 그 사람에게는 예상하지 못한 불이익이 생기고, 이를 되돌릴 절차가 곧바로 보장되는 것도 아니다. 이 손실을 인정하면서도 취소 확정의 효과를 당사자 사이에만 한정할 수는 없다. 문언이 이미 제3자에 대한 효력을 명시하고 있어, 제한된 해석을 택하면 조문의 정면 선언을 빛바래게 하는 결과가 된다. 반론의 부담을 남겨둔 채 대세적 효력을 확인하는 것이 이 판단의 태도다.
이 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 신청인 A가 거부처분을 취소하는 판결을 받았고, 행정청 B가 같은 신청에 다시 거부 회신을 보냈다는 사실이다. 대조할 자료는 취소 확정판결, 기속하는 판단, 이전 신청, 후속 처분, 간접강제 신청이다. 같은 신청에 대한 후속 처분이 판결 취지에 맞는지, 아니면 판결 취지에 반하는 것인지 여부는 이 장면만으로는 확정할 수 없다. 연도나 금액, 기산일도 설정하지 않았으므로 조건을 바꾼 대조는 판단 조건의 하나로만 다룬다. 따라서 후속 회신의 내용과 형식은 미확정으로 남기고, 확정판결이 제3자에게도 효력을 미친다는 범위만 문언에 따라 확인한다.
해당 원문 문언만으로 뒷받침되는 것은 처분등을 취소하는 확정판결의 효력이 제3자에게도 미친다는 판단과, 그 대세적 효력을 민사 판결의 범위와 구별할 수 있다는 판단이다. 그렇다고 하여 이 판단이 후속 처분 자체의 위법 여부나 이행 압박의 개별 요건까지 확정한 것은 아니다. 이 미확정된 사항들은 이 범위 밖의 물음으로 남는다.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
이전 단계에서 다룬 것은 효과의 범위를 제한할 수 있는지였고, 지금 물음은 그 확정된 틀 안에서 판결 이후의 조치를 어떻게 나누어 볼 것인가에 관한 것이다. 이 장면에서 재처분과 이행 압박의 안쪽에서 다시 구분할 부분이 무엇인지 밝힌다.
이 물음에 해당하는 법령 문언은 처분등을 취소하는 확정판결은 제삼자에 대하여도 효력이 있다 (행정소송법 제29조)는 것이다. 이 조문은 판결의 효력이 소송에 참여한 당사자라는 사람 사이에 묶이지 않고, 그밖에 있는 제삼자라는 범위까지 나아간다는 점을 말한다. 여기서 효력이란 확정된 취소의 결과를 그대로 받아들여야 한다는 구속을 가리키며, 누구의 어떤 행위에 적용되는지는 판결 취지와 별개의 문제로 남는다. 이 절은 이 항의 문언 범위만 빌린다.
이 문언과 앞선 판단은 서로 다른 두 단계를 구별할 것을 요구한다. 하나는 취소 확정의 효과가 어느 사람에게 미치는가이며, 다른 하나는 그 효과를 받는 기관이 어떤 조치를 내려야 하는가이다. 앞의 것은 대세적 효력, 즉 취소의 효과가 제삼자에게도 미치는 성질로 정리된다. 뒤의 것은 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 이루어졌는지, 아니면 미처분·당연무효 재처분에 이르렀는지에 따라 나뉜다. 구분은 작동하는 경우와 막히는 경우와 미확정인 경우의 조건에 한정된다.
가장 강한 반론은 참여하지 못한 사람의 이해가 바뀔 수 있다는 데 있다. 취소의 결과를 모르고 있던 제삼자에게까지 그 효력을 미치게 하면, 자신이 지킨 질서나 기대한 지위가 판결 하나로 흔들리는 손실과 불편을 감수해야 한다. 이 문언이 택한 범위가 제삼자이기 때문이다. 반론이 지적한 제삼자의 부담은 지우지 않은 채, 그 부담을 이유로 효과의 범위를 다시 좁히지는 않는다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 것은 A가 받은 취소 판결과 B가 보낸 후속 거부 회신뿐이다. 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 이루어졌는지, 후속 처분이 무효인지, 기속하는 판단이 무엇인지, 간접강제 신청이 실제로 어떻게 되었는지는 이 장면만으로 판단할 수 없다. 따라서 새 처분이 판결 취지에 반하는지 또는 무효인지 확인되지 않은 경우는 미확정인 경우에 머문다. 유효하고 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 이루어졌는데 결과가 불리하다는 이유만으로 미처분 간접강제를 구하는 것은 막히는 경우에 들어간다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 이렇다. 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 이루어지거나, 미처분·당연무효 재처분에 대해 법정 간접강제 통로가 열리는 경우가 작동하는 경우이다. 여기에 속하지 않고 위와 같이 확인되지 않는 사정은 미확정으로 남으며, 미처분과 같은 판단을 확정된 것으로 취급하지 않는다.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
앞 단계에서 취소 확정의 대외 범위를 확인한 데서 멈추고, 이제 신청인 A는 거부처분을 취소하는 판결을 받았지만 행정청 B는 같은 신청에 다시 거부 회신을 보낸 장면에서 이행 압박이 어느 지점에서 열리고 어느 지점에서 막히는지 묻는다. 이 물음은 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분의 실현과 그 결과에 대한 불만을 구별할 때만 정리된다.
해당 원문은 처분등을 취소하는 확정판결의 효력 범위를 적는다. 즉 "처분등을 취소하는 확정판결은 제3자에 대하여도 효력이 있다"고 선언한다(행정소송법 제29조). 여기서 처분등은 취소의 대상이 된 행정작용을, 취소하는 확정판결은 그 취소가 확정된 판결을, 제3자란 소송에 참가하지 아니한 사람을 가리키는 한정된 문언이다. 이 문언이 규정하는 것은 효력의 도달 범위이지, 후속 처분의 위법 여부나 간접강제의 인용 요건을 직접 정하지는 않는다.
이 조문이 확인하는 취소 확정의 대세적 효력, 곧 취소의 효과가 제삼자에게도 미치는 성질은 앞 절이 확인한 범위를 넘어 이행 압박의 기초가 된다. 다만 압박이 열리는 단계와 막히는 단계는 같은 기초 위에서도 갈린다. 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 이루어졌거나 미처분·당연무효 재처분에 대해 법정 간접강제 통로가 열린 경우에는 이행 압박이 유지되고, 유효하고 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 이미 이루어졌는데 결과가 불리하다는 이유만으로 미처분에 대한 간접강제를 구하는 경우에는 그 구별이 막힌다. 전자의 판단 기준은 후속 처분의 실질이 아니라 판결 취지와의 관계에서 정해지며, 둘을 섞으면 불만과 위법이 하나로 취급된다.
이 구별을 강하게 반박하는 입장은 손해와 형평의 측면에서 나온다. 참여하지 못한 사람의 이해가 바뀔 수 있다는 점, 그리고 승소자에게 재처분의 결과까지 보장하지 않으면 승소가 끝없는 재소의 시작이 된다는 점을 그 반론은 함께 강조한다. 그러나 저자의 답은 분명하다. 반론이 지적한 불편을 줄이는 길은 대세적 효력을 제한하는 데 있지 않고, 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분의 완결과 그 결과에 대한 불만을 서로 다른 문제로 취급하는 데 있다.
합성 장면에서는 신청인 A가 받은 취소 판결, 행정청 B의 후속 거부 회신, 그리고 두 사람 사이에 오간 간접강제 신청만 확인된다. 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분인 후속 회신이 유효한지, 또는 기속력 위반으로 당연무효인지 여부는 기록이 정하지 않는다. 따라서 새 처분이 판결 취지에 반하는지 또는 무효인지 확인되지 않은 구간은 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 판정 조건 하나만 바꾸어 불리한 재처분이 아니라 기속력 위반으로 당연무효인 재처분으로 확인되면 미처분과 같은 판단을 적용한다는 기준은 유지된다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 취소 확정의 효력이 소송 당사자 밖으로도 미치며, 그 위에서 이행 압박의 개방·차단·미확정이 판결 취지와의 관계에 따라 갈린다는 것이다. 이 절이 허용하지 않는 결론은 재처분 결과가 불리하다는 이유만으로 미처분의 강제 통로를 그대로 적용한다는 것이고, 미확정 구간을 곧 구제 불능으로 바꾸는 것도 허용되지 않는다.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
공공복리에 중대한 영향이나 정지사유 소멸이 있으면 정지 취소의 통로가 열린다는 점을 염두에 두면서, 이번 절은 판결의 효력이 어느 범위까지 미치는지를 다룬다. 이 장면에서 남는 물음은 하나다. 처분을 취소한 판결은 소송 당사자에게만 미치는가.
이 물음에 대해 법문은 직접적인 기준을 둔다. 행정소송법은 “제3자에 대하여도 효력이 있다”(행정소송법 제29조)고 선언한다. 그 문언이 가리키는 주체는 판결의 소송 당사자와 그 밖의 제삼자이고, 대상이 되는 행위는 ‘처분등을 취소하는 확정판결’이며, 조건으로는 판결의 확정이 전제된다. 저자는 이 특칙을 민사 판결의 효력 범위와 구별해 읽어야 한다고 본다. 민사 판결에서 효력의 주관적 범위가 상대적으로 좁게 논의되는 것과 달리, 취소 판결은 확정과 함께 그 효과가 당사자 바깥으로도 미친다.
왜 이 구별이 필요한지는 두 판단 단계를 나누어 보면 분명해진다. 첫째, 취소 확정이 무엇을 무너뜨렸는지를 정하고, 둘째, 그 무너짐이 누구의 법적 지위에 영향을 주는지를 정한다. 이 정의는 효과의 도달 범위를 가리키는 것이지, 판결을 받은 사람마다 서로 다른 취소 결과를 만들어낸다는 뜻이 아니다. 같은 취소를 사람별로 쪼개어 유지하면 하나의 처분을 두고 상충하는 법적 상태가 나란히 남게 된다. 이 결론은 이 구별에서 나온다. 처분등을 취소하는 확정판결은 제삼자에게도 효력이 있다는 특칙을 민사 판결의 범위와 구별해야 한다.
그럼에도 이 결론을 달갑지 않게 보는 반론이 있다. 소송에 참여하지 못한 사람은 판결을 낳은 싸움에 끼지 못했는데, 그 사람의 이해가 승소 판결 때문에 달라질 수 있다는 점이 반론이 겨냥하는 손실이다. 어떤 제삼자는 취소된 처분을 근거로 이미 얻은 지위나 기대를 잃고, 어떤 제삼자는 그 덕을 보던 상태가 사라지는 불편을 겪는다. 대세적 효력을 인정하면 이들의 목소리 없는 불이익은 구조적으로 남는다. 그렇더라도 저자의 답은 바뀌지 않는다. 제삼자의 손실이 크다는 사실은 그대로 두고, 그 손실을 이유로 효력을 당사자 사이에 가두어 버리는 해법을 받아들이지 않는 것이다.
이 앞의 조건을 합성 장면과 대조하면 남는 사실은 좁다. 신청인 A는 거부처분을 취소하는 판결을 받았고, 행정청 B는 같은 신청에 다시 거부 회신을 보냈다. 이 사실만으로는 후속 회신이 판결 취지에 맞는지, 또는 기속력을 거스른 무효인 처분인지 판단할 수 없다. 판결이 확정되었는지, 그 판결이 무엇을 기속하는지, 이전 신청과 후속 처분이 같은 대상을 가리키는지에 관한 기록도 합성 장면에는 열거되어 있을 뿐 내용이 주어지지 않았다. 따라서 이 장면으로는 취소 확정의 대세적 효력이 관계 행정청의 어떤 구체적 의무로 이어지는지를 확정할 수 없다. 그 판단은 다른 단계의 물음이며, 이 절은 미확정으로 남긴다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 명료하다. 처분을 취소한 확정판결은 소송 당사자에게만 미친다는 해석은 버리고, 그 효과가 제삼자에게도 이른다는 성질을 받아들인다. 다만 그 성질을 이유로 곧바로 어떤 행정청이 무엇을 하여야 한다고 단정하는 것은 이 절의 몫이 아니다. 대세적 효력의 정의를 효력의 도달 범위로 한정해 읽고, 민사 판결의 주관적 범위와 구별하는 선에서 문을 닫는다. 그 뒤의 물음은 정해져 있다. 취소판결의 대세적 형성력이 확인되면 당사자 행정청과 관계 행정청이 판결 취지에 어떻게 기속되는지를 행정소송법 제30조에 따라 살펴야 한다.