Summary
The tender and due date relevant to the defense of simultaneous performance must be distinguished from the grounds of insecurity relevant to an obligation to perform first.
2.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
A demand drafted to state only what is to be received may conceal the performance that must be rendered in return. The preceding section confirmed that the requirements for the possibility of specific performance and for damages for non-performance are set out separately, so that the performance one seeks must first be specified. Yet in the scene where plaintiff A, upon terminating the contract, seeks the return of what has already been paid while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance, the question arises whether, merely because the other party has failed to perform that obligation, plaintiff A's own performance may always be refused at the same time. At the same time, there remains the question of the standard by which the gateway to this remedy is opened.
This question is addressed by Civil Act Article 536, which is divided into two paragraphs. Paragraph (1) provides: "Under a bilateral contract, one party may refuse to perform its own obligation until the other party tenders performance of that obligation; provided, however, that this shall not apply where the other party's obligation is not yet due." Paragraph (2) adds: "Where one party must perform first for the other party, and there exist manifest grounds making the other party's performance difficult, the main clause of the preceding paragraph shall apply." This text places side by side the elements of a party to a bilateral contract, the other party's tender of performance, the refusal of one's own performance, the due date, the duty of prior performance, and manifest grounds making performance difficult (Civil Act Article 536).
According to the distinction drawn in that text, the defense of simultaneous performance is a right to refuse performance connected with the other party's tender of performance and the like, and the confirmation of the tender and the arrival of the due date are separate points of judgment. Just as with the requirements for specific performance and damages for non-performance that were separated earlier, here too one first specifies the performance demanded and contrasts the tender and due-date requirements attaching to that performance. As a result, where the respective requirements of performance, rescission, and damages are each satisfied and the restitutionary performance and the compensatory loss are specified without overlap, the gateway to this remedy is opened.
Yet the application of this defense leaves great inconvenience where the record is ambiguous. It may be difficult to confirm the other party's tender of performance, and plaintiff A may seek to suspend provisionally the whole of its own performance on the ground that the other party has put forward nothing at all. Even so, where the other party's obligation is not yet due, the defense under the main clause cannot be recognized unconditionally. The circumstance that uncertainty has accumulated because confirmation of the tender is difficult cannot by itself erase the requirement of the due date as well, and the question whether the party obliged to perform first falls within manifest grounds making the other party's performance difficult must be judged separately.
The fact ascertainable in the synthetic scene is only one: that plaintiff A, upon terminating the contract, seeks the return of what has already been paid while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. Accordingly, it cannot be known what the contractual performance is, whether the other party has tendered performance, whether a demand was made, whether a declaration of rescission was made, or whether the scope of what is to be returned and the heads of loss have been fixed in the record. Nor is it confirmed whether the performance stands in a simultaneous performance relationship, or whether it falls within the ground for refusal of performance constituting an exception to demand. Accordingly, the contrasting condition that, if a fact expressing an intention in advance not to perform is confirmed, the necessity of demand must be re-examined, cannot be taken as a confirmed fact.
In sum, the gateway to this remedy does not open merely upon the fact that the other party has failed to perform; it opens where the performance demanded, the parties, and the conditions are specified in the claim, and where the right supporting the chosen form of action can be defended. However, the state in which the other party's tender of performance has not yet been confirmed and the materials remain empty is undetermined, and does not proceed at once to the conclusion that there is no right. Conversely, reading this so that the defense of simultaneous performance is recognized unconditionally even though the other party's obligation is not yet due is not permitted by this section.
2.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Within such a combination, plaintiff A, upon terminating the contract, seeks the return of what has already been paid while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. Yet the point asked here is whether the plaintiff, merely because the other party has not tendered contractual performance, may postpone its own tender of performance to the end. This question, unlike the earlier stage of fixing the scope of restitution and damages contained within the plaintiff's claim, belongs to the stage of judging whether the plaintiff's refusal of performance is justified. Accordingly, the conditions forming the basis of the refusal must first be made clear.
The text corresponding to this question is as follows. "Article 536 (Defense of Simultaneous Performance) (1) Under a bilateral contract, one party may refuse to perform its own obligation until the other party tenders performance of that obligation; provided, however, that this shall not apply where the other party's obligation is not yet due. (2) Where one party must perform first for the other party, and there exist manifest grounds making the other party's performance difficult, the main clause of the preceding paragraph shall apply." (Civil Act Article 536). This provision makes one party to a bilateral contract the subject, and permits the refusal of one's own performance on the condition of the other party's tender of performance. At the same time, it sets down, as an exception to the main clause, the case where the other party's obligation is not yet due, and for the party obliged to perform first it provides manifest grounds of difficulty in the other party's performance as a separate basis.
Accordingly, the defense of simultaneous performance means the right to refuse performance connected with the other party's tender of performance and the like. This right to refuse is structured to operate only when both are examined together: whether the other party's performance has already been tendered, and whether the other party's obligation has reached its due date. The reason these two must be distinguished is that the tender of performance is a fact that makes the right to refuse possible, whereas the arrival of the due date is a limit that blocks that right to refuse. The fact alone that the other party has not performed cannot unconditionally carry through the demand for performance, and at the same time, if the other party's obligation is not yet due, the plaintiff's refusal is not justified either. Where the delay in performance requires a demand but the requirements of demand and non-performance are absent, or where the demand for performance cannot be carried through unconditionally because of the defense of simultaneous performance, if any one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied, the gateway to that remedy is closed.
Nevertheless, the difficulty of confirming the other party's tender of performance remains as a counterargument. In a contract involving several parties, materials and procedure are needed to judge when and in what manner the other party put forward the performance, and whether that tender conforms to the content of the contract. In such uncertain circumstances, there is also the concern that narrowing the parties' freedom to assert several means together weakens protection, and the resulting loss and inconvenience are not small. The difficulty of confirmation surrounding the other party's tender of performance remains as an undetermined circumstance, but it cannot be resolved by opening the right to refuse while disregarding the condition of the due date.
The fact ascertainable in the synthetic scene is that the plaintiff, upon terminating the contract, seeks the return of what has already been paid while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. Within this scene, the time of the other party's tender of performance, whether the due date of the other party's obligation has arrived, and whether the plaintiff owes a duty of prior performance are not fixed. So long as such facts are not confirmed, whether the defense of simultaneous performance operates cannot be determined from the scene alone, and whether it constitutes a refusal of performance falling within the exception to demand likewise remains undetermined. The point that, if a fact expressing an intention in advance not to perform is confirmed, the necessity of demand is re-examined, remains only as a contrast that alters the conditions of judgment.
The conclusion this section permits is that only after separately examining the tender and due-date conditions of the defense of simultaneous performance can it be judged whether the refusal of performance is justified. By contrast, the conclusion that the plaintiff's refusal is always justified merely because the other party has not performed is not permitted by this section. Even where unverified material remains, the narrow conclusion is retained that if any one of the statutory requirements is not satisfied, the gateway to that remedy is closed.
2.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
If the other party does not perform, do I always refuse my own performance as well? This question is asked together within the scene where plaintiff A, upon terminating the contract, seeks the return of what has already been paid while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. Even though plaintiff A has separated the restitutionary performance to be received and the compensatory loss, if the state of the other party's performance is not specified by the materials, then when one may refuse one's own performance is likewise undetermined. Against this, what the author addresses this time is what the materials of judgment for that right to refuse are, and how unconfirmed matters are to be recorded.
In this text, the subject holding the right to refuse performance is one party to a bilateral contract; its act is the refusal of performance of its own obligation; and its condition is bound within the range of the period until the other party tenders performance of that obligation. The proviso appended thereafter, however, restricts the use of this right to refuse where the other party's obligation is not yet due. Here, the defense of simultaneous performance means the right to refuse performance connected with the other party's tender of performance and the like, and the scope within which the author explains this text likewise remains within that limited question.
Linking this text with the question opened above reveals why the confirmation of the simultaneous performance relationship and the judgment of the grounds for the unease of the party obliged to perform first are separated. The former is the stage of comparing the other party's tender of performance with the due date of that obligation, and the latter is the stage of examining the case where one party must perform first for the other party and there exist manifest grounds making the other party's performance difficult. Civil Act Article 536 places these two in the main clause of paragraph (1) and in paragraph (2), respectively. Accordingly, the conclusion of this section of the author is that, where it is not confirmed whether the matter stands in a simultaneous performance relationship or whether it falls within the refusal of performance constituting an exception to demand, matters for which the materials of judgment are not specified are left undetermined, distinguished from impossibility. Here, 'undetermined' means that what the basis of judgment is has not been fixed, and 'impossibility' means that the performance itself cannot be rendered. If the two expressions are confused, the fact that the materials are empty is read as the impossibility of performance.
The strongest counterargument takes aim at the difficulty of confirming the other party's tender of performance. If the time and form of the tender of performance, and whether the other party's obligation has reached its due date, are not left in the materials, a party has difficulty confirming in advance the existence or non-existence of its own right to refuse performance and preparing accordingly. If this inconvenience is ignored, protection is weakened, and the concern follows that the parties' freedom to assert several means together is likewise narrowed. This loss and inconvenience are acknowledged. However, the author does not change the conclusion on account of this counterargument, because the defense under the main clause cannot be recognized unconditionally even though the other party's obligation is not yet due. If the right to refuse performance were left open even to the other party's obligation prior to its due date merely on the ground that confirmation is difficult, the limitation prescribed by the proviso would be rendered null.
In the synthetic scene, plaintiff A demands the return of what has already been paid while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance. Because the time of the other party's tender of performance, whether the other party's obligation is due, and the presence or absence of a demand are not specified within the scene, whether the defense of simultaneous performance is to be recognized cannot be judged from this scene alone. Yet since it is clear that plaintiff A's claim demands both the restitutionary performance and the compensatory loss, the requirements for each performance must each be satisfied, and must be specified without overlap. If a fact expressing an intention in advance not to perform is confirmed, the necessity of demand is re-examined.
The conclusion this section permits goes no further than leaving undetermined those matters for which, in the absence of materials, the basis of judgment has not been fixed; it does not permit reading such matters at once as impossibility or fixing the establishment of the right to refuse performance. Conversely, recognizing the right to refuse performance unconditionally merely because the materials are empty also lies outside the scope of this section. The materials of judgment—the contractual performance, tender of performance, demand, declaration of rescission, subject of restitution, and heads of loss—are to be left in the record, and which items are empty is marked as undetermined.
2.4The Records Needed for Determination
이러한 장면에서 상대방이 이행하지 않았으면 내 이행도 항상 거절하는가라는 물음이 먼저 놓이고, 그 뒤를 따라 어떤 자료를 갖추어야 그 판정을 할 수 있는가라는 요건이 함께 열린다. 그런데 이 물음에 답하려면 거절할 수 있는 권리의 근거와 거절의 시점을 한꺼번에 적은 주문이 아니라 나누어 읽을 수 있는 기록이 있어야 한다. 계약상 급부·이행 제공·최고·해제 의사표시·반환 대상·손해 항목 가운데 어느 항목이 그 판정을 지탱하는지 분리하지 않으면, 항목마다 무엇이 확인되었는지 적는 자리가 사라진다. 따라서 이 물음은 거절권의 성립 조건과 거절권 행사의 기록 기준을 함께 묻는 것으로 좁혀진다.
동시이행 항변의 제공·변제기와 선이행 의무의 불안 사유를 나누어 보아야 한다. 민법 제536조는 “①쌍무계약의 당사자 일방은 상대방이 그 채무이행을 제공할 때 까지 자기의 채무이행을 거절할 수 있다. 그러나 상대방의 채무가 변제기에 있지 아니하는 때에는 그러하지 아니하다.”라고 정하고, 이어서 “②당사자 일방이 상대방에게 먼저 이행하여야 할 경우에 상대방의 이행이 곤란할 현저한 사유가 있는 때에는 전항 본문과 같다.”라고 이어 둔다. 이 문언에서 주체는 쌍무계약의 당사자 일방이고, 행위는 상대방의 채무이행 제공 때까지 자기 채무이행을 거절하는 것이며, 제1항 단서는 상대방의 채무가 변제기에 있지 아니한 때의 예외를 적는다. 제2항은 자신이 먼저 이행하여야 할 경우에 상대방의 이행이 곤란할 현저한 사유가 있을 때 제1항 본문의 거절권을 그대로 두고 있어, 선이행 의무자의 불안 사유가 제공과 다른 판단 항목임을 보여 준다.
계약상 급부·이행 제공·최고·해제 의사표시·반환 대상·손해 항목에 기록된 자료만으로 단계를 판정한다. 앞서 문언에서 분리한 제공·변제기와 선이행 의무의 불안 사유는 각기 다른 기록 항목이 뒤따라야 하는데, 이행 제공의 기록 없이 변제기에 대한 판단을 넘기거나 불안 사유에 대한 기록 없이 선이행 의무자의 거절을 확정하면 문언이 함께 두어 둔 두 판단이 한 덩어리로 뭉친다. 단계 판정은 정해진 기록으로만 한다. 없는 기록을 추정으로 메우지 않는다. 즉 확인된 항목과 확인되지 않은 항목을 함께 적어 두어야 거절권의 성립과 거절의 범위를 나누어 판단할 수 있고, 이 구별이 지켜질 때만 동시이행 항변을 무조건적인 이행 거절의 근거로 잘못 확장하는 일을 막을 수 있다.
이런 기록 기준을 좁히면 상대방의 이행 제공을 확인하기 어려울 수 있다는 불편이 남는다. 대면한 제공의 흔적이 적고 서류만 남은 장면에서는 제공 여부 자체를 확정하기 어렵고, 확정을 서두르면 혼자 감당할 손실이 커질 수 있다. 그 불편에도 저자가 답하는 범위는 정해져 있다. 문언이 변제기에 있지 아니한 때를 예외로 두고 있으므로 기록만으로 변제기를 확인하기 어려운 상태라는 사정 자체가 곧 거절권의 성립을 뜻하지는 않는다. 확인이 어려운 항목은 미확정으로 남겨 두고, 확인된 항목으로만 그 단계를 넘기지 않는 방식이 이 기록 기준의 한정된 답이다.
합성 장면에서 확인된 것은 원고 A가 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구한다는 한정된 장면뿐이다. 이 장면에서 반환 대상과 손해 항목은 기록 요건의 항목으로 이름 붙여질 수 있으나, 상대방의 이행 제공 여부·최고의 유무·해제 의사표시의 시기·동시이행 관계가 확인되었다는 사실은 장면에 적혀 있지 않다. 따라서 이 장면만으로는 동시이행 항변의 성립과 무조건적 거절의 허용 여부를 확정할 수 없고, 각 항목이 자료로 확인된 뒤에야 그 판정을 넘길 수 있다. 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부를 다시 판단한다는 대조 문장은 최고가 필요한 이행지체의 단정을 전제로 둘 때 성립하는 조건의 변경일 뿐, 그 사실 자체를 장면에서 확정한 것은 아니다. 장면에 없는 사실은 미확정으로 남겨 두어야 한다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 동시이행 항변을 상대방의 이행 제공 등에 연결된 이행 거절권으로 두고, 그 성립과 행사를 계약상 급부·이행 제공·최고·해제 의사표시·반환 대상·손해 항목의 기록으로만 판정한다는 좁은 것이다. 확인되지 않은 제공이나 변제기, 불안 사유를 추정으로 메워 무조건 거절하거나 무조건 이행을 요구하는 쪽으로 넘기지 못하며, 미확정 항목은 미확정으로 남긴다. 대신 변제기 전의 거절을 확정하는 결론 역시 이 기록 기준이 허용하지 않는다.
2.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
그 결론 위에서 상대방이 이행하지 않았으면 내 이행도 항상 거절하는가라는 물음이 열린다. 이런 장면에서 상대방의 이행 제공과 나의 이행 거절이 함께 얽히면 어떤 변경이 기존 단계 판정을 뒤집는지도 함께 묻는다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 민법 제536조이다. 그 문언은 제1항에서 쌍무계약의 당사자 일방은 상대방이 그 채무이행을 제공할 때까지 자기의 채무이행을 거절할 수 있다. 그러나 상대방의 채무가 변제기에 있지 아니하는 때에는 그러하지 아니하다고 한정한다. 이어서 제2항은 당사자 일방이 상대방에게 먼저 이행하여야 할 경우에 상대방의 이행이 곤란할 현저한 사유가 있는 때에는 전항 본문과 같다고 정한다. 여기서 다루는 주체는 쌍무계약의 당사자 일방이고, 행위는 자기 채무이행의 거절이며, 조건은 상대방의 채무이행 제공과 그 채무의 변제기이다.
제1항의 제공과 변제기 조건은 거절권이 언제 성립하는지를 가리키고, 제2항의 선이행 의무와 현저한 불안 사유는 그 거절권이 선이행 의무자에게도 미치는지를 나누어 본다. 저자는 이 두 단계를 왜 구별해야 하는지에 대해, 제공의 확인과 변제기의 도래가 서로 다른 사실 판단이기 때문이라고 설명한다. 이 구별에 따라 지정된 변경이 확인되면 기존 차단·실효 판단을 폐기하고 단계부터 다시 판정한다. 그 폐기와 재판정은 앞 단계의 요건·예외·효과를 바꾸는 새 법적 효과를 만드는 것이 아니라, 같은 조건을 처음 단계에서 다시 대조하는 작업에 머문다.
가장 강한 반론은 상대방의 이행 제공을 확인하기 어려울 수 있다는 데 있다. 제공 시점과 방법이 불확실하면 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유가 좁혀지고, 그 불확실한 상황에서의 보호가 약해진다는 손실이 구체적으로 드러난다. 저자는 그러나 상대 채무가 변제기 전인데도 본문 항변을 무조건 인정할 수는 없다고 답한다. 이 답은 제공 확인의 어려움이라는 불리한 부분을 지우지 않으면서도, 변제기 조건을 무시한 채 거절권을 넓히는 방향으로는 나아가지 않는다.
합성 장면에서 확인된 것은 원고 A가 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구한다는 사실뿐이다. 이 사실을 제1항의 제공·변제기 조건과 대조하면, 상대방 채무의 변제기 도래와 이행 제공 여부는 기록에 남아 있지 않아 미확정으로 둔다. 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부를 다시 판단한다"라는 가정한 반대 사실은, 선이행 의무자의 불안 사유 판단이 이 절의 범위에 걸려 있을 때만 사용한다. 이 장면만으로 동시이행 관계나 최고 예외인 이행 거절 여부를 확정할 수 없으므로 그 항목은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은, 상대방의 이행 제공과 변제기를 나누어 보고 선이행 의무자의 불안 사유를 별도로 대조한 뒤 지정된 변경이 확인되면 단계를 다시 판정한다는 것이다. 반대로 허용하지 않는 것은, 상대방이 이행하지 않았다는 사실 하나만으로 언제나 내 이행을 거절할 수 있다고 단정하거나, 상대 채무가 변제기 전인데도 본문 항변을 무조건 인정하는 방향이다.
2.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
원고 A는 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하고 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구하면서, 상대방이 이행하지 않았으면 내 이행도 항상 거절할 수 있는지가 앞서 다룬 문제였다면, 이제는 상대방의 이행 제공 자체가 확인되기 어려운 경우에 그 항변을 그대로 인정해도 되는지가 남는다. 이 물음은 제공 여부의 확인 곤란을 이유로 항변을 넓게 허용해도 되는가를 겨냥한다.
이 문언에서 이행 거절권은 쌍무계약의 당사자 일방이라는 주체가 자기의 채무이행을 거절하는 행위에 대해, 상대방이 그 채무이행을 제공할 때까지라는 조건에 묶여 있다. 그리고 같은 항 단서는 상대방의 채무가 변제기에 있지 아니한 때를 별도로 둔다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 이어 보면, 확인이 어려운 제공을 이유로 항변을 넓히는 판단과 변제기의 문언을 지키는 판단은 서로 다른 단계에서 판정된다. 동시이행 항변이란 상대방의 이행 제공 등에 연결된 이행 거절권을 뜻하며, 제공 등이라는 연결점과 변제기라는 시점은 각각 항변이 성립할 조건과 성립한 뒤에도 유지될 조건을 나눈다. 따라서 상대 채무가 변제기 전인데도 본문 항변을 무조건 인정할 수는 없다. 제공 확인의 곤란은 해당 조건을 점검해야 할 이유가 될 뿐, 문언에 놓인 변제기 요건을 지워 주지 않는다.
가장 강한 반론은 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유를 좁히면 불확실한 상황의 보호가 약해진다는 점을 겨냥한다. 제공이 확인되지 않은 상태에서 이행 거절을 막으면, 상대방의 이행이 실제로 올지 알 수 없는 당사자가 먼저 내놓아야 하는 손실이 남는다. 이 불이익을 무시하지 않으면서도 앞의 답은 유지된다. 상대 채무가 변제기 전인데도 본문 항변을 무조건 인정할 수는 없으므로, 확인 곤란을 이유로 한 무차별 인정은 문언의 변제기 요건과 충돌한다. 다만 확인이 어려운 상황이 제공 여부와 변제기의 구별을 정하게 할 자료가 부족한 상태라면, 이 절에서는 미확정으로 남는다.
합성 장면에서 확인되는 것은 원고 A가 계약을 끝내고 이미 지급한 것을 돌려받으려 하면서 이행 지연으로 생긴 손해도 요구한다는 사실과, 판단 기록으로 계약상 급부·이행 제공·최고·해제 의사표시·반환 대상·손해 항목을 정해 두었다는 점이다. 이행 제공이 확인되지 않았다는 기록만으로는 변제기의 유무가 함께 정해진다고 말할 수 없다. 동시이행 관계나 최고 예외인 이행 거절 여부가 확인되지 않은 경우에도 이 절의 판단은 미확정에 머무르며, 미리 이행하지 않을 의사를 표시한 사실이 확인되면 최고 필요 여부를 다시 판단한다. 그러나 지금은 그 사실이 확인되지 않았다.
이 절에서 허용되는 것은 제공·변제기와 선이행 의무의 불안 사유를 나누어 보고, 확인 곤란을 이유로 상대 채무가 변제기 전인데도 본문 항변을 무조건 인정하지 않는 판단까지이다. 허용되지 않는 것은 제공 확인의 어려움만으로 항변을 무제한 넓히거나, 그 반대로 모든 이행 거절을 막는 판단이다. 제공 확인이 어려운 사정은 조건을 점검하는 지표일 뿐 문언의 요건을 대신하지 않으며, 자료가 부족한 항목은 미확정으로 남는다.
2.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
앞 절에서는 상대 채무가 변제기 전인데도 본문 항변을 무조건 인정할 수는 없다고 정리했다. 이런 장면에서 상대방이 이행하지 않았으니 내 이행도 미루어도 되는지가 문제이다. 여기서 말하는 주문 설계란 요구하는 급부만 적는 청구의 틀을 뜻하고, 상대에게도 부담이 남아 있다면 그 부담을 함께 살펴보아야 한다.
동시이행 항변을 규정한 문언은 상대방이 이행 제공을 할 때까지의 이행 거절을 허용하되 상대 채무가 변제기에 있지 아니한 때는 예외로 둔다. 민법 제536조 제1항은 "쌍무계약의 당사자 일방은 상대방이 그 채무이행을 제공할 때 까지 자기의 채무이행을 거절할 수 있다. 그러나 상대방의 채무가 변제기에 있지 아니하는 때에는 그러하지 아니하다." 이 문언이 말하는 주체는 쌍무계약의 당사자 일방이고, 그 행위는 자기 채무이행의 거절이며, 그 조건은 상대방의 채무이행 제공과 변제기의 도래이다.
따라서 이행 거절권을 인정하려면 우선 상대방의 이행 제공이 있어야 하고, 아울러 상대방의 채무가 변제기에 있는지를 따로 살피어야 한다. 제공과 변제기라는 두 단계를 나누어 보는 까닭은 서로 다른 사실을 기준으로 삼기 때문이다. 제공은 상대방이 실제 내놓은 이행과 연결되는 데 반해 변제기는 그 채무가 이행기에 도달했는지의 시점 문제이다. 선이행 의무자가 자신의 불안을 이유로 이행을 미루는 경우에는 제2항이 "당사자 일방이 상대방에게 먼저 이행하여야 할 경우에 상대방의 이행이 곤란할 현저한 사유가 있는 때에는 전항 본문과 같다."고 별도로 다룬다. 이 경우의 이행 거절권은 상대방의 이행 제공과는 다른 사유에 연결된다.
상대방의 이행 제공이 확인되기 어려울 수 있고, 당사자가 여러 수단을 함께 주장할 자유가 좁아지면 불확실한 상황의 보호가 약해진다는 점은 이 구별이 불러일으키는 불리이다. 확인이 어려운 장면에서는 제공의 유무를 놓고 다툼이 생길 수 있고, 한쪽 주장으로는 남은 판단이 어려울 수 있다. 문언이 변제기 전의 때를 명시적으로 빼 두었으므로, 제공 확인이 어렵다는 사정만으로 이 예외를 덮을 수는 없고, 반론의 어려움은 인정하되 정해진 구별을 함께 남겨 두어야 한다.
이 장면에 남은 사실만으로는 어느 쪽 채무가 먼저 변제기에 도달했는지, 상대방이 이행 제공을 하였는지가 특정되어 있지 않다. 계약상 급부, 이행 제공, 최고, 해제 의사표시, 반환 대상, 손해 항목 가운데 이 절과 관련된 것은 이행 제공과 변제기의 관계뿐이고, 나머지는 다른 분석 단계의 몫이다. 상대방 채무가 변제기에 도달하기 전인지가 확인되지 않는 한 이 항변의 성립 여부는 미확정으로 남는다.
동시이행 항변은 상대방의 이행 제공 등에 연결된 이행 거절권이므로, 제공과 변제기를 따로 확인한 뒤에 선이행 의무자의 불안 사유를 별도로 판단하여야 한다. 이 구별을 지키면 상대방이 아무것도 내놓지 않았어도 무조건 이행을 미루는 것은 되지 않고, 상대 채무가 변제기 전이라면 문언상 예외에 해당하여 항변을 인정하지 않게 된다. 다만 이 절은 이 두 기준을 나누어 보아야 한다는 판단까지만 서술하며, 실제 제공의 유무나 이행 거절의 성립을 확정하는 것은 아니고 다른 청구의 이름으로 같은 불이익이 반복되는 문제도 다루지 않는다.
2.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
In this scene, if the other party has not performed, may the plaintiff always refuse his or her own performance as well? This question becomes the first gateway that divides the scope of recovery when the contract is maintained and performance is demanded from when the contract is ended and what has been paid is reclaimed.
It provides that "either party to a bilateral contract may refuse to perform his or her own obligation until the other party tenders performance of his or her obligation; provided, however, that this shall not apply where the obligation of the other party is not yet due" (Civil Act Article 536). The subject indicated by this text is either party to a bilateral contract; the conduct protected is the refusal to perform one's own obligation; and that refusal is linked to the tender of performance by the other party. In addition, where the obligation of the other party is not yet due, the proviso limits the refusal right under the main text so that it does not reach such a case.
Paragraph (2) of the same Article arrives at the same protection by another route, providing that a party with a duty of prior performance also holds the refusal right under the main text where there is a manifest ground making the other party's performance difficult (Civil Act Article 536). Accordingly, here the defense of simultaneous performance and the grounds for unease under the duty of prior performance must be examined separately. The defense of simultaneous performance is a right to refuse performance linked to the tender of performance by the other party and the like, so a question arises of confirming both the tender and the due date, whereas grounds for unease take as their requirement a manifest ground of difficulty in performance even without any tender. If the two stages are read together, the argument for evading the limitation of the main text conceals what are in fact separate requirements.
It may be difficult to confirm the tender of performance by the other party. Where the materials are insufficient and neither the time of tender nor the arrival of the due date is revealed, the parties cannot assert several remedies together and run a great risk of being left in an uncertain situation. Yet that difficulty alone cannot justify unconditionally allowing the defense under the main text even though the other party's obligation is not yet due. Circumstances that are difficult to confirm are merely reasons to be left undetermined, and so long as the condition that the due date has not yet arrived is confirmed, the proviso in the text remains as it is, and the separate requirement of grounds for unease under the duty of prior performance must be satisfied independently.
In this scene, the only fact corresponding to this question is that the plaintiff is demanding, together with the return of what has already been paid upon ending the contract, damages for delay in performance. On this fact alone, it cannot be determined whether the obligations of the plaintiff and the other party stand in a relationship of simultaneous performance, whether the other party tendered performance, or whether the due date of the other party's obligation has already arrived. Nor can it be settled by this scene whether the plaintiff's refusal to perform conforms to the defense under the main text or rests on manifest grounds of difficulty in performance. These items must be left undetermined, and they are matters to be compared only after confirming from the record the contractual performance, tender of performance, demand, declaration of rescission, the object of return, and the items of damage.
What this section allows goes no further than excluding the conclusion that a refusal of my own performance is always justified merely by the circumstance that the other party has not performed, and judging separately the conditions of the main text—tender and due date—and the requirement of paragraph (2)—grounds for unease. Whether the plaintiff's choice to end the contract alters the scope of restitutionary performance or compensatory damages, whether an exception to the demand necessary for rescission arises, and whether the same detriment may be set out twice under different names of claim are not determined by this section, and it does not convert insufficient materials on these matters into incurable defects. May a contract always be rescinded immediately upon a breach of promise?
2.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Where the plaintiff seeks to end the contract and reclaim what has already been paid while also claiming damages arising from delay in performance, it must also be stated by when the plaintiff is to tender its own performance. The question to be addressed here is whether, if the other party has not performed, one may always refuse one's own performance as well. What remains is on which text that refusal rests, and how far that text may be used in fixing the combination and scope of contractual remedies.
This text places together the subject—either party to a bilateral contract—the conduct of refusing to perform one's own obligation, and the conditions of the tender of performance by the other party and the due date.
The conclusion derived on the basis of this text is that only the text within the scope of the source in question may serve as the basis for judging the combination and scope of contractual remedies (Civil Act Article 536). The condition of tender and due date and the condition, under the duty of prior performance, of a manifest ground making the other party's performance difficult occupy different stages. The former is the condition for the right to refuse performance linked to the tender of performance by the other party and the like—that is, the conditions for the defense of simultaneous performance—while the latter is the condition where that defense is applied as it stands to the party with a duty of prior performance. Only by not mixing the two conditions can one distinguish the range the text permits from the range it exceeds. If one expands the analysis by reference to the reasons for the judgment or the content of other items, that boundary collapses.
In a situation where the time and manner of tender have not been left in the record, if only the former condition is inquired into under the text, the party in need of protection is left in an uncertain state. The concern that editorial judgment narrowing the freedom to assert several remedies together may weaken the protection of that uncertain situation attaches to the same point. The loss pointed out by the counterargument is left in place, but the answer is not given by deleting the condition of the due date expressly stated in the text.
In this scene, what plaintiff A demands is restitutionary performance and damages for delay in performance, which raises the question of the combination of performance, rescission, and damages. Of the items of contractual performance, tender of performance, demand, declaration of rescission, the object of return, and the items of damage, the presence or absence of the tender of performance and of the demand bears directly on the adjudication of the defense of simultaneous performance. In the synthetic scene, the time of the other party's tender of performance, the due date of the obligation, and whether a demand was made are not fixed. Therefore, so long as neither a relationship of simultaneous performance nor a refusal to perform as an exception to the demand is confirmed, the scope of application of this defense remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted in this section is that one cannot always refuse one's own performance merely by the circumstance that the other party has not performed, and that refusal of performance becomes possible only when the conditions of tender and due date prescribed by the text are satisfied. What is not permitted is the conclusion of recognizing the defense unconditionally beyond the condition of the due date on the sole ground that confirming the tender is difficult. The requirements for performance, rescission, and damages, and the non-duplicative specification of restitutionary performance and compensatory damages, remain matters to be examined separately.
2.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
In this scene the question is whether, if the other party has not performed, one may always refuse one's own performance as well. One must now discern the parts to be divided and adjudicated again within the combination and scope of contractual remedies.
The text providing for the defense of simultaneous performance centers on the tender of performance by the other party and the due date. Here the subject is either party to a bilateral contract, the conduct is the refusal to perform one's own obligation, and the conditions are the tender of performance of the other party's obligation and the due date of the other party's obligation. Paragraph (2) of the same Article separately provides for the case where a party with a duty of prior performance faces a manifest ground making the other party's performance difficult.
What links this text with the conclusion of this section is the separation of the conditions. Confirming the tender of performance is a matter of examining the conditions under which the right to refuse performance operates, not a matter of expanding the scope of that right. Accordingly, the cases in which it operates, the cases in which it is barred, and the undetermined cases are confined to the conditions expressly stated. Where the requirements for performance, rescission, and damages are each satisfied and the restitutionary performance and the compensatory damages are specified without overlap, it is allowed; where delay in performance requiring a demand arises but the requirements of demand and non-performance are absent, or where the demand for performance cannot be pressed unconditionally because of the defense of simultaneous performance, it is barred. The remainder is confined to the conditions expressly stated.
If the time and manner of tender are unclear from the record, the concern remains that narrowing the parties' freedom to assert several remedies together will weaken the protection of the uncertain situation. The conclusion stands without erasing this disadvantage, for the defense under the main text cannot be recognized unconditionally even though the other party's obligation is not yet due. Opening the right to refuse first, without confirming the tender, results in bypassing the condition of the due date prescribed by the text. The undetermined is left as undetermined, but is not tilted toward unconditional recognition.
In the synthetic scene, the only fact belonging to this question is that there is a place to record the contractual performance, tender of performance, demand, declaration of rescission, the object of return, and the items of damage. Because the facts, service, and results of performance of actual cases have not been collected, the outcome, recovery, and on-site effect cannot be determined. Nor were any year, amount, accrual date, or judgment result set in the scene. If a fact showing an advance declaration of an intention not to perform is confirmed, the conclusion as to whether a demand is necessary changes.
What this section allows is the distinction within the range where the conditions are confirmed; what it does not allow is an assertion that skips over the conditions. Conclusions such as recognizing the defense of simultaneous performance unconditionally even though the other party's obligation is not yet due, or expanding the scope of the right to refuse without confirming the tender and the due date, are not contained here. Places where the materials are insufficient remain undetermined, and that in itself does not make them incurable.
2.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The conclusion reached up to the preceding stage of analysis carries over in a single sentence: the possibility of specific performance and the requirements for damages for non-performance are kept separate, and the desired performance is specified first. In this scene one must first consider the relationship between the tender of performance and the due date—that is, whether, if the other party has not performed, one may always refuse one's own performance as well.
The statutory provision on the defense of simultaneous performance reads as follows. "Either party to a bilateral contract may refuse to perform his or her own obligation until the other party tenders performance of his or her obligation; provided, however, that this shall not apply where the obligation of the other party is not yet due." (Civil Act Article 536) This text takes either party to a bilateral contract as its subject, links the tender of performance of the other party's obligation to the point at which performance may be refused, and treats the case where the other party's obligation is not yet due as an exception to the main text.
On the basis of this text, the defense of simultaneous performance is defined as a right to refuse performance linked to the tender of performance by the other party and the like. The requirements for the establishment of this right of refusal, the possibility of specific performance, and the requirements for damages for non-performance must each be satisfied separately. Plaintiff A demands restitutionary performance and compensatory damages together, but unless the object of return and the items of damage are specified without overlap, no scope is opened to the extent that the two remedies overlap. Where, in delay in performance requiring a demand, the requirements of demand and non-performance are missing, or where the demand for performance cannot be pressed unconditionally because of the defense of simultaneous performance, the remedy is barred.
The strongest counterargument lies in the difficulty of confirming the tender of performance by the other party. If the tender itself is not left in the record, the parties have difficulty judging whether the refusal to perform is justified and whether the demand for performance stands; and the criticism is that narrowing the freedom to set out several remedies together in this uncertain situation weakens protection. The disadvantage in confirmation targeted by the counterargument is left in place, but the answer is not changed so as to extend the refusal to a point before the due date.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are only the intention to end the contract, the demand for return of the performance already rendered, and the claim for damages from delay in performance. Whether performance was tendered, the order of priority of the contractual performance, the arrival of the declaration of rescission, and the presence or absence of a demand have not been determined. Therefore, whether a relationship of simultaneous performance exists, and whether there is a refusal to perform as an exception to the demand, are left undetermined.
What this section allows is the combination of remedies within the scope where the respective requirements for performance, rescission, and damages are satisfied and the restitutionary performance and the compensatory damages are specified without overlap; what it does not allow is opening remedies for delay in performance without the requirements of demand and non-performance, or pressing the defense of simultaneous performance unconditionally on grounds existing prior to the due date alone. Unconfirmed tender and grounds for refusal are not asserted but are left undetermined.
2.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
That conclusion was that the possibility of specific performance and the requirements for damages for non-performance are kept separate, and the desired performance is specified first. Yet even while taking down the order, if one conveniently seizes upon only the fact that the other party has not produced what it was to give, what performance I myself promised may be obscured along with it. Accordingly, in a bilateral contract one must first discern whether one side's postponement of its own performance rests on a defense or is mere delay.
The textual starting point is Civil Act Article 536. The same Article takes as its basic form the right to refuse performance while awaiting the tender of performance by the other party, and makes an exception where the other party's obligation is not yet due. The subject of the provision is either party to a bilateral contract, the conduct is the refusal to perform one's own obligation, and its condition is linked to the tender of performance by the other party. In addition, for a party bearing a duty of prior performance, the exception to the basic form is closed only where there is a manifest ground making the other party's performance difficult.
If the two stages indicated by this text are mixed together, even conclusions already settled are shaken. The defense of simultaneous performance is a right to refuse performance linked to the tender of performance by the other party and the like, and what must be examined separately is that confirming the tender of performance by the other party may be difficult. The ground for unease under the duty of prior performance—whether the other party will perform in time—is a separate object of judgment, so the difficulty of confirming the tender of performance must not be converted into an unlimited ground for refusing performance before the due date arrives. Without such a distinction, it cannot be discerned whether the reason the other party's request for performance came to nothing was the absence of a tender or the non-arrival of the due date.
The strongest counterargument here is aimed at the inconvenience caused by the difficulty of confirmation and the gap in protection. Whether the other party tenders performance does not immediately become apparent on the ground, and if a tender of performance that leaves no record and the dispute arising from it occur, only the party in the weaker position may bear that burden. While the disadvantage that protection of the uncertain situation is weakened is left as it is, the range in which unconditional recognition was refused is maintained.
In this scene, the names of the performance, the tender of performance, the demand, the declaration of rescission, the object of return, and the items of damage are only the kinds of items to be left in the record, and it is not confirmed that each of them actually exists. Accordingly, the range in which a relationship of simultaneous performance, the arrival of the due date, or grounds for unease under the duty of prior performance remain unconfirmed stays undetermined.
What this section allows is only the distinction that the tender and due date of the defense of simultaneous performance and the grounds for unease under the duty of prior performance must be examined separately. Beyond this distinction, conclusions such as recognizing refusal of performance before the due date without limit on the sole ground of difficulty in confirming the other party's tender of performance, or conversely excluding the defense in all cases where confirmation is difficult, are not permitted. Since the service, results of performance, or outcome of actual cases are nothing that has been fixed, they cannot be determined here.