Summary
Whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends not merely on the preparation of a new document but on whether the content of that disposition conforms to the purport of the judgment.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The mere fact that a document was reissued cannot be said to have cured the illegality. The preceding section took the view that a final and conclusive judgment of cancellation binds the administrative agency that was a party to the case and the related administrative agencies. After that binding force has operated, if Administrative Agency B sends yet another reply of refusal to the same application by Applicant A, one must now determine whether this new document actually satisfies the demand of the judgment. Does the fact that a new disposition has been issued mean that the judgment has been performed? What is the standard by which the channel of this remedy opens? Independent of the foregoing reasons, this question asks whether the act of drafting a document can be counted as the completion of performance.
The statutory text attached to this question points to what the administrative agency that made the disposition must do. Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act takes as its condition the case where the disposition canceled by judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, and provides that the administrative agency that made the disposition shall, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, again make a disposition on the previous application (Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The subject of this text is the administrative agency that made the refusal disposition, and the act is that of again making a disposition on the previous application. The condition is that it accords with the purport of the judgment.
Observing the constituent elements of this condition, one can see that whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends not merely on the drafting of a new document but on whether the content of that disposition accords with the purport of the judgment. Here, confirming the performance of a re-disposition is the task of distinguishing the existence of a new disposition from content that accords with the purport of the judgment. The two determinations lie at different stages. The former concerns whether the document was produced; the latter concerns whether its content embodies what the judgment demanded, and this distinction is the standard of judgment. Satisfaction of one does not fill the other.
Nevertheless, there is a risk of denying performance on the ground that the content is unfavorable. If the administrative agency repeatedly recites new grounds of refusal, a victorious judgment becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation, and Applicant A bears the loss and inconvenience of having to fight anew each time over a new document. Even so, the existence of the re-disposition document alone cannot establish performance in accordance with the purport of the judgment. This channel of remedy opens where a re-disposition accordant with the purport of the judgment is made, or where the statutory channel of indirect compulsory execution opens with respect to a non-disposition or a re-disposition void by operation of law. The burden of re-litigation pointed out by the counterargument should be alleviated, but it is not resolved by substituting confirmation of content with the mere existence of a new document.
Applicant A obtained a judgment canceling a refusal disposition, and Administrative Agency B sent a further reply of refusal to the same application. This fact alone does not establish whether the new reply accords with the purport of the judgment or is void by operation of law as a violation of its binding force, and therefore remains undetermined. However, performance cannot be established on the mere existence of a document without confirming the content of the new disposition. If it is confirmed not to be an adverse re-disposition but a re-disposition that is void by operation of law as a violation of binding force, the same determination as for non-disposition applies. Because the results of service and performance in an actual case and any amounts or accrual dates not present in the scene cannot be known, this section is confined to a conditional distinction.
The conclusion this section permits is to gauge the entrance to this remedy by distinguishing the existence of a new disposition from content that accords with the purport of the judgment; what it does not permit is establishing performance on the single fact that a document was issued.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
The scene now to be considered is one in which Applicant A obtained a judgment canceling a refusal disposition but Administrative Agency B sent a further reply of refusal to the same application, and the question arises whether the fact that a new disposition was issued alone means that the judgment has been performed. Along with it, the conditions under which the remedy is blocked are also at issue. The reason the matter must be viewed from the standpoint of confirming the performance of a re-disposition lies here. This item refers to the work of distinguishing the existence of a new disposition from content that accords with the purport of the judgment—that is, of separately examining the fact that a document was issued and the question whether that document is the disposition the judgment demanded. This distinction remains even after the foregoing conclusion is accepted.
The text corresponding to this question is found in Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act. Article 30(2) thereof provides: "Where the disposition canceled by judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, the administrative agency that made the disposition shall, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, again make a disposition on the previous application." The subject of this text is the administrative agency that made the disposition, and the act is that of again making a disposition on the previous application. The condition is that the disposition canceled has as its content the refusal of a party's application, and the standard for that act is that it must accord with the purport of the judgment. This paragraph sets out the basis of the duty of re-disposition, but does not address other procedural issues.
In light of this text, the conclusion of this section is as follows. Where a valid re-disposition accordant with the purport of the judgment has been made and indirect compulsory execution for non-disposition is sought solely because the result is unfavorable, the channel of remedy closes if any one of the statutory requirements is not met. Two things must be distinguished here. One is the existence of the disposition document; the other is whether its content accords with the purport of the judgment. Whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends on the latter, not the former. Since the act required by the text is a disposition in accordance with the purport of the judgment, merging the two stages of determination would erase the meaning of the performance the court demanded. There is no need to add new requirements or exceptions.
Yet there is a risk of denying performance on the ground that the content is unfavorable. The concern is that if the administrative agency repeatedly recites new grounds, victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. This counterargument targets the inconvenience and delay of the prevailing party having to contest the propriety of the re-disposition once again, and the cost of transferring to litigation afresh what had to be contested through the judgment. The unfavorable aspects cannot be erased. But the settled answer stands. For if performance were established on the single fact that a document was drafted, there would be no room left to examine what the content of that document is.
In the synthetic scene, the facts corresponding to this question are two: that there was a judgment canceling a refusal disposition, and that a further reply of refusal was sent in response to the same application. The foregoing condition distinguishes whether a valid re-disposition accordant with the purport of the judgment was made, or whether it is a non-disposition or a re-disposition void by operation of law. On this scene alone, which of the two obtains cannot be determined. Whether the content of the newly received reply is contrary to the purport of the judgment, or whether it is void by operation of law as a violation of binding force, has likewise not been settled. Accordingly, although one may posit the condition that if it is confirmed to be not an adverse re-disposition but a re-disposition void by operation of law as a violation of binding force, the same determination as for non-disposition applies, this cannot be determined at present. A state without materials is undetermined, and does not immediately mean that no remedy is available.
The boundary between the conclusion this section permits and the conclusion it does not is clear. Where a re-disposition accordant with the purport of the judgment has been made and indirect compulsory execution for non-disposition is sought solely because the result is unfavorable, the channel of remedy closes if any one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied. Conversely, the existence of a re-disposition document cannot of itself establish performance in accordance with the purport of the judgment. Whether the statutory channel of indirect compulsory execution is open for non-disposition and re-dispositions void by operation of law is a matter to be judged separately.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
In this scene, whether the fact that the duty of re-disposition was performed has been established is not decided by the mere circumstance that a new document exists. It follows that it must be examined, with the two questions distinguished, whether the fact that a new disposition was issued alone means the judgment has been performed, and where the boundary lies that cannot be fixed for want of materials.
Article 30(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides: "② Where the disposition canceled by judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, the administrative agency that made the disposition shall, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, again make a disposition on the previous application." (Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act) This text identifies the administrative agency that made the disposition as the subject of the duty, presupposes a disposition of cancellation that refuses a party's application, and requires the act of again making a disposition on the previous application. Because the condition that the content of that disposition, too, must accord with the purport of the judgment is attached to it, one cannot summarily conclude that the duty has been performed by the mere fact that a document was newly drafted.
Connecting this text with the conclusion of this section makes clear why confirming the performance of a re-disposition must distinguish the existence of a new disposition from content accordant with the purport of the judgment. As regards a new disposition whose contrariety to the purport of the judgment or invalidity has not been confirmed, matters on which the materials of determination have not been identified must not be treated as impossible but left undetermined. Impossibility denotes a case where no basis of judgment exists at all so that the matter cannot be fixed, whereas undetermined means a state in which the materials have not yet been sorted out and confirmation is held in abeyance. This distinction postpones the point of confirmation while avoiding the error of declaring the matter impossible outright.
The concern that if the administrative agency repeatedly recites new grounds, victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation points to substantive loss and inconvenience. If a party who obtained a victorious judgment must return to the beginning and contest the lawfulness of the re-disposition, the effect of the judgment is diluted and the dispute continues unresolved. These unfavorable aspects must not be erased. Even so, the answer stands that the existence of the re-disposition document alone cannot establish performance in accordance with the purport of the judgment. For if performance were established without reviewing accord with the purport of the judgment, the result might be to tolerate even a re-disposition that neutralizes the binding force of the judgment.
In the synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are the judgment canceling the refusal disposition received by Applicant A and the further reply of refusal sent by Administrative Agency B in response to the same application. No materials have been presented as to whether the content of this reply is contrary to the purport of the judgment, or whether it is a re-disposition void by operation of law as a violation of binding force. Accordingly, whether the content of the new disposition accords with the purport of the judgment cannot be determined, and that matter remains undetermined. Service and the actual results of performance, which cannot be adjudicated on the scene alone, likewise remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the performance of the duty of re-disposition cannot be established by the mere existence of a new disposition, and that matters not confirmed as contrary to the purport of the judgment or as invalid are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. What that conclusion does not permit is a determination that performance has or has not occurred in the absence of materials. Undetermined is the work of maintaining an open state in which the adjudication may change once materials are supplemented, and does not signify a resort to unavailability of remedies.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
Here the question remains whether the fact that a new disposition was issued alone means the judgment has been performed, and, if that stage is to be judged, which records are needed? On the premise that whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends not merely on the drafting of a new document but on whether the content of that disposition accords with the purport of the judgment, this stage adjudicates the stage on the basis of the records as designated alone.
Article 30(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides: "Where the disposition canceled by judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, the administrative agency that made the disposition shall, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, again make a disposition on the previous application." Along with the judgment that canceled the disposition, this text presupposes the condition that the disposition had as its content the refusal of a party's application, and designates the administrative agency that made the disposition as the subject who shall again make a disposition. The expression "a disposition on the previous application," rather than "a new disposition," does not require the appearance of a newly drafted document as such, but prompts the question whether the content of the disposition again made on the previous application accords with the purport of the judgment.
Here is where this text and the conclusion of this section connect. Confirming the existence of a new document and confirming whether its content accords with the purport of the judgment are different stages of determination. The former is the fact of whether a disposition was again made; the latter is the evaluation of whether, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, a disposition on the previous application was made. Combining the two into one stage would declare performance complete at the moment a single document is produced, yet the text places the standard of performance on the content of the disposition. Accordingly, stage adjudication is made only on the materials recorded in the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, the binding determination, the previous application, the subsequent disposition, and the application for indirect compulsory execution, and records that do not exist are not filled in by conjecture.
The strongest counterargument targets the risk of denying performance on the ground that the content is unfavorable. It is the concern that if the administrative agency repeatedly recites new grounds, victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. This concern points to actual loss and inconvenience. If Applicant A, having prevailed in the judgment, must fight anew with every new reply of refusal, a disadvantage arises in which the effect of the judgment drains away into a single document. This answer, without erasing the disadvantage the counterargument identifies, places the ground for establishing performance not on the existence of the document but on the comparison between the content of the disposition left in the records and the purport of the judgment.
In the synthetic scene, the facts relevant to this question are that Applicant A obtained a judgment canceling a refusal disposition, and that Administrative Agency B sent a further reply of refusal to the same application. On this scene alone, it is not confirmed whether the content of the new reply accords with the purport of the judgment, or whether it is void by operation of law as a violation of binding force. The materials used for adjudication are the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, the binding determination, the previous application, the subsequent disposition, and the application for indirect compulsory execution. Grounds, timing, and results not found in the records cannot be determined from this scene and therefore remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits remains within the scope that performance of the judgment cannot be established by the mere fact that a new disposition was issued, and that stage adjudication is made only on materials recorded in the records as designated, without filling in absent records by conjecture. This conclusion neither fixes the question of whether the content of the new disposition accords with the purport of the judgment, nor declares that the administrative agency's performance is complete.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In the scene where Applicant A obtained a judgment canceling a refusal disposition, but Administrative Agency B nonetheless sent another refusal reply in response to the same application, the question is whether, by the mere fact that the new reply was sent, implementation in accordance with the purport of the judgment has been completed. This question lies in discerning not the appearance of a new disposition but whether its content governs the determination of implementation.
The basis of this question is the wording of the duty of re-disposition prescribed in Article 30(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act. Under the provision, "Where the disposition canceled by a judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, the administrative agency that made the disposition shall, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, again make a disposition on the previous application" (Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act). This wording sets the subject as the administrative agency that made the disposition, the act as a re-disposition on the previous application, and the condition as a disposition in accordance with the purport of the judgment. Accordingly, the object of the duty is not the formal drafting of a document itself but the content of a disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment.
From the combination of subject, act, and condition that this wording denotes there emerges the standard of determination. Whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends not merely on the drafting of a new document but on whether the content of that disposition conforms to the purport of the judgment. The reason the two must be examined separately is that, if performance is established by mere existence, even a disposition contrary to the purport of the judgment would remain as valid performance, while if one hastens to decide on content alone, the procedural positions of non-disposition and re-disposition become entangled.
The counterargument that, if the administrative agency repeats new grounds, prevailing becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation, is aimed at substantive loss. The effect of the judgment already obtained by Applicant A would slip away through a single new reply, leaving behind the time and cost of contesting afresh with every new disposition. That disadvantage must not be erased. Denying implementation on the basis of unconfirmed new grounds is likewise not immediately permissible, but separately from that, reading the mere appearance of a document as completion of implementation is a determination that skips the condition set by the wording.
Comparing the facts of the scene with the foregoing conditions, the fact that Administrative Agency B sent another refusal reply in response to the same application is confirmed, but whether the content of that reply conforms to the purport of the judgment is not established by this scene alone. Where it is not confirmed whether the new disposition is contrary to the purport of the judgment or void, the determination remains undetermined. The contents contained in the record are not established here.
What this section permits is determining whether performance has occurred according to whether the content conforms to the purport of the judgment; what it does not permit is establishing performance by the single fact that a new document exists. Nor is denying the performance of a valid re-disposition merely because the outcome is unfavorable the answer of this section. The boundary lies not in the unfavorableness of the content but in its relationship to the purport of the judgment and in whether the specified change condition has been confirmed.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Following the flow in which the preceding analytical step concluded that performance of the judgment cannot be established merely by the appearance of a new disposition on the previous application, the present question narrows to how the content of that performance is to be confirmed. In the scene where Applicant A obtained a judgment canceling a refusal disposition, but Administrative Agency B nonetheless sent another refusal reply in response to the same application, the fact that a reply document exists and the assessment that its content followed the purport of the judgment are different questions.
The basis for answering this question lies in Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act. Article 30(2) thereof provides: "(2) Where the disposition canceled by a judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, the administrative agency that made the disposition shall, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, again make a disposition on the previous application." This wording takes as its subject the administrative agency that made that disposition, requires the act of again making a disposition on the previous application, and attaches to that act the condition that it must accord with the purport of the judgment.
What the provision requires of the administrative agency is not the act of drafting a document anew but the act of again making a disposition in accordance with the purport of the judgment. Accordingly, whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends not merely on the drafting of a new document but on whether the content of that disposition conforms to the purport of the judgment, and confirmation of the performance of a re-disposition is defined as the task of distinguishing the existence of a new disposition from content that conforms to the purport of the judgment. If the two are not distinguished and a single document that has appeared is established as performance, the qualification 'in accordance with the purport of the judgment,' which the provision attached as a condition, is dropped, and the determination becomes one that cannot be established.
The counterargument targets the substantive loss that this distinction entails. The complaint that, if the administrative agency repeats new grounds, prevailing becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation concretely points to the inconvenience and the consumption of time and cost in a situation that continues, with every new reply the administrative agency puts forward, as the applicant must again contest the lawfulness of its content. Even so, the answer above is that performance in accordance with the purport of the judgment cannot be established by the mere existence of the re-disposition document. The repetition of re-litigation pointed out by the counterargument is a clear loss, but on account of that loss the conclusion cannot be moved in the direction of omitting the review of content conformity that the provision requires and establishing performance by mere existence.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only the judgment canceling the refusal disposition received by A and the existence of the renewed refusal reply sent by B in response to the same application. Comparing these two facts with the definition of confirmation of the performance of a re-disposition, the existence of the new disposition is confirmed, but whether its content conforms to the purport of the judgment is not established by this scene alone. If, however, one judgment condition is altered, the boundary becomes apparent: if the re-disposition is confirmed to be one that is void by operation of law for violation of binding force rather than an unfavorable re-disposition, the same determination as where there is no disposition is applied. Conversely, performance cannot be denied merely on the ground that the content is unfavorable, and in this scene the conformity of the reply to the purport of the judgment remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that the existence of a new disposition and the conformity of its content to the purport of the judgment must be examined separately; the conclusion it does not permit is establishing performance by the mere fact that a document has been issued. Denying performance on the ground that the content is unfavorable is likewise not the conclusion of this section, and that determination is left to a later stage.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
The preceding section took the view that performance in accordance with the purport of the judgment cannot be established by the mere existence of the re-disposition document. It asks whether the judgment has been performed by the mere fact that a new disposition has emerged. Whether the judgment has been performed is a matter to be determined not by the surface event of issuing a document but by whether the content of that disposition actually contains what the judgment required. To answer this question, one must first clarify what the purport of the judgment, taken as the standard of performance, is.
The corresponding basis for this section is Article 30(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act. Its wording provides: "(2) Where the disposition canceled by a judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, the administrative agency that made the disposition shall, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, again make a disposition on the previous application" (Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act). In this wording the subject is the administrative agency that made the disposition being canceled, the act is again making a disposition on the previous application, and the condition is the case where the disposition being canceled has as its content the refusal of an application. Accordingly, the event that gives rise to the duty of re-disposition is limited to cases in which a refusal disposition on an application has been canceled. And the content of the act is specified not as the formal repetition of a document but as a new disposition on the previous application.
That wording expressly sets out the purport of the judgment as the standard for a re-disposition. The purport of the judgment refers to what the judgment took as its basis in canceling the disposition and what it required in directing that a disposition be made again; only a re-disposition conforming to this is evaluated as performance of that duty. This stands in the same context as the conclusion of the preceding section. This is precisely why the fact of the document's existence and the assessment of content conformity must be distinguished. If the former marks the time at which the duty arises, the latter determines whether that duty has been performed. As the wording goes, the duty that 'a disposition shall be made again' finds, from the purport of the judgment, what content that disposition must have; performance is therefore not established merely by completion of the drafting.
Nevertheless, the performance of the duty of re-disposition may not be denied merely because the new disposition that Administrative Agency B put forward is unfavorable to Applicant A. In the scene where the administrative agency sent another refusal reply in response to the same application, whether that reply is a new disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment is derived not from the favorable or unfavorable character of its content but from comparison with the standard set by the judgment. The counterargument that there is a serious risk of denying performance on the ground that the content is unfavorable even points to the loss that, if the administrative agency repeats new grounds, prevailing can become the beginning of endless re-litigation. This concern, however, cannot be resolved by placing the standard of performance on the existence of a document. Performance in accordance with the purport of the judgment cannot be established by the mere existence of the re-disposition document, and the disadvantage pointed out by the counterargument must be addressed by clarifying the criteria for assessing the content of the re-disposition.
In this section, confirmation of the performance of a re-disposition means the task of distinguishing the existence of a new disposition from content that conforms to the purport of the judgment. The synthetic scene set up only the fact that Applicant A obtained a judgment canceling a refusal disposition, but Administrative Agency B sent another refusal reply in response to the same application. Whether the subsequent reply is contrary to the purport of the judgment or void is not confirmed in the scene and therefore cannot be established in this section. Unconfirmed facts remain undetermined.
Accordingly, one cannot say that the judgment has been performed by the mere fact that a new disposition has emerged. The conclusion this section permits is the determination that whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends on whether the content of the new disposition conforms to the purport of the judgment. Conversely, conclusions that establish performance by the mere existence of a document or deny performance merely because the content is unfavorable are not permitted in this section. The premise carried over from the preceding section was that performance in accordance with the purport of the judgment cannot be established by the mere existence of the re-disposition document.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
A final and conclusive judgment of cancellation binds the administrative agency that is a party to the case in question and the related administrative agencies, and that binding effect is not extinguished merely by the fact that a new reply has arrived. What is to be asked here is whether the judgment has been performed.
Article 30(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides, leaving the wording as it is, "(2) Where the disposition canceled by a judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, the administrative agency that made the disposition shall, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, again make a disposition on the previous application" (Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act). This wording respectively limits the subject to the administrative agency that made the refusal disposition, the act to again making a disposition on the previous application, and the condition to the case where the disposition being canceled has as its content the refusal of an application.
Accordingly, the disposition that this wording requires is not the drafting itself but a disposition made in accordance with the purport of the judgment. The existence of a new disposition and content conforming to the purport of the judgment must be distinguished. The former is the fact whether a document has come into being; the latter is the question whether its content re-determined the previous application in accordance with the purport of the judgment, and if the latter is replaced by the former fact, the binding effect of the judgment comes to an end with a single empty form.
The strongest counterargument is directed at the point that, even after prevailing, if the administrative agency repeats new grounds, the burden of filing suit again remains each time, and at the point that, if performance is denied merely because the content is unfavorable, the practical benefit of the prevailing judgment is shaken. Yet the way to reduce that inconvenience does not lie in establishing performance by the mere existence of a new document. The determination that performance in accordance with the purport of the judgment cannot be established by the mere existence of the re-disposition document does not take the unfavorable outcome itself as a ground for denying performance, while separately examining whether the content followed the purport of the judgment.
In the synthetic scene, what A received is a judgment of cancellation, and what B sent is a renewed refusal reply to the same application. Whether the new refusal reply has content contrary to the purport of the judgment or is void by operation of law for violation of binding force is not confirmed by this scene alone and therefore remains undetermined. If that new disposition is confirmed to be a re-disposition that is void by operation of law for violation of binding force, the same determination as where there is no disposition is applied.
The conclusion this section permits is the determination that the mere fact that a new disposition has emerged does not allow one to assert that the judgment has been performed, and that whether it has been performed depends on separately confirming content conforming to the purport of the judgment. This determination does not decide what content of a re-disposition is void at once, nor by what procedure a departure from the purport of the judgment is contested. The route of compulsion to perform and the conditions for its effect are likewise not enumerated in this section, and the question whether an unfavorable re-disposition is at once the same as no disposition remains a different question.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
When adjudicating the performance of the duty of re-disposition, the fact alone that a new document has been produced cannot be taken as immediate cure of the illegality. In the preceding step, only the point that a final and conclusive judgment of cancellation binds the administrative agency that is a party to the case in question and the related administrative agencies was confirmed, and what conduct that binding effect requires was left aside. Accordingly, the present question narrows to discerning whether the reply that Administrative Agency B again put forward in response to the same application amounts to performance of the judgment.
The basis suited to this problem is the following wording of Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act. "(2) Where the disposition canceled by a judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, the administrative agency that made the disposition shall, in accordance with the purport of the judgment, again make a disposition on the previous application." This wording presupposes the case in which the judgment canceling the disposition limits the original disposition to a refusal disposition, and designates the administrative agency that made that disposition as the subject of the duty. And the required act is specified not as putting out any document anew but as again making a disposition on the previous application in accordance with the purport of the judgment.
Accordingly, to take this wording as the standard of adjudication, two stages must be examined separately. First, whether a duty has arisen for the administrative agency to make a disposition again; second, whether the new disposition actually made filled the content of that duty. Since the former confirmation does not automatically lead to the latter, the fact that a new document has been issued only signals the arising of the duty and does not mean its completion in performance.
The counterargument against which this distinction collides most strongly lies in the point that the practical burden on the administrative agency grows. There is a risk of denying performance on the ground that the content is unfavorable, and if, whenever a party remains dissatisfied with the outcome, the claim that performance is incomplete is repeated, the administrative agency is placed in endless re-litigation. Despite that risk, the counterargument's strong demand cannot be accepted as it stands. Because performance in accordance with the purport of the judgment cannot be established by the mere existence of the re-disposition document, the dispute over performance cannot be closed by merely showing a new document.
The fact confirmed in this scene goes no further than that Administrative Agency B sent another refusal reply in response to the same application. That this reply falls within the existence of a re-disposition can be seen from the scene. Whether the content of this reply conforms to the purport of the judgment, or whether it is void by operation of law for breach of binding force, is not confirmed by this scene alone and remains undetermined.
The conclusion that can be drawn as it stands in this section is that whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends not merely on the drafting of a new document but on whether the content of that disposition conforms to the purport of the judgment. However, by the mere fact that the outcome is unfavorable to Applicant A, a determination such as non-disposition or invalidity does not follow, nor can the wording be expanded by reading further reasoning of the judgment into it.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
In the preceding analysis, I addressed the question of whether the mere fact that a new disposition has been issued amounts to compliance with the judgment. Now, building on the premise thus carried forward, I ask what parts must be divided again and adjudicated in the case of a re-disposition matching the judgment of revocation and the pressure to comply. In particular, when a reply refusing the same application arrives again, the question remains as to what standard should be applied in adjudicating that reply.
The provision corresponding to this question is Article 30, paragraph (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act. Its text provides: "(2) Where the disposition revoked by judgment has as its content the refusal of a party's application, the administrative agency that made the disposition shall again make a disposition on the previous application in accordance with the purport of the judgment" (Article 30 of the Administrative Litigation Act). The actor indicated by this text is the administrative agency that made the disposition, the act is a disposition on the previous application, and the condition is that the disposition be made again in accordance with the purport of the judgment. Issues arising under other provisions are not addressed here.
Connecting this text with the preceding conclusion makes clear the distinction that whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends not merely on the drafting of a new document but on whether the content of that disposition accords with the purport of the judgment. In other words, the existence of a new disposition and content conforming to the purport of the judgment are separate stages of adjudication. The fact that the former is complete does not mean the latter is complete, and the incompleteness of the latter does not negate the existence of the former. Even without creating additional requirements or exceptions, these two stages alone separate the determinations.
The strongest counterargument points to the risk of denying compliance on the ground that the content is unfavorable. Behind it lies the loss that, if the administrative agency repeatedly raises new grounds, a victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. However, within the scope of the foregoing answer, the conclusion holds. Even if the disadvantage spoken of by the counterargument is not erased, it cannot substitute for the determination of whether the content accords with the purport of the judgment.
Taking from the synthetic scenario only the facts relevant to this question, Applicant A obtained a judgment revoking a refusal disposition, but Administrative Agency B sent a further reply refusing the same application. Contrasting this scene with the foregoing conditions, the fact that a subsequent disposition exists is confirmed, but whether its content accords with the purport of the judgment is not. Accordingly, where it is unconfirmed whether the new disposition contravenes the purport of the judgment or is void, the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusions this section permits are narrow. The case in which a re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment is made, or in which the statutory channel of indirect compulsory execution is opened with respect to a non-disposition or a re-disposition void by operation of law, is taken as the operating case; the case in which a valid re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment has been made yet indirect compulsory execution for non-disposition is sought on the sole ground that the outcome is unfavorable is taken as the blocked case; and the case in which the basis for adjudication is not yet available is taken as the undetermined case.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
A final and conclusive judgment revoking a disposition, etc. binds the administrative agency that was a party to the case and other related administrative agencies in that matter. Examining what this binding force signifies in this scene, the question remains whether the new reply refusing the application constitutes compliance with that judgment. That is, the question of whether the mere fact that a new disposition has been issued amounts to compliance with the judgment opens again here.
As the basis for answering this question, Article 30, paragraph (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act provides that "the administrative agency that made the disposition shall again make a disposition on the previous application in accordance with the purport of the judgment." In this text, 'the administrative agency that made the disposition' refers to the administrative agency that made the refusal disposition being revoked; 'in accordance with the purport of the judgment' means taking as the standard the grounds of illegality recognized by the judgment and the direction of revocation; and 'a disposition on the previous application' is a disposition made anew on an application already submitted, and therefore does not replace the preceding application procedure with a new one. Here I treat only the actor, act, and condition indicated by this text.
Where a re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment is made, that duty is treated as fulfilled and the door to pressure to comply closes; but where no such re-disposition exists, or with respect to a non-disposition or a re-disposition void by operation of law, the statutory channel of indirect compulsory execution is opened. The reason these two stages of adjudication must be distinguished is that the earlier stage determines 'what is to be done' while the later stage confirms 'whether it was done.' If merged, whether compliance occurred and the means of enforcement become entangled, and neither can be judged precisely.
There is, however, the risk of denying compliance on the ground that the content is unfavorable. If the administrative agency repeatedly raises new grounds, a victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation, and the applicant, even after obtaining a judgment, must keep repeating the same procedure and expending time and cost. Even so, to prevent that loss, compliance with the purport of the judgment cannot be established by the mere existence of a re-disposition document. Where a valid re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment has been made, seeking indirect compulsory execution for non-disposition on the sole ground that the outcome is unfavorable is blocked. Even in that case, the point that the content, not the document, was examined is not erased.
The facts that can be confirmed in the synthetic scenario are that the disposition to be revoked has as its content the refusal of the application, and that the administrative agency that made that disposition sent a further reply refusing the same application. These facts alone do not confirm whether the new reply contravenes the purport of the judgment, or is void by operation of law for violation of binding force. Because it cannot be known whether a valid re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment has been made, the matter remains undetermined for now. As the scenario contains no year, amount, or time limit, those items are not adjudicated.
The conclusions this section permits are narrow. First examine whether a re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment has been made; if it does not conform, or if there is a non-disposition or a disposition void by operation of law, consider the statutory channel of indirect compulsory execution; and if nothing has been confirmed, leave the matter undetermined. This section does not permit establishing compliance from the single fact that a document was issued, denying compliance from the single fact that the content is unfavorable, or reading an unconfirmed state at once as a state without remedy.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
This provision specifies, respectively, that the subject bearing the duty of re-disposition is the administrative agency that made the refusal disposition revoked by the judgment, that the act is again making a disposition on the previous application in accordance with the purport of the judgment, and that the condition is the case in which the foregoing disposition has as its content the refusal of the application. What this text speaks of is not repetition of dispositions but a disposition of specified content.
That text supports the point that whether the duty of re-disposition has been performed depends not merely on the drafting of a new document but on whether the content of that disposition accords with the purport of the judgment. Compliance in accordance with the purport of the judgment lies in again making a disposition on the previous application occupying the same place as the disposition revoked by the judgment; hence the fact that a new document was produced and the determination that the document contains the content required by the judgment are two distinct matters. Establishing the latter from the former alone would collapse into one the two circumstances the text distinguishes.
If, where the administrative agency has made a re-disposition conforming to the purport of the judgment, denial of compliance akin to non-disposition follows from the mere circumstance that the outcome is unfavorable to the applicant, the duty of re-disposition is transformed into a guarantee of a favorable outcome. The judgment that unfavorableness does not deny compliance and the judgment that the existence of a document does not establish compliance are maintained together.
What is confirmed in this scene is the existence of the judgment, the previous application, and the subsequent reply refusing that application. However, whether that subsequent reply conforms to the purport of the judgment, or is void for contravening the purport of the judgment, cannot be determined from the scene alone. The conclusion of this section extends to leaving such an unconfirmed state as undetermined.
What this section permits is to distinguish the existence of a new disposition from content conforming to the purport of the judgment and thereby confirm whether compliance with the purport of the judgment has occurred. What this section does not permit is establishing that compliance from the sole fact that a new disposition document was drafted. Whether the newly issued refusal disposition, beyond the circumstance that it is unfavorable to the applicant, is void by operation of law for violation of binding force is examined specifically in the next section.