Summary
Precedents treat a re-disposition that is null and void, such as for contravening the binding force, as equivalent to non-disposition, and distinguish it from mere dissatisfaction with the outcome.
4.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Between the fact that refusals were repeated and the conclusion that the judgment was not complied with, a determination of invalidity is required. Given the earlier-accepted conclusion that whether the obligation to make a re-disposition is performed depends not merely on the drafting of a new document but also on whether the content of that disposition conforms to the intent of the judgment, the question is in what circumstances that determination follows. Applicant A obtained a judgment canceling a refusal disposition, but administrative agency B sent another refusal reply to the same application. In this scene, the question is whether the mere fact that the new reply is adverse immediately places matters on the same footing as if no re-disposition had been made, or whether a separate determination must precede it.
The precedent presents conditions, saying: "[1] Even where a final and conclusive judgment canceling a refusal disposition has been rendered, if the administrative agency makes no re-disposition whatsoever, or even if it makes a re-disposition, that re-disposition is void by operation of law as being contrary to the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition or the like, this may be regarded as the same as the case where no re-disposition whatsoever has been made, and accordingly". The actor referred to here is the administrative agency bound by the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, and the conduct is the case where no disposition whatsoever is made after that judgment, or where a disposition is made but in a form contrary to that binding force. This wording addresses together the questions whether the disposition itself has effect and whether that effect departs from the intent of the judgment (Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002).
According to this wording, the entrance to this relief opens where a re-disposition conforming to the intent of the judgment has been made, or where the statutory route of indirect compulsory execution in respect of non-disposition or a re-disposition void by operation of law has been opened. In this determination, two stages must necessarily be distinguished. One is whether the act constituting a re-disposition occurred; the other is whether the content of that disposition respected the binding force of the judgment. A void re-disposition denotes a subsequent disposition that is without effect on account of a violation of binding force or the like; a disposition without effect, even if it takes the form of an act, does not by itself amount to performance of the obligation to make a re-disposition.
While the new refusal is separately contested, delay continues. If the administrative agency attaches new grounds and repeatedly refuses even after the judgment, the party, though having obtained a victorious judgment, is placed in the position of having to bring a new action each time. Despite such loss and inconvenience, even so, void by operation of law cannot be established merely from the fact that the outcome of the re-disposition is adverse. The point that the outcome is adverse is not the same as the conclusion that the disposition is void, and omitting that determination may produce the error of pushing into invalidity even dispositions that do have effect. The reason the conclusion is maintained, while acknowledging the weight of the counterargument, is that the standard of invalidity rests not on the outcome but on violation of binding force or the like.
The facts within the scene fitting the present determination are only that A obtained the judgment of cancellation and that B sent another refusal reply to the same application. Whether that reply had content conforming to the intent of the judgment, or was a disposition contrary to the binding force, is not confirmed in this scene. Accordingly, whether a void re-disposition is recognized, or whether the matter amounts to mere dissatisfaction with the outcome, remains undetermined. However, if it is confirmed to be a re-disposition void by operation of law on account of violation of binding force rather than merely an adverse re-disposition, the same determination as for non-disposition is applied. This is a condition that the determination of invalidity must be gone through; the mere fact that the reply is adverse does not replace the preceding determination.
What this section permits is that, where a re-disposition conforming to the intent of the judgment has been made, or where non-disposition or a void re-disposition is confirmed and the statutory route of indirect compulsory execution is opened, the entrance to this relief opens when the required performance and the parties and conditions are specified in the claim and the right of the chosen action can be defended. What is not permitted is treating a disposition as though it did not exist merely because its outcome is adverse to the party; substituting a determination on unconfirmed grounds of invalidity also lies outside the scope of this section. What is established here is the standard for the entrance, not the final evaluation of the disposition or the success of performance.
4.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Whether the obligation to make a re-disposition is performed depends not merely on the drafting of a new document but on whether the content of that disposition conforms to the intent of the judgment. In this scene, the repeated refusals alone cannot support the conclusion that the performance obligation was violated. Whether the new reply conforms to the intent of the judgment, and whether its effect is valid, must first be determined. Performance of the obligation to make a re-disposition is not completed merely by the drafting of a new document. Whether its wording and content fall within the range set by the judgment must be determined together. The question is how to distinguish mere dissatisfaction with the outcome from a genuine failure of performance.
Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002 makes this distinction clear in its wording. The precedent holds: "Even where a final and conclusive judgment canceling a refusal disposition has been rendered, if the administrative agency makes no re-disposition whatsoever, or even if it makes a re-disposition, that re-disposition is void by operation of law as being contrary to the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition or the like, this may be regarded as the same as the case where no re-disposition whatsoever has been made, and accordingly". Here the actor is the administrative agency that received the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, and the conduct is whether a re-disposition is drafted and its content. The conditions divide into two. One is the case where no re-disposition exists; the other is the case where a re-disposition exists but is void by operation of law as being contrary to the binding force or the like. This wording places the latter case in the same position as the former. However, the fact that the outcome is adverse to the applicant is not among the conditions of this wording.
Connecting this wording with the conclusion of this section reveals that the ground for treating non-disposition and a void re-disposition as the same lies not in the absence of a disposition but in the absence of its effect. Binding force is the power that constrains the making of an administrative disposition anew in the direction set by the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation. A re-disposition contrary to the binding force, even if it exists as a document in form, cannot become the disposition required by the judgment. Accordingly, the two concepts of adverse outcome and absence of effect must be determined separately. The former is a circumstance enabling the applicant to contest the new refusal reply separately; the latter is a circumstance satisfying the requirements for indirect compulsory execution in the case of non-disposition. Though these two may appear to overlap, they are not the same. If effect is not absent and a disposition conforming to the intent of the judgment already exists, however adverse the outcome, the requirements are not met.
The counterargument that delay continues while the new refusal is separately contested is aimed at practical loss. The applicant, though having already won one lawsuit, must follow the procedure anew in the face of a new refusal, and meanwhile the handling of the matter applied for continues to be postponed. There also arises the concern that, if repeated refusal is used strategically, victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. Such inconvenience and time costs do not disappear. Even so, the counterargument cannot change the requirements. This is because void by operation of law cannot be established merely from the fact that the outcome of the re-disposition is adverse. An adverse outcome and the absence of effect caused by violation of binding force are different objects of determination, and only when the latter is confirmed can treatment the same as non-disposition be possible. The problem of delay pointed out by the counterargument remains, but that fact alone does not mean the requirements have been met.
Gauging this question on the facts appearing in the synthetic scene alone, Applicant A obtained a judgment canceling a refusal disposition, and administrative agency B sent another refusal reply to the same application. The drafting of the new reply is itself confirmed. However, whether that reply is a disposition conforming to the intent of the judgment, and whether it is void by operation of law as being contrary to the binding force or the like, is not confirmed in this scene. Accordingly, on this scene alone it can be regarded neither as non-disposition nor as a void re-disposition. Whether the condition has been met remains undetermined. Whether its content fulfills the condition is a separate matter for confirmation.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. Where a valid re-disposition conforming to the intent of the judgment has already been made and indirect compulsory execution in respect of non-disposition is sought merely because its outcome is adverse, the route of relief is closed if even one of the statutory requirements is not met. The conclusion not permitted is to regard the administrative agency as having failed to comply with the judgment merely from the fact that refusals were repeated, or merely from the fact that the outcome is adverse. A void re-disposition denotes a subsequent disposition that is without effect on account of a violation of binding force or the like, and only when that absence of effect is confirmed is a status the same as non-disposition recognized. A state of insufficient materials is undetermined and does not immediately mean that relief is impossible.
4.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The mere fact that a new document was created is insufficient. It is therefore examined whether repeated refusal is the same as not making a re-disposition. Beyond that, it must also be settled where the boundary lies at which the materials for determination are wanting and no determination can be made. This article answers that question by dividing the places of the determined and the undetermined.
The precedent says: even where a final and conclusive judgment canceling a refusal disposition has been rendered, if the administrative agency makes no re-disposition whatsoever, or even if it makes a re-disposition, that re-disposition is void by operation of law as being contrary to the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition or the like, this may be regarded as the same as the case where no re-disposition whatsoever has been made, and accordingly, in such a case it must be regarded that the requirements necessary for an application for indirect compulsory execution under Article 30 (2) and Article 34 (1) of the Administrative Litigation Act are met (Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002). The actor indicated by this wording is the administrative agency bearing the obligation to make a re-disposition. The conduct is the re-disposition made after the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, and the case where that re-disposition is void by operation of law as being contrary to the binding force is the condition written in the wording. The wording places the time when that condition is fulfilled in the same position as the case of non-disposition.
The point where the wording of the precedent and its conclusion meet lies precisely in that distinction. A re-disposition void by operation of law as being contrary to the binding force or the like is without effect and is placed alongside non-disposition, but the mere fact that the outcome is adverse to the applicant is not placed in the same position. This distinction is needed because the determination of invalidity spoken of in the preceding sentence does not ask about the fact of repeated refusal itself but about whether that disposition bore binding force. Since the stages of determination are thus divided, where it is unconfirmed whether a new refusal disposition contradicts the intent of the judgment or is void, the materials for determination that cannot be specified divide into two. Among them, matters that cannot be determined for want of materials remain undetermined, and are not mixed with the impossibility of performing those matters.
The counterargument that the loss arising from leaving matters that way is great must be confronted. If the administrative agency repeatedly cites new grounds, victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. The applicant meanwhile continues to bear the delay, and time passes even while the new refusal is separately contested. The adverse point of this counterargument is that, if the same determination as for non-disposition is not laid down for repeated refusal, even after obtaining a judgment one is made to start the same fight again from the beginning. Still, the conclusion is maintained. Void by operation of law cannot be established merely from the fact that the outcome of the re-disposition is adverse. The boundary that the precedent has drawn against mere dissatisfaction with the outcome cannot be erased merely because the delay is great.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that A obtained a judgment canceling the refusal disposition and that B sent another refusal reply to the same application. Setting these facts against the preceding conditions, whether the new subsequent disposition is contrary to the binding force is something the scene does not record. Nor is it settled whether that refusal disposition is a void re-disposition without effect. Accordingly, the mere fact that refusals were repeated cannot establish the same determination as for non-disposition, and this matter remains undetermined until the materials are supplemented.
The conclusion permitted in this section is limited to the case where a re-disposition confirmed to contradict the intent of the judgment or to be void is regarded the same as non-disposition and the requirements for an application for indirect compulsory execution are met, and obtaining the same determination merely from the fact that the outcome is adverse is not otherwise permitted. This determination keeps the distinction from mere dissatisfaction with the outcome, which the wording of the precedent set down as written, and goes no further than to leave undetermined, rather than treating as impossible, matters that cannot be specified for want of materials. Since the synthetic scene does not settle the outcome of a real case or the success of performance, these are not established. Matters for which the materials for determination are wanting are undetermined; this means that the materials have not been prepared, not that relief is immediately impossible.
4.4The Records Needed for Determination
In this scene, the questions are whether an adverse re-disposition is immediately the same as making no re-disposition, and what records are needed to determine that stage.
On this question, Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002 premises that "even where a final and conclusive judgment canceling a refusal disposition has been rendered, if the administrative agency makes no re-disposition whatsoever, or even if it makes a re-disposition, that re-disposition is void by operation of law as being contrary to the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition or the like". Here the actor is the administrative agency, the conduct is the re-disposition following the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, and the condition is the case of non-disposition or a disposition void by operation of law on account of violation of binding force or the like.
What this wording treats is not whether a document was drafted but whether that disposition has effect. Accordingly, at the stage of determination two things must be distinguished. One is the fact that the administrative agency issued a subsequent disposition; the other is the judgment that that disposition was validly constituted by observing the binding force of the judgment. The latter, a void re-disposition, denotes a subsequent disposition that is without effect on account of a violation of binding force or the like. The stage is determined only on the materials recorded in the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, the binding judgment, the prior application, the subsequent disposition, and the application for indirect compulsory execution. The stage determination is made only on the established records. Records that do not exist are not filled in by conjecture.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the continuation of loss. Delay continues while the new refusal is separately contested, and if the administrative agency repeatedly cites new grounds, victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. Such inconvenience must be acknowledged. What the precedent regards as the same as non-disposition is a re-disposition void by operation of law as being contrary to the binding force or the like, and to assert from the outcome alone without fixing the records necessary for that determination goes beyond this scope.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is only the judgment of cancellation received by Applicant A, administrative agency B's renewed refusal reply to the same application, and the prior application preceding it. These records are used to compare the content of the subsequent disposition with the object of the prior application. What the binding judgment established by the judgment was, and how the application for indirect compulsory execution was recorded, are not set in the scene. Accordingly, where it is unconfirmed whether the new reply contradicts the intent of the judgment or is void, the stage remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the determination, on the established records, of whether the matter is non-disposition, a re-disposition void by operation of law on account of violation of binding force or the like, or a valid re-disposition. What it does not permit is the assertion, equating non-disposition merely from an adverse outcome, that establishes invalidity. Where a re-disposition void by operation of law on account of violation of binding force, or a state of non-disposition, is confirmed, the examination proceeds to the requirements for an application for indirect compulsory execution under Article 34 of the Administrative Litigation Act.
4.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Yet in the scene where the administrative agency again sends a refusal reply to the same application, the question this time is whether one can say that the judgment was not complied with on the strength of the new refusal alone. It amounts to asking what fills the gap between the fact of a repeated refusal and the violation of compliance.
On this question, Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002 states in Summary of Decision [1] that "even where a re-disposition has been made, if it is void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition, this may be regarded as no different from a case in which no re-disposition whatsoever has been made; accordingly". Here the subject is the administrative agency that made the refusal disposition, and the act is the re-disposition made after the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation. The condition requires that the re-disposition be void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition. Precedent treats the case in which this condition is satisfied as no different from a case in which no re-disposition exists, and finds the requirements necessary for an application for indirect compulsory execution under Article 30 paragraph (2), Article 34 paragraph (1), etc. of the Administrative Litigation Act to be met.
Connecting this ground with the fixed conclusion reveals that the fact that a re-disposition was made and whether that re-disposition constitutes valid compliance are separate stages of determination. The former alone cannot establish the latter, and only once the latter is confirmed can the existing blocking and effectiveness determination stand. Accordingly, where the designated change is confirmed—that is, where the re-disposition is confirmed to be void by operation of law by contravening the binding force—the determination applicable to non-disposition is applied, the existing blocking and effectiveness determination is discarded, and the matter is re-adjudicated from that stage. The proposition that a void re-disposition means a subsequent disposition devoid of effect on grounds such as violation of binding force also stands on this distinction. Dissatisfaction with the result, in the absence of a confirmation of ineffectiveness, does not lead to a determination of nullity.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the fact that delay continues while the new refusal is separately contested even after prevailing. This delay and the burden of re-litigation are disadvantages that in fact remain, and they should not be erased. While acknowledging the costs identified by the counterargument, the distinction—applying the determination applicable to non-disposition only where nullity is confirmed—is retained.
In the synthetic scene, only the fact that Administrative Agency B again sent a refusal reply to the same application has been established. Whether this reply contravenes the intent of the judgment or is void for violation of the binding force has not been confirmed, and therefore remains undetermined. Changing one of the confirmed adjudicative conditions: if it is confirmed to be not an adverse re-disposition but a re-disposition void by operation of law by contravening the binding force, the determination applicable to non-disposition is applied. Conversely, where the re-disposition is valid and consistent with the intent of the judgment, seeking indirect compulsory execution for non-disposition on the ground that the result alone is adverse is the very direction foreclosed by the conclusion of this section. That something is undetermined does not mean it is beyond remedy; it is the next object of confirmation.
The conclusion this section permits is this: a re-disposition confirmed to be void by operation of law is treated as non-disposition, and once the designated change is confirmed, the existing blocking and invalidity determination is discarded and the matter is re-adjudicated from that stage. The conclusion it does not permit is to establish that it is void by operation of law on the sole fact that the re-disposition result is adverse, or to treat it as non-disposition on that fact alone. The boundary that the premise of the existing determination changes only once a determination of nullity is confirmed divides these two. Other facts and detailed applications remain outside the scope of this section.
4.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Even after accepting that standard, a determination of nullity is necessary between the fact that the refusal was repeated and the conclusion that the judgment was not complied with. This article narrows and examines only the place of that determination. Even after a refusal reply to the same application arrives again, the illegality of the content of the disposition must be examined.
Precedent provides: "notwithstanding a final and conclusive judgment canceling a refusal disposition, where the administrative agency makes no re-disposition whatsoever, or where it makes a re-disposition but that re-disposition is void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition" (Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002). This is the wording of Summary of Decision [1]. Here the subject is the administrative agency, the act is a re-disposition after the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, and the condition is the case where the re-disposition is void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force. A void re-disposition means a subsequent disposition devoid of effect on grounds such as violation of binding force.
The wording of the above precedent treats such a re-disposition as "no different from a case in which no re-disposition whatsoever has been made," and finds the requirements for an application for indirect compulsory execution under Article 30 paragraph (2), Article 34 paragraph (1), etc. of the Administrative Litigation Act to be satisfied. (Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002) This is the closing phrase of Summary of Decision [1]. Yet what this wording addresses is not the case of an adverse result, but the case of void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force. A mere dissatisfaction with the result and an unlawful void re-disposition must be distinguished.
The counterargument that, if the administrative agency repeatedly advances new grounds, a victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation is aimed at real inconvenience. The applicant is made to follow the procedure repeatedly in response to the new refusal, and the benefit gained from the judgment is continually postponed. The loss of delay continuing while the new refusal is separately contested is also not light. Yet if a determination of nullity is hurried and fitted to dissatisfaction with the result, the counterargument is not resolved. It would not be right for an administrative agency, having made a valid re-disposition consistent with the intent of the judgment, to be treated as non-disposition on the result alone.
In this scene, Applicant A obtained a judgment canceling the refusal disposition, and administrative agency B again sent a refusal reply to the same application. On the records, only the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, the binding determination, the prior application, the subsequent disposition, and the application for indirect compulsory execution are classified. Accordingly, whether the new disposition is consistent with the intent of the judgment or is void has not been confirmed, and remains undetermined. The compliance outcome of the actual case cannot be established.
In sum, the conclusion this stage permits is that void by operation of law cannot be established on the sole fact that the re-disposition result is adverse. However, where that adverse result is confirmed in the form of a re-disposition that is void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force, precedent treats it as non-disposition and finds the requirements for indirect compulsory execution satisfied. Conversely, where a valid re-disposition consistent with the intent of the judgment has been made, seeking indirect compulsory execution for non-disposition merely because the result is adverse is not accepted. The presence or absence of a determination of nullity draws that boundary.
4.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
It takes up the premise of the preceding section, that void by operation of law cannot be established on the sole fact that the re-disposition result is adverse. Yet if the new reply of the administrative agency has content inconsistent with the binding force of the judgment, is it to be regarded as a valid re-disposition all the same? Merely disliking the result, and a subsequent disposition that fails to have any effect at all, must be distinguished. (Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002)
On this question, Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002 states that "notwithstanding a final and conclusive judgment canceling a refusal disposition, where the administrative agency makes no re-disposition whatsoever, or where it makes a re-disposition but that re-disposition is void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition, this may be regarded as no different from a case in which no re-disposition whatsoever has been made; accordingly" (Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002). Here the subject is the administrative agency bearing the duty to make a re-disposition after the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition, the act is the subsequent disposition on the prior application, and the condition is the case where the re-disposition is void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force of the judgment. Its wording treats the matter as non-disposition only in such a case.
What connects that ground with the conclusion of the preceding section is the stage of a determination of nullity. Precedent holds that "in such a case, it should be regarded as satisfying the requirements necessary for an application for indirect compulsory execution under Article 30 paragraph (2), Article 34 paragraph (1), etc. of the Administrative Litigation Act" (Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002). That is, a re-disposition void by operation of law for contravening the binding force is a subsequent disposition devoid of effect, and at that point the requirements for indirect compulsory execution are met. By contrast, if the re-disposition is valid, it is not treated as non-disposition even if the result is adverse to the applicant. The reason for dividing the two stages is that dissatisfaction with the result and the effect of a disposition are different questions. Without confirmation of the latter, the former alone cannot establish non-disposition.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the burden of delay and repeated litigation. Time continues to flow while the new refusal is separately contested, and if the administrative agency repeatedly advances new grounds, the applicant's victory becomes the beginning of endless re-litigation. Meanwhile compliance halts and only costs accumulate. Even so, the established answer is the same. The case in which precedent treats the matter as non-disposition is limited to when a re-disposition void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force, has been confirmed. The disadvantage identified by the counterargument cannot serve as the ground for a determination of nullity.
Returning to the synthetic scene, A obtained a judgment canceling the refusal disposition, and B again sent a refusal reply to the same application. In this scene, the facts to be confirmed are that A's judgment is a final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, and that B's reply is a subsequent disposition on the same application. However, whether that reply has content consistent with the intent of the judgment, or is void by operation of law for violation of the binding force, has not been established on this scene alone. Accordingly this circumstance remains undetermined. If this reply is a disposition that is valid and consistent with the intent of the judgment, indirect compulsory execution for non-disposition cannot be sought merely because the result is adverse.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. A re-disposition void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force, is treated as non-disposition and the requirements for indirect compulsory execution are met; and the distinction—that void by operation of law cannot be established on the circumstance of an adverse result alone—is the limit. Where it has not been confirmed whether the new disposition contravenes the intent of the judgment or is void, that determination cannot be made. This section deals only with the conditions for a determination of nullity, and does not deal with the manner of pressing for compliance itself.
4.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
A repeated refusal alone cannot adjudicate whether compliance has occurred. To determine non-disposition solely from the fact that the re-disposition result is adverse, the legal effect of the new refusal must be separately confirmed.
Supreme Court Decision 2002Mu22 decided December 11, 2002 presents in Summary of Decision [1] the wording that "notwithstanding a final and conclusive judgment canceling a refusal disposition, where the administrative agency makes no re-disposition whatsoever, or where it makes a re-disposition but that re-disposition is void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment canceling the prior refusal disposition". The subject prescribed by this wording is the administrative agency making a re-disposition after the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, the target act is the subsequent re-disposition on the prior refusal disposition, and the condition is the case in which no re-disposition exists and the case in which there is a re-disposition void by operation of law, such as by contravening the binding force. The two cases are set out in parallel in the wording, but their reasons differ. The former is the non-existence of an act; the latter is a determination that, although the act exists, it has no effect. This paragraph addresses only the wording of this condition.
The above wording places a void re-disposition in the same position as non-disposition, and thereby finds the requirements for an application for indirect compulsory execution satisfied. For this determination to stand, the concept of a void re-disposition must first be settled. The determination of contravening the binding force is separate from whether the new refusal was drawn up, and is a determination whether its content violated the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation. This is why the two stages are distinguished. The fact that a new disposition exists is merely the starting point for adjudicating whether compliance occurred, and whether that disposition has effect divides the matter into non-disposition or not. (2002Mu22) accords treatment as non-disposition precisely to this lack of effect.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the loss of delay and repeated litigation. Delay continues while Applicant A separately contests the new refusal, and meanwhile the time for recovery of the benefit may pass. For an applicant who, despite obtaining a judgment, receives only dispositions with adverse results, treating the matter as non-disposition accords with protection. This loss is not erased. Yet if, accepting the demand of the counterargument, void by operation of law is established on the sole fact that the re-disposition result is adverse, the result is to deny effect on the applicant's dissatisfaction alone. Excluding such an establishment is the conclusion. An adverse result and violation of the binding force must be distinguished, and the ground of a determination of nullity rests not on the result but on violation of the binding force and the like.
Taking out only the facts relevant to this question for comparison, what remains in the scene is the judgment of cancellation, the refusal reply sent again to the same application, and room for an application for indirect compulsory execution. Whether the new refusal reply contravenes the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, and is therefore devoid of effect, is not established on this scene alone. Accordingly it is unconfirmed and remains undetermined, and if it is confirmed to contravene the intent of the judgment, the adjudication changes. While unconfirmed, the requirements for indirect compulsory execution for non-disposition cannot be established. If confirmed, that determination of nullity becomes the ground for treatment as non-disposition. This comparison does not close without a determination of nullity.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Where, after a final and conclusive judgment of cancellation, no re-disposition is made, or where a re-disposition is made but is void by operation of law on grounds such as violation of the binding force, that re-disposition is treated as non-disposition. The conclusions not permitted are as follows: establishing a void re-disposition on the sole fact that the re-disposition result is adverse to the applicant, or on the sole fact that the new refusal was repeated, or declaring the requirements for indirect compulsory execution for non-disposition to be met, is not the conclusion of this section. A void re-disposition is a subsequent disposition devoid of effect on grounds such as violation of the binding force, and is distinguished from mere dissatisfaction with the result. The collection of actual records or compliance performance was not established by this section, and matters that remain unconfirmed stay undetermined. Only within this boundary can the place of a determination of nullity be settled.
4.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
앞선 분석 단계는 재처분 의무의 이행 여부가 새 문서의 작성만이 아니라 그 처분 내용이 판결 취지에 맞는지에 달려 있음을 확인했다. 그 판단은 새로 작성된 문서의 형식적 존재를 넘어 그 내용의 적법성을 요구했다. 이제 남은 물음은 같은 후속 처분을 두고 어떤 기준으로 미처분에 해당하는지를 밝히는 것이다.
대법원 2002. 12. 11. 자 2002무22 결정의 해당 구절은 이렇게 적는다. "[1] 거부처분에 대한 취소의 확정판결이 있음에도 행정청이 아무런 재처분을 하지 아니하거나, 재처분을 하였다 하더라도 그것이 종전 거부처분에 대한 취소의 확정판결의 기속력에 반하는 등으로 당연무효라면" 이라는 대목에서 출발한다. 여기서 다루는 주체는 행정청이고, 행위는 취소 확정판결 뒤에 있거나 없는 재처분이며, 조건은 판결의 기속력에 반하는 등으로 효력을 상실하는 경우이다. 이 구절이 가리키는 무효 재처분이란 기속력 위반 등으로 효력이 없는 후속 처분을 뜻한다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 잇는 것은 판정의 두 단계를 구별하는 일이다. 첫째, 취소 확정판결이 기속하는 판단을 행정청이 실제로 따랐는지 그 내용을 살핀다. 둘째, 그 내용이 판결 취지에 반하여 효력을 지니지 못한다면 결과적으로 미처분과 같은 지위가 부여된다. 저자는 이 두 단계를 나누어 보고, 둘째 단계의 요건을 문언의 범위 안에서만 적용한다. 다만 그 판단의 근거를 대법원 2002. 12. 11. 자 2002무22 결정의 해당 문언에 한정하며, 판결이유나 다른 부분으로 확장하지 않는다.
이 구분이 겨냥하는 가장 강한 반론은 새 거부를 별도로 다투는 동안 지연이 계속된다는 불편이다. 행정청이 새 사유를 반복해 들면 승소는 끝없는 재소의 시작이 되고, 신청인 A는 유예 기간에 그대로 묶인다. 지연이 쌓일수록 신청의 실익은 줄어들며 그 손실은 결과론적으로 파악하기 어렵다. 저자는 이 점을 부정하지 않는다. 지연의 고충은 간접강제의 판단을 서두르게 할지언정 무효 요건을 무너뜨리는 근거가 되지 못한다.
합성 장면으로 돌아와 보면, 행정청 B는 같은 신청에 다시 거부 회신을 보냈지만 그 회신이 종전 거부처분의 취소 확정판결의 기속력에 반하는지에 대해서는 확인된 사실이 없다. 관련 자료는 취소 확정판결, 기속하는 판단, 이전 신청, 후속 처분, 간접강제 신청뿐이다. 후속 처분이 기속력 위반 등으로 당연무효인 것으로 확인되면 미처분과 같은 판단을 적용하지만, 불리한 재처분이라는 사실만으로는 그 판단에 이르지 못한다. 결국 장면만으로는 현재의 후속 처분이 취소판결에 맞는지, 다시 말해 미처분에 해당하는지를 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 해당 원문 문언만 취소판결에 맞는 재처분과 이행 압박의 판정 근거로 삼는다는 것이다. 그 문언은 기속력 위반 등으로 당연무효인 재처분을 미처분과 같이 보며, 단순한 결과 불만과 구별한다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 결과가 불리하다는 사실 하나로 미처분 간접강제의 요건을 갖추었다고 보거나, 판결이유와 다른 항으로 판단을 넓히는 것이다.
4.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
새 문서가 아니라 판결 취지에 맞는 처분을 요구한다. 여기서는 불리한 재처분이면 곧 재처분을 하지 않은 것과 같은지를 다룬다. 이 물음은 재처분 의무의 이행 여부가 그 내용에 달려 있다는 전제 안에서만 다루어진다.
대법원 2002. 12. 11. 자 2002무22 결정의 판결요지 [1]은 “거부처분에 대한 취소의 확정판결이 있음에도 행정청이 아무런 재처분을 하지 아니하거나, 재처분을 하였다 하더라도 그것이 종전 거부처분에 대한 취소의 확정판결의 기속력에 반하는 등으로 당연무효라면 이는 아무런 재처분을 하지 아니한 때와 마찬가지라 할 것이므로”라고 밝힌다(대법원 2002. 12. 11. 자 2002무22 결정). 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 재처분 권한을 가진 행정청이며, 행위는 취소 확정판결 뒤의 재처분 또는 그 부작위이다. 조건은 아무런 재처분이 없는 경우와 재처분이 있으되 기속력에 반하는 등으로 당연무효인 경우로 나뉘며, 무효 재처분은 기속력 위반 등으로 효력이 없는 후속 처분을 뜻한다.
이 근거와 이 절의 결론을 잇는 것은 위 두 경우를 미처분과 같이 보면서도 단순한 결과 불만과 구별한다는 판례의 구분이다. 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 이루어졌는지는 새 문서의 작성 여부가 아니라 그 처분 내용이 기속력에 맞는지 여부로 판단한다. 같은 취소 확정판결과 기속하는 판단, 이전 신청과 후속 처분을 기록으로 두어도, 후속 처분이 무효인지 아닌지는 별개로 확인되어야 한다. 즉 결과가 불리하다는 사정 하나로 무효 판단을 건너뛰어 미처분을 확정하면, 무효 판단이 설 자리를 잃는다.
가장 강한 반론은 새 거부를 별도로 다투는 동안 지연이 계속되고, 행정청이 새 사유를 반복해 들면 승소가 끝없는 재소의 시작이 된다는 데 있다. 신청인 A는 판결을 받고도 같은 신청에 대한 거부 회신을 받는 셈이어서, 절차가 이어지는 동안 구제는 뒤로 밀린다. 그러나 그렇더라도 재처분 결과가 불리하다는 사실만으로 당연무효를 확정할 수는 없다. 이 답이 반론의 불리함을 지우는 것은 아니며, 미처분과 같은 취급은 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분의 이행 여부와 무효 여부를 각각 따져 보는 범위 안에서만 유지된다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 해당하는 사실은 신청인 A가 받은 취소 판결, 행정청 B가 보낸 후속 거부 회신, 그리고 그에 따른 간접강제 신청의 기록뿐이다. 이 장면만으로 후속 거부 회신이 기속력에 반하는지, 즉 무효 재처분인지 여부는 확인되지 않아 미확정으로 남는다. 실제 사건의 송달·이행 결과와 같은 자료는 수집되지 않았으므로, 이 절은 명시한 조건부 구별에 한정한다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분의 이행 여부를 그 내용과 무효 여부로 나누어 판정하는 것이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 결과 불리만으로 당연무효를 확정해 미처분과 같은 취급을 확정하는 것이다. 무효 재처분이라는 한 구별을 조건에 따라 적용하는 것으로 족하다.
4.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
같은 신청에 대한 회신이 반복되었다는 사실만으로는 B의 재처분이 이행되지 않았다고 단정할 수 없다. 거부가 반복되었다는 사실과 판결을 이행하지 않았다는 결론 사이는 무효 판단이 채워야 한다. 이 판단이 수행될 때 비로소 이 물음, 곧 불리한 재처분이면 곧 재처분을 하지 않은 것과 같은가에 답할 수 있다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 대법원 2002. 12. 11. 자 2002무22 결정의 판결요지 [1]에 있다. 여기서 주체는 취소 확정판결을 받은 행정청이고, 행위는 거부처분에 대한 재처분이며, 조건은 재처분이 아예 없거나 기속력에 반하는 등으로 당연무효인 경우다. 문언이 다루는 것은 재처분의 유무와 그 유효성이지 재처분 결과가 신청인에게 유리한지 여부가 아니다.
판례는 거부처분 취소의 확정판결이 있음에도 행정청이 종전 거부처분에 대한 취소 확정판결의 기속력에 반하는 재처분을 하여 당연무효인 경우 "이는 아무런 재처분을 하지 아니한 때와 마찬가지라 할 것이므로 이러한 경우에는 행정소송법 제30조 제2항, 제34조 제1항 등에 의한 간접강제신청에 필요한 요건을 갖춘 것으로 보아야 한다."고 설시하는 반면(대법원 2002. 12. 11. 자 2002무22 결정), 거부처분이 절차, 방법의 위법으로 취소된 경우(대법원 2005. 1. 14. 선고 2003두13045 판결)에는 행정청이 그 위법사유를 보완하여 다시 종전의 신청에 대한 거부처분을 할 수 있고 그러한 처분도 행정소송법 제30조 제2항에 규정된 재처분에 해당한다. 이 판단에서 미처분과 당연무효 재처분은 간접강제 요건을 갖춘 경우로 묶인다. 두 경우를 묶는 까닭은 취소 확정판결의 기속력을 실질적으로 이행한 것으로 볼 수 없다는 점에 있다. 새 문서가 작성되었다는 형식만으로는 이행 여부를 판단할 수 없고, 그 처분 내용이 판결 취지에 맞는지가 함께 봐야 할 기준이다. 따라서 결과가 불리하다는 사실과 기속력을 위반해 효력이 없는 후속 처분이라는 판단은 별개의 단계로 둔다.
행정청이 새 사유를 반복해 들면 승소는 끝없는 재소의 시작이 된다는 반론은 지연이 계속되는 손실을 겨냥한다. 신청인 A는 이미 취소 판결을 받았는데도 같은 신청에 대한 거부 회신을 다시 받았고, 그 회신을 별도로 다투는 동안 기간이 흐른다. 이 불이익을 가볍게 볼 수 없다. 기속력에 반하는 등으로 당연무효인 재처분은 미처분과 마찬가지로 다루지만, 결과가 불리한 재처분은 그 자체로 무효 판단에 이르지 못한다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 신청인 A가 취소 판결을 받았고 행정청 B가 같은 신청에 다시 거부 회신을 보냈다는 것뿐이다. 그 회신이 판결 취지에 반하는지, 기속력 위반으로 효력이 없는지는 이 장면만으로 정해지지 않았다. 무효 재처분은 기속력 위반 등으로 효력이 없는 후속 처분을 뜻하는데, 이 정의에 해당한다는 확인이 아직 없는 상태다. 따라서 새로운 거부처분이 유효하고 판결 취지에 맞는 처분인지, 아니면 기속력 위반으로 당연무효인 처분인지는 미확정으로 남는다. 확인된 범위에서 열리는 것은 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 있거나 미처분·당연무효 재처분에 대해 법정 간접강제 통로가 열린 경우이고, 막히는 것은 유효하고 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 있는데 결과가 불리하다는 이유만으로 미처분 간접강제를 구하는 경우다.
이 구별을 그대로 지키면, 불리한 재처분이라고 말하는 것만으로 미처분과 같은 취급을 끌어낼 수 없고, 그 대신 기속력 위반으로 당연무효인 재처분이라고 확인되면 미처분과 같은 판단을 적용한다. 미확정된 채로 남은 사항은 자료 부족일 뿐 구제 불능이 아니라 다음 확인의 대상으로 남는다.
4.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
신청인 A는 거부처분을 취소하는 판결을 받았지만 행정청 B는 같은 신청에 다시 거부 회신을 보냈다는 장면에서, 이 반복된 거부가 곧 판결의 이행을 거부한 것인지 가리려면 무효 재처분이라는 개념이 먼저 정리되어야 한다. 앞 절에서 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 이루어지거나 미처분·당연무효 재처분에 대해 법정 간접강제 통로가 열린 경우에는 작동하고, 유효하고 판결 취지에 맞는 재처분이 이루어졌는데 결과가 불리하다는 이유만으로 미처분 간접강제를 구하는 경우에는 막히며, 새 처분이 판결 취지에 반하는지 또는 무효인지 확인되지 않은 경우에는 미확정으로 남는다고 정리한 데서, 이 절은 그 구별의 마지막 축을 맡는다. 불리한 재처분이면 곧 재처분을 하지 않은 것과 같은가라는 물음에 답하는 일이 남았다.
대법원 2002. 12. 11. 자 2002무22 결정은 판결요지 [1]에서 "거부처분에 대한 취소의 확정판결이 있음에도 행정청이 아무런 재처분을 하지 아니하거나, 재처분을 하였다 하더라도 그것이 종전 거부처분에 대한 취소의 확정판결의 기속력에 반하는 등으로 당연무효라면 이는 아무런 재처분을 하지 아니한 때와 마찬가지라 할 것이므로"라고 설시한다(대법원 2002. 12. 11. 자 2002무22 결정). 여기서 말하는 주체는 취소 확정판결을 받은 행정청이고, 행위는 판결 이후의 재처분이며, 조건은 재처분이 취소 확정판결의 기속력에 반하는 등으로 당연무효라는 것이다. 문언은 그 조건이 성립하는 경우에 한정하여 재처분을 하지 아니한 때와 마찬가지라고 본다.
그 조건이 성립하면 간접강제신청에 필요한 요건을 갖춘 것으로 보아야 한다는 점까지가 판례가 정한 범위다(대법원 2002. 12. 11. 자 2002무22 결정). 이 판정과 단순한 결과 불만을 구별하는 이유는 두 판단 대상이 서로 다르기 때문이다. 하나는 새 처분의 효력, 즉 기속력 위반 등으로 무효인지의 문제이고, 다른 하나는 재처분 결과가 신청인에게 유리했는지의 문제다. 효력 판단을 거쳐 당연무효로 확인된 경우에만 미처분과 같은 취급이 성립하므로, 결과 불만 단계에서는 그 취급이 아직 열리지 않는다.
새 거부를 별도로 다투는 동안 지연이 계속된다는 불편은 무겁다. 행정청이 새 사유를 반복해 들면 승소는 끝없는 재소의 시작이 된다는 우려도 현실적이다. 지연의 불리함을 인정하면서도 그 사실만으로 미처분 간접강제의 요건을 채운 것으로 볼 수는 없고, 그 문을 여는 판단 근거는 기속력 위반 등으로 효력이 없다는 확인에 남는다.
장면에서 확인되는 것은 신청인 A가 받은 취소 판결과 행정청 B가 보낸 거부 회신이라는 두 사실뿐이고, 그 회신이 판결 취지에 반하는지 또는 무효인지는 이 장면만으로 확정되지 않는다. 따라서 이 경우는 미확정으로 남고, 후속 처분과 간접강제 신청이 어떻게 정리되었는지도 확인된 바 없다. 다만 조건 하나를 바꾸어 살피면, 불리한 재처분이 아니라 기속력 위반으로 당연무효인 재처분으로 확인되면 미처분과 같은 판단을 적용한다.
이 절의 결론은 이렇다. 당연무효인 재처분은 미처분과 같은 자리에 놓이고, 그 확인 없이 결과가 불리하다는 이유만으로 같은 취급을 청구할 수는 없다. 이 경계는 새 처분의 유불리가 아니라 효력 판단을 기준으로 한다.