Summary
Even a person who is not the direct addressee may raise the issue of standing to sue if an interest protected by law is infringed.
2.1The Standard by Which the Path Opens
Resident A, who is not the direct addressee of the disposition, seeks to challenge the disposition of Administrative Agency B on the ground that his or her interests in daily life are infringed. A disposition directed at another person may also affect one's own rights. Since it was earlier decided to distinguish the legal interest in seeking revocation from the magnitude of harm or the intensity of dissatisfaction, the analysis now examines whether that interest can also be recognized in a person other than the addressee of the disposition. The first question is the criterion by which the entrance to this remedy opens from the place where A stands.
Supreme Court Decision 2018Du47189 decided August 30, 2019 sets out the criterion for plaintiff standing in Summary of Decision [1] as follows: "In an action for revocation of an administrative disposition, plaintiff standing is determined not by whether one is the addressee of the disposition but by whether one has a legal interest in seeking its revocation. The legal interest referred to here means a direct and concrete interest protected by the law underlying the disposition, and does not include cases involving only an indirect or a factual or economic interest." This passage is confirmed within the scope of the Holdings and the Summary of Decision, and the detailed facts stated in the reasons for the judgment are not drawn into it.
Reading this passage together with the preceding distinction clarifies the order of decision. First one asks whether there is a legal interest in seeking revocation, and then distinguishes whether that interest is direct and concrete and protected by the law underlying the disposition. Third-party plaintiff standing means legal interest in maintaining an action based on a protected interest of a person other than the addressee of the disposition; whether one is an addressee and whether a protected interest exists are different stages of decision. The present stage, however, opens its entrance only when the requirements for application and the like according to the type of action are also satisfied together, and when the demanded relief, parties, and conditions are particularized in the claim and the right of the chosen action can be defended.
If this criterion is set broadly, the counterargument that the stability of administration is shaken presses from behind. The worry is that people with entangled interests will line up and attach themselves, imposing unpredictable burdens on the party awaiting finality of the disposition, and that the relations surrounding the administrative disposition will become more complex. That worry points to real inconvenience and must not be erased. Even so, plaintiff standing cannot be denied on the sole ground that one is not the addressee of the disposition out of that concern alone; the answer is given by drawing the boundary with the directness and concreteness of the protected interest.
Returning to the synthetic scene, A is not the direct addressee who seeks to challenge the disposition of Administrative Agency B, and claims that his or her interests in daily life are infringed. On this fact alone it cannot be determined whether A's interest is a direct and concrete interest protected by the law underlying the disposition. What the protective statute is and what effect the disposition has on A, whether A's status falls within that scope of protection, and whether an interest remains to be recovered even after the effect of the disposition has lapsed are matters to be confirmed on the records. Accordingly, no conclusion can be fixed from this scene, and unconfirmed connections remain undetermined.
Even so, one thing is clear: plaintiff standing must not be denied merely because one is not the addressee of the disposition. At the same time, at the opposite end, a general and indirect interest in the public interest alone does not create a legal interest. Between these two boundaries, when one seeks the legally protected interest recoverable through revocation of disposition (administrative act) and confirmation of the relevant disposition and confirms together the requirements for each type of lawsuit, the passage to this remedy opens.
2.2The Conditions That Block Relief
Resident A, though not a direct addressee, seeks to bring a lawsuit on the ground that the disposition of Administrative Agency B infringes his or her interests in daily life, proceeding on the premise that the legal interest in seeking revocation is distinguished from the magnitude of harm or the intensity of dissatisfaction. In the preceding stage, the legal interest in seeking revocation was distinguished from the magnitude of harm or the intensity of dissatisfaction. The analysis now narrows its focus to the question of the conditions under which the passage to relief closes, namely whether one cannot bring a lawsuit unless one is the addressee of the disposition. This is the point at which third-party plaintiff standing, that is, legal interest in maintaining an action based on a protected interest of a person other than the addressee of the disposition, is at issue.
The source passage corresponding to this question is as follows. Supreme Court Decision 2018Du47189 decided August 30, 2019 declares: "[1] In an action for revocation of an administrative disposition, plaintiff standing is determined not by whether one is the addressee of the disposition but by whether one has a legal interest in seeking its revocation." According to this, the subject spoken of in this passage is a person asserting a legal interest irrespective of whether he or she is the addressee of the disposition; the act is seeking revocation of that disposition; and the condition is whether there is a legal interest in seeking that revocation. What is settled here is only that, on the wording, status as an addressee itself is not the criterion of plaintiff standing.
The same passage continues: "the legal interest referred to here means a direct and concrete interest protected by the law underlying the disposition, and does not include cases amounting to no more than an indirect or a factual or economic interest" (Supreme Court Decision 2018Du47189 decided August 30, 2019). This basis connects to the preceding conclusion. The reason addressee status and protected interest must be viewed separately is that, if the former is taken as the criterion, the presence or absence of legal interest in maintaining an action appears to be settled at once, whereas only if the latter is taken as the criterion can one confirm what interest will be recovered by that revocation. Accordingly, where there is only a general and indirect interest in the public interest and no individually protected legal interest is recognized, if any one of the statutory requirements is not met, the passage to relief closes. No new requirements or exceptions are attached here.
The counterargument that attaches most strongly to this conclusion comes from those concerned for the stability of administration. As indirect interested parties increase, already final dispositions may be toppled belatedly, or Administrative Agency B may have to defend the same disposition against several persons, so the effectiveness of the disposition is shaken. That inconvenience is not small. But the loss on the other side must be placed alongside it. If the legal interest is taken too narrowly, the more widely the harm has spread, the more it produces a state in which no one can challenge it. The author's answer is clear. Plaintiff standing cannot be denied merely because one is not the direct addressee. But a mere interest without a protected interest does not open the passage either.
The discussion returns to the synthetic scene. Resident A seeks to bring a lawsuit on the ground that the disposition of Administrative Agency B infringes his or her interests in daily life. In the scene, the year, amount, starting date, and outcome of the judgment are not fixed. What can be compared with the preceding conditions are only two points: the fact that A is not the direct addressee of the disposition, and the fact that A claims infringement of his or her interests in daily life. Nor does the scene contain records from which the protective statute, the effect of the disposition, the applicant's status, and the interest to be recovered after the lapse of the effect could be confirmed. Accordingly, the connection between the harm and the objects protected by the underlying law is not confirmed by this scene alone, so A's plaintiff standing remains undetermined. The scene only shows the range of application of the passage; it does not decide victory or defeat.
What is fixed in this section is narrow. Plaintiff standing is not denied by the sole fact that one is not the addressee of the disposition; and where there is only a general and indirect interest in the public interest and no individually protected legal interest, the passage to this remedy closes. Beyond this range, whether A will prevail, or how much interest can be recovered, is not settled here. However, if a legal interest to be recovered remains even after the effect of the disposition has ended, legal interest in maintaining an action (interest in filing action) is not denied on the mere passage of time.
2.3The Boundary That Remains When There Is No Data
The disposition of Administrative Agency B is directed at another person, yet Resident A regards that disposition as infringing his or her interests in daily life and seeks to challenge it. From this scene alone, however, one can only know whether A is the direct addressee of the disposition; it is not yet made clear which law protects those interests in daily life.
Supreme Court Decision 2018Du47189 decided August 30, 2019 presents the criterion passage for this question. Summary of Decision [1] of that judgment states: "In an action for revocation of an administrative disposition, plaintiff standing is determined not by whether one is the addressee of the disposition but by whether one has a legal interest in seeking its revocation." The subject spoken of here is the person seeking to bring an action for revocation; the act judged is that he or she seeks that revocation; and the condition is the existence of a legal interest. This passage places the criterion for judging plaintiff standing not on the status of addressee but on the presence or absence of a protected interest.
The point at which this criterion and the conclusion of this section connect lies in the stages of decision being different. The first stage distinguishes whether one is an addressee from the presence or absence of a legal interest; the second stage asks whether the materials to check that the interest is protected are in place. The preceding section had already distinguished the legal interest from the magnitude of harm or the intensity of dissatisfaction. When one reaches a boundary that cannot be fixed because the materials are lacking, matters for which the connection between the harm and the objects protected by the statute is unconfirmed are ones where the materials of decision are not particularized; they are not declared impossible but left undetermined. Undetermined is a state that leaves room for the materials to check to be filled in, whereas impossible is a judgment that the interest was not protected in the first place.
The strongest counterargument aims elsewhere. As indirect interested parties increase, the stability of administration is weakened. If too many people drag in one disposition of Administrative Agency B to challenge it, the effect of administration is shaken, and that burden is borne together by the direct addressee of the disposition and everyone else. In addition, if the legal interest is read narrowly, the more widely the harm has spread, the more no one can challenge it, producing the disadvantage that though the harm is large the way to challenge is blocked. These two losses must be seen together. Leaving in place the disadvantage to which the counterargument points, a return to the proposition that the status of addressee is the criterion of decision is not permitted.
Taking out from the synthetic scene only the facts relevant to this question: A is not the direct addressee of the disposition and claims that his or her interests in daily life are infringed, and as the records for that judgment, the protective statute, the effect of the disposition, the applicant's status, and the interest to be recovered after the lapse of the effect are designated. The scene, however, does not tell which law takes those interests in daily life as an object of protection, or of what magnitude the effect of the disposition on A's life is. Neither the protective statute nor the effect of the disposition has ever been confirmed as a fact of this scene. Accordingly, the connection between the harm and the objects protected by the statute is unconfirmed, and this matter remains undetermined. Even if the parts that cannot be adjudicated from the scene are left unfixed, the conclusion of this section does not change.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. A's plaintiff standing is not negated outright by the sole circumstance of not being the direct addressee of the disposition; rather, whether he or she has a legal interest in seeking that revocation becomes the criterion of decision. Distinguished from this, pressing matters that cannot be fixed for lack of materials into the category of impossibility is a conclusion this section does not permit. Until the connection left in an unverified state is filled in with materials to check, impossibility and undetermined must be kept apart. Conversely, it is also a conclusion this section does not permit to assert that a connection not yet confirmed actually denotes a protected interest.
2.4The Records Needed for Determination
The stage is adjudicated solely on the materials recorded in the records concerning the protective statute, the effect of the disposition, the applicant's status, and whether an interest remains to be recovered after the lapse of the effect of the disposition. Stage adjudication is done only on the fixed records. Missing Records are not filled in by inference. Can one not bring a lawsuit unless one is the addressee of the disposition? At this place and time, on the premise of the question as so received, the question is what must be recorded in order to judge whether Resident A, who is not the direct addressee of a disposition and seeks to challenge the disposition of Administrative Agency B on the ground that his or her interests in daily life are infringed, is qualified to stand as plaintiff. (Supreme Court Decision 2018Du47189 decided August 30, 2019)
The source passage corresponding to this question lies in Summary of Decision [1] of Supreme Court Decision 2018Du47189 decided August 30, 2019. That passage draws the line: "In an action for revocation of an administrative disposition, plaintiff standing is determined not by whether one is the addressee of the disposition but by whether one has a legal interest in seeking its revocation." and then clarifies that the legal interest referred to means a direct and concrete interest protected by the law underlying the disposition, and that cases amounting to no more than an indirect or a factual or economic interest are not included. The subject this passage fixes is the claimant seeking revocation; the act it denotes is the judgment of plaintiff standing; and the condition is the existence of a direct and concrete interest protected by the underlying law.
The Records are materials concerning the protective statute, the effect the disposition has, the applicant's status, and whether an interest remains to be recovered even after the effect of the disposition has lapsed. Here two things must be viewed separately. One is whether one is the direct addressee of the disposition; the other is whether one has a legal interest in seeking its revocation. Since the passage of the precedent fixes that the latter, not the former, is the criterion, the records asking about addressee status and the records asking about the protected interest must not be mixed. What is confirmed in the latter records is a fact reaching the definition of legal interest; with the former records alone the stage cannot be passed.
The inconvenience this criterion targets deserves to be noted separately. The wider the ripple of the disposition, the more the number of interested parties grows, and it may amount to opening an action that shakes the stability of the administrative disposition in each case. The demand to prevent the increase of indirect interested parties is substantial. Even so, the conclusion remains at its fixed place. It is not an answer given by erasing the value of stability that the counterargument speaks of. However, given that the criterion of plaintiff standing is placed not on the status of addressee but on the protected interest, the point that addressee status is not decisive remains as it is.
Returning to the synthetic scene: Resident A is not the direct addressee of the disposition yet claims that his or her interests in daily life are infringed, and what he or she seeks to challenge is the disposition of Administrative Agency B. On this fact alone it cannot be said that a legal interest to be recovered has been confirmed. What must be confirmed is what the protective statute takes as its object of protection, what effect that disposition has on A's interest, what A's status is, and whether any interest remains even after the effect of the disposition has ended. If the connection among these is not confirmed, it is left undetermined. Matters the scene cannot adjudicate are not filled in by inference.
The boundary this section closes is as follows. Since the legal interest in seeking revocation differs from the magnitude of harm or the intensity of dissatisfaction, the ground distinguishing that difference must lie in the fixed records. To erect missing records by inference is to let the stage adjudication slip through, and thereby to reach a conclusion this section does not permit. Blocking the claim merely because one is not the direct addressee is rejected in the same way. What remains is the attitude of viewing each stage on the records alone. Does a deep interest in the public interest create a legal interest?
2.5Circumstances That Change the Decision
Having distinguished, in the preceding step, the legal interest for which revocation is sought from the magnitude of harm or the intensity of dissatisfaction, the present step asks whether that distinction operates in the same way for persons other than the direct counterparty of the disposition. At this point, whether A may come forward in a lawsuit cannot be answered by asking whether A is the counterparty of the disposition. Rather, the judgment turns on whether A's interest is an interest protected by the statute underlying that disposition, and whether that interest is direct and concrete. In the same vein as the preceding step, which took the magnitude of harm and the intensity of dissatisfaction as its criterion, here too it is the nature of the protected interest, and not a given status or relationship, that determines eligibility.
The relevant source text on this question is stated clearly. [1] In an action for revocation of an administrative disposition, standing as plaintiff is determined not by whether one is the counterparty of the disposition in question but by whether one has a legal interest in seeking its revocation. This language shifts the criterion for standing as plaintiff from counterparty status to the existence of a legal interest. The subject to which the language points is a third party who is not the direct counterparty of the disposition, and the required act is the filing of an action seeking revocation of that disposition. The conditions are twofold. First, the interest must be protected by the statute underlying the disposition in question; and second, that interest must be direct and concrete. Cases limited to an indirect interest, or consisting merely of factual or economic interests, fall outside the protection of this language.
Why is this distinction of conditions necessary? If legal interests and factual interests are not separated, the result is that everyone affected by a disposition is sent into litigation; and if the line is drawn in the opposite direction, the more widely dispersed the harm, the less able anyone will be to contest it. Between these two extremes, the criterion of a direct and concrete protected interest creates a boundary. This criterion is a step distinct from counterparty status. The fact of not being a counterparty does not itself strip away eligibility, nor does it follow automatically that, because one is not a counterparty, the interest one holds becomes a merely factual interest. The conclusion of this section preserves this distinction. Standing as plaintiff cannot be denied on the sole ground that one is not the direct counterparty of the disposition; instead, one examines whether the interest is protected by the underlying statute and is direct and concrete. It is also noted here at once that confirming a protected interest is not the same as confirming success in the suit. The qualification to demand administrative relief as plaintiff is recognized where there exists a legally protected interest that can be restored through revocation or confirmation of the disposition in question and where requirements such as the filing of application under each type of lawsuit are also satisfied, and that determination remains confined to the question of eligibility.
It should be made clear what inconvenience this criterion creates on the other side. The counterargument that, as indirect interested parties multiply, the stability of administration is weakened is a substantive concern. The effects of each disposition spread outward to its surroundings, and if everyone within that spread were able to go to court, the effects of administration already carried out would be unsettled for a time, and a burden would arise from third parties, unanticipated when the authorities determined the counterparty, intruding. To preserve the answer of this section without erasing that disadvantage, it is more accurate to specify concretely the scope at which the counterargument is aimed. What is of concern here is the case limited to general and indirect public-interest concern. Where no individually protected legal interest is recognized, no qualification to demand administrative relief as plaintiff arises, and this operates as a device that protects the stability of administration. Yet if that boundary is shifted to counterparty status itself, it would also bar cases in which the effect of the disposition directly moves the victim's interests of daily life. Hence the answer stands that standing as plaintiff cannot be denied on the sole ground that one is not the direct counterparty.
The portions of the question reachable on the facts appearing in the synthetic scene are compared here. Resident A is not the direct counterparty of the disposition, and seeks to contest the disposition of administrative agency B on the ground that A's interests of daily life, which are direct and concrete and protected by the statute underlying the disposition, have been infringed. The facts confirmed in this scene are only these; values such as the year, the amount, or the commencement date are not fixed. The conditions to be compared are two: whether A's interest is an interest protected by the statute underlying the disposition, and whether that interest is direct and concrete. If these two conditions are confirmed, the fact that A is not the counterparty does not become an excluding factor in the eligibility determination; if they are not, no eligibility arises on the ground that the interest is limited to general and indirect concern. Meanwhile, if it is confirmed that a legally protected interest that can be restored remains even after the effect of the disposition has ended, legal interest in maintaining an action (interest in filing action) is not denied by the mere lapse of time. However, because the scene does not fix what that interest to be restored is, this item remains undetermined.
This section distinguishes the conclusions it permits from those it does not. What is permitted is the judgment that a person other than the direct counterparty of a disposition may also raise the issue of standing as plaintiff when a direct and concrete interest protected by the statute underlying the disposition is infringed. This judgment determines eligibility by the nature of the protected interest rather than by counterparty status, and at the same time carries the boundary that no eligibility arises where there is only general and indirect public-interest concern. What is not permitted is the conclusion denying standing as plaintiff on the single fact of not being a counterparty. Further, since this section deals only with the establishment of standing as plaintiff, it does not say that, once eligibility is recognized, the revocation or confirmation of the disposition is immediately finalized or the recovery is accomplished. If it is confirmed that a legally protected interest that can be restored remains, the prior judgment must be reexamined, and this is bound up with the confirmation of the same conditions.
2.6The Strongest Counterargument and the Answer
The distinction secured before the question of whether one cannot sue unless one is the counterparty of the disposition was that the legal interest for which revocation is sought is examined apart from the magnitude of harm or the intensity of dissatisfaction. The problem now is how widely the standing as plaintiff of third parties should be left open in the face of the counterargument that, as indirect interested parties multiply, the stability of administration is weakened. In this scene, the remaining issue is whether 'not being the direct counterparty' alone can be advanced as the ground barring A's qualification to sue.
The relevant source text states the criterion for this question as follows. "[1] In an action for revocation of an administrative disposition, standing as plaintiff is determined not by whether one is the counterparty of the disposition in question but by whether one has a legal interest in seeking its revocation." (Supreme Court Decision 2018Du47189 decided August 30, 2019) This language places the subject of the determination of standing as plaintiff on 'the legal interest in seeking its revocation,' and does not take the status of counterparty of the disposition itself as the criterion. That is, what the language points to is the conjunction of the person seeking revocation and the interest that person seeks to restore, not the list of counterparties recorded in the disposition document. Therefore, the fact of 'whether A is the counterparty of B's disposition' alone does not determine the existence of qualification to sue.
Connecting the language above with the conclusion of this section reveals that, in the determination of standing as plaintiff, counterparty status and legal interest are different steps. The former indicates whom the form of the disposition targeted; the latter asks whether the interest restored by revocation of that disposition is a direct and concrete one protected by the underlying statute. The two must be distinguished. For if the fact of not being a counterparty already stood in for the latter judgment, the need separately to confirm the existence of a protected interest would disappear. However, this conclusion does not stand apart from the premise that a protected interest exists.
The strongest counterargument aims at the loss of stability. The more people feel an interest in a disposition, the wider the range of counterparties in the action for revocation becomes, and the harder it becomes to predict when the disposition of administrative agency B will be contested. That inconvenience leads to the cost of rebuilding regulations or plans already enforced, the trouble of reversing effects already carried out, and the burden of having to bear multiple lawsuits over the same disposition. The counterargument also points out that, if legal interest is narrowed, the more widely dispersed the harm, the less able anyone will be to contest it. Yet one cannot answer while erasing those adverse aspects. For if the demand of the counterargument is accepted as written, stability increases at the price of closing the door of relief to persons whose protected interests have been infringed. Even viewing this loss together with the rest, standing as plaintiff cannot be denied on the sole ground that one is not the direct counterparty.
What can be confirmed from the synthetic scene is limited. A is not the direct counterparty of the disposition and seeks to contest B's disposition on the ground that A's own interests of daily life are infringed. Compared with the foregoing conditions, this scene alone does not determine whether the interest A seeks to contest is a direct and concrete interest protected by the statute underlying B's disposition, or is limited to an indirect or merely factual or economic interest. What must be confirmed is the protective statute, the effect of the disposition, the applicant's status, and the interest to be restored after the effects lapse. Accordingly, whether A's eligibility is recognized remains undetermined. Yet undetermined does not mean relief is impossible, and the conclusion cannot be hastened by filling in unconfirmed connections.
The conclusion this section permits is narrow. Its boundary is that it does not deny standing as plaintiff on the single fact of lying outside the counterparty of the disposition, and that it understands a third party's standing as plaintiff as a qualification to sue founded on a protected interest outside the counterparty of the disposition. Conversely, where one has only general and indirect public-interest concern and no individually protected legal interest is confirmed, that qualification is not recognized. The satisfaction of other requirements or actual recovery results lie outside the scope of this section.
2.7The Link to the Application and the Dispositive Part
Yet can one not sue unless one is the counterparty of the disposition? Since the preceding section adopted the premise that standing as plaintiff cannot be denied on the sole ground that one is not the direct counterparty, the next step is to examine that premise as it stands. The third party's standing as plaintiff dealt with in this question means a qualification to sue founded on a protected interest outside the counterparty of the disposition. This section sets out what serves as the criterion when determining the eligibility of a person who is not the counterparty of the disposition.
Summary of Decision [1] of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court Decision 2018Du47189 decided August 30, 2019) states: "In an action for revocation of an administrative disposition, standing as plaintiff is determined not by whether one is the counterparty of the disposition in question but by whether one has a legal interest in seeking its revocation. The legal interest referred to here means a direct and concrete interest protected by the statute underlying the disposition in question, and does not include cases of merely indirect or factual or economic interests." This language takes as its subject a person seeking to become the plaintiff of an action for revocation, as its act the seeking of revocation of that disposition, and as its condition the infringement of a direct and concrete interest protected by the underlying statute. In place of the status of counterparty, the protected interest is set in the seat of judgment.
The criterion fixed in that language is not the work of first screening counterparty status at the threshold of the question. Herein lies the reason why the determination of standing as plaintiff must be read in two stages. A third party's standing as plaintiff is a qualification to sue founded on a protected interest outside the counterparty of the disposition; therefore, the circumstance of not being a counterparty does not conclude the matter in itself, and whether an interest directly and concretely protected by the underlying statute has been infringed occupies the next place. Thus the fact that A is a resident outside the counterparty does not immediately put standing as plaintiff in issue; rather, the existence of a legal interest in seeking revocation is put in issue.
The counterargument that, as indirect interested parties multiply, the stability of administration is weakened contains the concern that broadly opened qualifications to sue may shake again the relations created by a disposition and loosen the order that administration has held in place. That inconvenience must not be erased. Even so, the loss left by the same criterion is greater. If legal interest is narrowed, the more widely dispersed the harm, the less able anyone will be to contest it. Therefore, against this counterargument as well, the answer stands that standing as plaintiff cannot be denied on the sole ground that one is not the direct counterparty. Stability is a matter to be adjusted together with the work of defining the scope of individually protected interests, and not a ground for closing the door in advance on counterparty status alone.
The facts confirmed in the synthetic scene are that A is not the party who directly received B's disposition, and that A seeks to contest it on the ground that A's own interests of daily life are infringed. Measured against the foregoing conditions, the circumstance of not being the direct counterparty of the disposition alone does not yet determine A's standing as plaintiff. Where there is a legally protected interest in seeking revocation and requirements such as the filing of application under each type of lawsuit are also satisfied, the qualification to demand administrative relief as plaintiff may be at issue. However, because it has not been confirmed what among the protective statute, the effect of the disposition, the applicant's status, and the interest to be restored after the effects lapse is connected and how, the matter remains undetermined. The scene alone does not permit a determination.
The conclusion this section permits remains within the range that standing as plaintiff cannot be denied on the sole ground that one is not the direct counterparty, and that standing as plaintiff may be at issue where a legally protected interest is infringed. Conversely, it does not say that qualifications to sue are open even in cases of only general and indirect public-interest concern where no individually protected legal interest is recognized. That determination, however, is referred to a separate discussion later, and this section concludes here.
2.8The Scope This Section Undertakes
취소를 구할 법률상 이익은 피해의 크기나 불만의 강도와 구별된다는 점을 전제로 한다. 처분 상대방이 아니면 소송할 수 없는가, 지금 이 물음에서 판정해야 할 것은 B의 처분을 받은 당사자인지 여부가 아니라 A가 그 처분의 취소를 구할 수 있는 자격을 갖추는지이다.
이 물음에 답하는 문언을 대법원 2019. 8. 30. 선고 2018두47189 판결이 놓았다. 그 판결요지는 "행정처분에 대한 취소소송에서 원고적격은 해당 처분의 상대방인지 여부가 아니라 그 취소를 구할 법률상 이익이 있는지 여부에 따라 결정된다"고 선을 그었다. 여기서 원고적격이란 취소소송을 원고로 제기하여 다툴 수 있는 소송상 지위를 뜻하고, 판단의 준거는 처분 상대방이라는 외형적 지위가 아니라 그 처분의 취소를 구할 법률상 이익의 유무이다. 처분 상대방인지 여부는 이 판단의 출발점이 될 뿐 결론을 대신하지 않는다.
같은 판결요지는 법률상 이익의 내용도 함께 특정하였다. "여기에서 말하는 법률상 이익이란 해당 처분의 근거 법률로 보호되는 직접적이고 구체적인 이익을 가리키고, 간접적이거나 사실적·경제적 이해관계를 가지는 데 불과한 경우는 포함되지 않는다"는 문언이 바로 그것이다. 이 구절에서 두 가지 판단 단계가 갈린다. 첫째, 처분 상대방이 아닌지도 묻지 않은 채로 곧바로 소송 자격을 부정할 수 없다는 소송 자격의 판단 기준이 있고, 둘째 그 자격을 인정할지는 근거 법률의 보호 대상에 속하는 직접적이고 구체적인 이익인지에 따라 갈린다. 이 둘은 섞을 수 없다. 전자가 후자의 심사를 시작할 문을 열어 주는 것이지 후자의 요건을 완화해 주는 것은 아니기 때문이다. 제삼자의 원고적격은 이 두 단계가 함께 놓일 때, 처분 상대방 밖의 보호 이익에 기초한 소송 자격으로 정의된다.
그럼에도 이 판단 기준을 넓히는 데서 오는 불편은 지우기 어렵다. 간접 이해관계자가 늘면 행정의 안정성이 약해진다는 우려가 그대로 남는다. 한 건의 처분에 이해관계를 주장하는 사람이 여럿으로 늘어나면, 그 처분으로 정리된 법률관계가 다시 흔들리고 처분을 한 행정청 B의 후속 조치도 기다려야 한다. 처분 상대방에게만 소송 자격을 허용하면 이러한 불편을 피할 수 있다는 점에서, 이 반론은 진정한 대가를 지적한다. 이 답은 반론의 비용을 없애는 대신 그 비용을 법문이 요구하는 보호 이익의 확인이라는 관문으로 되돌린다. 일반적·간접적 공익 관심만으로는 그 관문을 넘지 못하므로, 안정성에 대한 우려는 문언이 정한 요건에서 그 한계를 찾는다.
이 대조를 합성 장면에 놓고 보면, 주민 A는 B의 처분을 받은 상대방이 아니므로 상대방의 지위로는 원고적격을 세울 수 없다. 다만 A는 자기 생활상 이익의 침해를 주장하므로, 그 침해된 이익이 B의 처분 근거 법률로 보호되는 직접적이고 구체적인 이익에 해당하는지가 다음 확인 대상이 된다. 기록으로 살펴야 할 것은 보호 법규, 처분의 영향, 신청자 지위, 그리고 효과 소멸 뒤 회복할 이익이다. 단 장면에는 연도·금액·기산일이 설정되지 않았고, 처분의 근거 법률이 무엇인지, 그 법률이 A의 이익을 보호 대상으로 삼는지도 확인되지 않았다. 따라서 이 장면만으로 A의 원고적격을 인정하거나 배척할 수는 없으며, 판정은 미확정으로 남는다.
정리하면 이 절이 허용하는 것은 처분 상대방이 아니라는 사정만으로 소송 자격을 미리 잘라 내지 않는 것이고, 허용하지 않는 것은 그 사정만으로 곧바로 원고적격을 인정하는 것이다. A의 생활상 이익이 침해되었다는 호소만으로는 부족하고, 그 이익이 근거 법률의 보호를 받는 직접적이고 구체적인 이익인지에 따라 갈린다. 그 확인이 끝나지 않은 지금, A의 자격을 논하기 위한 문은 열려 있으되 판단은 유보된다.
2.9Application of the Text of the Provisions and the Holdings of Precedents
취소를 구할 법률상 이익은 피해의 크기나 불만의 강도와 구별된다. 이 장면에서 A의 소송 자격을 정하는 데 쓸 판정 근거의 범위가 문제다. 즉 원고로 행정구제를 요구할 자격을 판단할 때 어느 문언까지를 근거로 삼을 수 있는지가 문제이다.
해당 원문은 대법원 2019. 8. 30. 선고 2018두47189 판결요지 [1]이다. 그 문언은 "행정처분에 대한 취소소송에서 원고적격은 해당 처분의 상대방인지 여부가 아니라 그 취소를 구할 법률상 이익이 있는지 여부에 따라 결정된다"고 정한다. 여기서 주체는 취소소송의 원고가 되려는 사람이고, 행위는 그 처분의 취소를 구하는 청구이며, 조건은 그 처분의 근거 법률로 보호되는 직접적이고 구체적인 이익을 가지는 것이다. 같은 문언은 간접적이거나 사실적·경제적 이해관계만 가진 경우가 그 이익에 포함되지 않음을 함께 밝힌다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론을 잇는 줄은 판정 근거의 범위다. 해당 원문 문언만을 원고적격의 판정 근거로 쓰고, 그 범위 안의 문언만을 적용한다. 따라서 판결이유와 다른 항으로 판단을 넓히지 않는다. 이 구별은 법률상 이익과 피해의 크기나 불만의 강도를 나누는 앞의 단계와 같은 맥락에 있다. 피해를 크게 느끼는지와 그 이익이 근거 법률로 보호되는지는 서로 다른 물음이므로, 앞 단계의 구별은 뒤 단계의 문언 적용에서 흔들리지 않는다.
한편 가장 강한 반론은 행정의 안정성이다. 간접 이해관계자가 늘어날수록 처분마다 다툼이 잦아지고, 행정청 B의 처분이 끝없이 흔들려 결국 다수의 기대가 함께 무너진다는 걱정이다. 이 불안은 사라지지 않는다. 다만 원고적격은 그 자체로 처분의 존부를 결정하지 않고, 다툼을 시작할 자격의 문턱이므로 안정성 우려가 직접 상대방이 아니라는 사정만으로 자격을 거절하는 이유가 되지는 않는다.
합성 장면에서 확인할 수 있는 것은 A가 처분의 직접 상대방이 아니라는 점, B의 처분이 A의 자기 생활상 이익에 영향을 준다는 주장, 그리고 A가 다투려 한다는 사실뿐이다. 앞의 조건은 처분 상대방 밖의 보호 이익에 기초한 소송 자격을 인정할 수 있는지이고, 이는 근거 법률로 보호되는 직접적이고 구체적인 이익이 A에게 있는지에 달렸다. 그러나 어떤 보호 법규가 존재하는지, 그 법규의 보호 대상에 A가 드는지는 이 장면에서 정해지지 않았다. 따라서 연결이 확인되지 않은 지금 단계에서 A의 자격은 미확정으로 남는다.
이 절에서 허용되는 결론은 좁다. 원고적격은 처분 상대방인지가 아니라 그 취소를 구할 법률상 이익이 있는지에 따라 정해지며, 직접 상대방이 아니라는 이유만으로 자격을 부정해서는 안 된다. 허용되지 않는 결론은 이 문언만으로 A의 자격을 이미 확정했다고 말하는 것이다. 소송유형별 신청 요건의 충족 여부나 기록상의 확인 내용은 이 범위 밖에 있다.
2.10Fine Distinctions Within the Stage
처분의 직접 상대방이 아닌 주민 A는 자기 생활상 이익이 침해된다며 행정청 B의 처분을 다투려 할 때, 원고로 행정구제를 요구할 자격 안에서 다시 나누어 판정할 부분은 무엇인가. 이 물음은 자격의 존재 유무를 통째로 묻지 않고, 그 안에서 얼마만큼을 따로 가를 수 있는지를 묻는다. 처분 상대방 밖의 보호 이익에 기초한 소송 자격을 뜻하는 제삼자의 원고적격이라는 같은 용어가 이 물음의 틀을 이룬다.
이 물음에 해당하는 문언은 「(대법원 2019. 8. 30. 선고 2018두47189 판결)」의 판결요지 [1]에 있다. 여기서 결정의 기준이 되는 주체는 처분의 상대방인지 아닌지가 아니라 취소를 구할 법률상 이익을 가진 자이고, 가려야 할 행위는 그 처분에 대한 취소소송의 제기이며, 필요한 조건은 근거 법률로 보호되는 직접적이고 구체적인 이익의 침해이다.
이 문언은 앞 단계가 세운 구별과 이어진다. 취소를 구할 법률상 이익은 피해의 크기나 불만의 강도와 구별되며, 같은 판례는 간접적이거나 사실적·경제적 이해관계를 가지는 데 불과한 경우에는 법률상 이익에 포함되지 않는다고 밝힌다(「대법원 2019. 8. 30. 선고 2018두47189 판결」). 두 판단을 구별해야 하는 이유는 명확하다. 앞의 것은 보호 이익이 무엇인지를 정하고 뒤의 것은 그 이익을 무엇과 혼동하지 않을지를 정한다. 이 두 단계를 나누지 않으면, 큰 불만을 가졌다는 사정이 곧바로 법률상 이익으로 바뀌는 오류에 빠진다.
이 구별에 가장 강하게 붙는 반론은 행정의 안정성이다. 간접 이해관계자가 늘어나면 하나의 처분에 대해 다툴 사람이 그만큼 늘어나고, 행정청 B로서는 언제 어느 주민이 처분을 다시 문제 삼을지 예측하기 어려워지며, 처분에 기대어 이어진 생활 관계가 흔들릴 수 있다. 그러나 이 불이익을 들어도 결론은 흔들리지 않는다. 직접 상대방이 아니라는 이유만으로 원고적격을 부정할 수는 없고, 대신 보호 이익이 무엇인지 가려내는 작업이 그 자리를 대신한다.
이 장면에서 지금 다룰 사실은 두 가지이다. 처분의 직접 상대방이 아닌 주민 A가 자기 생활상 이익의 침해를 주장한다는 것, 그리고 그 상대가 행정청 B의 처분이라는 것. 이 사실만으로는 판정이 끝나지 않는다. 판정 기록에는 보호 법규, 처분의 영향, 신청자 지위, 그리고 효과 소멸 뒤에 회복할 이익이 들어가야 하고, 지금 장면에서는 그 내용이 비어 있다. 처분 효과가 끝나도 회복할 법률상 이익이 남으면 단순한 기간 경과만으로 소의 이익을 부정하지 않는다는 조건은, 기록에 남길 항목의 하나로만 참작할 수 있다.
따라서 이 자격 안에서 나눌 수 있는 부분은 조건에 따라 정해진다. 처분 취소·확인으로 회복할 법률상 보호 이익이 있고 소송유형별 신청 등 요건도 충족한 경우가 하나의 갈래이고, 일반적·간접적 공익 관심만 있어 개별적으로 보호되는 법률상 이익이 인정되지 않는 경우가 다른 갈래이며, 피해와 법규의 보호 대상 사이의 연결이 확인되지 않은 경우는 미확정으로 남는다. 이 세 갈래 밖에 단계를 새로 만들어서는 안 된다.
2.11Synthesis of Effectiveness, Blockage, and Undetermination
여기서는 제삼자의 원고적격을 둘러싼 실효·차단·미확정의 구별이 드러난다. 취소를 구할 법률상 이익을 피해의 크기나 불만의 강도와 구별해야 하는 까닭이 여기에 있다.
판결요지 [1]은 이 물음을 직접 다룬다. 대법원 2019. 8. 30. 선고 2018두47189 판결은 “행정처분에 대한 취소소송에서 원고적격은 해당 처분의 상대방인지 여부가 아니라 그 취소를 구할 법률상 이익이 있는지 여부에 따라 결정된다”고 말한다. 이 문언이 가리키는 주체는 취소소송의 원고가 되려는 사람이고, 판단 대상은 처분 상대방이라는 지위가 아니라 취소를 구할 법률상 이익이다. 대법원 2019. 8. 30. 선고 2018두47189 판결에 따르면 그러한 이익은 해당 처분의 근거 법률로 보호되는 직접적이고 구체적인 이익이며, 간접적이거나 사실적·경제적 이해관계는 포함되지 않는다.
이 문언과 이 절의 결론이 만나는 자리에서 두 판단 단계가 갈린다. 첫째, 회복할 법률상 보호 이익이 있고 소송유형별 신청 등 요건도 충족하면 자격은 열린다. 둘째, 일반적·간접적 공익 관심만 있고 개별적으로 보호되는 법률상 이익이 인정되지 않으면 막힌다. 이 구별은 보호 법규·처분의 영향·신청자 지위·효과 소멸 뒤 회복할 이익을 기록으로 살펴 판정된다. 앞 절의 결론에 더해, 직접 상대방인지 묻는 자리와 보호 이익이 있는지 묻는 자리를 나란히 두지 않는 이유가 바로 이 때문이다.
간접 이해관계자가 늘면 행정의 안정성이 약해진다는 반론이 가장 큰 부담을 건다. 다툼의 문이 넓어지면 같은 처분을 두고 이해관계가 얽힌 다수가 달려들 수 있고, 행정청으로서는 언제 확정되는지 가늠하기 어렵다는 불편이 남는다. 가장 넓게 퍼진 피해일수록 누구도 다투지 못하게 되는 결과가 올 수 있으므로, 보호 이익의 유무로 좁히되 상대방 지위로 막지는 않는다. 법적 통로가 열려 있다는 뜻이며, 실제 지급·인도·회수 성과가 보장된다는 말은 아니다.
합성 장면에서 주민 A는 처분의 직접 상대방이 아니면서도 자기 생활상 이익이 침해된다고 주장한다. 이 장면으로 확정되는 사실은 그 주장과 다툼의 방향뿐이며, A가 보호 법규에 따라 개별적으로 보호되는 이익을 가졌는지, 처분의 영향이 그 생활상 이익에 직접 닿는지는 미확인이다. 연결이 확인되지 않으면 판정은 미확정으로 남는다. 자료가 모자라는 상태를 곧바로 구제 불능으로 옮기지 않는 점도 같은 태도에서 나온다.
이 절이 허용하는 결론은 조건부 구별이다. 회복할 법률상 보호 이익과 소송유형별 신청 등 요건이 함께 갖추어져 자격이 열리고, 일반적·간접적 공익 관심에 그쳐 개별적 보호 이익이 없으면 차단되며, 피해와 법규의 보호 대상 사이의 연결이 확인되지 않으면 미확정으로 남는다. 다만 판결이유와 상세 사실은 읽은 근거 밖에 있어 실제 사건의 승패나 회수 결과까지 여기서 단정할 수 없다.
2.12Conclusion Carried Over to the Next Section
This account begins at the point where the conclusion of the preceding analytical stage comes down to a single sentence. The conclusion carried up to the preceding stage is that the legal interest sufficient to seek revocation must be distinguished from the magnitude of harm or the intensity of dissatisfaction. Bearing that distinction in mind, the question to be examined now is whether a person other than the addressee of the disposition is truly barred from bringing a lawsuit. The expression third-party standing to sue as plaintiff denotes litigation qualifications grounded in a protected interest beyond that of the addressee of the disposition. Yet whether the criterion for this qualification to arise lies in the magnitude of the benefit the individual actually obtains or in something else is something that needs to be confirmed from this point forward. Only after confirming it can it be said what this qualification hands over to the discussion that follows.
The source text to be confirmed is Summary of Decision [1] of the Supreme Court Decision 2018Du47189 decided August 30, 2019. This summary states that "in an action for revocation of an administrative disposition, standing to sue as plaintiff is determined not by whether the party is the addressee of the disposition in question but by whether that party has a legal interest in seeking its revocation." The sentence that follows is more directly on point for the present question. The same summary adds: "the legal interest referred to here means a direct and concrete interest protected by the statute on which the disposition is based, and does not extend to cases involving merely an indirect interest or a factual or economic stake." The actor addressed by this language is not the direct addressee of the disposition but a person other than that addressee. The conduct that person targets is the filing of an action for revocation of an administrative disposition, and the condition the language requires is that the person has a direct and concrete interest protected by the statute on which the disposition is based. Whether the interest is merely indirect or a factual or economic stake is a case that this language separately distinguishes.
The above language is now set against the present question. Resident A is not the direct addressee of the disposition, yet whether he has a legal interest in seeking the revocation of that disposition becomes the axis of standing to sue as plaintiff. This means that litigation qualifications do not vanish immediately merely because one is not the addressee of the disposition. Then why must the status of addressee and legal interest be kept separate at all? In the same vein as the earlier stage distinguished the magnitude of harm or the intensity of dissatisfaction from legal interest, a further distinction is needed here as well. Whether one is directly affected by the disposition is the starting point of standing to sue as plaintiff, not its end. The end is reached by asking which interest of the applicant the statute underlying that disposition protects. Thus the record of determination contains the protective statute, the effect of the disposition, the applicant's status, and the interest to be recovered after the effects cease. The items in this record are kinds of material for adjudication, not conditions whereby qualification arises or disappears through any single item alone.
This distinction draws an objection. The worry is that if legal interest is construed broadly and the threshold for standing to sue as plaintiff is lowered, even persons with merely an indirect stake in the disposition will be able to raise disputes against the administration, weakening the stability of administration. This worry grows the greater the distance becomes between the person who feels the harm and the persons the statute underlying the disposition intends to protect. On the other side, however, lies another loss. If the fact that a person's interest in daily life has been affected and the fact that the interest is legally protected are not joined to each other, a state arises in which no one can contest the lawfulness of the disposition. Embracing the inconvenience of both sides, the conclusion to be maintained is a single one.
The discussion returns to this scene. What is fixed in this scene is that Applicant A's status is not that of the addressee of the disposition, that the disposition he seeks to contest is a disposition of Administrative Agency B, and that he asserts his interest in daily life has been infringed. Placed against the foregoing criteria of adjudication, what remains is whether the matter corresponds to a direct and concrete interest protected by the statute underlying the disposition. From the scene alone it cannot be confirmed what the protective statute is, how far the effect of the disposition extends, or whether Applicant A's status falls within the scope of that protection. These items therefore remain undetermined. The fact that there is no material does not itself mean that relief is unavailable. Rather, what cannot be established from the scene must be left unestablished.
The boundary between the conclusion that can be stated in this section and the conclusion that cannot is set as follows. Standing to sue as plaintiff must not be denied solely on the ground that one is not the direct addressee of the disposition. Legal interest means a direct and concrete interest protected by the statute on which the disposition is based, and cases involving merely an indirect interest or a factual or economic stake fall outside that scope. The protective statute, the effect of the disposition, the applicant's status, and the interest to be recovered after the effects cease must be examined together, and if that connection is not confirmed, the matter remains undetermined. However, where there is only a general and indirect interest in the public good and no individually protected legal interest is recognized, the qualification to demand administrative relief as plaintiff is barred. With the standard of qualification for persons other than the addressee set in this way, one question remains.