Summary
Amendments of claims are likewise subject to the limitation on substantial delay.
5.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
새 요구가 들어오면 상대방에게 필요한 심리도 함께 늘어난다. 취지가 불명료한 공격·방어방법에 대한 각하와 실기 각하의 요건을 나누어 적용하는 앞 단계의 구별을 받아들이면, 이제 남는 물음은 이 구제의 통로가 열리는 기준이 무엇인가 하는 것이다. 청구 변경은 종결 전이면 언제나 가능한가, 그리고 그 입구를 가리는 조건은 무엇인가.
민사소송법 제262조 제1항은 청구 변경의 시점과 한정을 함께 정한다. 원고는 변론을 종결할 때(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고할 때)까지 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꿀 수 있다. 그 문언은 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도 안에서 변경을 허용하면서, 소송절차를 현저히 지연시키는 경우의 예외를 단서로 붙인다.
이 문언은 두 가지를 따로 정한다. 하나는 원고가 변경할 수 있는 시기와 범위이고, 다른 하나는 그 변경으로 절차가 크게 늦어지는 경우의 제한이다. 저자는 이 제한이 실기 각하 요건에 해당하지 않거나 해당 방법이 적법하게 받아들어진 경우에만 이 구제의 입구가 열린다고 본다.
새 사실에 따른 변경을 막으면 별소 소송이 늘어난다는 반론은, 변경을 제한하면 필요한 판단을 별도 사건으로 옮기게 되어 오히려 소송이 늘어나고 잘못된 판결을 막을 기회도 잃게 된다는 손실을 겨냥한다. 중요한 자료라면 시기에 관계없이 받아들여야 한다는 주장도 같은 우려에서 나온다. 그렇더라도 변경의 권한만 쓰고 지연 제한을 삭제할 수는 없다. 현저한 지연이란 변경으로 절차 진행이 크게 늦어지는 경우를 뜻하며, 이 제한은 변경 권한과 함께 작동한다.
이 장면에서 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는 사실만을 놓고 보면, 이 쟁점은 늦은 주장 자체가 아니라 지연 제한이 어느 쪽에 맞는지에 관한 것이다. 제출 기록·준비명령·지연 이유·예상 심리 부담·각하 이유를 대조하여야 하지만, 늦어진 원인이나 추가 심리의 지연 효과를 알 수 없으면 실기 각하 여부는 미확정으로 남는다. 단순 지각만 남고 고의·중과실 또는 완결 지연이 부정되면 실기 각하 결론을 다시 판단한다.
따라서 청구 변경이 종결 전에 이루어졌다는 사실만으로 입구가 열리는 것은 아니다. 시기와 지연 효과를 함께 따져 실기 각하 요건에 해당하지 않거나 해당 방법이 적법하게 받아들어진 경우에 한하여, 요구하는 급부·당사자·조건의 특정과 방어 가능성 판단으로 나아간다. 중요한 자료의 지연은 어떤 이유로 결론내려야 하는가?
5.2The Conditions That Block Relief
취지가 불명료한 공격·방어방법에 대한 각하와 실기 각하의 요건을 나누어 적용한 것은, 늦게 제출된 방법을 다룰 때 판단의 순서가 흔들리지 않게 하려는 취지다. 그 구별은 이번 단계의 물음을 여는 출발점으로만 사용한다. 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는데, 이 장면에서 문제는 새 자료의 늦음 자체보다 변경이 절차에 더할 지연이다. 청구 변경은 종결 전이면 언제나 가능한가? 변경의 권한과 그 권한이 받는 제한이 함께 검토된다.
민사소송법 제262조는 “①원고는 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도안에서 변론을 종결할 때(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고할 때)까지 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꿀 수 있다. 다만, 소송절차를 현저히 지연시키는 경우에는 그러하지 아니하다.”고 정한다. 이 문언은 주체를 원고로, 행위를 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꾸는 것으로, 시한을 변론 종결의 시점으로 잡는다. 동시에 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도라는 조건과, 소송절차를 현저히 지연시키는 경우라는 단서가 권한을 제한한다. 제262조 제1항의 문언이 직접 가리키는 대상은 청구의 변경이며, 지금의 검토도 이 항의 물음에 머문다.
따라서 청구 변경이 변론 종결 전에 이루어졌다는 사정만으로 그 변경이 받아들여지는 것은 아니다. 소송절차를 현저히 지연시키는 경우에는 단서가 적용되어 권한이 제한되며, 여기서 현저한 지연은 변경으로 절차 진행이 크게 늦어지는 경우를 뜻한다. 이 정의와 제262조 제1항의 문언은 서로 다른 판단 단계를 이루는데, 권한의 존재 시점을 묻는 것과 그 권한이 지연 때문에 막히는지를 묻는 것은 구별되어야 한다. 저자는 이 구별을 바탕으로, 현저한 지연이라는 조건이 인정된 변경에 대해 권한만 내세워 그 제한을 넘을 수 없다고 본다.
새 사실에 따른 변경을 막으면 별도 소송이 늘어난다는 반론은, 막힌 변경이 결국 새로운 사건으로 이어져 당사자의 분쟁이 하나의 절차에서 정리되지 못하는 손실과 지연을 겨눈다. 중요한 자료라면 시기에 관계없이 받아야 잘못된 판결을 막을 수 있다는 점도 함께 지적되며, 이는 변경을 허용하지 않을 때 생기는 사실 판단의 오류 위험을 가치로 내세운다. 저자는 이런 불리함을 없애지 않은 채, 그렇더라도 변경의 권한만 쓰고 지연 제한을 삭제할 수는 없다고 답한다. 즉 분쟁의 통합 처리라는 이익과 변경으로 인한 절차의 지연이라는 손실이 함께 놓일 때, 단서가 정한 제한은 그대로 유지된다.
피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는 장면에서, 대조할 사실은 변경의 시점과 그 변경이 가져올 절차의 늦음이다. 변경이 원고의 행위인지 여부와 상대방에게 더해질 심리의 정도가 확인되지 않는 이상, 현저한 지연의 인정 여부는 이 장면만으로 확정되지 않는다. 따라서 변경이 종결 전에 이루어졌다는 사정과 별개로 지연의 조건이 충족되었는지는 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 청구 변경의 권한이 변론 종결의 시점까지 살아 있고, 그 권한이 현저한 지연의 제한을 함께 받는다는 구별이다. 허용하지 않는 것은 종결 전이라는 시점만으로 변경이 언제나 가능하다고 단정하거나, 변경의 권한만을 들어 지연의 제한을 지우는 해석이다.
5.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투었다. 같은 절 안에서 앞 단계가 맡은 심리 진입의 기준은 따로 두고, 여기서는 그 자료와 뒤따를 변경이 절차를 얼마나 늦출지 자료가 없어 확정할 수 없는 경계만 다룬다. 구체적으로 늦어진 원인이나 추가 심리가 실제로 얼마나 밀릴지가 기록에서 드러나지 않을 때, 그 사정을 판단에서 어떻게 취급해야 하는지 물음으로 삼는다. 이는 실효 여부를 그대로 답할 문제와는 분리된다.
청구 변경이 가능한 시한과 한계는 민사소송법 제262조 제1항이 정한다. 그 문언은 원고가 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도안에서 변론을 종결할 때(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고할 때)까지 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꿀 수 있다. 다만, 소송절차를 현저히 지연시키는 경우에는 그러하지 아니하다고 밝힌다(민사소송법 제262조). 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 원고이고, 행위는 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꾸는 것이며, 조건은 기초 불변과 종결 전이라는 시한이다. 그 조건을 모두 갖추어도 권한은 그대로 있고, 같은 조문이 단서로 둔 현저한 지연이 함께 성립하면 변경은 거기서 멈춘다.
이 두 판단은 순서가 정해져 있고, 같은 질문에 대한 두 번의 답이 아니다. 앞서 나눈 심리 진입은 늦은 공격·방어방법이 소송자료로 다뤄지는지의 문제이고, 여기서 보는 지연 제한은 그 자료가 몰고 올 변경이 절차를 크게 늦추는지의 문제다. 저자가 구별한 현저한 지연은 변경으로 절차 진행이 크게 늦어지는 경우를 뜻한다. 근거 문언과 이 구별이 연결되는 지점은, 변경의 권한이 시한 안에서 열려 있어도 지연 제한이 그 문을 다시 닫을 수 있다는 데 있다. 따라서 권한의 존재만으로 지연 심사를 건너뛸 수는 없고, 지연이 인정된다고 해서 그 자체로 늦은 자료의 진입 판단까지 정해지는 것도 아니다. 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항은 불능으로 단정하지 않고 미확정으로 남긴다.
이 구별에 드는 비용은 분명하다. 새 사실에 따른 변경을 막으면 별도 소송이 늘어난다. 중요한 자료라면 시기에 관계없이 받아야 잘못된 판결을 막을 수 있다는 점도, 다툼을 새로 여는 쪽이 손실을 감수해야 할 이유를 약화시킨다. 단서가 정한 지연 제한은 변경을 밀어붙이는 힘이 상대방과 법원에 남기는 부담을 함께 보도록 한 것이고, 그 부담을 지우면 조문이 정한 시한의 문턱만 남는다. 반론이 지적한 별소 증가라는 불편은 그대로 두면서, 권한과 제한을 함께 두는 결론을 유지한다.
이 장면에서 확인되는 사실은 피고 B가 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 냈고, 원고 A가 의도적인 지연이라고 다투었다는 점이다. 그 자료가 몰고 올 변경의 크기, 그리고 늦어진 원인과 추가 심리가 실제로 얼마나 밀릴지에 대해서는 기록에 아무것도 없다. 따라서 현저한 지연의 성립 여부는 이 장면만으로 정할 수 없다.
따라서 이 절에서 허용되는 결론은, 변경의 권한이 열려 있는 시한 안이라도 현저한 지연이라는 제한을 함께 따져야 하고, 늦어진 원인이나 추가 심리의 지연 효과가 확인되지 않는 한 그 경계는 미확정으로 남는다는 것까지다. 여기서 미확정은 판정을 거부하는 것도, 불능을 선언하는 것도 아니며, 판단 재료가 채워질 때 다시 볼 여지를 남기는 상태다. 반대로 권한만 남기고 지연 제한을 없앴다고 보거나, 자료가 없다는 이유만으로 변경이 막혔다고 단정하는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는 결론이다.
5.4The Records Needed for Determination
늦어진 원인 또는 추가 심리의 지연 효과를 알 수 없는 경우에는 판정을 미확정으로 남기며, 이를 구제가 막힌 경우와 구별한다. 이 결론을 전제로 이번 절의 물음은 그 판정이 어떤 기록에 기대는가에 놓인다. 앞 절이 정한 판정과 구제의 경계는 다시 논증하지 않고, 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는 장면을 그대로 전제한다. 장면 전문은 권 도입에 싣지만, 이 절은 그 가운데 판정 기록에 관련된 사정만 골라 대조한다. 그래서 지금 정해야 할 것은 결론의 방향이 아니라 그 결론을 지탱하는 자료의 목록이다.
청구 변경에 관한 문언은 “①원고는 청구의 기초가 바뀌지 아니하는 한도안에서 변론을 종결할 때(변론 없이 한 판결의 경우에는 판결을 선고할 때)까지 청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꿀 수 있다. 다만, 소송절차를 현저히 지연시키는 경우에는 그러하지 아니하다.”라고 규정한다(민사소송법 제262조). 이 문언에서 ‘원고’는 변경의 주체이고, ‘청구의 취지 또는 원인을 바꿀 수 있다’는 부분이 변경의 대상과 시기를 가리킨다. 뒤의 단서는 같은 권한이 언제나 행사된다는 뜻이 아니라는 점을 분명히 한다. 다만 이 절은 현저한 지연이라는 한정이 변경의 권한과 함께 작동한다는 문언만 다루며, 변경의 범위나 완성 시점에 관한 다른 쟁점은 담당하지 않는다.
이 문언과 이번 절의 결론을 잇는 고리는 변경의 권한과 지연 제한을 나누어 보는 태도다. 권한은 변경을 가능하게 하는 근거이고, 제한은 그 행사가 절차를 크게 늦추는 경우를 막는 장치다. 현저한 지연은 여기서 변경으로 절차 진행이 크게 늦어지는 경우를 뜻한다. 이 구별은 제출 기록·준비명령·지연 이유·예상 심리 부담·각하 이유라는 기록 항목이 각각 어느 판단 단계를 받치는지 가르는 틀이 된다. 이 판정은 위 기록을 근거로 하며, 그 기록이 없으면 결론은 미확정으로 남는다. 기록이 없다는 사정은 곧 각하 요건의 입증이 끝났다는 뜻이 아니고, 반대로 변경이 무조건 허용된다는 뜻도 아니다.
가장 강한 반론은 변경을 막으면 별도 소송이 늘어난다는 불편에 겨눠진다. 새 자료에 따른 요구가 늦게 드러나는 경우까지 막아버리면, 당사자는 같은 분쟁을 다른 소송으로 옮겨 다시 다투어야 하고 법원도 같은 사실을 두 번 살피게 될 수 있다. 중요한 자료라면 시기에 관계없이 받아야 잘못된 판결을 막을 수 있다는 점도 함께 지적된다. 이 손실과 가치를 가볍게 볼 수는 없지만, 변경의 권한만 쓰고 지연 제한을 삭제할 수는 없다. 조문의 단서가 함께 읽히는 한, 권한의 존재만으로 현저한 지연이라는 한정을 지울 수는 없다.
합성 장면에서 관련된 사실은 좁다. 피고 B는 변론이 마무리될 무렵 새 자료를 내고, 원고 A는 의도적인 지연이라고 다투는 상황이다. 이 절은 그 자료의 제출 시점과 의도적 지연이라는 주장이 기록 위에서 어떤 형태로 남는지만을 본다. 제출 기록은 자료가 언제 들어왔는지를, 지연 이유는 왜 늦어졌는지를, 예상 심리 부담은 추가 심리가 얼마나 남는지를, 각하 이유는 제한이 어떻게 적용되었는지를 각각 적는 자리다. 준비명령은 그런 판단이 서는 기준을 밝히는 자료다. 다만 장면에 연도나 금액이 정해지지 않았으므로, 어떤 수치가 어느 쪽에 유리한지는 이 장면만으로 판단할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은 변경의 권한과 지연 제한을 함께 보아 필요한 기록을 정하는 결론이고, 권한만 들어 지연 제한을 없는 것으로 처리하는 것은 허용하지 않는다. 기록 항목이 모자라면 그 판정은 미확정으로 남으며, 이는 구제가 막힌 상태와 같은 말이 아니다.
5.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Building on the premise that the requirements for dismissal of attack and defense methods whose gist is unclear and the requirements for dismissal for untimeliness are to be applied separately, the analysis now turns to the permissible scope of the amendment itself. That question does not merely ask about the timing of the amendment; it also asks how a delay caused by the amendment reverses the stage determination already made.
The provision governing amendment of a claim is Article 262 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. The party designated by this provision is the plaintiff, the act is an amendment of the gist or the grounds of the claim, and its limit is the scope within which the basis of the claim is not changed. In addition, the point in time of "until the close of oral argument" is given together, and the exception of "where it significantly delays the litigation proceedings" follows.
Connecting this provision to the criteria of judgment divided out earlier reveals why the permissibility of the amendment and the delay effect of the amendment must be distinguished. The former is a question of authority—whether the plaintiff may change the gist or the grounds of the claim—while the latter is a question of limitation—whether that amendment greatly slows the progress of the proceedings. Significant delay here means a case in which the progress of the proceedings is greatly slowed by the amendment (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262). Accordingly, where only simple delay remains and intent, gross negligence, or delay in the conclusion of the lawsuit is denied, the conclusion of dismissal for untimeliness is reconsidered; and where the specified amendment is confirmed, the existing blocking and estoppel determination is discarded and the matter is re-adjudicated from the stage onward.
The counterargument that blocking an amendment based on new facts increases separate lawsuits is aimed at the inconvenience and cost of materials that could not all be litigated at once leading to a new lawsuit. The counterargument further maintains that if the material is important, it should be accepted regardless of timing, so that an erroneous judgment can be prevented. The increase in separate lawsuits pointed out by the counterargument remains as it is, but the delay limitation set out by the provision cannot be erased along with it; accordingly, the conclusion of this section is maintained, placing authority and limitation together.
In a synthetic scenario, Defendant B submits new material around the time oral argument is being concluded, and Plaintiff A argues that this is intentional delay. The fact in this scenario corresponding to this question is that the timing of the amendment and the allegation of delay were submitted together. Contrasting this with the foregoing conditions, whether the amendment was made before the close and whether that amendment caused significant delay are examined separately. Where the submitted records, the scheduling order, the reasons for the delay, the anticipated burden of hearing, and the reasons for dismissal are confirmed, the requirements for dismissal for untimeliness are compared against those records; but where the cause of the delay or the delay effect of additional hearing cannot be ascertained, that part remains undetermined. Values absent from the scene, such as the year, the amount, or the outcome of the judgment, cannot be determined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is not that an amendment of a claim is always possible before the close, but that it is possible within the limit that the basis of the claim is not changed and is at the same time subject to the limitation of significant delay. The conclusion not permitted is the reading that deletes the delay limitation and leaves only the authority to amend. That reading may reduce the increase in separate lawsuits emphasized by the counterargument, but since it also erases the limitation set by the provision, it lies outside this boundary.
5.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The requirements for dismissal of attack and defense methods whose gist is unclear and the requirements for dismissal for untimeliness were applied separately. In the scenario where Defendant B submits new material around the time oral argument is being concluded and Plaintiff A argues that this is intentional delay, the counterargument that blocking an amendment based on new facts increases separate lawsuits is at issue.
The statutory text corresponding to this question prescribes both the timing and the limitation of amendment of a claim. Article 262 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "(1) The plaintiff may change the gist or the grounds of the claim until the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the judgment is pronounced), within the limit that the basis of the claim is not changed; provided, that this shall not apply where it significantly delays the litigation proceedings" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262). In this text, the plaintiff is the party who amends, what may be changed is the gist or the grounds of the claim, and the boundary of permissibility is the limit within which the basis of the claim is not changed.
That text, in its proviso, places the authority to amend and the limitation of delay side by side in a single sentence. Accordingly, the answer to the question whether an amendment of a claim is always possible before the close is not that it is always possible, but that it is possible within the limit that the basis of the claim is not changed and is at the same time subject to the limitation of significant delay (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262). The author takes this distinction as the ground for excluding the reading that draws out only the authority to amend and deletes the delay limitation. In other words, the determination of the permissible scope and the determination of the delay limitation are separate stages.
The counterargument that blocking an amendment based on new facts increases separate lawsuits is aimed at the loss whereby a blocked amendment ultimately gives rise to the filing of a new action and adds to the burden on the entire dispute. The supplementary reason that important material should be accepted regardless of timing, so that an erroneous judgment can be prevented, points out that excluding material that arrives late from the hearing may sacrifice an accurate determination. Yet without erasing such adverse aspects of the counterargument, the author's answer remains that one cannot invoke only the authority to amend and delete the delay limitation. In other words, the mere fact that separate, divided lawsuits may increase does not render the text of the delay limitation void.
In a synthetic scenario, Defendant B submits new material around the time oral argument is being concluded, Plaintiff A argues that this is intentional delay, and the author defines significant delay as a case in which the progress of the proceedings is greatly slowed by the amendment. However, in this scenario no year, amount, start date, or outcome of the judgment is set; therefore, the actual degree of delay or the burden of additional hearing cannot be fixed in figures. To the extent that the cause of the delay or the delay effect of additional hearing cannot be ascertained, the matter remains undetermined.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted by this section extends only to the point that the delay limitation cannot be deleted by invoking the authority to amend alone; conversely, it is also not permitted to regard the authority to amend itself as never having existed merely because the limitation of significant delay is confirmed. The determination that a party may proceed to the hearing where the requirements for dismissal for untimeliness are not met or where the submission has been lawfully accepted does not go beyond the conclusion of this stage.
5.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
In the scenario where Defendant B submits new material around the time oral argument is being concluded and Plaintiff A argues that this is intentional delay, this delay appears not as a mere inconvenience but as a problem requiring additional time for the opposing party's response and the court's hearing. Accepting the premise that one cannot invoke only the authority to amend and delete the delay limitation, the analysis confronts the question whether an amendment of a claim is always possible before the close. The fact that amendment is permitted up to the point of the close does not mean that every amendment within that point is accepted unconditionally. It must be confirmed whether the limitation prescribed by the Article operates together.
The relevant text is Article 262 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. That phrase reads: the plaintiff may change the gist or the grounds of the claim until the close of oral argument, within the limit that the basis of the claim is not changed. In this text, the party is the plaintiff, the act is an amendment changing the gist or the grounds of the claim, and the time is until the close of oral argument. In addition, the text attaches the condition of significant delay as a proviso, thereby limiting the permissible scope of amendment. What this section addresses is how that limitation attaches to the amendment.
Linking this ground with the conclusion of this section, one can say that an amendment of a claim is also subject to the limitation of significant delay. The limit of time and the limit of delay prescribed by the Article are different stages of judgment and must be examined distinctly. The former fixes when an amendment may be attempted; the latter fixes that such an attempt is not permitted where it greatly slows the progress of the proceedings. Here, significant delay means a case in which the progress of the proceedings is greatly slowed by the amendment. Having passed the limit of time does not mean that the limit of delay has also been passed; conversely, the existence of a limit of delay does not eliminate the authority to amend itself.
The counterargument that blocking an amendment based on new facts increases separate lawsuits is aimed at the inconvenience and cost of parties having to raise the same dispute again because of a refusal. The observation that important material should be accepted regardless of timing, so that an erroneous judgment can be prevented, reveals the value of not losing substantive justice. Despite such losses and values, one cannot invoke only the authority to amend and delete the delay limitation, because the Article places the authority to amend and the limitation of significant delay together. Without erasing the disadvantages pointed out by the counterargument, what remains is the answer that the structure of the text placing authority and limitation together cannot be stripped away.
In a synthetic scenario, the fact relevant to this question is the passage that Defendant B submits new material around the time oral argument is being concluded and Plaintiff A argues that this is intentional delay. Contrasting this fact with the foregoing conditions reveals that the timing of the amendment and the delay that the amendment would cause are at issue together. However, this scene alone does not determine the reasons for the delay, the anticipated burden of additional hearing, or the actual content of the amendment. Accordingly, all that can be determined from this scene is the limitation that an amendment is subject to the limitation of significant delay as well, while whether the delay is in fact significant in an individual case remains undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is that an amendment of a claim is also subject to the limitation of significant delay, and accordingly it advances to the scope that an amendment causing significant delay may not be permitted even before the close. However, it is not permitted to regard the authority to amend itself as having vanished, or to hold that even amendments whose delay is not significant must be refused. This section does not determine which amendments constitute significant delay.
5.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
Following the question whether an amendment of a claim is always possible before the close, the next question concerns the boundary of the adjacent section. What remains in this scene is when the moment should be taken at which the trial closes its doors.
It is provided that "the plaintiff may change the gist or the grounds of the claim until the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the judgment is pronounced), within the limit that the basis of the claim is not changed; provided, that this shall not apply where it significantly delays the litigation proceedings" (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262). Here the party is the plaintiff, the act is an amendment of the gist or the grounds of the claim, and the boundary of amendment is the scope within which the basis of the claim is not changed.
"Until the close of oral argument" and "this shall not apply where it significantly delays [the proceedings]," both set out by the same Article, are different stages of judgment. The former fixes when the authority to amend remains open; the latter sets a limitation that prevents that authority from actually being exercised. Accordingly, in answer to whether an amendment of a claim is always possible before the close, the time condition of being before the close is insufficient, and the conclusion is reached that an amendment of a claim is also subject to the limitation of significant delay.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that blocking an amendment based on new facts increases separate lawsuits. The demand that important material be accepted regardless of timing, so that an erroneous judgment can be prevented, pushes the losses and inconvenience spoken of by the counterargument to their limit. Yet one cannot invoke only the authority to amend and delete the delay limitation. Leaving the adverse aspect of increased delay as it stands, one cannot unconditionally open the door to amendments that greatly delay the conclusion of the lawsuit.
What is confirmed in a synthetic scenario is only the fact that Defendant B submitted new material around the close of oral argument and that Plaintiff A contested that submission as intentional delay. The types of materials—such as the submission records, the scheduling order, the reasons for the delay, the anticipated burden of hearing, and the reasons for dismissal—are specified, but no actual records have been collected. The procedural stage to which those materials belong is the entry into the hearing of late allegations and evidence; whether the statutory condition of dismissal for untimeliness—that is, a delayed submission through intent or gross negligence that delays the conclusion of the lawsuit—has been established cannot be determined from this scene alone.
The conclusion permitted by this section is narrow. To the question whether an amendment of a claim is always possible before the close, the distinction that the authority to amend remains open but must at the same time pass the limitation of significant delay is the scope of this section. Beyond that, the question of whether dismissal for untimeliness should be recognized, or the reasons for concluding on the delay of important material, is not addressed here.
5.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
Whenever the content of the demand or its grounds are newly written in, within a range in which the basis of the claim does not change, the opposing party must freshly prepare its defense and rebuttal to it, and the court must continue the examination to contest this claim. Taking up the premise, adopted in the previous section, that the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds of attack and defense methods whose meaning is unclear and the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission are applied separately, it opens the question whether amendment of the claim is possible at any time before the closing.
The basis for this question is the text of Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act. It provides: "The plaintiff may change the gist or grounds of the claim, to the extent that the basis of the claim is not changed, until the closing of oral argument (or, in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the pronouncement of the judgment). Provided, however, that this shall not apply where it significantly delays the litigation proceedings." In this text, the plaintiff is the holder of the authority, changing the gist or grounds of the claim is the act, and the time until the closing of oral argument is the temporal limit of that authority.
This text sets out the scope of the authority and its limitation together in a single sentence. That is, the range in which amendment of the claim is permitted and the case in which such an amendment is not accepted are divided into two, and the author draws from this distinction the conclusion that amendment of the claim is likewise subject to the limitation of significant delay. Accordingly, as to the question whether amendment of the claim is possible at any time before the closing, the determination is that amendment is not unconditionally permitted merely by the temporal condition of being before the closing. However, the reason why it is necessary to examine the scope of the authority and its limitation as separate requirements is that, since the two requirements are set out together in the text, judging by only one of them causes the other to be missed. The text merely sets out the holder of the authority, the act, and the condition, and the author describes this conclusion on the basis of that text.
If amendment of the claim is barred solely on the ground of significant delay, the disadvantage may arise that, if amendments following new facts are barred, the number of separate lawsuits increases. If the plaintiff sought to resolve the matter by adding a new demand within the existing lawsuit but was refused, a separate action must be filed; the number of cases and the examinations increase, and the burden on judicial resources and on the parties' time and expense grows. The counterargument is raised in the same place that, if the material is important, it must be accepted regardless of timing so that an erroneous judgment can be prevented. While the author recognizes this disadvantage and this counterargument, the conclusion is maintained to the extent that the authority of amendment alone cannot be invoked to delete the delay limitation. That is, the scope of the authority and its limitation are two elements set out together in one sentence, and if either one alone is retained, the reason found in the text for keeping both together disappears.
Contrasting this scene with the definition of significant delay as a case in which the progress of the proceedings is greatly delayed by the amendment, it is necessary to examine separately whether the condition of significant delay is satisfied. The submission record, the preparatory order, the reason for the delay, the anticipated burden of examination, and the reason for dismissal on procedural grounds are the records that must be verified. From the scene alone it is impossible to weigh the timing of the submission and the effect of the delay and determine whether the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission are met, or whether the method in question is lawfully accepted, and so this item remains undetermined.
Amendment of the claim must be regarded as falling within the scope of the authority if it satisfies the temporal condition of being before the closing, while at the same time the distinction must be maintained to the end that, if it falls within the case of significantly delaying the litigation proceedings, it enters the range of the exception in the text. That is, in order to support the conclusion that amendment of the claim is likewise subject to the limitation of significant delay, neither of the two parts of the text may alone be made the basis of the determination. Conversely, looking only at the scope of the authority in the text and deleting the limitation of significant delay, or reading the mere existence of the delay limitation as meaning that amendment itself is impossible, lies outside the range of this conclusion. The conclusion permitted in this section extends no further than placing the two requirements side by side and examining them together; the determination of what degree significant delay signifies is passed on to what follows. What does significant delay mean in this determination?
5.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
From the question whether amendment of the claim is possible at any time before the closing, this conclusion applies separately the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds of attack and defense methods whose meaning is unclear and the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission. In the same direction, there remains a part to be divided and adjudicated again within the stage. Defendant B submits new material around the time oral argument is being concluded, and Plaintiff A contests it as intentional delay; in this scene, the question is how far to carry the fine subdivision within the entry into examination of late assertions and evidence. This question merely subdivides further how the limitation operates within the scope of the authority of amendment already established. The question is therefore framed not in the direction of creating a new procedure anew, but in the direction of counting further items of determination within the stage already given. It must then be made clear next by what standard the division can be made without crossing beyond the stage.
The original text provides as follows in Article 262 paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. This text specifies the holder as the plaintiff, the act as changing the gist or grounds of the claim, and the conditions as the limit of not changing the basis of the claim and until the closing of oral argument. And the proviso gives the case of significantly delaying the litigation proceedings as the ground that bars such an amendment. Here, to interpret beyond the range of the holder, act, and condition that the text speaks of, or to read into it a condition not found in the text, departs from the reading of the text that this section has undertaken. Only the text of the relevant clause and paragraph within the given range is addressed; the issues of other paragraphs are not explained here.
Linking this basis with the conclusion of this section, the determination stands that the fine subdivision within the stage is limited to the conditions of cases in which it operates, cases in which it is blocked, and cases that are undetermined. Cases in which it operates mean those in which, weighing the timing of the submission and the effect of the delay, the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission are not met, or the method in question is lawfully accepted. Cases in which it is blocked mean those in which, the statutory condition of the completion of the lawsuit being delayed by a delayed submission made with intent or gross negligence being recognized, the relevant attack or defense method is dismissed. These two are distinguished so that the stage of looking at the circumstances surrounding the submission itself and the stage of looking at whether the requirements that block it by dismissal on procedural grounds are in place are set apart for judgment. Only then are simple lateness and lateness that has brought about the conditions for dismissal on procedural grounds not lumped together as the same item. Cases that are undetermined are left as those in which the cause of the delay or the delay effect of additional examination cannot be known, so that a state of insufficient material is not hurriedly turned into a final determination. Only when divided in accordance with these expressly stated conditions is it a subdivision within the stage.
This argument points to the loss and inconvenience that, if new material is not accepted even late, circumstances that could not be dealt with in it flow into another lawsuit and the dispute is ultimately split in two. It also notes at once that, if the material is important, it must be accepted regardless of timing so that an erroneous judgment can be prevented, advancing the value that the accuracy of the judgment takes precedence over a late submission. The author nevertheless answers that the authority of amendment alone cannot be invoked to delete the delay limitation. That is, without erasing the limitation of significant delay that the proviso to Article 262 paragraph (1) places alongside it, the text permitting the amendment and the text barring the delay are read together. The increase in separate actions or the possibility of error in judgment pointed out by the counterargument is not erased and remains as it is, but the conclusion is not changed in the direction of abolishing the delay limitation on the ground of that loss. The scope of the answer is thus maintained at the line of not overwriting the counterargument while not erasing the limitation.
Looking only at the facts bearing on this question in the synthetic scene, Defendant B submits new material around the time oral argument is being concluded, and Plaintiff A contests it as intentional delay. Measured against the conditions above, the issue Plaintiff A contests appears closer to the delay effect arising from the lateness than to the lawfulness of the application itself. However, what this scene provides is only the timing and the direction of the dispute; why the material was late, and how much further the additional examination will be extended as a result, are not written down. It is therefore right to hold that the cause of the delay and the delay effect of the additional examination cannot be known here, and to leave them undetermined. What Plaintiff A calls intentional delay is still a contested assertion and not a settled determination, and so no conclusion toward dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission is drawn from this scene alone. If it is confirmed that only simple tardiness remains and that intent or gross negligence, or the delay in completion, is negated, the conclusion of dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission is reconsidered.
The conclusion permitted by this section extends no further than dividing, within the entry into examination of late assertions and evidence, the fine subdivision within the stage into cases in which it operates, cases in which it is blocked, and cases that are undetermined. Taking the submission record, the preparatory order, the reason for the delay, the anticipated burden of examination, and the reason for dismissal on procedural grounds as the standard, in cases where the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission are not met or where the method is lawfully accepted, the determination goes in the direction of opening the entry into examination; where the statutory condition of the completion of the lawsuit being delayed by a delayed submission made with intent or gross negligence is recognized, the determination goes in the direction of dismissal on procedural grounds. If the cause of the delay or the delay effect of the additional examination cannot be known, it is left undetermined, and it is not turned immediately into no available remedy on the sole ground that the material is insufficient. What is not permitted here is either adding a further stage of determination outside these three divisions, or invoking the authority of amendment alone to delete the delay limitation.
5.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
On the premise that the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds of attack and defense methods whose meaning is unclear and the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission are applied separately, the scene unfolds in which Defendant B submits new material around the time oral argument is being concluded and Plaintiff A contests it as intentional delay. In this scene, whether to permit or to block the entry into examination of the delayed material, and how to handle the case in which the grounds for determination are insufficient, are the questions of this section.
Article 262 paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act allows the plaintiff to change the gist or grounds of the claim, to the extent that the basis of the claim is not changed, until the closing of oral argument, while providing that "provided, however, that this shall not apply where the litigation proceedings are significantly delayed" (Civil Procedure Act Article 262). In this text, "the plaintiff" is the holder of the authority of amendment, "may change the gist or grounds of the claim" is the permitted act, and "the case of significantly delaying the litigation proceedings" is the condition that bars that permission.
The link connecting this text with the conclusion of this section is that the delay limitation stands alongside the authority of amendment. Where, weighing the timing of the submission and the effect of the delay, the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission are not met or the method in question is lawfully accepted, the entry into examination is opened; where the statutory condition of the completion of the lawsuit being delayed by a delayed submission made with intent or gross negligence is recognized and the relevant attack or defense method is dismissed without prejudice, it is blocked. The reason the determination of whether there is a delay and the determination of the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds must be distinguished is that, whereas the former determination points to the slowing of the progress of the proceedings, the latter determination requires a statutory requirement that arises from the submission of a particular attack or defense method.
The assertion that, if the material is important, it must be accepted regardless of timing so that an erroneous judgment can be prevented, points to the loss that the delay limitation sacrifices the accuracy of the judgment. So long as the proviso to Article 262 paragraph (1) places the delay limitation alongside the permission of amendment, the determination must be made while leaving in place the adverse aspects of the increase in the examination that the opposing party must bear and the delay in the completion of the lawsuit.
The facts in the synthetic scene relevant to this question are that Defendant B submitted new material around the time oral argument was being concluded, and that Plaintiff A contested it as intentional delay. From these facts alone, neither the cause of the delay nor how much the additional examination will actually be extended has been settled. Accordingly, whether the delayed submission was made with intent or gross negligence, and whether the statutory condition of the completion of the lawsuit being delayed is established, remain undetermined.
The conclusion permitted by this section is the distinction that, where, weighing the timing of the submission and the effect of the delay, the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for late submission are not met or the method in question is lawfully accepted, the entry into examination is opened, and that where the statutory condition is recognized and dismissal on procedural grounds follows, it is blocked. The conclusions not permitted are leaving only the authority of amendment by deleting the delay limitation, and fixing a dismissal on procedural grounds while the cause of the delay and the delay effect of the additional examination remain unconfirmed.
5.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
On the premise, established in the preceding section, of applying separately the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds of attack and defense methods of unclear purport and the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds for late filing, this section now considers the case in which an amendment of claim comes before the close of proceedings. In the scene in which Defendant B submits new materials as oral argument draws to a close and Plaintiff A contends that this is deliberate delay, the remaining question is what effect the timing of the amendment itself has on the proceedings. In particular, it must be made clear what burden the additional examination occasioned by the amendment places on the opposing party's preparation. This question lies not in redefining the requirements for dismissal on procedural grounds of late assertions, but in distinguishing the authority to amend from the limitations placed upon that authority. It must now be confirmed until when an amendment is permitted, and what limitations attach to that permission.
The provision setting the timing of an amendment of claim reads as follows. "The plaintiff may, within the limits of not altering the basis of the claim, change the object or grounds of the claim until the close of oral argument (in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the pronouncement of judgment). However, this shall not apply where it significantly delays the litigation proceedings." (Civil Procedure Act, Article 262) In this provision the subject is the plaintiff, and the act is changing the object or grounds of the claim. The limits within which that act is permitted are the scope in which the basis of the claim is not altered, and the time limit is until the close of oral argument or, in the case of a judgment rendered without oral argument, until the pronouncement of judgment. The proviso that follows makes an exception to that permission, preventing the amendment where it significantly delays the litigation proceedings. This provision addresses only the timing of the amendment, and does not separately establish the requirements for the dismissal on procedural grounds of late assertions or evidence.
The opening part of the above provision and its proviso require different determinations. The opening part fixes the time at which an amendment is possible and its limits, recognizing the plaintiff's authority to change the claim until the close of proceedings. The proviso prevents the exercise of that authority only where the result of its exercise is that the progress of the proceedings is greatly delayed. Accordingly, the determination that the authority to amend exists and the determination of whether its exercise causes significant delay must be examined separately. Significant delay means a case in which the progress of the proceedings is greatly delayed by the amendment, and this is distinct from the fact that the amendment itself came late. One cannot hold that the limitation of delay is extinguished merely by the existence of the authority; conversely, neither does the ground for the amendment itself vanish merely because the delay is great. Only when the two determinations are placed together is the permissibility of an amendment of claim settled.
It is difficult to deny that preventing an amendment based on new facts increases the number of separate lawsuits. If the dispute cannot be concluded within a single set of proceedings, the parties must bring a new action, and the court must again deal with the same facts. Despite that loss and inconvenience, one cannot use only the authority to amend and delete the limitation of delay. Since the provision recognizing the authority also imposes the limitation of delay, one cannot select and use only one of the two. The increase in separate lawsuits pointed out by the counterargument remains as it is, but it cannot serve as a ground for erasing the existence of the proviso concerning significant delay. Accordingly, in determining the permissibility of an amendment, the increase in the number of lawsuits and the delayed progress of the proceedings must be considered together.
The facts that can be confirmed in this scene are that Defendant B submitted new materials as oral argument drew to a close, and that Plaintiff A contested this as deliberate delay. These facts alone are not sufficient to determine whether the amendment causes significant delay. Since significant delay means a case in which the progress of the proceedings is greatly delayed by the amendment, the fact alone that the new materials were submitted close to the close of oral argument cannot establish conclusively that the requirement is met. Rather, the actual delaying effect of the submission, and what burden was placed on the opposing party's preparation, must be confirmed together. Since the scene contains no material by which to gauge the magnitude of the delay, whether it constitutes significant delay remains undetermined. The distinction itself, however, that the authority and the limitation of delay are separate is maintained in this scene as well.
What can be settled in this section is the distinction that an amendment of claim, while being an authority available before the close, is at the same time subject to the limitation of significant delay. One cannot hold that the limitation of delay is extinguished merely by the determination that the timing and limits of amendment are permitted, nor can it be said that the amendment is blocked merely because late materials were produced. The magnitude of the delay that remains undetermined does not alter the conclusion of this section, and means only that further facts are needed to apply the distinction.