Summary
Rescission for delay of performance in principle requires a demand allowing a reasonable period and non-performance, while leaving an exception for a refusal to perform declared in advance.
3.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
The mere circumstance that there is a need to end the contract does not by itself satisfy the requirements for ending it. After the determination above that the tender and the time of performance under the defense of simultaneous performance, and the grounds of insecurity of the prior performance obligation, must be examined separately, what is asked here and now is whether one may rescind immediately at any time a promise is broken, and what the standard is that opens the channel of this remedy. Plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid, while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. Yet since the single circumstance that a need to end the contract has arisen cannot be said to establish the requirements for rescission as well, it is necessary to confirm, beginning with the wording of the provision, the threshold of the gateway that swings open rescission.
The basis that fixes the threshold of this gateway is as follows. Article 544 of the Civil Act provides: "Where one of the parties fails to perform his/her obligation, the other party may fix a reasonable period of time and demand performance thereof, and if the obligor fails to perform within that period, the other party may rescind the contract. Provided, that where the obligor has declared in advance his/her intention not to perform, no demand is required." The subject to which this wording points is the counterparty of the party that fails to perform its obligation; the required act is a demand for performance fixing a reasonable period of time; and only when nonperformance within the demanded period follows does rescission become possible. Here, a demand for performance means the act of demanding the stipulated performance by fixing a reasonable period of time.
Connecting this wording with the conclusion settled earlier makes it clear that rescission for delay in performance takes a demand within a reasonable period of time and nonperformance as its principle, while leaving as an exception a refusal of performance announced in advance. The demand and the nonperformance that follows it belong to the layer of the principle, and the refusal of performance previously expressed belongs to the layer of the exception; if the two are viewed as one lump, it is impossible to adjudicate to which layer the matter belongs. Moreover, where the respective requirements of performance, rescission, and damages are satisfied and the restitution performance and compensatory damages are specified without overlap, the entrance to this remedy opens. In other words, whether the gateway opens is determined not by the single factor of whether a demand was made or not, but by a judgment in which the requirements separately to be filled for each remedy and the specification in the claim's demand must interlock together.
While waiting, one may lose the opportunity for substitute transactions. During the time that passes without the other party performing, plaintiff's side may miss the opportunity to conclude an agreement with another counterparty or to secure the same performance on the market, and this kind of loss is the point at which the rule that one may proceed to rescission only after filling out the period of the demand imposes a real burden. It is also a point to keep in view that narrowing the freedom of a party to assert several means together weakens the protection of uncertain situations. Even so, immediate rescission without a demand cannot be allowed for every delay. Where the delay in performance is one for which a demand is required, but the demand-and-nonperformance requirement is absent, or where the demand for unconditional performance cannot be pressed home on account of the defense of simultaneous performance, the channel of this remedy does not open.
Returning to the synthetic scene, plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid, while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. In this scene, only the places are fixed where the contractual performance, the tender of performance, the demand, the declaration of intention to rescind, the subject of restitution, and the items of damage are to be taken as the record; whether a demand actually occurred, and how long its period was, is unverified. Where the relationship of simultaneous performance, or whether there was a refusal of performance constituting the exception to the demand, is also unverified, the judgment remains undetermined. However, if the fact of an advance declaration of an intention not to perform is confirmed, the necessity of a demand is judged anew. Since the scene alone cannot fix the outcome, the recovery, or the on-site effects, the conclusion of this section is limited to the conditional distinction stated above.
In sum, the single circumstance that a promise was broken does not permit immediate rescission; the channel of this remedy opens only after it is determined which of the requirements is satisfied—those of the principle, namely the demand and nonperformance, or those of the exception, namely a refusal of performance announced in advance. Upon this must be superimposed the respective requirements of performance, rescission, and damages, the non-overlapping specification of the restitution performance and the compensatory damages, and the specification of the performance, the parties, and the conditions in the claim's demand; and if the defense of simultaneous performance remains, the demand for unconditional performance cannot be pressed home. A conclusion reached without crossing this boundary is confined to a judgment according to whether the conditions are met; the moment it is crossed, the judgment becomes one allowing immediate rescission without a demand, and the conclusion of this section collapses.
3.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Accepting the premise that the tender and the time of performance under the defense of simultaneous performance, and the grounds of insecurity of the prior performance obligation, must be examined separately, I confine myself to the question whether one may rescind immediately at any time a promise is broken, and what the conditions are that block that channel. In this scene, only the conditions that themselves open or close the rescission are set out.
Here, the basic route to rescission is this: there is a delay in performance on the part of the party that fails to perform its obligation, and the other party, having fixed a reasonable period of time and demanded performance, finds no performance within that period. The provision separately leaves only one exception: where the obligor has declared in advance an intention not to perform, no demand is required.
This wording requires that the procedural condition that opens the door of rescission be separated from the judgment after that condition has been met. Here, a demand for performance means the act of demanding the stipulated performance by fixing a reasonable period of time; only where that demand precedes and it is confirmed that no performance occurred within the period does the ordinary route of rescission for delay in performance come into being. Accordingly, where the demand-and-nonperformance requirement is absent, or where the demand for unconditional performance cannot be pressed home on account of the defense of simultaneous performance, one of the statutory requirements remains unmet and the channel of that remedy is closed. This does not mean that there is no need to rescind; it is the distinction that the conditions for taking that channel do not yet exist.
The strongest counterargument targets the point that, while waiting, one may lose the opportunity for substitute transactions. If one must wait for the demand and the lapse of the period, the timing of moving to another transaction may be pushed back on the side of the delayed party, and meanwhile market conditions or supply and demand may change. Concern also arises that narrowing the freedom to assert several means together weakens the protection of uncertain situations. Even so, listening to this concern, immediate rescission without a demand cannot be allowed for every delay, and the judgment is maintained that, where a delay in performance is one for which a demand is required and the demand-and-nonperformance requirement is absent, the door of that channel is closed.
What can be confirmed in the synthetic scene is only the direction that plaintiff A seeks to recover what has already been paid and also to claim damages for delay in performance. How the contractual performance, the tender of performance, the demand for performance, the declaration of intention to rescind, the subject of restitution, and the items of damage are each recorded is not confirmed. There is no material as to whether the relationship is one of simultaneous performance, or whether the other party declared in advance an intention not to perform and thus falls within the exception to the demand. Thus the scene alone cannot establish whether the requirements of delay in performance are met, or whether the exception to the demand comes into being.
Accordingly, what can be said in this section is the limited conclusion that, when judging whether rescission is immediately possible, the demand-and-nonperformance requirement and the operation of the defense of simultaneous performance must first be checked. Only when the requirements are met—either by the existence of a demand and nonperformance within its period, or by a confirmed refusal of performance for which no demand is necessary—does the channel of this remedy open. Rescission cannot be fixed while those conditions remain unconfirmed, nor can it be said that the remedy is permanently impossible merely because material is lacking. What is permitted at this stage, however, is a conditional judgment; the scope of restitution or damages is not determined here.
3.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
Up to the preceding step, the premise was established that the tender and the time of performance under the defense of simultaneous performance, and the grounds of insecurity of the prior performance obligation, must be examined separately; now, from the question whether one may rescind immediately at any time a promise is broken, I ask after the boundary among these that remains unconfirmed. Whether the point that cannot be fixed for want of material is an actual impossibility, or merely a shortage of materials for judgment, is the concern of this inquiry.
The relevant provision reads as follows. "Article 544 (Delay in Performance and Rescission) Where one of the parties fails to perform his/her obligation, the other party may fix a reasonable period of time and demand performance thereof, and if the obligor fails to perform within that period, the other party may rescind the contract. Provided, that where the obligor has declared in advance his/her intention not to perform, no demand is required." (Article 544 of the Civil Act) Here, the other party is the subject that demands performance of the obligation in delay, and a demand means the act of demanding the stipulated performance by fixing a reasonable period of time.
This wording divides the demand and the nonperformance within its period into the stage of the principle, and a refusal of performance announced in advance into the stage of the exception. The reason the two stages must be distinguished is that the facts of demand and nonperformance falling under the principle, and the expression of refusal of performance falling under the exception, require different materials for judgment. If a conclusion fixed by materials of one kind is extended to the other, matters unconfirmed as to the relationship of simultaneous performance or the existence of a refusal of performance will be declared impossible outright.
The counterargument that one may lose the opportunity for substitute transactions while waiting targets the loss at this point. That the profit which could have been gained with another counterparty disappears as time passes, and that the inconvenience of postponing a certain decision remains, cannot be erased. Plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid, while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance; from that scene alone it is not settled whether there was a demand, or whether the other party declared in advance an intention not to perform.
Contrasting the facts of the scene with the settled standard of judgment, among the contractual performance, the tender of performance, the demand, the declaration of intention to rescind, the subject of restitution, and the items of damage, what is used for the question posed in this section is the presence or absence of the demand and of the expression of refusal of performance. So long as the two items are not specified in the record, one can neither find that a demand within a reasonable period of time and nonperformance within that period are satisfied, nor find that the matter falls under the exception. In that case, instead of reaching a conclusion without materials for judgment, the matter is distinguished from impossibility and kept undetermined; and if the fact of an advance declaration of an intention not to perform is confirmed, the necessity of a demand is judged anew.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted in this section is a judgment of rescission bound to the requirement confirmed among demand and nonperformance, or the expression of refusal of performance; what is not permitted is the judgment that drags in unconfirmed matters and recognizes immediate rescission for every delay. Turning at once into an impossibility of relief the case where the demand for unconditional performance cannot be pressed home on account of the relationship of simultaneous performance, or the case where material is insufficient, is also not included here.
3.4The Records Needed for Determination
Under the premise that the tender and the time of performance under the defense of simultaneous performance, and the grounds of insecurity of the prior performance obligation, must be examined separately, plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid, while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. May one rescind immediately at any time a promise is broken? If this question is answered that rescission is immediately possible, one cannot explain why the moment plaintiff resolved to end the contract and the moment the requirements for ending it were satisfied are different. What must therefore be examined is what material is needed to make that judgment.
Article 544 of the Civil Act fixes the wording of rescission for delay in performance as follows: "Where one of the parties fails to perform his/her obligation, the other party may fix a reasonable period of time and demand performance thereof, and if the obligor fails to perform within that period, the other party may rescind the contract. Provided, that where the obligor has declared in advance his/her intention not to perform, no demand is required." This wording divides the subjects into one of the parties and the other party, and arranges the acts in sequence: a demand for performance fixing a reasonable period of time, nonperformance within that period, and then rescission.
On the basis of this wording, the conclusion of this section is that the stages are judged on the settled record alone, and gaps in the record are not filled by presumption. Since this demand and the declaration of intention to rescind are different acts, the existence of one must not be taken to mean that the other also existed. Whether there was a tender of performance, whether there was a demand fixing a reasonable period of time, whether performance was not rendered within that period, and whether an intention to rescind was expressed are each confirmed by the record. The stage of judgment changes according to which item's record is empty.
Adhering to this record-based standard leaves the inconvenience that one may lose the opportunity for substitute transactions while the delay lengthens. Worry is also raised that the freedom to assert several means together narrows and the protection of uncertain situations weakens. Yet to eliminate that loss, immediate rescission without a demand cannot be allowed for every delay. Opening that path would erase the sequence that the wording divided into demand and nonperformance, and one would come to say that the stage of rescission had been reached by the declaration of intention to rescind alone. The answer of this section is to show the inconvenience of waiting, but that the inconvenience alone cannot carry one past the requirement of a demand.
The fact confirmed in this scene is only that plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid, while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. Contrasting this scene with the settled record items, the subject of restitution and the items of damage appear in the form of demands, but the content of the contractual performance, the presence or absence of a tender of performance, whether there was a demand, and whether there was a declaration of intention to rescind are not confirmed within the scene. The condition that, if the fact of an advance declaration of an intention not to perform is confirmed, the necessity of a demand is judged anew is also not contained in this scene. Therefore, whether the requirement of a demand has been met, and whether the exception of refusal of performance applies, remain undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that, when judging rescission and the demands that follow it, only the records of the contractual performance, the tender of performance, the demand, the declaration of intention to rescind, the subject of restitution, and the items of damage are taken as the basis. The conclusion not permitted is that, from the mere appearance of a need to end the contract, one may rescind immediately even without a demand and nonperformance. Nor can it be declared that rescission is impossible because there are blanks in the record, nor can the blanks be filled by presumption and it be declared that the requirements for rescission are satisfied.
3.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
앞 단계에서 남긴 것은 동시이행 항변의 제공·변제기와 선이행 의무의 불안 사유를 나누어 보아야 한다는 구별뿐이다. 그 구별은 끝내기 요건을 가리는 작업이 아니다. 지금 물어야 할 것은 약속을 어기면 언제나 즉시 해제할 수 있는가, 곧 미리 밝힌 이행 거절이라는 사정이 최고라는 단계를 건너뛰게 하는지다. 그 요구는 끝내기의 요건이 충족되었는지에 달려 있다.
이 물음에 해당하는 원문은 민법 제544조다. "당사자 일방이 그 채무를 이행하지 아니하는 때에는 상대방은 상당한 기간을 정하여 그 이행을 최고하고 그 기간내에 이행하지 아니한 때에는 계약을 해제할 수 있다. 그러나 채무자가 미리 이행하지 아니할 의사를 표시한 경우에는 최고를 요하지 아니한다"(민법 제544조)고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 당사자 일방이고, 행위는 채무를 이행하지 않음이며, 상대방은 상당한 기간을 정해 이행을 최고하는 절차를 거쳐야 한다. 그러고도 그 기간 안에 이행하지 않을 때 계약을 해제할 수 있다. 다만 채무자가 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 경우에는 최고를 요하지 아니한 것으로 정해진다.
이 문언은 최고를 원칙으로 삼으면서 그 예외만 한정적으로 남긴다. 그래서 두 단계를 구별해야 한다. 먼저 상당한 기간을 정해 약정 급부를 요구하는 행위, 곧 이행 최고가 있었는지 본다. 다음으로 그 기간 안에 이행이 없었는지 본다. 최고가 필요한 이행지체인데 최고·미이행 요건이 없으면 계약을 끝내겠다는 요구는 여전히 막혀 있다. 그러나 채무자가 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부를 다시 판단한다. 이전에 최고가 없어 차단되었다는 결론은 그 사실 앞에서 유지되지 않는다.
기다리는 동안 대체 거래의 기회를 잃을 수 있다는 반론이 겨냥하는 것은 시간과 불확실성이다. 약정 급부를 기다리는 동안 시장이 움직이거나 상대방이 다른 거래를 선택하면, 최고를 기다려야 하는 쪽은 그 기회를 영영 놓칠 수 있다. 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면 불확실한 상황의 보호가 약해진다는 걱정도 같은 자리에 있다. 반론이 제시한 손실은 조문이 남긴 예외의 조건에서 다루어지며, 지체 사실만으로 단계를 건너뛸 근거가 되지는 않는다.
합성 장면에서 원고 A는 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하며 이행 지연 손해를 함께 요구한다. 미리 밝힌 이행 거절이 확인되지 않거나 동시이행 관계가 확인되지 않은 경우, 끝내기 판단은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 좁다. 이행지체 해제는 상당한 기간의 최고와 미이행을 원칙으로 하고 미리 밝힌 이행 거절의 예외를 남긴다는 결론이며, 지정된 변경이 확인되면 기존 차단·실효 판단을 폐기하고 단계부터 다시 판정한다. 허용되지 않는 것은 지체 사실만으로 곧바로 계약을 끝내는 길을 여는 것이고, 최고 없는 즉시 해제를 모든 지체에 허용하는 것도 아니다. 최고 없이 끝낼 수 있었는지는 앞선 단계의 판정을 새 사실로 다시 검사해 보아야 한다.
3.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
약속을 어기면 언제나 즉시 해제할 수 있는가라는 물음은 계속되지만, 앞서 세워 둔 구별을 다시 논증하지 않고 이어받는다. 이어지는 물음은 기다리는 동안 대체 거래의 기회를 잃을 수 있다는 사정이다. 지연이 길어지면 그 사이 값이 오르거나 물건이 빠져 다른 상대와 손을 잡을 시기를 놓칠 수 있다. 그래서 상대방이 약속을 지키지 않을 때 기다림 자체가 곧바로 손해가 된다. 이 손실을 무시하면서 최고라는 절차만 지키라고 말할 수 있는가. 이 물음에 답하는 일이 이번 단계의 몫이다.
이 물음에 답하려면 해당 문언부터 읽는다. 민법 제544조는 이행지체 해제에 관해 이렇게 정한다. "당사자 일방이 그 채무를 이행하지 아니하는 때에는 상대방은 상당한 기간을 정하여 그 이행을 최고하고 그 기간내에 이행하지 아니한 때에는 계약을 해제할 수 있다." 이 문언에서 주체는 채무를 이행하지 아니하는 당사자와 그 상대방이고, 행위는 상당한 기간을 정한 이행의 최고이며, 조건은 그 기간 안에 이행하지 아니한 때이다. 최고는 상당한 기간을 정해 약정 급부를 요구하는 행위를 뜻한다. 문언은 곧바로 해제를 허용하지 않고 기간의 만료를 기다리게 한다. 조문의 다른 쟁점은 이 자리에서 다루지 않는다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론은 이어진다. 제544조는 원칙과 예외를 나누어 두는데, 원칙은 최고와 기간 만료 뒤의 미이행이고 예외는 채무자가 미리 이행하지 아니할 의사를 표시한 경우이다. 이 두 단계를 나누어 보아야 한다. 앞서 정리한 대로 동시이행 항변의 제공·변제기와 선이행 의무의 불안 사유도 함께 구별한다. 이 구별은 형식 취미가 아니라 최고가 무엇을 요구하고 무엇을 요구하지 않는지를 가르기 때문이다. 기다리는 동안 대체 거래의 기회를 잃을 수 있다는 사정은 최고의 필요성을 없애는 사정이 아니고, 대신 기간이 얼마여야 상당한지, 또는 예외가 성립하는지를 묻게 하는 사정이다.
그렇다면 이 반론이 겨냥하는 손실은 무엇인가. 기다리는 동안 대체 거래의 기회를 잃을 수 있다는 말은 값의 변동, 물건의 소진, 다른 상대와의 협상 시기 상실처럼 되돌리기 어려운 불편을 가리킨다. 상대방의 침묵이 길어질수록 피해자는 손을 놓고 있어야 하는 셈이고, 그렇게 기다린 값을 아무도 보상하지 않는다. 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면 불확실한 상황의 보호가 약해진다. 이 가치를 부정하지 않으면서도 결론은 달라지지 않는다. 최고라는 절차가 남아 있더라도 예외가 성립하는지, 기간이 상당한지는 다시 판단할 여지가 있다. 반론이 지적한 불이익은 사라지지 않고 다만 최고의 필요성과 상당 기간의 판단 안으로 옮겨질 뿐이다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 사실은 이렇다. 이 장면에는 계약상 급부, 이행 제공, 최고, 해제 의사표시, 반환 대상, 손해 항목의 기록이 대응한다. 그런데 장면에는 최고를 했는지, 상대방이 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시했는지, 동시이행 관계인지가 적혀 있지 않다. 따라서 최고가 필요한 이행지체인데 최고·미이행 요건이 없거나 동시이행 항변 때문에 무조건 이행 요구를 관철할 수 없는 경우에는 해제의 길이 열리지 않는다. 이런 항목은 미확정으로 남는다. 장면 자체로 판정할 수 없는 일은 판정하지 않는 편이 정확하다.
정리하면, 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 이행지체로 해제하려면 상당한 기간의 최고와 그 기간 안의 미이행이 원칙이고, 채무자가 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 밝힌 경우에만 최고가 필요 없다. 이 범위를 넘어 모든 지체에 최고 없는 즉시 해제를 허용하는 결론은 이 자리에서 세울 수 없다. 기다림의 손실을 설명하는 사정은 그러한 전면 허용의 근거가 되지 못하고, 최고의 필요성과 상당 기간 판단을 세부적으로 묻는 계기로만 쓰인다. 장면에 없는 연도·금액·기산일을 끼워 넣거나 실제 사건의 결과를 단정할 수 없다.
3.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
앞 절에서 이미 모든 지체에 최고 없는 즉시 해제를 허용할 수는 없다는 결론에 이르렀지만, 그 문장 자체는 어떤 경우에 얼마를 기다려야 하는지를 가려내 주지 않는다. 원고 A는 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구하는 입장에서, 약속을 어기면 언제나 즉시 해제할 수 있는가라는 물음은 그 자리에서 다시 열린다. 계약을 끝내려는 필요성과 끝낼 수 있는 요건은 서로 다른 차원에 놓여 있기 때문이다. 이 절이 다루는 것은 이행이 늦어지는 경우에 해제의 문을 여는 절차적 조건이며, 그 조건의 중심에 이행 최고가 있다. 이행 최고란 상당한 기간을 정해 약정 급부를 요구하는 행위를 가리키는 말로, 상대방이 당장 주지 않는다는 사정만으로 곧바로 해제할 수 있는지 여부를 가르는 준거가 된다.
민법 제544조는 이 문제에 대해 “상대방은 상당한 기간을 정하여 그 이행을 최고하고 그 기간내에 이행하지 아니한 때에는 계약을 해제할 수 있다. 그러나 채무자가 미리 이행하지 아니할 의사를 표시한 경우에는 최고를 요하지 아니한다.”라고 정하고 있다. 이 문언에서 상대방은 계약을 해제하려는 당사자를 가리키고, 그 이행을 최고한다는 행위는 앞서 정의한 이행 최고, 즉 상당한 기간을 정해 약정 급부를 요구하는 행위를 뜻한다. 최고의 상대방이 되는 채무자는 계약상 급부를 맡은 쪽이고, 그 채무자가 미리 이행하지 아니할 의사를 표시하는 것은 이행 거절을 미리 밝힌 경우를 가리킨다. 다만 이 조문은 이행지체로 인한 해제만을 다루며, 해제에 따른 반환이나 배상의 범위까지 정하고 있지는 않다.
제544조의 문언이 설정한 판정은 두 단계를 구분해서 봐야 한다. 첫 단계는 상당한 기간을 정한 이행 최고와 그 기간 안의 미이행이라는 두 요건이 함께 갖추어졌는지 살피는 것이고, 예외는 그 앞에 놓인다. 채무자가 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고가 필요 없는지 여부를 그 사실을 기준으로 다시 판단하며, 최고와 미이행의 단계를 거칠 필요가 없게 된다. 이 두 구간을 나누는 까닭은, 한쪽은 상대방에게 이행할 기회를 주어 지체를 끝낼지 가려내는 절차이고 다른 한쪽은 그 기회를 줄 필요가 이미 없어진 경우에 대한 판단이기 때문이다. 원고 A는 이행 지연을 근거로 계약을 끝내고자 하지만, 해제의 요건은 그 필요성만으로 충족되는 것은 아니다. 여기에 이행 최고와 미이행이라는 조건이 놓이고, 그 조건 없이 이행지체 해제가 성립하는 것은 미리 밝힌 이행 거절이 확인된 경우로 한정된다.
그러나 상당한 기간을 기다리는 동안 대체 거래의 기회를 잃을 수 있다는 점은 실제 손실로 다가온다. 상대방이 약속한 급부를 계속 주지 않으면서 그 기간 안에 시장 조건이 바뀌고, 같은 계약 목적을 달성할 다른 상대를 찾는 시기가 늦어질 수 있으며, 그 사이 원고가 입는 불확실성은 가볍지 않다. 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면 불확실한 상황의 보호가 약해진다는 점도 함께 고려되어야 한다. 최고 없이 허용되는 즉시 해제는 제544조가 남겨 둔 미리 밝힌 이행 거절의 경우에 한정되고, 그 사실이 확인되지 않은 이행지체에 대해서는 상당한 기간의 최고와 그 기간 내 미이행이라는 요건이 그대로 남는다. 대체 거래의 필요성은 요건을 생략할 사유가 아니라, 이 요건을 어떻게 적용할 것인지를 검토하는 과정에서 고려되는 사정에 머무른다.
합성 장면에서 원고 A는 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구하는데, 이 장면만으로는 상대방의 채무 내용이나 그 이행이 어떻게 늦어졌는지, 원고가 상당한 기간을 정해 이행을 요구했는지, 그 기간 안에 이행이 있었는지가 드러나지 않는다. 그러한 항목들은 계약상 급부, 이행 제공, 최고, 해제 의사표시, 반환 대상, 손해 항목의 기록에서 확인해야 할 대상으로 남는다. 특히 동시이행 관계인지, 아니면 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 있는지는 이 장면으로 확정할 수 없으므로, 그 두 가지는 미확정으로 남겨 둔다. 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부를 다시 판단하게 되며, 그 사실이 확인되지 않은 채로는 상당한 기간의 최고와 미이행 요건이 이행지체 해제의 관문으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 이행지체로 인한 해제는 상당한 기간을 정한 이행 최고와 그 기간 내 미이행을 원칙으로 하고, 미리 밝힌 이행 거절이 확인된 경우에만 그 최고가 요구되지 않는다는 것이다. 모든 지체에 최고 없는 즉시 해제를 허용할 수는 없다는 선을 넘어서, 계약을 끝내려는 필요성만으로 곧바로 해제할 수 있다는 판단으로 나아갈 수는 없다. 다만 이 확정된 범위가 해제의 요건을 모두 갖춘 뒤에 이어지는 반환의 문제, 즉 이미 주고받은 것은 어떻게 되는지까지 가리키는 것은 아니다.
3.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In this scene, the demand to terminate the contract goes beyond a declaration of intent and stands at a stage awaiting satisfaction of separate requirements. The tender and time for performance under the plea of simultaneous performance, and the grounds of insecurity in the duty to perform first, which the preceding analytical stage distinguished, are taken here only as the starting premises of this section. At present the distinction is not reargued; what is asked is how the choice between maintaining the same contract and ending it changes the scope of recovery. And the portion of this question that this section takes upon itself alone is limited to the question whether one may always rescind immediately when a promise is broken. This scope must first be set out so that it does not become mixed with the adjacent question concerning the scope of recovery.
The text governing this question is set out in Article 544 of the Civil Act. It provides: "Where one of the parties fails to perform his/her obligation, the other party may, by fixing a reasonable period of time, demand performance thereof, and, if performance is not made within such period, rescind the contract; provided, that in a case where the obligor has notified in advance of his/her intention not to perform, such demand shall not be required." (Article 544 of the Civil Act). In this text, the subject of "fails to perform his/her obligation" is the party bearing the contractual obligation, and the structure is read as conferring the right of rescission upon the other party. The condition is framed as fixing a reasonable period, demanding performance, and the absence of performance within that period; and a demand refers to the act of specifying and requesting from the party on whom it is served the agreed performance. No requirements from other provisions are added here; only the manner in which this text opens the door to rescission for delay in performance is examined.
This text compels rescission for delay in performance to be assessed in two steps. The first step is the procedure of demanding performance within a reasonable period; the second step is the result of non-performance, namely that performance is absent within that period (Article 544 of the Civil Act). Rescission for delay in performance proceeds on the principle of a demand with a reasonable period and subsequent non-performance. The reason the two concepts must be distinguished is that, without a demand, the period itself, which serves as the criterion for judging non-performance, never comes into being. The provision does, however, leave an exception: where an intention not to perform has been notified in advance, no demand is required. This exception should be understood not as cancelling the principle but as a qualification, permitting the demand to be skipped in cases where the other party has itself made plain that it has removed the benefit of waiting.
The counterargument that presses most strongly against this principle is that, during the waiting, the opportunity for substitute transactions may be lost. If, between making the demand and letting the period run, market conditions change, there remains a loss from having missed the moment at which one could have ended the contract and moved to another transaction. Beyond this, there is also the concern that narrowing a party's freedom to assert several remedies together weakens the protection afforded in situations of uncertainty. These disadvantages are not denied; yet even so, immediate rescission without a demand cannot be permitted for every delay. The reason is that, if immediate rescission without a demand were allowed, the textual requirement of a demand within a reasonable period would itself lose its meaning. The exception for cases in which an intention not to perform has been notified in advance remains open because it rests on the judgment that, once that fact is confirmed, there is no benefit in requiring a demand.
Contrasting the facts and conditions presented in this scene, Plaintiff A is claiming damages arising from delay in performance, and thus takes the form of a claim premised on rescission for delay in performance. Further, whether the obligor notified in advance of an intention not to perform, or whether the other party's demand for unconditional performance is barred by the plea of simultaneous performance, cannot be confirmed from this scene alone. These items leave the judgment of this section conditional, and leaving them undetermined does not mean suspending the conclusion.
The conclusion permitted by this section remains within the scope of defining the requirements for rescission for delay in performance as a demand within a reasonable period and non-performance within that period, and of allowing the demand to be omitted only in the case of a refusal to perform disclosed in advance. The conclusion not permitted is one in which immediate rescission without a demand opens up on the mere need to end the contract, or one that allows immediate rescission without a demand for every delay. How this choice alters the scope of recovery of what has already been given and received remains a question outside this scope.
3.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Without unfolding the argument up to that stage again, the remaining question is to examine whether the combination and scope of the various remedies asserted by Plaintiff A are limited by the specified statutory text. The circumstances giving rise to a need to end the contract may be many, but that does not mean that the requirements for ending it have been satisfied together. The preceding stage left it that the tender and time for performance under the plea of simultaneous performance, and the grounds of insecurity in the duty to perform first, must be examined separately. The question that follows is whether one may always rescind immediately when a promise is broken.
The relevant statutory text is first checked as written. Here the subjects are the party who fails to perform the obligation and the other party; the acts are the demand for performance and rescission; and the conditions are the lapse of a reasonable period and non-performance within that period. The text does, however, also leave the exception of a refusal to perform disclosed in advance.
Linking the structure of the text to the conclusions it yields, it emerges that, among Plaintiff A's claims, the combination and scope of contractual remedies are limited by this text alone. The principled stage and the exceptional stage require different conditions. The principle applies where the two conditions of a demand with a reasonable period and non-performance within that period are both met; the exception is that where the obligor has notified in advance of an intention not to perform, no demand is required. The author's conclusion is not to expand upon grounds that go beyond the language of this text. Adding reasons for judgment or drawing in other clauses blurs the distinction between the conditions set by this text.
The most persuasive counterargument is that the opportunity for substitute transactions may be lost during the wait. In addition, there is the worry that narrowing a party's freedom to assert several remedies together weakens the protection afforded in situations of uncertainty. The fact that market conditions may change while waiting, or that the chance to find another counterparty may be lost, comes home as an actual loss. Plaintiff A's seeking the restitutionary performance together with compensatory damages likewise arises from the same unease. Yet the relevant text does not permit immediate rescission without a demand for every delay. The inconvenience targeted by the counterargument remains, but it is not used as grounds for erasing the distinction between demand and non-performance set by the text.
The facts in this scene relevant to this question are that Plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid, while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. Contrasting this scene with the conditions of the text, a demand for performance means the act of requesting the agreed performance within a fixed reasonable period. Whether Plaintiff A actually made a demand, whether a reasonable period was fixed, whether performance was absent within that period, and whether the obligor notified in advance of an intention not to perform, are not settled in the scene. Years, amounts, commencement dates, actions, and outcomes of success or failure that the synthetic scene does not contain cannot be added. Accordingly, the necessity of a demand remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the judgment limiting the combination and scope of contractual remedies to the conditions of the relevant statutory text. What it does not permit is a judgment allowing immediate rescission without a demand for every delay, or broadening the scope of the combination on grounds outside the text. Where the simultaneous-performance relationship or the existence of a refusal to perform, which constitutes the exception to the demand, is unconfirmed, the judgment is undetermined; and insufficient material does not mean that relief is unavailable.
3.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Without rewriting the foregoing argument, only the problem that remains afterward is taken up. What is asked here, unlike the question whether one may always rescind immediately when a promise is broken, is by what standard Plaintiff A's demand, which seeks several remedies together, is to be redivided and examined within the combination and scope of contractual remedies. Even though the need for immediate recovery is strong, it is kept as a question separate from whether the requirements are satisfied.
The relevant statutory text for this section is Article 544 of the Civil Act. Here the subjects are the party who fails to perform the obligation and the other party; the act is the demand for performance; and the condition is non-performance within the period fixed. The same text also leaves the exception of a refusal to perform disclosed in advance.
Because this text requires a demand for performance while also providing an exception, the propriety of the demand and the non-performance after the expiry of the period must be placed at different stages of judgment. Accordingly, the cases in which it operates, the cases in which it is blocked, and the undetermined cases are limited to those conditions. Where the respective requirements of performance, rescission, and damages are met and the restitutionary performance and compensatory damages are specified without overlap, it is recognized; where delay in performance requiring a demand is present but the requirement of demand or non-performance is lacking, or where, on account of the plea of simultaneous performance, unconditional performance cannot be compelled, it is blocked.
If, after the demand is received and while a reasonable period passes, market prices change, Plaintiff A may lose the benefit of receiving at the desired point in time, and that loss is not filled simply by bringing a damages claim afterward. Beyond this, the point that narrowing a party's freedom to assert several remedies together weakens the protection afforded in situations of uncertainty is also carried in the counterargument. Even while recognizing the cost of delay pointed out by the counterargument, the requirements of demand and non-performance remain.
So long as the simultaneous-performance relationship or the existence of a refusal to perform, which constitutes the exception to the demand, is unconfirmed, that place remains one of the undetermined cases. If the fact of having notified in advance of an intention not to perform is confirmed, the conclusion as to the necessity of a demand changes. Values that cannot be judged from the scene alone are left undetermined.
Accordingly, what is permitted here is the distinction drawn in accordance with the stated conditions, and throwing open every delay as immediate rescission without a demand is a conclusion this place does not permit. Places where the material is empty are left undetermined, and unverified status alone is not taken as foreclosing efficacy. Within this boundary, the requirements for rescission and the distinction of its conditions are first set in order.
3.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
This question asks, when the conditions of that rescission are gathered in one place together with the demand for performance and the demand for damages, what opens and what is blocked. This circumstance explains only the need for cessation of performance; it does not by itself satisfy the requirements for rescission either. That the three demands may be advanced together does not automatically fill the requirements of any one of them.
This problem begins with what the language of Article 544 of the Civil Act requires. That Article declares: "Where one of the parties fails to perform his/her obligation, the other party may, by fixing a reasonable period of time, demand performance thereof, and, if performance is not made within such period, rescind the contract." The demands of the text bind together into a single chain three elements: the existence of one party's non-performance of the obligation, the reasonable period fixed by the other party, and the non-performance within that period. The subject the text denotes is the other party making the demand; the act is the request for performance within the fixed period; and the condition is the failure to perform within that period.
Connecting this text with the separation of the three states discussed earlier yields the judgment that opens rescission. First, performance, rescission, and damages must each satisfy their own requirements separately, and the restitutionary performance and compensatory damages must be specified by item so as not to overlap. Conversely, where delay in performance requiring a demand is present but no demand was made, or where non-performance within the reasonable period is not confirmed, or where, on account of the plea of simultaneous performance, unconditional performance cannot be compelled without the other party's own tender, rescission is blocked. The reason the two steps of demand and non-performance were examined separately is that the fact of non-performance and the condition of a lawful initiation of rescission lie on different dimensions. Even on the same facts, it does not follow that one may rescind immediately without a demand.
The price is not a light one. When the other party defers performance and drags out time, the party in need wishes to secure a substitute transaction before market prices change, and greater harm may accumulate by the length of the deferral. The concern that narrowing the freedom to assert several remedies together weakens the protection afforded in situations of uncertainty is likewise not to be dismissed. Because the procedure of the demand is a filter that sorts out the gravity of the delay and the intention to perform, omitting that filter results in the contract being severed without giving the other party any opportunity to prepare.
Contrasting the same scene with these conditions reveals the place of separation. The facts alone—that Plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and seeks to specify the objects of restitution and the items of damage—do not settle whether a demand was made, whether performance was absent within the fixed period, or whether the other party is still in a state of not having tendered the performance that is the object of the plea of simultaneous performance. Intervals for which no such record remains must remain undetermined. The synthetic scene merely specified the kinds of facts needed for judgment; it did not settle the success or failure or the recovery results of an actual case.
Accordingly, what is permitted here is only the combination of remedies where the requirements of the three demands are each satisfied and the restitutionary performance and the items of damage are specified without duplication. What is not permitted is immediate rescission for a delay unaccompanied by demand and non-performance, or the compulsion of unconditional performance while the plea of simultaneous performance stands. Not converting intervals lacking material into a denial of relief, but leaving them undetermined, is also part of this distinction.
3.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
앞 절의 결론을 동시이행 항변의 제공·변제기와 선이행 의무의 불안 사유를 나누어 보아야 한다는 한 문장으로만 이어받는다. 이 기준을 받아 원고 A는 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구하는데, 이 요구가 곧바로 성립하려면 약속을 어기면 언제나 즉시 해제할 수 있는가라는 물음에 먼저 답해야 한다. 즉시 해제가 일반적으로 열려 있는지, 아니면 지연 자체만으로는 부족하고 다른 사정이 더 필요한지를 살펴보아야 한다. 이 물음은 이번 절이 맡은 범위이다.
이 문제에 해당하는 원문은 민법 제544조이다. 조문은 "당사자 일방이 그 채무를 이행하지 아니하는 때에는 상대방은 상당한 기간을 정하여 그 이행을 최고하고 그 기간내에 이행하지 아니한 때에는 계약을 해제할 수 있다"고 정하고, 이어서 "그러나 채무자가 미리 이행하지 아니할 의사를 표시한 경우에는 최고를 요하지 아니한다"는 단서를 붙인다. 이 문언은 이행지체를 이유로 계약을 해제하려는 상대방에게 상당한 기간의 최고와 그 기간 내 미이행을 요구하는 것이 원칙임을 보여준다.
이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 채무를 이행하지 않는 당사자와 그 상대방이며, 행위는 상당한 기간을 정해 약정 급부를 요구하는 이행 최고, 조건은 그 기간 내의 미이행이다. 이 최고와 미이행이라는 두 단계를 구분해야 하는 까닭은, 앞 절에서 나눈 제공·변제기와 불안 사유의 구별이 지연 상황에서 해제의 입구를 규정하는 역할을 하기 때문이다. 앞 절의 논증을 다시 전개하지 않더라도, 이 구분만으로도 계약을 끝낼 필요가 있다는 사정과 끝낼 요건이 충족되었는가는 별개의 질문임이 드러난다.
최고와 그 기간의 경과를 기다리는 동안 시장이 움직이거나 상대방이 자리를 뜨면 원고는 지금 잡을 수 있었던 거래 기회를 영영 놓칠 수 있고, 그 손실은 소송으로도 온전히 되돌리기 어렵다. 또 다른 보는 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면 불확실한 상황의 보호가 약해진다고 본다. 이 불이익을 지우지 않더라도 모든 지체에 최고 없는 즉시 해제를 허용할 수는 없다. 지연의 지속 시간이나 손실의 무게가 해제 요건을 대신하는 것은 아니며, 미리 밝힌 이행 거절이라는 예외가 확인될 때만 최고가 빠진다.
합성 장면에서 원고 A는 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구하는데, 여기에서 확인된 것은 그 요구의 방향뿐이다. 기록으로 살펴보아야 할 항목은 계약상 급부·이행 제공·최고·해제 의사표시·반환 대상·손해 항목이다. 최고가 있었는지, 있었다면 상당한 기간이 정해졌는지, 그 기간 내에 이행이 없었는지는 장면만으로 확정되지 않으므로 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 이행지체 해제가 상당한 기간의 최고와 미이행을 원칙으로 하고, 미리 밝힌 이행 거절을 예외로 남긴다는 판단이다. 여기에서 밀어붙일 수 없는 것은 지연 사실만으로 곧바로 해제할 수 있다는 해석이고, 미리 밝힌 이행 거절의 확인 없이 최고 없는 즉시 해제를 일반 규칙으로 세우는 것도 이 절이 허용하지 않는다. 지금까지 정해진 것은 해제의 문을 여는 최고의 자리와 그 예외의 조건뿐이며, 문을 연 뒤의 효과는 아직 다루지 않았다. 해제하면 이미 주고받은 것은 어떻게 되는가?