Summary
This chapter sets out both parties' obligations of restitution together with the protection of third-party rights, thereby narrowing the object of recovery.
4.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
계약을 끝내는 문장만으로 이미 옮겨 간 재산이 돌아오지는 않는다. 이행지체 해제는 상당한 기간의 최고와 미이행을 원칙으로 하고 미리 밝힌 이행 거절의 예외를 남긴다고 앞에서 밝힌 바 있다. 이 기준을 통과한 해제에 이어 이제 이미 주고받은 것이 어떻게 되는지를 묻는다. 원고 A는 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구한다. 이 장면에서 반환 대상과 손해 항목이 함께 놓이면 회복의 대상을 어디까지 잡아야 하는지가 문제가 된다. 따라서 회복의 문이 열리는 기준을 먼저 정해야 한다.
이 물음에 대한 문언은 민법 제548조에서 확인된다. 그 제1항은 “당사자 일방이 계약을 해제한 때에는 각 당사자는 그 상대방에 대하여 원상회복의 의무가 있다. 그러나 제삼자의 권리를 해하지 못한다.”고 적는다. 여기서 주체는 계약을 해제한 당사자와 그 상대방이며, 행위는 상대방에 대한 반환, 조건은 계약 해제가 이루어진 때다. 뒷문장은 그 반환의 범위가 제삼자의 권리를 침해하지 않는 선에 머문다고 한정한다. 이 문언의 적용에 관한 구별과 평가는 저자의 몫이며, 문언 자체와 나누어 읽어야 한다.
이 문언은 당사자 사이의 반환 의무와 제삼자 권리 보호라는 두 판단을 함께 둔다. 앞의 것은 해제한 당사자와 상대방이 서로에게 지는 의무를 정하고, 뒤의 것은 그 회복의 범위가 밖으로 밀려나는 것을 막는다. 원상회복이란 해제로 생기는 상대방에 대한 반환 의무를 뜻하며, 이 정의는 반환의 축을 당사자 사이에 묶는다. 이행·해제·배상 각각의 요건을 충족하고 반환 급부와 배상 손해를 중복 없이 특정한 경우라는 조건도 같은 자리에 놓인다.
가장 강한 반론은 제삼자 보호가 원래 당사자의 완전 회복을 막을 수 있다는 점을 겨눈다. 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면, 불확실한 상황의 보호가 약해진다는 손실과 불편을 지적한다. 이미 옮겨 간 재산과 지연 손해를 한 자리에서 돌려받으려는 원고의 이해관계가 제삼자 권리라는 장애 앞에서 줄어들 수 있다. 그렇더라도 해제를 제삼자의 권리까지 무조건 없애는 효과로 바꿀 수는 없다. 반론이 가리키는 불리함은 그대로 두면서도, 회복의 범위를 당사자 사이의 반환으로 묶어 두는 결론은 유지된다.
합성 장면에서 이 물음에 해당하는 사실은 계약을 끝내고자 하는 의사, 이미 지급한 재산의 반환 요구, 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해의 항목뿐이다. 이 세 요소를 반환 급부와 배상 손해로 나누어 특정하면, 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건의 특정과 함께 위 기준에 놓인다. 그러나 동시이행 관계 여부나 최고 예외인 이행 거절 여부는 이 장면에서 확인되지 않으므로 미확정으로 남는다. 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부를 다시 판단한다. 제삼자의 권리가 실제로 어떻게 겹치는지도 장면으로 확정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 요구되는 급부·당사자·조건이 특정되고 선택한 소의 권리를 방어할 수 있을 때 이 구제의 통로가 열린다는 판단이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 해제를 제삼자의 권리까지 무조건 없애는 효과로 바꾸어 회복의 범위를 넓히는 것이다. 이행·해제·배상의 요건과 중복 없는 특정이 함께 놓이지 않으면 입구는 열리지 않으며, 자료가 없어 확정되지 못한 항목은 미확정으로 남는다.
4.2The Conditions That Block Relief
이 장면에서 해제란 계약 관계를 장래를 향해 끝맺는다는 의미에 그치지 않고 이미 이행한 급부를 서로 되돌리는 결과를 함께 부른다. 이행지체 해제는 상당한 기간의 최고와 미이행을 원칙으로 하고 미리 밝힌 이행 거절을 예외로 남긴다. 이 원칙이 지켜질 때에만 해제로 인한 회복의 문제가 처음으로 열린다. 여기서 물음은 해제 뒤 이미 주고받은 것이 어떻게 되는지, 그리고 어떤 조건에서 이 구제의 통로가 닫히는지에 있다.
해당 문언은 회복의 대상을 정한다. 민법 제548조는 "①당사자 일방이 계약을 해제한 때에는 각 당사자는 그 상대방에 대하여 원상회복의 의무가 있다. 그러나 제삼자의 권리를 해하지 못한다."라고 규정한다. 여기서 회복 의무의 주체는 해제한 때의 각 당사자이고, 그 상대방이 반환의 수령인이 된다. 즉 원상회복은 해제로 생기는 상대방에 대한 반환 의무를 뜻한다. 한편 후단은 회복의 범위를 완전한 되돌림으로 열어두지 않고 제삼자의 권리를 해치는 방향의 반환을 배제한다. 이 문언만으로 계약의 어떤 급부가 반환 대상인지, 제삼자의 권리가 어떤 상태인지까지 정해지는 것은 아니다.
이 문언과 앞의 요건을 함께 보면 판정 기준이 드러난다. 해제의 효력이 발생하려면 먼저 이행지체 해제의 요건, 즉 상당한 기간의 최고와 미이행이 갖추어져야 한다. 최고가 필요한 이행지체인데 최고와 미이행 요건이 없거나 동시이행 항변 때문에 무조건 이행 요구를 관철할 수 없는 경우, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 해당 구제 통로는 닫힌다. 즉 반환 의무의 논의는 해제 자체가 유효하게 성립한 뒤에야 비로소 시작된다. 요건의 결여와 회복 범위의 한정은 별개의 판단 단계이므로, 어느 한쪽을 다른 쪽으로 대신할 수 없다.
그런데 반환의 범위를 정할 때 제삼자 보호가 원래 당사자의 완전 회복을 막을 수 있다. 당사자가 서로 주고받은 것이 이미 제삼자의 권리와 결합되어 있다면, 그대로 되돌리는 것이 오히려 제삼자의 지위를 흔들게 된다. 이런 손실과 불편은 실제이며, 회복을 요구한 당사자 입장에서는 계약을 끝낸 뒤에도 자기가 지급한 것을 온전히 돌려받지 못하는 결과가 남는다. 후단의 문언이 남긴 한정은 회복의 범위를 좁히는 조건이지, 제삼자의 권리를 무로 만드는 근거가 아니다.
반환 대상이 특정되고 해제의 요건이 갖추어졌다면 원상회복의 의무가 문제되지만, 이 장면만으로는 계약상 급부·이행 제공·최고·해제 의사표시·반환 대상·손해 항목의 기록이 확인된 바 없다. 동시이행 관계나 최고 예외인 이행 거절 여부가 확인되지 않은 경우는 미확정으로 남는다. 제삼자의 권리가 반환 대상과 결합되어 있는지 역시 이 장면으로는 판단할 수 없다.
따라서 이 절이 허용하는 것은, 해제의 요건이 갖추어진 경우 각 당사자가 상대방에 대하여 원상회복의 의무를 진다는 구별이다. 그러나 그 회복이 제삼자의 권리를 해치는 방향으로까지 확장된다는 결론은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다. 최고·미이행 요건이나 동시이행 항변의 문제가 남아 있는 한 이 구제의 통로가 열렸다고 볼 수 없고, 제삼자 보호가 걸려 있는 한 회복의 대상이 완전히 되돌려진다고 볼 수도 없다. 미확인 항목이 남아 있어도 이미 정해진 이 좁은 결론은 유지된다.
4.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
이 장면에서 계약 종료와 반환 요구는 함께 걸려 있지만 반환의 범위가 바로 정해지는 것은 아니다. 이 원칙을 받아 이 물음은 이미 주고받은 것이 어떤 상태로 돌아가는지, 그중 자료만으로 확정할 수 없는 경계는 어디인지 가리는 데 있다. 앞 절이 최고와 미이행의 요건을 다루었다면 지금은 그 뒤에 생기는 반환 의무의 대상과 한계를 따로 살핀다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민법 제548조 제1항에 있다. 그 문언은 "당사자 일방이 계약을 해제한 때에는 각 당사자는 그 상대방에 대하여 원상회복의 의무가 있다. 그러나 제삼자의 권리를 해하지 못한다"고 적는다. 이 조문이 가리키는 주체는 계약을 해제한 당사자와 그 상대방이며, 행위는 이미 주고받은 것을 돌려주는 반환이다. 원상회복이란 여기서 해제로 생기는 상대방에 대한 반환 의무를 뜻한다. 조건은 당사자 일방이 계약을 해제한 때로 잡히고, 각 당사자가 서로에게 그 의무를 진다. 다만 문언은 제삼자의 권리를 해하지 못한다고 한정하여, 당사자 사이의 회복만을 전부로 삼지는 않는다.
이 문언을 이 절의 결론과 연결하면 반환 의무와 그 한계가 함께 놓인다. 각 당사자의 원상회복 의무는 계약 해제라는 전제에서 생기고, 그 대상은 상대방에 대한 반환으로 특정된다. 그런데 동시에 제삼자 권리 보호라는 한정이 붙어 있으므로, 회복의 대상이 당사자가 원하는 만큼 넓게 잡히지는 않는다. 두 가지를 구별해야 하는 까닭은, 하나는 당사자 사이의 반환 의무를 정하는 것이고 다른 하나는 그 회복이 제삼자의 권리에 닿는지를 막는 것이기 때문이다. 전자만 보고 후자를 놓치면 회복의 범위가 넓어지고, 후자만 앞세우면 당사자의 반환 의무 자체가 흔들린다. 이 구별은 이번 물음에서 미확정으로 남길 경계를 가르는 기준이 된다.
제삼자 보호가 원래 당사자의 완전 회복을 막을 수 있다. 반환을 받으려는 당사자가 제삼자의 권리를 건드리지 않으면서 돌려받아야 하므로, 원하는 만큼 되돌리지 못하는 손실이 생길 수 있고 확인에 드는 불편도 남는다. 조문이 제삼자 권리를 해하지 못한다고 적어 둔 이상, 해제라는 사실 하나로 제삼자의 권리가 정리되는 것은 아니다. 이 답은 당사자의 회복이 어려운 점을 지우지 않으면서도, 회복의 범위를 넓히려고 제삼자의 권리를 무시하는 쪽으로 결론을 옮기지 않는다.
이 장면의 사실만으로는 반환 대상이 무엇인지, 그 반환에 제삼자의 권리가 얽혀 있는지가 드러나지 않는다. 판단에 쓸 기록은 계약상 급부, 이행 제공, 최고, 해제 의사표시, 반환 대상, 손해 항목이다. 동시이행 관계나 최고 예외인 이행 거절 여부가 확인되지 않은 경우 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항은 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남긴다. 만약 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부에 관한 결론이 달라진다. 자료가 없다는 이유만으로 회복이 불능하다고 단정할 수 없고, 확인되지 않은 지점은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은, 계약을 해제한 때 각 당사자가 상대방에 대하여 원상회복의 의무를 지고 그 회복이 제삼자의 권리를 해하지 못한다는 범위에 머문다. 여기서 미리 밝힌 이행 거절의 예외가 적용되는지, 반환 대상에 제삼자의 권리가 겹치는지처럼 확인되지 않은 것은 불능으로 단정하지 않고 미확정으로 남긴다. 반대로 이 절에서 허용되지 않는 것은, 제삼자 권리 보호를 회피하기 위해 해제가 그 권리를 무조건 없애는 효과를 가진다고 보는 것이나, 자료 부족을 곧바로 구제 불능으로 옮기는 태도이다. 계약을 해제하면 손해배상도 포기한 것인가?
4.4The Records Needed for Determination
동시이행 관계나 최고 예외인 이행 거절 여부가 확인되지 않은 경우에는 판정을 미확정으로 남기며, 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별한다. 이 절의 물음은 이 판정에 어떤 기록이 필요한지이다. 이 장면에서 회복의 대상과 손해의 항목을 나누어 특정하려면 자료가 있어야 하며, 자료 부족을 곧바로 구제 불능으로 읽어서는 안 된다.
해제하면 이미 주고받은 것은 어떻게 되는가에 답하기 위하여 해당 문언을 먼저 본다. 민법 제548조 제1항은 "당사자 일방이 계약을 해제한 때에는 각 당사자는 그 상대방에 대하여 원상회복의 의무가 있다"고 정한다. 여기서 각 당사자는 계약의 당사자이며, 그 상대방은 반환을 요구할 상대를 가리키고, 원상회복의 의무는 해제로 생기는 반환 의무를 말한다. 같은 항은 "그러나 제삼자의 권리를 해하지 못한다"고 덧붙여 회복의 대상을 한정한다.
이 문언과 이번 결론은 계약상 급부, 이행 제공, 최고, 해제 의사표시, 반환 대상, 손해 항목의 기록으로 이어진다. 여기서 원상회복은 해제로 생기는 상대방에 대한 반환 의무를 뜻하며, 손해 항목과는 구별된다. 반환 대상은 이미 옮겨 간 급부를 특정하여 정하고, 손해 항목은 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해를 따로 적는다. 두 가지를 나누어 적어야 하는 까닭은 앞의 것은 계약 이전 상태로 돌아가는 것이고 뒤의 것은 그 상태로 돌아가도 남는 불이익이기 때문이다. 이 판정은 그 기록이 없으면 미확정으로 남는다.
이미 옮겨 간 재산이 제삼자의 권리에 묶여 있으면 당사자는 원하는 대로 되돌려 받지 못할 수 있고, 그 불이익은 이 절의 결론이 지워 버릴 수 없는 부분이다. 문언은 원상회복의 의무와 제삼자 권리 보호를 함께 적어 회복의 대상을 좁히고 있으며, 반론의 불리한 점은 그대로 남겨 둔 채 범위만 정해진다.
원고 A의 장면에서 확인되는 것은 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하며 이행 지연 손해도 요구한다는 사실이다. 이 사실을 앞의 조건과 대조하면 반환 대상은 이미 지급한 것이고 손해 항목은 이행 지연으로 생긴 것으로 특정되어야 한다. 그러나 연도, 금액, 기산일은 설정되지 않았고, 동시이행 관계나 최고의 예외인 이행 거절 여부도 확인되지 않았다. 제삼자의 권리가 실제로 반환 대상에 닿는지조차 이 장면만으로는 정할 수 없어 미확정으로 남는다.
자료가 없을 때 결론을 미확정으로 남기고 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별된다. 허용하지 않는 것은 기록 없이 회복의 대상을 넓히거나 좁혀 확정하는 것과, 해제를 제삼자의 권리까지 무조건 없애는 효과로 바꾸는 것이다.
4.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
The reason for leaving that exception in place bears directly on the Next stage of judgment. What must be asked now is what must change in order for the stage determination already reached to be withdrawn and the path to a fresh determination opened.
The provision in question is Article 548 (1) of the Civil Act. "Where one of the parties rescinds a contract, each party shall be bound to restore the other party to the original position; provided, however, that this shall not prejudice the rights of a third party." This text first fixes the subject as one party to the contract and the other party, and attaches the point in time of "when the contract is rescinded." It then declares that each party bears, as against the other, the duty to restore the original position. The same text, however, immediately qualifies this by providing that it shall not prejudice the rights of a third party.
This text divides the object of restoration into two branches. The first establishes the parties' mutual duties of restitution; the second limits that restitution so that it is carried out only within bounds that do not infringe rights that a third party already holds. Only by reading the two parts together is the object of restoration ascertained. Further, the separate determination of the necessity of a demand earlier in the same section concerns requirements, whereas the restitution and limitation addressed here concern the effects that follow once rescission has taken effect. Re-doing the determination of requirements and narrowing the object of restoration occupy different places.
Even if Plaintiff A seeks to recover everything already paid, the part of the object of restitution in which a third party's rights are entangled may remain as it is. Consequently, the party's expectation of returning to the pre-contract state may not be fully satisfied, and that loss is felt all the more keenly in the face of a third party's right discovered belatedly. This limitation only narrows the scope of the duty of restitution; it does not erase the conclusion that rescission itself has taken effect or the conclusion that a duty of restitution exists between the parties.
What is confirmed in the synthetic scene is the fact that Plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid, and at the same time claims damages for delay in performance. The items to be examined in the records are contractual performance, tender of performance, demand, declaration of intention to rescind, the object of restitution, and the heads of damages. Among these, what the object of restitution is, and whether a third party's rights overlap with that object, cannot be determined from the scene alone. Where a concurrent-performance relationship, or refusal to perform as an exception to the requirement of demand, has not been confirmed, that part remains undetermined. The fact of being undetermined does not mean that relief is impossible; it means only that the range that can be determined now is that much narrower. Matters that cannot be determined from the scene are left as they are and passed over.
What can be determined in this section is that, where rescission takes effect, each party bears, as against the other, the duty to restore the original position, and that this restoration remains within the bounds of not prejudicing the rights of a third party. Accordingly, it cannot be categorically asserted that Plaintiff A's request for restitution will prevail unconditionally even as to the part that overlaps with a third party's rights; conversely, neither does one lose the fact that a duty of restitution arises in principle. It is only that the materials for determining with which object a third party's rights overlap, and to what extent that right reaches, have not been confirmed here.
4.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
Rescission ends the contractual relationship and at the same time creates a new duty to return to its place the performance already transferred. Yet if, in the course of restitution, the rights of a person outside the parties to the contract are engaged, how far is the scope of restoration determined? How is that strongest of the counterarguments answered?
It is provided that "Where one of the parties rescinds a contract, each party shall be bound to restore the other party to the original position; provided, however, that this shall not prejudice the rights of a third party" (Article 548 of the Civil Act). Here "one of the parties" is the party who rescinds, "each party" denotes both sides who concluded the contract, and the duty to restore the original position is set as a duty of restitution owed to the other party. The proviso that follows is a limiting condition that places the rights of a third party outside the contract beyond the scope of restoration. This text concerns the determination of the object of restitution; it does not at the same time determine the requirements for rescission for delay in performance or whether other claims are established.
Connecting this text with the conclusion of this section reveals that the parties' mutual duties of restoration to the original position and the protection of a third party's rights are devices that jointly narrow the object of restoration. The duty clause of the preceding paragraph determines "who returns what to whom," and the proviso determines "how far the return can go"; these are distinct stages of judgment, and the latter stage does not possess the function of arbitrarily abolishing the duty fixed at the former stage. If the judgment that a duty has arisen and the judgment that that duty does not reach a third party's rights are commingled, the result is that the former duty is denied as well. Rescission therefore cannot be converted into an effect that unconditionally extinguishes even the rights of a third party. This distinction attaches only to the present question, which asks what the object of restoration is.
The strongest of the counterarguments takes aim at the point that this limitation narrows the scope of restoration and leaves the original party's loss unaddressed. Plaintiff A seeks to recover what has already been paid and to recover delay damages as well; if a third party's rights lie along the path of restitution, that part falls out of the recovery. A further disadvantage remains in that narrowing the freedom of a party to assert several means together weakens protection in uncertain situations. The loss and inconvenience that this counterargument identifies are not erased. Even so, the answer does not change. Even if third-party protection prevents the original party's full restoration, rescission cannot be converted into an effect that unconditionally extinguishes even the rights of a third party. The counterargument only describes the limits of the scope of restoration; it does not furnish grounds for removing those limits.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only that Plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid, and also claims delay damages. This fact shows a situation in which the parties' mutual duties of restoration to the original position may be at issue; but whether a third party's rights actually lie upon the object of restitution, and whether the requirements of demand and non-performance for rescission for delay in performance are satisfied, are not settled by the scene. Nor has a concurrent-performance relationship, or refusal to perform as an exception to the requirement of demand, been confirmed. Accordingly, neither the final determination of the scope of restoration nor the outcome of restitution can be determined on the basis of this scene. This condition does not take its place as a fact that alters the present judgment of the scope of restitution.
The conclusion this section permits is that, even though rescission gives rise to the parties' mutual duties of restoration to the original position, that restoration is determined within the bounds of not prejudicing the rights of a third party. The conclusion not permitted is the judgment that, on account of third-party protection, the duty of restoration itself disappears, or conversely that restoration may be pushed through in disregard of a third party's rights. Within this distinction the narrowing of the object of restoration remains, but it cannot be expanded into an effect that eliminates that narrowing.
4.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Building on the conclusion that rescission cannot be converted into an effect that unconditionally extinguishes even the rights of a third party, the present question asks how what has already been given and received is settled after rescission. In this scene, assets do not return of their own accord merely upon the declaration that the contract is ended, so who must return what to whom becomes a separate object of judgment.
The relevant source text for this question is Article 548 (1) of the Civil Act. Its wording states "each party shall be bound to restore the other party to the original position" and adds "provided, however, that this shall not prejudice the rights of a third party." The subjects this sentence denotes are the party who rescinded the contract and the other party, the act is the return of what has already been given and received, and the condition is the time when the rescission takes effect. Since this section addresses paragraph (1) alone, however, it does not expound other issues of the provision.
This text limits the object of restoration to the original position twice over. Here restoration to the original position means the duty of restitution owed to the other party that arises from rescission, and it records at once that the subject and the other party are both sides. At the same time, the proviso that it shall not prejudice the rights of a third party means that the object of that restoration cannot displace rights that a third party has already acquired. The reason these two stages must be distinguished is that the judgment fixing the direction of restitution and the judgment limiting the scope of that restitution follow different sentences. Looking only at the former, one easily insists on full restoration; looking only at the latter, one misses the subject of the duty.
If property already transferred overlaps with a third party's rights, the plaintiff must bear, as it stands, the loss and inconvenience of not returning to its place despite the contract having ended. This answer maintains a boundary that does not erase the point that third-party protection is disadvantageous to the parties, while at the same time refusing to extend the effect of the device of rescission without limit beyond the restitutionary relationship between the parties.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that Plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid, and that the plaintiff claims together the loss arising from delay in performance. What has been noted as the object of restitution is what has already been paid, and the heads of damages are limited to those arising from delay in performance. Yet whether the object of restitution and a third party's rights actually overlap, and within what range they overlap, cannot be determined from this scene alone. Accordingly, the concrete range within which the object of restoration is narrowed remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that, once rescission takes effect, both parties bear toward each other the duty to restore the original position, and that the object of that restoration is limited within bounds that do not prejudice the rights of a third party. The conclusion not permitted is one that regards rescission alone as invalidating even a third party's rights, or that ignores the limitation on the ground that the parties' full restoration is required. That the range cannot be specified for want of materials is not an absence of relief but a state of remaining undetermined.
4.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
When a contract is rescinded, what becomes of what has already been given and received? Passing this principle, the question now is how the scope of restoration is determined. Here, how far the object he may recover extends is the question this section addresses.
Article 548 (1) of the Civil Act provides: "Where one of the parties rescinds a contract, each party shall be bound to restore the other party to the original position; provided, however, that this shall not prejudice the rights of a third party." This text first takes the actor to be one party and makes the time when he rescinds the contract the occasion. It then imposes on each party the duty to restore the original position toward the other, so that the direction of restitution is determined reciprocally. At the end of this duty, however, it places a proviso so that the rights of a third party are not prejudiced. This paragraph records together the parties' mutual duties of restitution and their limits.
Taking this text as its basis, the object of restoration is narrowed. This definition makes clear that the counterparty of restitution is the counterparty to the contract. Accordingly, property already transferred does not return as it stands merely upon the intention to end the contract, and the object of restitution must be specified after that duty has arisen. At the same time, the proviso that the rights of a third party shall not be prejudiced prevents even that restitution from being enlarged without limit. Only by reading these two elements separately does the difference between maintaining the contract and ending it come to light.
This limit narrowing the scope of restoration produces the result of leaving actual loss as it stands. If property already transferred overlaps with a third party's rights, the party may be unable to recover that portion. The author records the existence of such a disadvantage without erasing it. The conclusion that a duty of restitution arises between the parties and the conclusion that the scope of that restitution is determined within bounds that do not infringe a third party's rights are maintained together.
Reading the synthetic scene against the present question, Plaintiff A seeks to recover what has already been paid, and what the object of restitution is proves decisive. What must be set down in the records is contractual performance and tender of performance, demand and declaration of intention to rescind, the object of restitution and the heads of damages. Of these, the object of restitution is the part this section addresses, while the heads of damages remain a separate question. Yet as the scene fixes no year or amount, the size of the restitution cannot be determined. Moreover, as a concurrent-performance relationship, or refusal to perform as an exception to the requirement of demand, has not been confirmed, such matters are left undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is that rescission gives rise to each party's duty of restitution toward the other, that its object is specified, and that it is limited within bounds that do not prejudice the rights of a third party. What it does not permit is the interpretation that rescission itself unconditionally returns property already transferred, or that it produces the result of extinguishing even a third party's rights. Here the line is maintained that if one opts to keep the contract, the question of the duty of restitution does not arise, and only when one opts to end the contract is the scope of restoration determined.
4.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The conclusion of the preceding stage carries over as a single sentence: rescission for delay in performance in principle requires a demand with a reasonable period and non-performance, while leaving open the exception of a refusal to perform declared in advance. This scene shows a state in which the ending of the contract, a demand for return, and a demand for damages overlap in one place. The question posed here is who asks about the scope of restoration to the original state and its relationship to other remedies. The question is set not on the demand requirement of the preceding stage but on the object of restoration.
The relevant wording is the following phrase of Article 548 of the Civil Act. It states: "Where one party rescinds a contract, each party shall be bound to restore the other party to the original state; provided, that the rights of third persons may not be prejudiced." (Article 548 of the Civil Act) In the preceding sentence, restoration to the original state means the duty to return to the counterparty that arises from rescission. The subject of this wording is one of the parties to the contract, the act is the rescission of the contract, and the condition is the time when that rescission takes place. The effect is written as each party bearing a duty toward the counterparty to restore the original state. This phrase pairs the ending of the contract with return.
Yet the same wording sets out the mutual duties of return and the protection of third parties together in a single provision. The two sentences aim at different objects and must therefore be read distinctly. The first sentence governs the duty of restoration between the parties, and the second declares that the scope of restoration is bound to a line that does not touch the rights of third persons. Accordingly, the object of restoration is limited to what the parties have given and received from one another, and a restoration procedure cannot shake rights that a third party has already acquired. This distinction operates to narrow the object of restoration, and that narrowing is not the same as a declaration that return is impossible. So long as judgment stops within this wording, the wording is used as the basis for the combination of contractual remedies and the scope of those remedies.
The party that suffers the greatest loss from this distinction is the party who wants complete restoration. If a third party has already acquired rights, the party's path to recovering precisely the pre-contract state may be blocked before those rights. If the party's freedom to assert several means together is narrowed, the means of response available in uncertain situations that call for protection are reduced. The wording, however, while accepting the protection of third parties as an absolute limit on restoration, did not alter the very meaning of rescission by pointing to cases in which complete restoration becomes difficult because of that protection. While not erasing the inconvenience spoken of by the counterargument, rescission cannot be changed into an effect that unconditionally extinguishes the rights of third parties as well. The narrowing of the scope of restoration remains, while the extension by which rescission wipes out the rights of third parties is excluded.
The facts that can be confirmed in this scene are the combination of the intention to end the contract, the demand for return, and the demand for damages. Placing these demands side by side against their respective requirements, the restitution performance and the compensatory damages must each be specified as separate items. Only when what is to be returned and what items of delay-in-performance damage are determined together can they be examined without duplication. The scene, however, fixes no year and no amount, and neither a simultaneous-performance relationship nor a prior declared refusal to perform has been confirmed. These matters remain undetermined. From the scene alone, neither the amount returnable nor the extent of damage can be fixed, and whether a third party has acquired rights is likewise not established.
What is permitted in this section is the narrow judgment that, when a contract is rescinded, each party bears toward the counterparty a duty to restore the original state, and that restoration is determined within a scope that does not prejudice the rights of third persons. What is not permitted is to establish from this wording an effect that unconditionally extinguishes the rights of third persons, or to obtain an extension beyond the scope of restoration. Adding amounts or outcomes that the wording does not fix is likewise excluded. The question carried to what follows is whether, by rescinding the contract, one has also waived damages.
4.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
The question remaining in this situation is to discern which parts must be split apart and adjudicated anew in asserting contractual remedies together. Taking up the meaning of restoration to the original state left by the preceding section, the present inquiry is confined to how far the object of restoration is to be set.
The provision states: "each party shall be bound to restore the other party to the original state; provided, that the rights of third persons may not be prejudiced" (Article 548 of the Civil Act). In this wording the subject is both parties who have rescinded the contract, the act is the performance of restoration to the original state toward the counterparty, and the condition is limited to a scope that does not prejudice the rights of third persons. The third person spoken of here refers to a person holding rights outside the parties to the contract, and the provision narrows the object of restoration by adding this limitation. Issues raised in other paragraphs are not addressed.
This wording regulates together, in a single provision, the duties of return between the parties and the protection of the rights of third persons. Since the first sentence determines the subject of restoration and the second limits the scope of that restoration, the two stages of judgment must be examined distinctly. Under this definition, the duty of return arises within the relationship between the parties, and the limitation that the rights of third persons may not be prejudiced divides the object and manner of that return. Within the limits of observing this limitation, where the respective requirements of performance, rescission, and damages are met and the restitution performance and the compensatory damages are specified without duplication, the combination of remedies operates. Where delay in performance requiring a demand lacks the demand and non-performance requirements, or where, because of a defense of simultaneous performance, a demand for performance cannot be enforced unconditionally, that range is blocked.
Even if both parties seek to return everything already given and received between them and to come back to the pre-contract state, if the rights of a third party lie in between, those rights fall outside the object of restoration. As a result, the party may have to bear the loss of not recovering in full what was paid and the inconvenience of a reduced scope of return. If this limitation of the wording were removed, the result would be to sacrifice the rights already secured by a third party for the sake of the party's restoration, and the distinction drawn by the provision would disappear. Accordingly, the conclusion is maintained while leaving the adverse aspect that complete restoration is blocked.
The facts needed in this scene to determine the object of restoration are the contractual performance, the tender of performance, the demand, the declaration of rescission, the object of return, and the items of damage. Since plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid while also claiming damage arising from delay in performance, the object of return is the performance already rendered, and the item of damage is the damage arising from the delay. Whether the rights of a third party overlap with the object of return, and if so in which part, cannot be known from the scene alone. Nor has a simultaneous-performance relationship or a refusal to perform falling under the exception to a demand been confirmed, and these matters therefore remain undetermined.
What this section confirms is the narrow conclusion that the object of restoration is fixed by the duties of return between the parties and that its scope is narrowed within the limitation of protecting the rights of third persons. Within that limitation, when return and damages are specified without duplication, the combination of remedies operates; and where the demand and non-performance requirements are lacking, that range is blocked. How the rights of a third party actually overlap, up to what amount restoration reaches, and what the records of the scene show, however, are not determined here. Judgment is confined to the stated conditions.
4.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
Within this flow, the issue is whether the task of fixing the state to which things return after rescission and the task of claiming damages together run against each other. Placing the object of return and the items of damage side by side, one must discern which opens and which is blocked.
Article 548 (1) of the Civil Act provides "Where one party rescinds a contract, each party shall be bound to restore the other party to the original state," and then adds "provided, that the rights of third persons may not be prejudiced." This wording places the effect of rescission in mutual return between the parties to the contract, while making clear that the scope of that return may not proceed in a direction that infringes rights a third party has already acquired.
The wording of Article 548 (1) limits the object of restoration to return between the parties and places the rights of third persons within that limitation as well. This limitation touches on the reason why the restitution performance and the compensatory damages must be calculated by dividing them without duplication when each is specified and then added together. The object of return is determined by what performance has already passed over; the compensatory damages are determined by what items arose from delay in performance; and the two are judgments at different stages. If returning what has already been given and received and making good the damage arising from that delay are treated as one lump, it becomes difficult to discern which item belongs to which side.
The sharpest counterargument to this distinction is that the protection of third parties may itself block the party's complete restoration. The worry that protection in uncertain situations is weakened if the party's freedom to assert several means together is narrowed comes from the same direction. From the plaintiff's position, it may be thought that one is placed back in one's proper place only after ending the contract, recovering what has already been paid, and additionally receiving the delay damages. The wording that defines restoration to the original state as a duty of return while simultaneously recording the rights of third persons guards against the party's demand for restoration being extended in a manner that pushes aside rights already acquired by a third party.
Comparing the scene in which plaintiff A seeks to end the contract and recover what has already been paid while also claiming damage arising from delay in performance against the foregoing conditions confirms only that the object of return and the items of damage have been raised together. Whether the respective requirements of performance, rescission, and damages have all been met, and whether the restitution performance and the compensatory damages have been specified without duplication, are not fixed by this scene alone. Whether, in delay in performance requiring a demand, the demand and non-performance requirements have been fulfilled, whether a demand for performance cannot be enforced unconditionally because of a defense of simultaneous performance, and whether the fact of a prior declaration of an intention not to perform is confirmed are likewise left open.
The conclusion this section permits is that, where the respective requirements of performance, rescission, and damages are met and the restitution performance and the compensatory damages are specified without duplication, the combination opens; and where delay in performance requiring a demand lacks the demand and non-performance requirements, or where a demand for performance cannot be enforced unconditionally because of a defense of simultaneous performance, it is blocked. The range in which a simultaneous-performance relationship or a refusal to perform falling under the exception to a demand has not been confirmed remains undetermined. To this is added the protection of third-party rights under Article 548 (1), which narrows the object of restoration. Reading beyond this distinction to mean that rescission also entails waiving damages, or writing down undetermined matters straightaway as unavailable remedies, is not what this section draws.
4.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
After that proviso has been sorted out as well, one must examine what state rescission actually brings things back to. In this scene there is one question. The issue to be carried to the next section is placed here alongside it.
Article 548 of the Civil Act provides as to this question: "Where one party rescinds a contract, each party shall be bound to restore the other party to the original state." Here the subject is each party at the time of rescission, and restoration to the original state toward the counterparty arises for them. At the same time, the same provision adds: "provided, that the rights of third persons may not be prejudiced." These two passages set the direction of restoration and the limits of restoration together within a single rule. The first sentence deals with the relationship between the parties; the second indicates the place that this restoration cannot reach. Matters handled in other paragraphs of the provision are not explained here.
Under this wording, when a contract is rescinded, each party bears toward the counterparty a duty to restore the original state. That is, restoring things to a state in which what has already been given and received is sent back is an effect that arises together with rescission. Yet the object of that restoration is limited. For the proviso that the rights of third persons may not be prejudiced narrows the scope of restoration. This section therefore distinguishes two things. One is that a duty of return arises between the parties; the other is that this duty of return stops before the rights of third persons. Only by placing both stages together does it become clear how far the object of restoration extends. Whether waiver of damages is to be added to this is a separate question.
The party that objects most strongly points out that the protection of third parties may itself block the party's complete restoration. If, for the party seeking to recover what has already been paid, that restoration is caught on the rights of a third party and cannot be carried through to the end, the point of the party's having wanted to end the contract diminishes. If, in a situation where the party sought to recover even the damage arising from delay in performance, the restitution performance is reduced, the loss and inconvenience suffered by the party remain. Even so, this counterargument does not change the conclusion. This limit does not erase the disadvantage on the side for whom restoration does not proceed smoothly. What is maintained is only that this disadvantage does not serve as a ground for widening the duties of return between the parties.
What is confirmed in this scene is the fact that the contract has ended and return and damages are requested together. The object of return is placed within the scope of the duty of return toward the counterparty arising from rescission, and that scope remains within the limit of not prejudicing the rights of third persons. Since no year, amount, or start date is fixed in this scene, how much of the restitution performance actually remains is not determined here. How the rights of a third party actually bear on the matter is likewise undetermined from the scene alone. This does not widen the limits of restoration.
The conclusion this section permits is as follows. When a contract is rescinded, each party bears toward the counterparty a duty to restore the original state, and that restoration takes place only within a scope that does not prejudice the rights of third persons. Since this wording does not determine whether damages are waived as well, the arising of the duty of return and the survival of the claim for damages are not judged together here. The question to be carried to the next section lies exactly at that point.