Summary
This chapter keeps the possibility of compulsory performance separate from the requirements for damages for non-performance of an obligation, so that the desired performance is identified first.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
계약의 목적물이 필요한 사람에게 돈의 배상은 같은 회복이 아닐 수 있다. 이 관찰은 급부를 요구하는 사람과 금전으로 대체하려는 사람의 목적이 다를 수 있음을 가리킨다. 국가배상법·특별규정·민법의 관계를 따라 책임 범위와 손해를 별도로 판단해야 한다. 이 기준을 받아 이번에는 계약이 지켜지지 않은 시점에서 어떤 수단을 남겨 두는지, 그리고 그 수단을 요구하기 위해 무엇이 먼저 특정되어야 하는지를 묻는다. 계약이 지켜지지 않으면 곧 손해배상만 남는가, 그리고 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준은 무엇인가가 지금의 물음이다.
민법 제389조는 “①채무자가 임의로 채무를 이행하지 아니한 때에는 채권자는 그 강제이행을 법원에 청구할 수 있다. 그러나 채무의 성질이 강제이행을 하지 못할 것인 때에는 그러하지 아니하다.”라고 정한다. 이 문언은 이행을 요구하는 주체를 채권자로, 이행하지 않는 주체를 채무자로 두고, 그때의 행위를 법원에 대한 강제이행 청구로 특정한다. 동시에 이행의 관철 가능성을 채무의 성질에 묶어 두어, 모든 급부를 같은 방식으로 내밀 수는 없음을 분명히 한다. 같은 조문에서 손해배상의 요건은 따로 적혀 있지 않으므로, 원하는 급부를 정하는 일과 배상을 요구하는 일은 서로 다른 질문으로 남는다.
민법 제390조는 “채무자가 채무의 내용에 좇은 이행을 하지 아니한 때에는 채권자는 손해배상을 청구할 수 있다. 그러나 채무자의 고의나 과실없이 이행할 수 없게 된 때에는 그러하지 아니하다.”라고 규정한다. 이 규정은 채무의 내용에 좇은 이행이 없었는지와 채무자에게 고의나 과실이 없는지의 판단을 요구한다. 강제이행의 가능성은 제389조 제1항의 문언에 따르고, 손해배상의 요건은 제390조의 문언에 따르므로, 두 판단을 하나로 합칠 수 없다. 이 구별이 필요한 까닭은 계약 구제의 목표가 원래 급부 또는 대체적 회복 가운데 요구하는 상태를 뜻하기 때문이다. 요구하는 상태가 무엇인지에 따라 이행을 먼저 요구할지, 대체적 회복을 특정할지가 갈리며, 그 선택을 전제로 반환 급부와 배상 손해를 중복 없이 특정한 경우에 이 구제의 입구가 열린다.
이행을 고집하면 손해가 더 커질 수 있다는 반론은, 시간이 지날수록 목적물의 가치나 이용 이익이 달라질 수 있고 이미 지급한 대가의 회복도 늦어질 수 있다는 불편을 겨냥한다. 그 불편은 무시할 수 없다. 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면 불확실한 상황의 보호가 약해진다는 우려도 같은 방향에서 나온다. 그러나 불이행만으로 원래 급부 청구가 모두 소멸했다고 쓸 수는 없다. 손해배상 청구의 요건을 별도로 보는 이상, 원래 급부를 요구하는 청구가 이행 지연만으로 일괄 소멸한다고 정할 근거는 해당 문언에 없다. 이 답이 유지하는 것은 불이행이 곧 급부 청구의 소멸이라는 단정을 거절하는 데 있으며, 손해가 커질 수 있다는 불리함까지 지우지는 않는다.
원고 A는 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구한다. 이 장면에서 지금 살필 사실은 요구하는 급부의 형태와 반환 대상의 범위, 그리고 배상 손해의 항목이 서로 다른 것으로 남아 있는지이다. 계약상 급부·이행 제공·최고·해제 의사표시·반환 대상·손해 항목의 기록이 그 구별을 뒷받침한다. 다만 동시이행 관계나 최고 예외인 이행 거절 여부가 확인되지 않았으므로, 무조건 이행 요구를 관철할 수 있는지는 여기서 정할 수 없다. 최고가 필요한 이행지체인데 최고·미이행 요건이 없으면 그 통로는 막히며, 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부를 다시 판단한다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 좁다. 이행·해제·배상 각각의 요건을 충족하고 반환 급부와 배상 손해를 중복 없이 특정한 경우 이 구제의 입구가 열린다는 판단이다. 이 판단은 불이행만으로 손해배상만 남는다고 단정하지 않으며, 동시에 모든 이행 요구가 그대로 관철된다는 뜻도 아니다. 자료가 부족한 항목은 미확정으로 남고, 그것이 곧 구제 불능을 뜻하지 않는다.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
이러한 사정에서 계약 구제의 목표는 원래 급부 또는 대체적 회복 가운데 요구하는 상태를 뜻한다. 국가배상법·특별규정·민법의 관계를 따라 책임 범위와 손해를 별도로 판단해야 한다는 전제 위에서, 계약이 지켜지지 않은 뒤 해당 구제 통로가 닫히는 조건을 다룬다.
민법 제389조 제1항은 이렇게 정한다. 「①채무자가 임의로 채무를 이행하지 아니한 때에는 채권자는 그 강제이행을 법원에 청구할 수 있다.」 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 채권자이고, 대상 행위는 채무자의 임의 이행이 없는 경우의 강제이행 청구다. 조건은 임의로 채무를 이행하지 아니한 때라는 하나의 전제뿐 아니라, 다만 다음에 오는 「그러나 채무의 성질이 강제이행을 하지 못할 것인 때에는 그러하지 아니하다」는 한정도 함께 읽어야 한다.
민법 제390조는 손해배상의 문언을 따로 둔다. 「제390조(채무불이행과 손해배상) 채무자가 채무의 내용에 좇은 이행을 하지 아니한 때에는 채권자는 손해배상을 청구할 수 있다.」 두 조문의 문언이 각각 강제이행 가능성과 손해배상 요건을 다른 전제로 다루기 때문에, 원하는 급부를 먼저 특정하고 그 다음에 배상을 논하는 순서가 나온다. 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 해당 구제 통로는 닫히며, 최고가 필요한 이행지체인데 최고와 미이행 요건이 없거나 동시이행 항변 때문에 무조건 이행 요구를 관철할 수 없는 경우에는 그 통로가 막힌다.
이행을 고집하면 손해가 더 커질 수 있다. 그 손실은 목적물의 교환 가치뿐 아니라 보관·감가·시기 지연으로 옮겨간 이익까지 포함할 수 있고, 불확실한 상황에서 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면 보호가 약해진다는 불리함도 남는다. 손해배상 청구가 가능해지는 사건이 같은 시각에 강제이행 청구를 소멸시킨다는 법정 근거는 해당 문언에 들어 있지 않다.
합성 장면에서 확인된 사실은 원고 A가 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구한다는 것뿐이다. 이 장면은 반환 대상과 손해 항목을 함께 특정하는 형상일 뿐, 최고의 발송·도달 사실이나 이행 제공 사실은 담지 않는다. 따라서 최고가 필요한 이행지체 요건의 충족 여부와 동시이행 관계의 성립 여부는 모두 미확정으로 남으며, 만약 채무자가 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부를 다시 판단해야 한다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 구제 통로가 언제 열리고 언제 닫히는지의 조건부 구별뿐이다. 강제이행 가능성과 손해배상 요건을 별도로 두어 원하는 급부를 먼저 특정하고, 그러한 특정 없이 소멸을 단정하거나 반환·배상의 중복을 미리 확정하지 않는 범위에서 판단을 유지한다. 반대로 허용하지 않는 것은 불이행 사실만으로 원래 급부 청구가 모두 소멸했다고 적는 것이며, 미확정 자료를 구제 불능으로 바꾸는 것도 이 범위 밖이다.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
앞 절에서는 최고가 필요한 이행지체인데 최고와 미이행 요건이 없거나 동시이행 항변 때문에 무조건 이행 요구를 관철할 수 없는 경우에는 이 구제가 막힌다고 보았다. 그런데 기록에 남은 사실만으로는 동시이행 관계가 성립하는지, 아니면 최고의 예외인 이행 거절에 해당하는지가 드러나지 않을 수 있다. 원고 A가 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구하는 장면에서, 이처럼 확인되지 않은 부분을 어떻게 처리할 것인가가 지금의 물음이다.
이 물음의 출발점은 민법 제389조의 문언이다. 그 제1항은 "①채무자가 임의로 채무를 이행하지 아니한 때에는 채권자는 그 강제이행을 법원에 청구할 수 있다. 그러나 채무의 성질이 강제이행을 하지 못할 것인 때에는 그러하지 아니하다"라고 정하고 있다(민법 제389조). 이 문언은 채무자가 임의로 이행하지 않은 때, 채권자라는 주체와 강제이행 청구라는 행위를 전제로 하되, 채무의 성질상 강제이행을 할 수 없을 때는 예외로 둔다. 여기서는 이 문언이 강제이행의 가능성을 어떻게 여는지만 살피며, 같은 조의 다른 항에 딸린 쟁점은 다루지 않는다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 잇는 고리는, 강제이행의 가능성과 채무불이행 손해배상의 요건을 별도로 두어 원하는 급부를 먼저 특정한다는 점이다. 두 물음은 겉으로는 모두 불이행을 다루지만, 하나는 원래 급부를 법원에 요구할 수 있는지의 문제이고 다른 하나는 이미 생긴 손해를 메울 수 있는지의 문제다. 민법 제390조는 "제390조(채무불이행과 손해배상) 채무자가 채무의 내용에 좇은 이행을 하지 아니한 때에는 채권자는 손해배상을 청구할 수 있다. 그러나 채무자의 고의나 과실없이 이행할 수 없게 된 때에는 그러하지 아니하다"라고 정한다(민법 제390조). 이 둘을 나누어 두지 않으면, 자료가 없는 부분을 손해배상 요건의 부족으로 곧바로 읽어버리기 쉽다. 그러므로 동시이행 관계나 최고 예외인 이행 거절 여부가 확인되지 않은 경우에는 판정을 미확정으로 남기며, 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별한다.
가장 강한 반론은 이행을 고집하면 손해가 더 커질 수 있다는 점을 겨눈다. 계약의 목적물이 필요한 사람이 기다리는 동안 비용이 쌓이거나, 끝내 이행을 받지 못해 상황이 악화된다면 원래 급부를 계속 요구하는 편이 오히려 불리할 수 있다는 걱정이다. 나아가 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면, 불확실한 상황에서 보호받을 길이 줄어든다는 우려도 있다. 이 점은 부정할 수 없으나, 그렇더라도 불이행만으로 원래 급부 청구가 모두 소멸했다고 쓸 수는 없다. 여기서 내리는 판단은 목표 상태를 특정하는 순서에 관한 것이며, 이미 손해배상으로 대체되었다는 확정을 뜻하지 않는다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 것은 원고 A가 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구한다는 사실이다. 이 요구들은 각각 반환 대상과 손해 항목에 해당하므로, 이 절의 판정은 요구하는 상태가 원래 급부인지 대체적 회복인지를 먼저 가리는 데 머문다. 다만 동시이행 항변이 있는지, 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 있는지는 장면이 정하지 않았다. 따라서 이 부분은 구제가 막혔다고 확정할 수도, 열렸다고 확정할 수도 없다. 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부를 다시 판단한다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 자료가 없어 동시이행 관계나 이행 거절 여부를 확인할 수 없을 때 그 판단을 미확정으로 남기고, 그것을 구제가 막힌 상태와 같지 않은 것으로 구별하는 것이다. 허용되지 않는 것은, 확인되지 않은 사실을 없는 사실처럼 전제하여 원래 급부 청구가 소멸했다고 단정하거나, 미확정 상태 자체를 이미 구제가 막힌 것으로 적는 일이다. 여기까지를 전제로, 그 판정에는 어떤 기록이 필요한가?
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
계약이 지켜지지 않으면 곧 손해배상만 남는가, 그리고 그 판단을 하려면 어떤 자료가 필요한가라는 물음이 남는다. 앞서 책임과 손해를 나누어 보았다면 이제는 각 구제 단계가 어떤 자료 위에서 서 있는지 묻는 차례다.
이 물음에 해당하는 법령 문언은 두 개로 나뉜다. 여기서 주체는 채권자이고, 대상은 채무자의 임의 이행이 없는 경우이며, 조건은 강제이행을 가로막는 채무의 성질이 없는 일이다. "채무자가 채무의 내용에 좇은 이행을 하지 아니한 때에는 채권자는 손해배상을 청구할 수 있다. 그러나 채무자의 고의나 과실없이 이행할 수 없게 된 때에는 그러하지 아니하다."고 정한다. 손해배상 청구는 이행이 내용에 맞지 않은 때와 채무자의 귀책 사유가 겹치는 때를 따로 보아야 한다.
이 두 문언을 함께 놓으면 강제이행의 가능성과 채무불이행 손해배상의 요건을 별도로 두어 원하는 급부를 먼저 특정해야 하는 까닭이 드러난다. 전자는 원래의 급부를 법원에 요구할 길이 열려 있는지, 후자는 그 급부가 지켜지지 않은 데 대한 회복을 요구할 요건이 갖추어졌는지를 각각 묻는다. 그래서 판정 기준으로는 계약상 급부·이행 제공·최고·해제 의사표시·반환 대상·손해 항목에 드러난 자료만 삼는다. 여기서 계약 구제의 목표는 원래 급부 또는 대체적 회복 가운데 요구하는 상태를 뜻하며, 무엇을 요구하는 상태로 두는지에 따라 필요한 기록이 갈린다. 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우면 어느 단계에 서 있는지 확정되지 않은 채 판단만 앞서게 된다.
이렇게 기록을 좁히면 이행을 고집하면 손해가 더 커질 수 있다는 손실이 남는다. 목적물이 시의성을 잃거나 보관 비용이 쌓이는 상황에서 원래 급부를 계속 요구하는 쪽이 당사자에게 불리할 수 있고, 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면 불확실한 상황의 보호가 약해진다는 걱정도 함께 제기된다. 그러나 이 불이익을 이유로 불이행만으로 원래 급부 청구가 모두 소멸했다고 쓸 수는 없다. 반론이 지적한 비용과 불확실성은 남겨 두되, 청구가 소멸했다는 결론으로 넘어가지 않는 범위에서 기록 요건을 지키는 것이 이 절이 유지하는 자리다.
이 장면에서 원고 A는 계약을 끝내려 하고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하며 이행 지연 손해를 함께 요구한다. 이 사실만으로는 계약상 급부가 무엇인지, 이행 제공과 최고가 있었는지, 해제 의사표시가 있었는지, 반환 대상과 손해 항목이 어떻게 특정되었는지가 드러나지 않는다. 기록 요건에 대조하면 지금 확인된 것은 요구의 방향뿐이며, 각 단계의 요건 충족 여부는 미확정으로 남는다. 동시이행 관계나 최고 예외인 이행 거절 여부가 확인되지 않은 경우에도 단정하지 않고 미확정으로 둔다.
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 결론은 기록된 자료 안에서 단계를 판정하고, 없는 기록은 채우지 않은 채로 두는 선까지다. 불이행을 확인했다는 이유만으로 손해배상만 남는다고 단정하거나, 기록이 비어 있다는 이유만으로 구제가 불가능하다고 단정하는 것은 허용되지 않는다.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
In this flow, the present question is whether, when a contract is not kept, only damages remain, and what change in circumstances overturns a stage determination already made. That is, Plaintiff A aims at both recovery of the original performance and substitute recovery.
The first text corresponding to this question opens the path to compulsory performance. Article 389 paragraph (1) of the Civil Act declares: "①If the debtor does not perform the obligation voluntarily, the creditor may file a claim with the court for compulsory performance." Here the subject is the creditor, the act is a claim to the court for compulsory performance, and the condition is the time when the debtor does not perform voluntarily. However, where "the nature of the obligation is such that compulsory performance cannot be effected," that path is closed. Because this text does not state the requirements for damages, it is distinguished from the work of first specifying the desired performance.
On the other hand, Article 390 of the Civil Act provides: "If the debtor does not perform in accordance with the contents of the obligation, the creditor may claim damages," and makes "the time when performance has become impossible without the intent or negligence of the debtor" an exception. The requirements for the arising of the right to claim damages and the constraint on the nature of the claim for compulsory performance are each placed in a separate text. Hence only after fixing the goal of contractual remedies—that is, the state demanded among the original performance or substitute recovery—can one determine which path is open. If this distinction collapses, the very state demanded by Plaintiff A disappears and only damages are examined. Premised on this distinction, the author places the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements of damages for nonperformance separately and first specifies the desired performance.
While delivery of the subject matter continues to be demanded, if market prices move or storage costs accumulate, there is the concern that the loss may become greater than the recovery. In addition, it is also pointed out that if the parties' freedom to assert several means together is narrowed, protection in uncertain situations is weakened. Yet even acknowledging such losses and inconveniences does not change the conclusion. For it cannot be written that nonperformance alone extinguishes the claim for the original performance in its entirety. The expansion of costs that the counterargument indicates serves, in the end, only as a ground for checking the choice of the specified performance and its scope; it cannot erase the existence of the claim for performance itself.
The facts confirmed in this scene are limited to the point that Plaintiff A terminates the contract and demands both return of what has already been paid and damages for delay in performance. If the fact that the debtor has expressed in advance an intention not to perform is confirmed, the question of whether a demand is necessary must be reassessed. If that fact is confirmed, the existing determination of blockage and effectuation is discarded and the matter is adjudicated anew from the stage. However, whether there is a concurrent-performance relationship, whether there is refusal to perform as an exception to demand, and the specification of the subject matter of restitution and the items of harm cannot be determined from this scene and remain undetermined.
Therefore, the permissible conclusion is not to assert that damages alone remain merely from the circumstance that nonperformance has been confirmed. It departs from the premise that, according to the relationship among the State Compensation Act, special provisions, and the Civil Act, the scope of liability and the harm must be determined separately. Conversely, the impermissible conclusion is the judgment that nonperformance alone extinguishes the claim for the original performance in its entirety.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The preceding stage, which asked whether only damages remain when a contract is not kept, left behind the standard of placing the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements of damages for nonperformance separately and first specifying the desired performance; and now Plaintiff A, seeking to terminate the contract and recover what has already been paid, also demands the harm arising from delay in performance. In this scene the worry is raised that insisting on performance may make the harm grow greater. Even so, whether it can be written that nonperformance alone extinguishes the claim for the original performance in its entirety is the present question.
The source texts corresponding to this question are two provisions. Article 389 of the Civil Act provides: "①If the debtor does not perform the obligation voluntarily, the creditor may file a claim with the court for compulsory performance," and then makes the time when the nature of the obligation is such that compulsory performance cannot be effected an exception (Article 389 of the Civil Act). The subject indicated by the text is the creditor, the act is a claim to the court for compulsory performance when there is no voluntary performance, and the condition is such nonperformance together with the nature of an obligation capable of compulsory performance.
Article 390 of the Civil Act provides that when the debtor does not perform in accordance with the contents of the obligation, the creditor may claim damages, and makes the time when performance has become impossible without the intent or negligence of the debtor an exception (Article 390 of the Civil Act). The two provisions deal side by side, respectively, with the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements for damages. This distinction is important because the standard set by the preceding stage—that is, the work of placing the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements of damages for nonperformance separately and specifying the desired performance—must be presupposed. Here, the goal of contractual remedies means the state demanded among the original performance or substitute recovery. Since one cannot assert that choosing one automatically extinguishes the other, it cannot be written that nonperformance alone extinguishes the claim for the original performance in its entirety.
The strongest counterargument starts from the point that insisting on performance may make the harm grow greater. Where costs accumulate while the subject matter arrives late, or where the time passes and the performance itself becomes useless, there is the concern that an attitude of continuing to demand the original performance places the creditor in a worse position and leaves the debtor with an uncertain obligation. Further, there follows the criticism that narrowing the parties' freedom to assert several means together weakens protection in uncertain situations. These losses and inconveniences are not erased. Even so, the conclusion is maintained that nonperformance alone cannot be written to extinguish the claim for the original performance in its entirety. The circumstance that the harm grows greater is a matter to be dealt with in the choice of the specified performance and the determination of requirements; it does not mean the extinction of the claim itself.
The demanded state of this scene—that is, the goal of contractual remedies—has not yet been specified as to whether it is the original performance or substitute recovery. The subject matter of restitution and the items of harm are left as items to be dealt with in the records, so that the existence of nonperformance alone cannot be taken to determine which one is fixed. Nor have the concurrent-performance relationship or the question of refusal to perform as an exception to demand been confirmed; accordingly, nothing can be determined from this scene alone.
The conclusion this section permits is the distinction that even when nonperformance is confirmed, the claim for the original performance cannot be regarded as immediately extinguished. The possibility of a claim for compulsory performance under Article 389 of the Civil Act and the requirements for a claim for damages under Article 390 of the Civil Act each follow their own texts and exceptions, and these two cannot be compressed into one. However, which performance is in fact capable of compulsion, or which items of harm are recognized, is not determined in this section. The case where compulsory performance is impossible by the nature of the obligation, and the exception of impossibility of performance without intent or negligence, are likewise merely conditions placed in the text, not factual determinations applied to this scene.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
When a contract is not kept, do only damages remain? Taking over from the preceding section the premise that nonperformance alone cannot be written to extinguish the claim for the original performance in its entirety, this question begins with the work of first fixing the desired state. If one separates, within the same transaction, the person who takes the original performance as the desired state from the person who demands substitute recovery by way of monetary damages, the conditions and records of the two paths do not become entangled.
Article 389 paragraph (1) of the Civil Act provides: "①If the debtor does not perform the obligation voluntarily, the creditor may file a claim with the court for compulsory performance." The subject protected by this text is the creditor, the object is the obligation that the debtor has not performed voluntarily, and the act is filing a claim with the court for that compulsory performance. The same paragraph excludes from that text the time when the nature of the obligation is such that compulsory performance cannot be effected, thereby asking first whether the performance requested is, by the nature of the obligation, an object of compulsory performance. This judgment remains a separate question from which harm is to be calculated in money.
Article 390 of the Civil Act provides: "Article 390 (Nonperformance and Damages) If the debtor does not perform in accordance with the contents of the obligation, the creditor may claim damages," while excluding from its text the time when performance has become impossible without the intent or negligence of the debtor. A claim for damages takes as its requirements the fact that there is no performance in accordance with the contents and the grounds for attribution of the debtor, whereas a claim for compulsory performance is designed as a response to the time when performance is not voluntarily rendered. The requirements diverge because the demanded state differs. If the goal of contractual remedies is taken to be the original performance, one first specifies the desired performance and determines the possibility of compulsory performance of that performance; if it is taken to be substitute recovery, one separately specifies the subject matter of restitution and the items of harm. If these two stages are drawn at once into the doorway of damages, the judgment concerning the nature of the performance disappears, and whether the demanded performance can be received is closed off.
The strongest counterargument is that insisting on performance may make the harm grow greater. Even if recovery in a certain state takes precedence for the creditor who needs the subject matter, the storage costs during the delay or the loss of the opportunity of a substitute transaction may pile up before one's eyes. If the freedom to assert several means together is narrowed, there also remains the criticism that the ways of defending the creditor in an undecided situation grow thin. Yet this answer is upheld. The worry that the harm grows greater is handled, even where the goal of recovery is fixed as the original performance, by specifying the subject matter of restitution and the items of harm without overlap; and the fact that there are not yet materials from which to calculate those costs does not do away with the judgment fixing the goal of recovery itself.
Whether delay in performance amounts to the time when performance is not voluntarily rendered and whether such compulsory performance is possible by the nature of the obligation, whether it falls within the time when performance has become impossible without the intent or negligence of the debtor, and whether the subject matter of restitution and the items of harm have been fixed so as not to overlap each other, cannot be discerned from this scene alone. It must also be examined through what demand the delay has proceeded to a declaration of intention to rescind. If the fact that an intention not to perform has been expressed in advance is confirmed, the conclusion concerning the necessity of a demand changes. The scope this section covers extends only to first specifying the desired performance and viewing the possibility of its compulsory performance separately from the requirements for damages.
Therefore, it cannot be asserted that only a claim for damages remains merely from the circumstance that the contract was not kept. Placing the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements of damages for nonperformance separately and first specifying the desired performance is the conclusion this section permits. Extending the same conclusion to cover what means of compulsory performance are permitted, the method of obtaining restitution and compensation together, the time of rescission, and the correspondence of concurrent performance, lies outside the scope set by this section.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In this scene, the recovery he aims at is not merely a money substitute but reaching the state promised by the contract. The present question handed down from that is to examine separately whether a channel for seeking the original performance remains even after the contract has not been kept, and when the doorway to damages opens. Here, the goal of contractual remedies is fixed as the state demanded among the original performance or substitute recovery, and the question is whether the conditions of these two paths differ from each other.
As the starting point of this question, the text of Article 389 of the Civil Act is presented. Its paragraph (1) provides: "①If the debtor does not perform the obligation voluntarily, the creditor may file a claim with the court for compulsory performance." In this text the subject is the debtor who has not performed voluntarily, the act is the creditor's claim for compulsory performance through the court against that, and the condition is the time when the debtor does not perform voluntarily. The proviso that follows raises as an exception the time when the nature of the obligation is such that compulsory performance cannot be effected. This phrase concerns only the possibility of a claim for compulsory performance, and does not reach other issues.
Article 390 of the Civil Act provides: "Article 390 (Nonperformance and Damages) If the debtor does not perform in accordance with the contents of the obligation, the creditor may claim damages," while making the time when performance has become impossible without intent or negligence an exception. Viewed in the light of this text, the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements of damages for nonperformance are placed separately and connect to the work of first specifying the desired performance. That is, whether the doorway to compulsory performance opens because there is no voluntary performance, and whether the doorway to damages opens because there is no performance in accordance with the contents of the obligation, must each be confirmed separately according to their respective requirements. If the two judgments are bound together as one lump, it reads as though the channel for seeking the original performance has already been closed, but the text does not declare such extinction.
If this distinction is broadened, a counterargument returns. For a creditor who needs the subject matter under the contract, insisting on compulsory performance may be advantageous; but on the debtor's side, insisting on performance may make the harm grow greater. Without denying the disadvantage that losses and costs grow, it still cannot be written that nonperformance alone extinguishes the claim for the original performance in its entirety. That the requirements of each means are placed separately is the answer, and the circumstance that one means is difficult to carry through does not extinguish the requirements of the other means as well.
The fact relevant to the scene to be examined in this section is that Plaintiff A seeks to terminate the contract and recover what has already been paid, while also demanding the harm arising from delay in performance. Whether he continues to specify and demand the original performance, or demands substitute recovery only, is not determined by the scene alone, and the concrete scope of the subject matter of restitution or the items of harm is not fixed here either. Since the synthetic scene has no year, amount, or start date fixed, these are not converted into figures. Meanwhile, the condition that if the fact of having expressed in advance an intention not to perform is confirmed, the necessity of a demand is to be reassessed, is a matter to be handled outside the scope of this section, and is not determined here.
Therefore, the conclusion this section permits stops at this: prompted by nonperformance, the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements of damages for nonperformance are placed separately, and the desired performance is first specified insofar as the goal of contractual remedies points to the state demanded among the original performance or substitute recovery. In the light of this, asserting that nonperformance alone leaves only damages, or conversely saying that compulsory performance is carried through in every case, falls outside the scope of this section.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Between an object that cannot be restored and money, what determines the combination and scope of the remedies that this plaintiff can present to the court? The question asks whether the claim to end this scene and take back what was given and the demand for damages for delay can stand side by side.
Among the relevant provisions bearing on this question, the first is Civil Act Article 389, which provides as follows: "①Where a debtor does not voluntarily perform an obligation, the creditor may claim compulsory performance thereof before the court." The subjects of this wording are the debtor and the creditor, the act is a claim for compulsory performance where there has been no voluntary performance, and its basis is placed on a claim made to the court. And since only paragraph (1) of Article 389 is addressed here, the wording of paragraph (2) and the following paragraphs is not drawn in. The next provision, Civil Act Article 390, provides: "Article 390 (Nonperformance of Obligations and Damages) Where a debtor does not perform in accordance with the contents of an obligation, the creditor may claim damages," thereby setting out a separate claim for damages. On the face of the wording, the requirements of the two claims are described separately as a claim for compulsory performance and a claim for damages.
Reading the provisions quoted above within their proper scope, the wording of Civil Act Article 389 and the wording of Civil Act Article 390 are used together as the basis for determining the combination and scope of contract remedies. Yet the same wording cannot be bundled together and read as a single mass. One speaks of the possibility of compulsory performance where the debtor has not voluntarily performed, and the other speaks of damages where the debtor has not performed in accordance with the contents of the obligation, with the conditions of each attached separately. By keeping the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements of damages for nonperformance separate, the desired performance is first specified. Only once this distinction is settled is it determined whether the state sought by plaintiff A is the original performance or substitute recovery, and the subject of restitution and the heads of damage are specified so as not to overlap.
The most persuasive counterargument targets the point that insisting on performance may enlarge the damage. From the position of a person who needs the object of the contract, delayed performance may come too late for restoration to be possible, and if the damage grows in the meantime, the creditor must bear all of that burden. The same counterargument goes further, to the concern that narrowing the freedom of a party to assert several means together weakens protection in situations of uncertainty. This concern is not erased but left in place; even so, nonperformance alone cannot be written as extinguishing the claim for original performance in its entirety. Inasmuch as the wording has divided compulsory performance and damages into their respective requirements, the fact of nonperformance alone does not bring within the proper scope of the wording any textual ground for treating one claim as absorbed into the other.
Returning to the synthetic scene, the state sought by plaintiff A already places side by side the restitution of what has already been paid and the damages arising from delay in performance. Where the subject of restitution and the heads of damage are specified so as not to overlap, it is determined whether each item is placed under the wording on the possibility of compulsory performance or under the wording on the requirements for damages. However, this scene fixes no year, amount, or starting date, and the record of service or of performance in an actual case is unknown. Accordingly, whether there is a concurrent performance relationship, whether there is a refusal of performance as an exception to demand, and whether this is a delay in performance for which a demand is required cannot be determined here.
The conclusion this section permits is this narrow one. Nonperformance alone cannot be written as extinguishing the claim for original performance in its entirety, and once the desired state is first specified and the subject of restitution and the heads of damage are divided without overlap, several means may be asserted together. The conclusion that is not permitted is equally clear. To assert on the basis of these provisions that performance can be enforced unconditionally without a demand, or that the defense of concurrent performance can be overcome, is to settle in advance a determination that the wording does not undertake. Unconfirmed facts are left undetermined, and the point that undetermined does not mean an absence of remedy is left as it stands.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
Starting from the question whether, when a contract is not kept, only damages remain, the part to be addressed now is where the scope is to be divided anew for judgment when several remedies are asserted together.
Civil Act Article 389 provides: "①Where a debtor does not voluntarily perform an obligation, the creditor may claim compulsory performance thereof before the court." This wording indicates the condition that the debtor has not voluntarily performed and the subject and act of the creditor making a claim to the court. The proviso that follows imposes only the limitation of the case where the nature of the obligation does not permit compulsory performance, so whether the possibility opens or closes according to the character of the performance is determined first.
Civil Act Article 390 provides that "Where a debtor does not perform in accordance with the contents of an obligation, the creditor may claim damages," thereby setting the conditions for damages separately. Accordingly, the work of keeping the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements of damages for nonperformance separate and first specifying the desired performance comes first. The reason the two concepts must be distinguished is that the state of demanding the original performance and the state of filling an impaired interest are not bound together in a single judgment. Whether it operates, is blocked, or remains undetermined in accordance with this distinction is limited to the foregoing conditions.
The counterargument that insisting on performance may enlarge the damage targets the inconvenience that, while one clings to securing the object, damages for delay grow or restoration is ultimately further delayed. This counterargument also points out that narrowing the freedom of a party to assert several means together weakens protection in situations of uncertainty. However, the case where it operates is confined to the case where the respective requirements of performance, rescission, and damages are met and the restitutionary performance and the damages for loss are specified without overlap; and where this is a delay in performance for which a demand is required but the requirements of demand and nonperformance are absent, or where an unconditional demand for performance cannot be maintained because of the defense of concurrent performance, the blocked case remains as it is.
Weighing this fact against the foregoing conditions, where the subject of restitution and the heads of damage are presented together, the problem of specification within the operating case emerges, and the determination diverges according to which way the records of contractual performance, tender of performance, demand, and declaration of intention to rescind go. Where the concurrent performance relationship or a refusal of performance as an exception to demand is not confirmed, it remains undetermined.
What this section permits is the conclusion that, after the desired performance is first specified, the possibility of that performance and the requirements for damages are each compared. Conversely, the mere fact that nonperformance has been confirmed cannot be written as extinguishing the claim for original performance in its entirety, and the determination is limited to the operating, blocked, and undetermined cases expressly stated. Records in which the conditions are not met must be left undetermined.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The preceding section proceeds on the premise that the object of contract remedies means the state sought among original performance or substitute recovery. Therefore, before speaking of the three remedies together, one must distinguish what state each of them targets.
Civil Act Article 389, which forms the basis of compulsory performance, provides as follows: "Where a debtor does not voluntarily perform an obligation, the creditor may claim compulsory performance thereof before the court; provided, however, that this shall not apply where the nature of the obligation does not permit compulsory performance." The subject indicated by this wording is the creditor, the act is a claim for compulsory performance before the court where the debtor has not voluntarily performed, and the condition is that the nature of the obligation permits compulsory performance.
"Where a debtor does not perform in accordance with the contents of an obligation, the creditor may claim damages; provided, however, that this shall not apply where the debtor becomes unable to perform without intent or negligence of the debtor." These two articles set different bases and requirements, so the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements of damages for nonperformance are judged separately. Where the respective requirements are met and the restitutionary performance and the damages for loss are specified without overlap, the combination operates; where this is a delay in performance for which a demand is required but the requirements of demand and nonperformance are absent, or where an unconditional demand for performance cannot be maintained because of the defense of concurrent performance, it is blocked.
This counterargument targets the loss that the inconvenience and delay, which money cannot fill for a person who needs the thing, may grow. Nor can it be overlooked that narrowing a party's freedom to assert several means together weakens protection in situations of uncertainty. Yet even while leaving the disadvantage of the counterargument as it stands, nonperformance alone cannot be written as extinguishing the claim for original performance in its entirety.
What is confirmed in this scene is only the list of the subject of restitution and the heads of damage, and the records of contractual performance, tender of performance, demand, and declaration of intention to rescind have not been confirmed. Whether there is a concurrent performance relationship or a refusal of performance as an exception to demand also cannot be judged from the scene and remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits remains within the narrow range of the operating case, where the requirements of each of the three remedies are met and the restitutionary performance and the damages for loss are specified without overlap. Cases without confirmation of the requirements of demand and nonperformance or of the defense of concurrent performance cannot be asserted to be operating, and undetermined cannot be reworded as blocked or as an absence of remedy.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
It starts from the premise that the scope of liability and the damage must be judged separately. Whether I may continue to seek the original performance when the other party does not perform, or whether I must change direction with a single claim for damages, is the question remaining here. By the object of contract remedies here is meant the state sought among original performance or substitute recovery, and the starting point of the judgment diverges according to which of these the creditor seeks. In the situation where plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid while also demanding the damage arising from delay in performance, the reason the creditor asserts together the claim to recover what has already been received and the damage for delay is that the original purpose has not been completely abandoned.
The first provision supporting that distinction is Civil Act Article 389. In this provision the subjects are the debtor who has not voluntarily performed and that creditor, and the act is a claim for compulsory performance before the court. The condition is limited to the case where the debtor has not voluntarily performed, and the exception is limited to the case where the nature of the obligation does not permit compulsory performance. Accordingly, nonperformance itself is not written in the wording as an act that extinguishes the creditor's right to claim the original performance. What the article addresses is the possibility of compulsory enforcement of performance.
The second provision is Civil Act Article 390: "Article 390 (Nonperformance of Obligations and Damages) Where a debtor does not perform in accordance with the contents of an obligation, the creditor may claim damages; provided, however, that this shall not apply where the debtor becomes unable to perform without intent or negligence of the debtor." This article addresses the conditions of the claim for damages, and is not the same judgment as the possibility of compulsory performance above. One asks whether the original performance can be sought before the court; the other asks whether the damage arising from nonperformance can be recovered as damages. Where the debtor has become unable to perform without intent or negligence, damages are blocked, but that does not mean that the claim for original performance is automatically extinguished. Only when these two stages are kept apart is it first determined whether the state the creditor demands is original performance or substitute recovery, and only then can what the damage is be judged.
Even so, the counterargument remains that insisting on performance may enlarge the damage. The longer the delay, the more the value of the object may fall, or the greater the opportunity loss from missing other transactions; and if one presses for performance and does not receive it, only the costs already incurred pile up. In these respects this counterargument targets real inconvenience. There is further the worry that narrowing the freedom of a party to assert several means together weakens protection in situations of uncertainty. Because there are many cases where the money received as damages does not give the same recovery as the original object, the specifying of what state the creditor demands remains prior to the assessment of damage.
Only where the restitutionary performance and the damages for loss are specified together can the two claims be placed without overlap, and this is a condition at the stage of the combination and scope of contract remedies. Yet whether the other party tendered performance, whether this is a delay in performance requiring a demand, and whether there is a concurrent performance relationship must be examined together. Therefore what can be determined in this section is limited to the distinction that nonperformance does not automatically extinguish the claim for original performance.
In sum, it cannot be asserted that only the claim for damages remains by reason of nonperformance; the state the creditor demands is first specified, and then the possibility of compulsory performance and the requirements for damages are judged respectively. However, that distinction does not mean that performance can be enforced unconditionally, and where the defense of concurrent performance or the requirement of a demand is in issue, the matter does not end in this section. If the other party does not perform, do I always refuse my own performance as well?