Summary
Res judicata in principle extends to what is included in the dispositive part and is not the same as the factual narrative of the entire written judgment.
1.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
긴 판결문 가운데 다시 다툴 수 없는 부분은 따로 정해진다. 앞 절에서 명백한 표시 오류·미재판 청구·판단 불만을 나누고 경정결정에 대한 불복과 본안 항소의 관계를 확인해야 한다는 점을 받아, 이번 단계는 확정판결의 어느 부분이 다시 다툼을 막는가라는 물음에 이른다. 원고 A는 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 점을 들어 새로운 소송에서도 그 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장한다. 이 주장이 어느 부분에 붙어 있는지를 가리는 일부터 시작한다.
해당 문언은 단정적이다. 민사소송법 제216조 제1항은 「확정판결은 주문에 포함된 것에 한하여 기판력을 가진다」(민사소송법 제216조)고 선언한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 확정된 판결이며, 그 판결의 주문에 포함된 판단 대상이다. 기판력, 즉 확정된 판단에 대하여 다시 다툴 수 없게 하는 효력은 여기에 묶인다. 문언은 판결문에 실린 모든 서술을 같은 값으로 다루라고 말하지 않는다.
조문이 그리는 선은 객관적 범위의 기준이 된다. 객관적 범위란 기판력이 미치는 판단 대상의 범위를 뜻한다. 앞서 받은 원고의 주장은 바로 이 선을 넘어서는 것이다. 인도 판결의 주문이 무엇을 명하였는지와는 별개로, 그 이유에 적힌 소유권을 그 자체로 확정된 판단으로 세우려 하기 때문이다. 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나누는 판단은 이 구분 위에서 이루어진다.
그렇다고 이런 구별이 불편을 없애는 것은 아니다. 이유의 판단을 다시 다투면 같은 쟁점이 두 번 심리되고, 모순된 결과와 반복 비용이 생길 수 있다. 가장 강한 반론은 이 손실을 겨냥한다. 그러나 판결문에 적힌 모든 사실에 기판력을 부여할 수는 없다. 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나누어 후자의 급은 새로운 심판의 대상으로 남기는 것으로 반론에 답할 수 있다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 주장의 형태뿐이다. 원고 A는 이유에 적힌 소유권 하나를 들어 확정을 주장하지만, 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지는 미확인으로 남는다. 전후 소장·확정판결 주문과 이유·상계 주장 범위가 필요한 이유도 여기에 있다. 전소에서 다룬 것이 주문 대상이 아닌 선결문제로 확인되면 그 자체의 기판력 주장을 거둔다. 장면만으로 후소가 구속되는 범위가 얼마인지, 인도 청구의 급부가 어디까지인지 특정할 수는 없어, 그 판정은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 것은, 확정판결의 주문에 포함된 것만을 다시 다툴 수 없는 것으로 보아 후소의 대상을 나누는 판단이다. 허용하지 않는 것은, 이유에 적힌 사실 서술 전부에 그 효력을 부여해 별도의 청구를 묶어 버리는 해석이다. 새 판단을 덧붙이지 않는 조건부 구별로 남는 것이 이 물음의 답이다.
1.2The Conditions That Block Relief
명백한 표시 오류와 미재판된 청구, 판단에 대한 불만을 나누어 보고 경정결정에 대한 불복을 본안 항소와 대조하는 일은 앞 단계에서 끝난 것으로 받아들인다. 앞서 그 세 가지를 가른 뒤에도 남는 물음이 있다. 확정된 판결문 안에서 어느 부분이 다시금 그 사건의 쟁점을 꺼내 다툼을 막는가. 그리고 그 막음이 성립하지 못하는 조건은 무엇인가. 이 주장이 어떤 범위에서 성립하는지를 따져야 한다.
이 물음에 답할 수 있는 법문은 기판력이 닿는 자리를 한정한 조항이다. 민사소송법 제216조 제1항은 확정판결은 주문에 포함된 것에 한하여 기판력을 가진다고 적고 있다(민사소송법 제216조). 이 문언에서 주문이란 판결의 끝에 청구에 대하여 내린 결론 부분을 가리키고, 포함된 것이란 그 결론이 다루는 대상을 뜻한다. 기판력이라는 말은 동일한 사안에 대하여 다시 재판을 구하는 것을 막는 확정판결의 효력을 이른다. 따라서 이 조항이 정하는 주체는 확정판결을 선고한 법원이 아니라 그 판결의 효력을 주장하는 당사자이고, 행위는 후소에서 동일한 판단을 요구하는 청구이며, 조건은 그러한 요구가 주문이 포섭한 판단 대상 안에 있어야 한다는 점이다. 판결문의 다른 부분이 서술한 사실까지 함께 다루는 해설은 이 문언의 범위 밖에 있다.
이 문언을 앞의 물음에 이어 붙이면 기판력이 미치는 판단 대상의 범위를 뜻하는 객관적 범위는 주문이 포섭한 것으로 한정된다. 주문에 포함된 판단과 그 판단을 뒷받침하려고 이유에 적힌 사정은 서로 다른 자리에 놓인다. 전소 확정판결의 주문 대상 또는 법정 상계 판단의 범위와 충돌하는 새 판단을 요구하는 경우, 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제의 길은 닫힌다. 이 구별은 판결문을 읽는 방식의 차이가 아니라 후소를 막는 효력의 범위를 정하는 기준의 차이이다. 주문이 다룬 대상을 식별한 뒤에 그 밖의 범위를 나누는 일을 먼저 하지 않으면, 막힘과 열림의 경계가 흐려져 확정된 대상 밖의 새 심판이라는 단계에 도달할 수 없다.
이 구별에 반대하는 가장 강한 의견은 모순과 비용을 겨눈다. 같은 쟁점을 이유에서 이미 판단한 대로 받아들이지 않고 후소에서 다시 심리하면, 앞뒤 판결이 서로 다른 결론을 내리는 모순된 결과가 생길 수 있다. 그러한 재심리는 앞 소송에서 이미 들인 심리와 당사자의 입증 노력을 다시 치러야 하는 반복 비용을 불러온다. 이러한 손실과 불편은 실제로 생길 수 있다. 그렇더라도 판결문에 적힌 모든 사실에 기판력을 부여할 수는 없다. 판결문의 사실 서술까지 모두 확정된 것으로 묶으면, 주문의 결론과 무관한 사정에 대해서도 후소에서 다투는 길이 함께 막힌다. 모순과 반복 비용을 줄이는 편익이 크더라도, 그것만으로 기판력의 객관적 범위를 주문 밖으로 넓힐 수는 없다.
합성 장면으로 돌아가면 앞선 인도 판결의 주문은 인도를 명한 부분이고, 소유권에 관한 기재는 그 인도 판단을 뒷받침한 이유에 들어 있다. 원고 A는 이 이유의 기재를 들어 새로운 소송의 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장하지만, 앞서 정한 기준에 따라 따져야 하는 것은 그 기재가 주문에 포함되어 있는지의 여부이다. 전후의 소장과 확정판결의 주문과 이유, 상계 주장의 범위라는 기록만을 대상으로 대조하면, 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나눌 수 있다. 다만 앞선 판결이 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지가 확인되지 않은 채로는 이 대조를 끝낼 수 없으므로, 그 점은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 주문에 포함된 판단이 다시 다툼을 막고, 그 판단과 충돌하는 새 판단을 요구하는 경우 법정 요건 중 하나라도 충족되지 않으면 구제의 길이 닫힌다는 것이다. 다만 이 결론이 허용하지 않는 방향도 분명히 해야 한다. 이유에 적힌 모든 사실이 곧 기판력의 대상이 된다고 읽는 것은 이 절의 결론이 아니다. 확정된 대상 밖의 범위를 새로 심판하는 일은 전후 소의 대상을 대조하여 그 경계를 나눈 뒤에만 열린다.
1.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
앞 단계에서 명백한 표시 오류·미재판 청구·판단 불만을 나누고 경정결정에 대한 불복과 본안 항소의 관계를 확인해야 한다는 절차를 확인하고 나면, 이제 그 뒤의 물음이 남는다. 그 물음은 확정판결의 어느 부분이 다시 다툼을 막는가, 그리고 자료가 없어 확정할 수 없는 경계는 어디인가이다. 긴 판결문 안에는 주문도 있고 그에 이르는 이유의 판단과 사실의 적술이 함께 놓인다. 그런데 이 가운데 어떤 부분만이 후소에서 다시 다투는 것을 막는가.
확정판결의 어느 부분이 다시 다툼을 막는가에 대해 법문은 그 경계를 문언으로 못 박는다. 민사소송법 제216조는 “주문에 포함된 것에 한하여 기판력을 가진다”고 정한다. 여기서 주문이란 판결 끝에 청구에 대한 결론으로 선고되는 부분이고, 포함된 것이라는 말은 기판력이 그 주문이 선고한 판단 대상에 묶인다는 뜻이다. 기판력이란 확정된 판단에 의해 후소에서 당사자가 그 판단과 모순되는 주장을 하거나 법원이 그와 모순된 판단을 하는 것이 막히는 효력을 가리킨다. 이 조항은 주문의 문언을 그 범위의 기준으로 삼는다. 그러므로 판결문 앞부분에 쓰인 사실의 인정이나 이유에서의 법적 평가는 그 자체로 주문이 아니라는 점이 문언에서 드러난다.
그 문언과 이번 물음의 결론은 다음과 같이 이어진다. 기판력은 원칙적으로 주문에 포함된 것에 미치며 판결문 전체의 사실 서술과 같지 않다. 전소에서 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우 판단 재료가 특정되지 않은 사항은 불능과 구별해 미확정으로 남긴다는 판단이 여기서 나온다. 이 구별에서 불능이란 주어진 자료로 어떤 사항을 판정할 수 없다는 결론 자체를 뜻하고, 미확정이란 판정에 필요한 자료가 아직 특정되지 않아 판단을 보류해야 하는 경우를 뜻한다. 전자가 판정의 종결이라면 후자는 판정의 개시 조건이 아직 열리지 않은 상태이다. 두 단계를 섞지 않는 이유는 전자를 후자로 오인하면 자료 부족을 곧바로 권리의 부인으로 옮기고, 후자를 전자로 오인하면 아직 들어오지 않은 판단 재료를 거절한 결과가 되기 때문이다. 이 절의 물음은 자료가 없는 경계를 규정하는 일이지 자료를 대신 채우는 일이 아니다.
이 구별을 유지하는 데 따르는 반론은 분명하다. 이유의 판단을 다시 심리하면 앞 판결과 모순된 결과가 생기고, 같은 쟁점에 대한 반복 비용과 판단의 불안정이 뒤따른다는 것이다. 그러한 손실과 불편은 실제로 크다. 같은 소유권 판단을 두 번 심리하면 두 법원이 서로 다른 결론에 이를 수 있고, 당사자에게는 다시 소송을 준비하는 비용이 남는다. 이유 부분의 사실 서술까지 후소에서 다투지 못하게 하면, 주문이 다루지 않은 사항까지 확정되는 결과가 생기고, 그 확정의 범위는 주문의 문언으로 정할 수 없게 된다. 반론이 지적한 모순의 위험과 반복 비용은 인정하되, 그 위험을 줄이는 길을 판결문 전체의 사실에 기판력을 부여하는 데서 찾을 수는 없다.
합성 장면을 이 물음에 맞추어 보면, 장면은 앞선 인도 판결의 이유에 소유권이 적혔다는 사실만을 정하고 있다. 그런데 전후 소장·확정판결 주문과 이유·상계 주장 범위라는 판단 기록이 아직 전소의 주문 대상이 무엇인지 알려주지 않는다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 현재 상태에서, 이유에 적힌 소유권 판단이 주문에 포함된 것인지 아닌지는 특정되어 있지 않다. 그렇다고 그 소유권 판단의 기판력이 없다는 결론에 이르는 것은 아니다. 확인되지 않은 것은 판단의 결과가 아니라 판단에 필요한 자료의 특정이다. 그러므로 그 사항은 불능으로 판정할 수 없고 미확정으로 남는다. 반대로 전소의 주문 대상에 소유권 판단이 포함된 것으로 확인되면, 그때 비로소 기판력의 객관적 범위를 논할 수 있다. 장면만으로는 이 중 어느 쪽인지를 정할 수 없다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론과 허용하지 않는 결론을 나누면 다음과 같다. 허용되는 것은 전소의 주문 대상이 확인되지 않은 상태에서, 이유에 적힌 판단이 주문에 포함된 것인지 아닌지가 정해지지 않았으므로 그 사항을 미확정으로 남기는 결론이다. 반대로 자료가 없다는 이유만으로 그 판단의 기판력이 없다고 단정하거나, 이유에 적혔다는 사실만으로 기판력이 있다고 단정하는 것은 이 절이 허용하지 않는다. 미확인 항목은 판단을 미루는 표시이지 결론의 대체물이 아니며, 자료 부족은 미확정이지 곧바로 구제 불능이 아니다. 이 판단은 확정된 대상 밖의 새 심판이라는 단계에 묶여 있고, 전후 소의 대상을 대조해 후소가 기판력에 구속되는 범위와 그 밖의 범위를 나눌 때에만 작동한다.
1.4The Records Needed for Determination
이 주장은 확정판결의 어느 부분이 다시 다툼을 막는가 하는 물음과 맞닿아 있다. 그런데 그 앞에는 판단을 하기 위한 기록의 범위를 먼저 정해야 한다. 판단을 위하여 어떤 기록이 필요한가 하는 물음이다.
민사소송법 제216조 제1항의 문언은 “확정판결은 주문에 포함된 것에 한하여 기판력을 가진다”라고 적는다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 확정된 판결이며, 그 효력의 대상은 판결문 전체가 아니라 주문에 포함된 판단이다. 여기서 주문이란 청구에 대한 법원의 종국적 결론을 적은 부분이고, 기판력은 확정된 판단이 다시 다툼을 막는 효력을 뜻한다. 이 절에서는 제216조 제1항만을 다룬다.
제216조 제1항의 문언과 단계 판정의 결론을 이어 보면, 기판력은 원칙적으로 주문에 포함된 것에 미치며 판결문 전체의 사실 서술과 같지 않다는 구별이 나온다. 이 구별이 바로 객관적 범위, 즉 기판력이 미치는 판단 대상의 범위를 정하는 작업이다. 따라서 단계 판정은 전후 소장·확정판결 주문과 이유·상계 주장 범위에 기록된 자료만으로 한다. 없는 기록은 추측으로 메우지 않으며, 앞서 정리한 명백한 표시 오류·미재판 청구·판단 불만의 구분도 이 기록 안에서 확인한다.
이유의 판단을 다시 다투면 모순된 결과가 생길 수 있다는 반론이 겨냥하는 것은 같은 쟁점이 두 번 심리되어 서로 다른 결론이 나오고 당사자가 반복 비용을 치르는 손실이다. 이 불편을 줄이려는 요구는 분명하며 지우지 않는다. 판결문의 사실 서술까지 모두 확정된 판단으로 묶으면 이유와 주문의 구별이 무너지므로, 반론이 말하는 반복 비용을 막는 범위가 오히려 넓어진다.
앞선 인도 판결에서 소유권이 이유에 적혀 있고 원고 A는 그 사실을 들어 새로운 소송에서의 소유권 판단이 확정되었다고 주장하는 장면을 보면, 전후 소장과 확정판결의 주문과 이유, 그리고 상계 주장 범위에 무엇이 기록되어 있는지가 핵심이 된다. 전소가 무엇을 주문으로 판단했는지 확인되지 않은 경우에는 단계를 판정할 수 없다고 남겨둔다. 그러나 장면만으로 전후 소장이나 상계 주장 범위의 실제 내용이 확인된 것은 아니므로, 그 범위를 초과하는 사항은 미확정으로 둔다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은, 기판력이 미치는 객관적 범위가 주문에 포함된 것으로 한정된다는 판단과, 그 범위를 가르기 위해 전후 소장·확정판결 주문과 이유·상계 주장 범위에 기록된 자료만을 쓴다는 판단이다. 허용되지 않는 결론은, 판결문에 적힌 모든 사실에 기판력을 부여하는 것이거나, 없는 기록을 추정해 단계를 확정하는 것이다.
1.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Which part of a final and conclusive judgment bars renewed contest? This question takes concrete shape in the scene where, on the ground that ownership was written in the reasons of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery, it is asserted that the ownership determination has already been established in a new lawsuit. The task of distinguishing obvious clerical errors, unadjudicated claims, and dissatisfaction with determinations, and of confirming the relationship between an appeal against a rectification order and an appeal on the merits, leads to the work of defining the scope assigned to res judicata. This section examines whether that scope extends to preliminary issues and what kind of change overturns an existing adjudication.
The statutory wording corresponding to this question is Article 216 paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. That provision declares that "a final and conclusive judgment has res judicata only as to matters included in the dispositive part." Here the subject is the final and conclusive judgment, the object is what is included in the dispositive part, and the condition means that the determination must be included in the dispositive part. The reason the provision divides the dispositive part from the remaining parts is that not every sentence in a judgment document carries the same legal weight. Below, the discussion addresses not the other issues raised by the provision but only this limited distinction.
What connection is to be drawn between this wording and the conclusion of this section must be examined. Here the objective scope means the scope of determinations to which res judicata extends. This determination applies the distinction supplied by the wording of the preceding paragraph as it stands. In other words, matters falling within the dispositive part and preliminary issues are separated and adjudicated as distinct stages. A new adjudication outside the determined matter is the standard of the stage, and no new requirements or exceptions may be added to it.
That said, this distinction is not costless. If the determinations in the reasons are contested again, contradictory outcomes may arise. The counterargument is aimed at the stability and efficiency of the procedure, in that re-examining the same issue produces inconsistent judgments and repeated costs. Yet res judicata cannot be conferred on every fact written in the judgment document. The reason is that res judicata is limited to what is included in the dispositive part, and the stability the counterargument demands is protected only within that limit. A disadvantage remains. The determinations in the reasons may still be repeated, and that cost is borne by the subsequent action.
In the synthetic scenario, the preceding and subsequent complaints, the dispositive part and the reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion are designated as the records. The fact determined in the scenario is only that ownership was written in the reasons of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery; what the dispositive part of the judgment document took as its object is not confirmed. Where what the prior action determined as its dispositive part is not confirmed, this scenario alone cannot compare the objects of the prior and subsequent actions so as to divide the scope in which the subsequent action is bound by res judicata from the scope beyond it. Accordingly, the fact that ownership was written in the reasons remains in an undetermined state. Whether the condition established in the scenario holds—namely, that if what was dealt with in the prior action is confirmed to have been a preliminary issue rather than an object of the dispositive part, the res judicata assertion on that basis is withdrawn—also remains undetermined.
Accordingly, the conclusion permitted for this question is narrow. Beyond the principle that res judicata cannot be conferred on every fact written in the judgment document, a determination that would extend the scope of res judicata to ownership recognized in the reasons is not permitted. Adjudication proceeds only when the standard of a new adjudication outside the determined matter and the records comprising the preceding and subsequent complaints, the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion are both satisfied.
1.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The analysis up to the previous stage ended, leaving in place the task of distinguishing obvious clerical errors, unadjudicated claims, and dissatisfaction with determinations, and of confirming the relationship between an appeal against a rectification order and an appeal on the merits. The question remaining in this section is this: where plaintiff A asserts in a new lawsuit, on the ground that ownership was written in the reasons of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery, that the ownership determination has already become final, how far can the scope of that assertion be recognized? If the preceding section asked which part of a final and conclusive judgment bars renewed contest, the assertion that a determination written in the reasons bars the determination of the subsequent action is now treated separately among those questions. It is determined here which part of the record of a long judgment document is placed in a state where it can no longer be put in issue in a subsequent dispute.
The statutory provision corresponding to this question is Article 216 paragraph (1) of the Civil Procedure Act. Its wording states that a final and conclusive judgment has res judicata only as to matters included in the dispositive part (Civil Procedure Act Article 216). What is designated in this wording as having res judicata is the final and conclusive judgment, and the limited scope is set as what is included in the dispositive part. Thus, not the judgment document as a whole but the determinations entered in the dispositive part become the object that bars renewed contest. Here the dispositive part means the command belonging to the concluding part of the judgment, and res judicata means the effect by which an established determination cannot be contested again in a subsequent lawsuit. The provision limits only the objective scope of res judicata, that is, the scope of determinations to which res judicata extends, to what is included in the dispositive part, and it does not separately determine whether the facts or determinations written in the reasons fall within that scope as well.
Connecting this wording with the circumstances of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery, whether the ownership determination written in the reasons can be asserted as established in a subsequent action is divided first according to whether that determination was included in the dispositive part. The objective scope means the scope of determinations to which res judicata extends, and that scope is not the same thing as the factual narrative of the judgment document as a whole. The statutory provision limits the ground of res judicata to what is included in the dispositive part in order to distinguish the object of the established determination from the records outside that determination. If the dispositive part of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery settled the determination as to delivery and ownership was written together in its reasons, the author takes the view that the narrative in those reasons alone cannot be regarded as making the ownership determination in the subsequent action final. The finality spoken of here means a state in which the matter cannot be contested again in the subsequent action, and the scope of that state is limited to what is included in the dispositive part. The conclusion that res judicata cannot be conferred on every fact written in the judgment document follows from this distinction.
There remains the inconvenience that determinations on the same ownership diverge between the earlier and later lawsuits, and that the subsequent action deals again with circumstances already confirmed in the reasons of the earlier judgment, so that repeated costs grow. This inconvenience is real, and here lies the incentive to treat as established, as broadly as possible, the facts written in the judgment document. Even so, res judicata cannot be conferred on every fact written in the judgment document. So long as the provision limits the scope of res judicata to what is included in the dispositive part, the determinations written in the reasons cannot, by themselves, serve as the ground for barring the subsequent action. The way to reduce the risk of contradiction and repeated costs lies in judging by comparing a new adjudication outside the determined matter with the objects of the prior and subsequent actions, and if, on the basis of that comparison, the scope in which the subsequent action is bound by res judicata can be divided from the scope beyond it, then a new adjudication is opened within the divided scope.
Plaintiff A's assertion rests on the fact that ownership was written in the reasons of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery. What is confirmed in this scenario is only that what materials are to be used for comparing the preceding and subsequent complaints, the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion has been determined; what the dispositive part of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery actually took as the object of its determination is not confirmed. Where what the prior action determined as its dispositive part is not confirmed, the objective scope of that determination remains undetermined. The scenario alone cannot establish whether the description of ownership in the reasons was included in the dispositive part, or merely dealt with as a preliminary issue preceding the dispositive part. Since the facts, service, and results of performance of an actual case, or judgment outcomes absent from the synthetic scenario, have not been set, this section leaves only the boundary that it decides differently only where the confirmed conditions change.
What this section permits is the determination that the res judicata of a final and conclusive judgment is limited to what is included in the dispositive part and that the scope beyond it lies outside this effect. Accordingly, the conclusion that treats every fact written in the judgment document as established is not permitted. Nor does this erase the determinations in the reasons as though they were wholly without meaning, nor does it open the way even where a new determination conflicting with the object of the dispositive part of the prior action or with the scope of a statutory set-off determination is demanded. This paragraph does not itself establish what was included in the dispositive part of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery or what status the description of ownership in the reasons occupied, but leaves only the distinction within the confirmed scope.
1.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
On what basis is that separated? As received from the preceding section, on the premise that res judicata cannot be conferred on every fact written in the judgment document, the question arises which part of a final and conclusive judgment bars renewed contest. That separation is determined not by the narrative within the judgment document but by comparison with the claim refiled. This question lies in specifying how far the determinations that are the object of res judicata extend, that is, the objective scope.
As to this question, the Civil Procedure Act provides that "a final and conclusive judgment has res judicata only as to matters included in the dispositive part" (Civil Procedure Act Article 216, Article 216 paragraph (1)). This wording provides that what bears res judicata is the final and conclusive judgment, namely the court's final determination of the claim, and it limits what bars renewed contest to the determinations included in the dispositive part. The dispositive part means the portion indicating the court's final response to the claim, such as the grant or dismissal of the claim, and what is "included" therein means the matters of determination readable from the indication in the dispositive part.
For the same reason, the objective scope means the scope of determinations to which res judicata extends. The reason this scope must be set as what is included in the dispositive part is that the res judicata of a final and conclusive judgment has the strong effect of repelling the claim in a subsequent action. If the standard for specifying the object of that effect is not found in the dispositive part, the other records contained in the judgment document automatically become subject to the prohibition on re-examination. Separating the determination in the dispositive part from the narrative of the grounds leading to that determination is the stage-by-stage adjudication that divides how far this effect is recognized.
Yet the loss this determination aims at is not small. If the determinations in the reasons are contested again, contradictory outcomes arise on the same issue, and the repeated cost of re-examining the same facts is incurred. There also remains the anxiety that the same transaction may be judged twice in different ways. Nevertheless, res judicata cannot be conferred on every fact written in the judgment document. If even the factual narrative the court took as the ground of its determination were made to bar every determination in the subsequent action, the parties would lose the opportunity to contest it even though that narrative does not enter the object of the determination in the dispositive part.
What is to be contrasted with this assertion is what the dispositive part of the earlier judgment determined, and whether the ownership determination written in the reasons is included in the dispositive part. If, although the preceding and subsequent complaints and the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment have been compared, what the object of the dispositive part of the earlier judgment was is not confirmed, the scope of res judicata on that basis itself remains undetermined.
Accordingly, what a final and conclusive judgment bars as renewed contest is, in principle, limited to the determinations included in the dispositive part. To go beyond this and place the factual narrative of the entire judgment document under the same effect is a conclusion this section does not permit. Only the question of how the effect of the determinations written in the reasons is separately to be viewed lies outside this question.
1.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
At the place left after the preceding section drew the line between obvious clerical errors and unadjudicated claims and dissatisfaction with determinations, and confirmed the relationship between an appeal against a rectification order and an appeal on the merits, the question this stage has taken on is which determination of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery actually binds the next trial. To examine this assertion, one must first settle which part of the judgment document is the place of the determination that bars renewed contest.
The wording provides that a final and conclusive judgment has res judicata only as to matters included in the dispositive part (Civil Procedure Act Article 216). Here the dispositive part means the concluding part of the judgment document in which the court's final conclusion on the subject matter of suit is written, and res judicata means the general effect of a final and conclusive judgment by which its determination binds the parties and the court so that the same matter cannot be contested again. Accordingly, the subject designated by this wording is the final and conclusive judgment, the object is the determination included in the dispositive part, and the condition is the finality of the judgment. The same wording does not deal with factual narratives or evidence assessments outside this scope.
That wording limits the objective scope of res judicata, in other words, the scope of determinations to which res judicata extends, to what is included in the dispositive part. The reason supporting this limitation is that the reasons part of the judgment document contains both the process of argumentation and the findings of fact leading to the dispositive part. The description of ownership written in the reasons is not, by itself, a conclusion settling the party's claim, and the work of separating the determinations included in the dispositive part from the remaining narrative is itself the work of setting the objective scope. If the preceding paragraph settled what the statute takes as the object of the dispositive part, this paragraph explains why the wording outside that object cannot be bound with the same force. Without needing to add new requirements or create exceptions, the work of distinguishing the dispositive part from everything else is sufficient.
Even so, the counterargument that re-examining the same matter produces inconsistent judgments and repeated costs carries weight. It says that ownership was already settled in the reasons of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery, and that if this is examined again in the subsequent action, the two judgments will render conflicting determinations and the parties and the court will have to go through the same argumentation twice. Yet the fact that room remains to contest the determinations in the reasons again does not make the risks of contradiction and cost disappear, and this unfavorable aspect must be recorded as it stands. Even so, res judicata cannot be conferred on every fact written in the judgment document. The settled limitation that res judicata extends only to what is included in the dispositive part blocks the way of raising factual narratives generally to the status of established determinations on the ground of saving costs.
Among the facts appearing in the synthetic scenario, those bearing directly on this question are that ownership was written in the reasons of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery, and that plaintiff A invokes that description to assert in a new lawsuit that the ownership determination has become final. Contrasting these two facts with the limitation above, one cannot say that the mere circumstance that ownership was written in the reasons made that determination an object of the dispositive part bearing res judicata. However, what the dispositive part of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery took as the object of its determination, and whether that ownership was included in the determinations of the dispositive part or was dealt with only as a preliminary issue, cannot be confirmed from this scenario alone. The records, such as the preceding and subsequent complaints, the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertion, are matters that must be confirmed, and at the present stage they remain undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is the limitation that the objective scope of res judicata extends to the determinations included in the dispositive part, and the conclusion it does not permit is the interpretation that all the facts or determinations written in the reasons bind the subsequent action as they stand. This is why it is difficult to say, on the sole ground that ownership was written in the reasons of the foregoing judgment ordering delivery, that the determination became final and bars a new lawsuit.
1.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
The previous step carries over only the points that manifest clerical errors, unadjudicated claims, and dissatisfaction with the ruling must be distinguished, and that the relationship between an appeal from a rectification order and an appeal on the merits must be clarified. On that basis, the earlier question—asking which part of the final and conclusive judgment again bars relitigation—is left aside, and this time only the narrow question remains of how the relevant source-text language applies to a new adjudication outside the scope of what has been finalized. To evaluate this argument, one must consider together where in the judgment the determination is stated and the range of application that its language permits.
The relevant basis is paragraph (1) of Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act. Its language places "only with respect to matters included in the dispositive part" in order to limit the scope to which res judicata extends. Here the dispositive part is the portion of the judgment pronouncing its conclusion, and res judicata means the binding constraint by which the parties and the court may not again dispute matters already finalized. The subjects addressed by this limitation are the parties to the final and conclusive judgment, the condition is that the matter must be a determination included in the dispositive part, and the result is that relitigation is barred. Because this section deals only with paragraph (1) of Article 216, the requirements of the other paragraphs are not drawn in to broaden this language.
On the basis of this language, what may be used as the ground of decision in a new adjudication outside the scope of what has been finalized is only the language within the relevant source-text range, and it must not be extended to the reasons for the judgment or to other paragraphs. The reason is that the present determination is divided into two stages. First, one determines what of the prior judgment falls within the scope of what is finalized; then one determines on what basis a claim outside that scope is to be decided. If the first stage, which sets the objective scope—that is, the scope of the matters determined to which res judicata extends—is mixed with the second stage, which deals with matters outside that scope, even determinations not found in the dispositive part of the prior judgment could be treated as binding.
The inconvenience that follows from maintaining this distinction is clear. If facts already addressed in the reasons are tried again in a later lawsuit, differing determinations may emerge on the same matter, and the parties and the court must repeat the same trial. The counterargument that re-trying the same issue produces inconsistent judgments and duplicative costs aims at this point. Yet at the price of preventing that loss, res judicata cannot be conferred on every fact stated in the judgment. Since the language that grounds res judicata is limited to what is included in the dispositive part, the limitation cannot be exceeded and the effect of finality broadened on the ground of duplicative costs.
In the synthetic scene, all that is confirmed about plaintiff A is that ownership was recorded in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery; what the dispositive part of that earlier judgment took as the object of delivery has not been confirmed. Accordingly, one must compare the complaints of the prior and subsequent actions, the dispositive part and the reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertions, and distinguish the range by which the subsequent action is bound by res judicata from the range beyond it. Unless that comparison confirms the object of the dispositive part of the earlier judgment, the conclusion that the ownership determination has been finalized cannot be drawn in this scene. However, where a new determination is demanded that conflicts with the object of the dispositive part of the earlier judgment or with the scope of the statutory set-off determination, the adjudication in this new adjudication is barred.
Accordingly, in a new adjudication outside the scope of what has been finalized, it must be distinguished whether what can serve as the starting point of the decision is the statement of facts recorded in the reasons of the prior judgment or the limitation of the dispositive part set by the relevant source-text language. However confident the reasons of the prior judgment may be, that alone cannot make the claim of the subsequent action bound by finality. Nor is the prior judgment treated as devoid of all meaning merely because it was not included in the dispositive part. Only the narrow conclusion that the grounds of decision are limited to the range set by this language is permitted.
1.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
What remains is which part within the newly opened adjudication outside the scope of what has been finalized is to be separately divided and decided. This scene shows in advance that the answer differs according to what is recorded where in the judgment. Accordingly, among the descriptions of a long judgment, which of them again bars relitigation must be determined separately.
The statutory provision corresponding to this question is the phrase "only with respect to matters included in the dispositive part" in Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act. This language indicates that the subjects to which res judicata attaches are the parties to the final and conclusive judgment, and that the determination forming its object is a matter included in the dispositive part of the judgment. Only final determinations such as the granting or dismissal of the claim contained in the dispositive part fall here. Accordingly, findings of fact or legal evaluations not included in the dispositive part do not become objects of the res judicata prescribed by this paragraph. The other paragraphs of this Article and the requirements for finality are not dealt with here.
This language establishes that not all statements recorded in a judgment have the same effect. The objective scope means the scope of the matters determined to which res judicata extends, and here the matters determined are limited to those included in the dispositive part. The reason for dividing the scope of the dispositive part from the remaining portion of the reasons is that the former is finalized and again bars relitigation, while the latter is not an object of such an effect of finality. This distinction creates no separate new exception. The author's added evaluation is that this distinction operates as a stage for setting the scope of res judicata, and that recognizing the same effect for the entire judgment is inconsistent with this language.
The strongest counterargument aims at the point that re-trying the determination in the reasons may produce a conclusion inconsistent with the prior judgment. If a different determination is rendered on the same ownership issue in the subsequent action, the two judgments diverge, and the parties bear the cost of litigating the same question twice. The answer to this counterargument, however, is that res judicata cannot be conferred on every fact recorded in the judgment. That is, the aim of reducing inconsistency and duplicative costs cannot serve as grounds for extending the objects of res judicata beyond the dispositive part. This answer does not erase the disadvantage the counterargument points out; it only keeps the objective scope of res judicata bound within the limitation set by the language.
This scene is now compared with the conditions set out earlier. Looking at the complaints of the prior and subsequent actions and the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, for plaintiff A, the mere fact that ownership was recorded in the reasons of the judgment ordering delivery does not settle the range by which the subsequent action is bound by res judicata. If what the prior action determined in its dispositive part was the claim for delivery, that determination of delivery becomes the object of res judicata, and the description of ownership not included in the dispositive part does not itself become an object of the finalized determination. It is only that, from this scene alone, it cannot be confirmed what was included in the dispositive part of the prior action, and whether the ownership determination was itself the object of the dispositive part or merely a preliminary issue. The state in which it is not confirmed what the prior action determined as its dispositive part remains undetermined.
What is permitted in this section is a determination that, in accordance with the limitation that the res judicata of a final and conclusive judgment extends to what is included in the dispositive part, looks separately at the scope of the dispositive part and the parts beyond it. What is not permitted is the conclusion that, after conferring res judicata on every fact recorded in the judgment, blocks the new trial in the subsequent action in its entirety. A new determination demanded in conflict with the object of the dispositive part of the final and conclusive judgment in the prior action, or with the scope of the statutory set-off determination, is barred; where the objects of the prior and subsequent actions are compared and the bound range is distinguished from the range beyond it, it operates. No additional step beyond this distinction is inserted, and determinations outside the scope of what has been finalized may be dealt with anew in the remaining range.
1.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
The preceding stage carries forward the points up to distinguishing manifest clerical errors, unadjudicated claims, and dissatisfaction with the ruling, and confirming the relationship between an appeal from a rectification order and an appeal on the merits. To decide whether this argument can be accepted, one must examine separately the cases in which a new adjudication outside the scope of what has been finalized takes effect, the cases in which it is blocked, and the cases in which it remains undetermined. The determination one seeks to make begins with the work of comparing the objects of the claims in the two lawsuits against each other.
The statute limits the scope of res judicata of a final and conclusive judgment as follows. Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act provides: "①A final and conclusive judgment shall have res judicata only with respect to matters included in the dispositive part." Here, the dispositive part means the range in which the court's determination on the parties' claims is pronounced in the conclusion portion of the judgment. Accordingly, the subjects to which the effect of res judicata extends are the parties finalized by that dispositive part, the object is the matters determined included in the dispositive part, and the condition is that the judgment has become final and conclusive. The range indicated by the language is confined to what is included in this dispositive part, and this language does not say that the same effect extends to statements of fact recorded in other parts of the judgment.
This language is linked to the determination organized above. If ownership in the earlier judgment ordering delivery was recorded as a determination in the reasons, the scope of its own finality is determined according to whether or not it is included in the dispositive part. Only with this distinction can one compare the objects of the prior and subsequent actions and distinguish the range by which the subsequent action is bound by res judicata from the range beyond it. Without this distinction, if the entire judgment is bound together as one, the range by which the subsequent action is bound and the range by which it is not cannot be marked.
The strongest counterargument is aimed at the point that relitigating the determination in the reasons may produce inconsistent results. Re-trying the same issue produces inconsistent judgments and duplicative costs. If a new determination emerges that reverses what the earlier judgment already addressed, the two judgments diverge, and the cost of undergoing the same trial once more is also incurred. Even so, the conclusion stands. The language of the determination already finalized above confers res judicata only on what is included in the dispositive part, and the inconsistency and cost the counterargument points out cannot create an effect exceeding that language.
Returning to the facts revealed in the synthetic scene, the material advanced by plaintiff A is the single phrase of recognition of ownership recorded in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery. Whether that phrase was a determination included in the dispositive part of the earlier judgment, or a preliminary issue outside the dispositive part, cannot be settled from this scene alone. Where a new determination is demanded that conflicts with the object of the dispositive part of the final and conclusive judgment in the prior action, or with the scope of the statutory set-off determination, that new adjudication is blocked. Conversely, where the objects of the prior and subsequent actions are compared and the range by which the subsequent action is bound by res judicata is distinguished from the range beyond it, the new adjudication falling in the range beyond it takes effect. Where it is not confirmed what the prior action determined as its dispositive part, the matter remains undetermined.
The conclusion this section permits is limited to what is marked by dividing the effect, blocking, and undetermined status of a new adjudication into these three items. The conclusion not permitted here is to regard every fact recorded in the judgment as finalized and to assert categorically that a separate claim is bound by those facts alone. While it remains unconfirmed what the prior action determined as its dispositive part, the outcome cannot be decided.
1.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
What must first be settled in this scene is whether the determination recorded in the reasons concerns the same object as the determination in the dispositive part, and what range each of the two determinations draws in. Since the length of a long judgment does not itself mean the size of res judicata, the question of which part again bars relitigation leads to the task of examining the boundaries of the object determined rather than the outward form of the judgment.
The language given for this question is taken from Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act, paragraph (1) of which sets the limits of res judicata as follows: "A final and conclusive judgment shall have res judicata only with respect to matters included in the dispositive part." This language limits the subjects and objects to which res judicata extends not to all determinations recorded in the judgment but to those included in the dispositive part. The dispositive part is the court's final response to the parties' claims, and res judicata means the power that, only with respect to matters belonging to that response, prevents them from being disputed again in a subsequent action. Accordingly, read as the language stands, the starting point of res judicata differs according to whether the determination is located in the reasons or in the dispositive part.
The link connecting this language to the conclusion set out above is the objective scope of res judicata. This scope does not widen with the plaintiff's assertions or the quantity of statements of fact recorded in the judgment, but is determined by what the finalized object is. The reason is that res judicata is at once an institution designed to bring a dispute to an end at once and an institution designed not to bar claims outside the scope of what has been finalized. It is also for this reason that one must distinguish the case of re-trying the determination of the prior action from the case of separately trying a range different from that determination.
The counterargument that relitigating the determination in the reasons may produce inconsistent results aims at this distinction. Re-trying the same issue may produce inconsistent judgments and duplicative costs, a loss that is difficult for both the court and the parties to bear. If all statements of fact recorded in the judgment are tied together as finalized objects, what has been finalized and what has not are bundled together, and even the range that may be called unadjudicated claims is closed off. The inconsistency and cost the counterargument points out are real, but no basis holds that the way to remove that price must be to broaden the objective scope of res judicata.
What is confirmed solely from the facts contained in this scene is that ownership was recorded in the reasons of the earlier judgment ordering delivery, and that plaintiff A asserts that determination as finalized in the new lawsuit as well. The complaints of the prior and subsequent actions, the dispositive part and reasons of the final and conclusive judgment, and the scope of the set-off assertions are designated as verification materials, but their content itself has not yet been confirmed. In this state, where it is not confirmed what the prior action determined as its dispositive part, the status of the ownership recorded in the reasons cannot be asserted categorically as finalized. However, one condition is clear: if it is confirmed that what the prior action addressed was not the object of the dispositive part but a preliminary issue, the claim to res judicata as to it is withdrawn.
What this section permits is limited to placing the objective scope of res judicata as the scope of the matters determined, and distinguishing the finalized within that scope from the undetermined outside it. What it does not permit is bundling every fact recorded in the judgment as finalized, or treating the determination recorded in the reasons as identical to the determination in the dispositive part. Only determinations that do not cross this boundary proceed to the next analysis, and facts and results beyond that scope remain undetermined. Accordingly, whether antecedent legal relationships—such as ownership recognized in the reasons for the judgment—bind the subsequent action becomes the central issue in the next stage.